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Guardianship
I disagree with Richard Rief, who questioned the rationale for young junior officers and enlisted personnel to have security clearances for highly classified materials. [“Letters: Unclear Clearances,” p. 6, June/July].
When I was a young captain with less than four years of Active duty and as a commander of a “geographically separated unit,” my commander/supervisor was stationed thousands of miles away. My senior NCO was a tech sergeant and the rest of my unit were Airmen with less than four years of Active duty. Our mission was to maintain, update and distribute over a million classified materials for fighter units in the Asian Pacific area. There were two other units that were similarly manned in the Pacific that supported fighter units during the Vietnam War.
When I was a captain and chief of intelligence targets at a fighter unit, I can attest to the fact that lieutenants and Airmen did the bulk of the work to assemble, produce, update, and maintain the intelligence and targeting materials to brief, train, and assist young pilots (mostly lieutenants) to plan for and accomplish conventional and nuclear missions.
The chief of intelligence was the only field grader with two captains, four lieutenants, two or three NCOs and a dozen Airmen, most of whom were just a year out of lntel tech school. There were at least six fighter units in the Pacific and Asia that were similarly manned by such young personnel.
With these two examples, I am saying that if you take away clearances from young officers and Airmen, who will accomplish the war planning, warfighting and war supporting missions of the Air Force?
The key to the success of having young personnel with SECRET clearances is an effective security program at the unit level. That requires a monthly security briefing and testing of all personnel of all security regulations, procedures, and techniques. Additionally, the first priority of the IG is to check on the security knowledge and practices of all unit personnel.
In my humble opinion, in the Air Guard situation, it appears there was a failure of leadership—supervisory and security training and procedures.
Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi,
USAF (Ret.)
Pearl City, Hawaii
I disagree with reader Richard Reif’s comments about “junior” Airmen and their access to Top Secret material.
I was assigned to the former USAF Security Service from 1963 to 1967 as an R20250, Radio Intercept Analyst.
As the holder of a TS/SCI clearance, I handled Secret and Top Secret Code Word material on a daily basis.
Most of the intercept and analysis was done by E-3 and E-4s, supervised by E-5’s. I know of only one case where CW material was compromised, and that was by an E-6 linguist. Sixty years later I have kept my silence.
Sgt. Paul Talbott,
USAF (Ret.)
Fayetteville, Ga.
Recruiting Crisis
In Tobias Naegele’s Editorial [“Why Recruiting is in Crisis,” April, p. 2] You mention important secular trends leading to lower recruiting numbers. However, I would share that more important ones were missed. I say this as someone who signed up during the Gulf War and joined the U.S. Army’s Old Guard between 1991-1994. I now have a son who is an Air Force Officer, which is why I joined AFA.
Those who join the military tend to be [dedicated to] God, family, and country. It is my perception that our modern leaders are attacking all three of these by undermining our traditional faith and pushing acceptance of alternative lifestyles. In addition, forcing our troops to take known unsafe vaccinations with horrendous side effects is also a deal-breaker for many.
What are we fighting for anymore? Freedom? Can we say this in an age where our federal agencies are conspiring with big business to suppress our freedoms of speech, religion, and bear arms? It is also extremely discouraging to see an uneven system of justice and how our disabled veterans are treated upon release—better than illegal immigrants.
If we only fight just wars, promote traditional American values, uphold the rule of law, and inspire patriotism, while taking care of those who are injured in the line of duty, you will see the numbers skyrocket. Our youth want to do something inspiring! It will take men and woman of courage to talk about this rather than hide behind statistics and safe politically correct answers.
Pfc. Rick Scheeler,
USA (Ret.)
West Chester, Ohio
Not A Good Fit
I enjoyed reading David Roza’s article [“Rescue in the High-End Fight,” May, p. 28], but felt it overlooked some significant options.
SAR [Search and Rescue], and especially CSAR [Combat SAR], has always been one of those “red-headed stepchildren” that never found a stable place in the USAF force structure. While CSAR is an important force protection and morale-boosting element of combat air forces, it doesn’t really belong under Air Combat Command, which primarily trains and equips combat aircrew, nor does it fit properly under Air Mobility Command, which primarily trains and equips airlift/refueler aircrews.
I think the answer to the CSAR problem is to return it to Air Force Special Operations Command, and buy additional CV-22Bs with some minor modifications for CSAR. Why? CSAR is very much like some aspects of Air Force Special Ops.
Given the value placed upon every Airman, CSAR is a high-risk, urgent, time-sensitive operation, the outcome of which will have significant political as well as military implications. CSAR, like [other] Air Force special operations, requires very intensive training for low-level, night/all-weather operations in contested airspace. CSAR aircraft need considerable unrefueled range/payload, good cruising speed, and VTOL/hover capability.
A variant of the CV-22 is considerably faster, longer-ranged, with higher payload, and generally more survivable than any H-60 variant, including the HH-60W.
Maj. Steven E. Daskal,
USAF (Ret.)
Virginia Beach, Va.
Top-Down Logic
In the May issue, the article about the B-52J [“World: It’s Official: Re-Engined B-52 Will be the B-52J,” p. 21] referred to the old radar as the “APG-166.” It is APQ-166. I would hope that as part of the upgrade process, they include an air-to-air function for the new radar, and the necessary interfaces to fire AAMs from the midwing pylons or perhaps shoulder mounts on the inboards similar to the F-15’s configuration.
Also valuable would be adding drogue refueling modules in the aft end of the external fuel tanks and an APU in the tail position formerly occupied by the gun. Perhaps a small AESA array (AN/APG-83?) and a 10-round launcher similar to the Navy’s RIM-116 Mk 49 with flame ducts to the side could also be mounted in the tail, launching folding fin versions of the AIM-9X out the rear against enemy fighters or even SAMs, which would have high infrared signatures due to their speed.
This might also lead to a compressed carriage version of the AIM-9 that could fit three or four instead of just one in the side bays of the F-35 and F-22. This way, these pilots playing foolish games during intercepts might be a little more wary when it’s a BUFF!
It may also be advantageous to adapt the AESA radar to take over the man-in-the-loop data link function of the AXQ-14 pod for certain EO GBUs or the AGM-84 SLAM. This would eliminate the necessity of carrying the reliability-challenged pod. Same goes for the AN/APG-82 upgrade in the F-15E.
I disagree with the removal of the EO sensor blisters, and I think mounting off-the-shelf sensor balls like the MX-15 or MX-20 would give better field of regard and also allow two-at-a-time laser designation along with better resolution optical performance from high altitude.
MSgt. Chris Dierkes,
106th RQW
Westhampton Beach, N.Y.
Sacrifice
Col. Phil Meilinger’s reading list [“Readings on Vietnam,” April, p. 54] is awesome and a worthy contribution to your magazine. He speaks as a preeminent military historian. However, one reader, Capt. Rollie Sterrett, (Letters, June/July) suggested one significant omission—any significant reading concerning the larger war that we fought in Southeast Asia, and in particular the mess that we had to deal with in Laos.
As a remedy, I suggest “The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War,” by Norman Hannah. Published in 1987, with a foreword by Col. Harry Summers. It clearly and decisively explains our failure to recognize the central role that Laos played in the conflict and in fact, enabled the North Vietnamese to win the war. It raises the pungent question—did we fight the right war but in the wrong country?
Col. Darrel Whitcomb,
USAFR (Ret.)
Colorado Springs, Colo.
Correction:
Print editions of the June/July issue USAF & USSF Almanac incorrectly listed the rank of Gen. Duke Z. Richardson, the commander of Air Force Materiel Command. The digital edition has been corrected.