The Air Force should buy 145 stealth B-21 bombers to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security since that program came into being, Gen. Anthony J. Cotton, head of U.S. Strategic Command, said at the McAleese and Associates annual Defense Programs Conference.
Cotton also said the Air Force should reassess the planned number of AGM-181 Long Range Stand-Off weapons and “pay attention” to the progress of the B-52J upgrade program. The Navy probably needs to up the number of ballistic missile subs it is planning for as well, he added.
“I, as a customer, want to see increased rates” of B-21 production, Cotton said, noting that the program’s low production rate was set “when the geopolitical environment was a little bit different than what we face today.”
While Cotton said the current plan of 100 B-21s should be the absolute minimum, he favors a figure of 145, which he said was the sense of Air Force Global Strike Command when he commanded that organization—his last assignment before taking the helm at STRATCOM.
This is not the first time Cotton has indicated he would like more Raiders. Last year, he told lawmakers that he would “love” to have more than 100 of the bombers, but he did not offer the 145 figure he presented now.
“That gives us 220 bombers when the BUFFs (B-52s) are included,” Cotton said at McAleese. Cotton also said he’s “really happy with the work Northrop Grumman is doing” with development and testing of the B-21.
He also praised Raytheon for its “amazing” work on the LRSO, the new nuclear missile the Air Force is working on to succeed the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile. Like the B-21, though, he suggested the program needs to grow.
“Again, we have to question now, what are we looking for, as far as capacity [and] sufficiency, there,” Cotton said, due to the evolving security situation, without specifying how many additional LRSOs he thinks should be acquired. He’s ready to “move out” with that program, he said.
The Air Force plans to buy 1,087 LRSOs, 67 of which would be used for development and test. That figure was set in the early 2010s and was largely based on the nuclear capabilities of Russia, before China embarked on an aggressive campaign of building strategic weapons and developing new hypersonic missiles. The LRSO is highly classified and is set to enter operational service in the late 2020s.
Cotton also said that the Navy’s new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine also likely needs to be built in greater numbers than were originally envisioned, for all the same reasons. The threat is “significantly greater” than it was in an earlier era, and “this is not ‘Cold War 2.0,’” he said.
While Cotton was pleased with progress on the B-21 and LRSO, he said he is “a little worried” about the B-52J upgrade, which comprises new engines, navigation, radars and other improvements that will extend that bomber’s service life to 2050 or beyond.
“It is my LRSO carrier,” he said, “so I need to make sure the Air Force is paying attention to that—to the acquisition strategy—and gets the B-52J out on the ramp as soon as we can.” He did not explain why he is concerned about the upgrade’s progress, or why the Air Force might not be giving the program the attention it deserves. The program has experienced some delays and cost increases as it has transitioned from a fast-tracked prototyping program to a major acquisition program.
The final leg of the new nuclear triad, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, is also struggling with delays and cost concerns. Cotton said that when he was at Global Strike Command, he predicted the program would be a “mega project,” with breathtaking scope and cost—including a new missile, launch silos, civil engineering, and upgraded command, control, and communication.
Still, “that doesn’t mean it’s a project that does not need to be accomplished,” given the rising importance of deterrence programs as the U.S. faces not one but two peer nuclear competitors, he said.
Noting that he will retire in the coming months, Cotton said he regrets that the U.S. did not tackle the various strategic modernization programs in a staged, sequential fashion—“one a decade”—instead of all at once. There “is no margin” left and no time left to get these projects accomplished, he said, warning that the zeal to contain costs should not result in the delay or cancelation of any of them.