NORAD Boss: Russian Bombers Flew Toward US, China May Follow

March 14, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

A pair of Russian strategic bombers flew near U.S. and Canadian airspace last week before turning back short of the countries’ Air Defense Identification Zone, the head of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command revealed March 14.

Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot also offered more details on his warning that Chinese warplanes could start flying near or in the U.S. ADIZ this year during an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

NORAD regularly detects Russian aircraft operating in the ADIZ—buffer regions that extend beyond territorial boundaries, covering airspace hundreds of miles from the coastline that nations use to track approaching aircraft. However, Guillot specified that this latest incident was different in that the bombers, Tu-95 “Bears,” were approaching from the northeast and not toward Alaska, where most such incidents occur.

“We’ve had some success working with NATO and European Command on the … northeast approach,” Guillot said. “Just last week, for the first time in over two years, the Russians sent two ‘Bear’ bombers down along that avenue through what we call the ‘GIUK gap,’ Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, approaching the Canadian and the United States Air Defense Identification Zones.”

The Tu-95 is a strategic, long-range bomber capable of carrying diverse weapons payloads. In February, NORAD reported three occasions of Russian aircraft flying in the Alaskan ADIZ without detailing the aircraft types, but Russian military officials disclosed that two of the four planes in one incident were Tu-95s, according to Reuters.

NORAD occasionally scrambles fighters to intercept those aircraft and escort them out of the ADIZ. In this latest incident, that wasn’t needed as U.S. and Canadian fighters were already in the air, Guillot said.

“We didn’t have to intercept them because we had aircraft flying to the point where we would intercept them before they crossed the identification zone, and the Russians turned around prior to reaching that zone,” Guillot said.

Guillot said NORAD kept its eyes on the bombers throughout their flight, crediting collaborative data sharing with allies via the U.S. European Command and NORTHCOM, particularly with Norway.

While the Russian bombers did not fly near Alaska this time, Guillot noted that China’s People’s Liberation Army may soon join Russia in approaching the ADIZ in that region.

“What I’ve seen is a willingness and a desire by the Chinese to act up there (the Artic),” Guillot said. “I expect to see air activity in the Alaska part of the Arctic as soon as this year, potentially. It’s a very big concern of mine.”

Guillot previously told the House Armed Services Committee that he was anticipating Chinese airplanes operating near the U.S. ADIZ sometime this year, but he did not specify what region.

Both Russia and China continue to present major threats to the U.S. homeland, Guillot said.

Russia has made substantial investments in advanced guided-missile submarines, hypersonic glide vehicles, ICBMs, and developmental systems like nuclear torpedoes and nuclear-powered cruise missiles, despite heavy losses of its ground forces in Ukraine.

“Russia retains the world’s largest stockpile of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, along with significant capacity to strike inside North America with air and sea launch precision conventional weapons,” Guillot said.

According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s senior analyst, China possesses the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal, which Guillot repeatedly described as “the most destabilizing weapon.”

Given the threat, Guillot emphasized the need for NORAD and NORTHCOM to have over-the-horizon radar and tracking systems to bridge awareness gaps.

“There are some gaps that will be manifesting in the near future,” Guillot said. “Those are currently scheduled to be addressed by the over-the-horizon radar and by the HBTSS, which is the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space system.”

Another area of concern Guillot highlighted was the need to train and equip backup forces to handle the Arctic’s extreme weather.

“The backfill forces are probably very well trained, but they’re not equipped and they haven’t trained in that environment,” Guillot said. “So, anything that we could do for the supplementing forces or the backfill forces that would go into the Arctic, training them in either in the Arctic environment or in something that would replicate that will be very important. Not only to give them those skills, but to identify what are the pieces of kit and equipment that we need to develop and issue, so they could seamlessly operate in that strategic environment.”

Air Force Plans $400 Million Upgrade to Airfield on Tiny Pacific Island of Yap

March 14, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept depends on the U.S. military gaining footholds and airstrips on dozens of small islands throughout the Pacific—places like Tinian, Palau, and Saipan, all fewer than 200 square miles each. All have hosted troops and received millions of dollars in investment in recent years.

Now, in its most fiscal 2025 budget request, the Air Force has laid out plans to upgrade facilities on the tiny island of Yap, which lies between Guam and Palau, some 1,000 miles southeast of China. Part of the Federated States of Micronesia, Yap comprises just 46 square miles, making it just two-thirds the size of Washington, D.C.

The Air Force wants to invest $400 million to extend its runway in both directions and expand facilities there, beginning with an initial investment of $96 million in 2025.

“An adequate and safe runway is required to accommodate larger aircraft to land and take-off in support of training, operations, and humanitarian mission at the Yap airport,” budget documents state. “The extended runway is required to enable increased capacity of the runway by allowing larger aircraft to land and take-off quickly and safely. This increased capacity supports provisions for a command-and-control capable infrastructure for multi-service forces in the rapid establishment of operational capabilities in various locations.”

If approved, construction would begin in August 2025. “An additional project is planned for this location that would add capacity for aircraft parking and improve access to the runway,” budget documents state.

Agile Combat Employment (ACE) would disperse small teams of Airmen from larger hubs to small, remote, and austere bases, where they would operate independently, making it harder for an adversary to target them. In the Indo-Pacific, where the idea originated, that meant scouring “every single piece of concrete” in the region to determine where troops can go, said Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach in 2020, when he commanded PACAF. Wilsbach recently moved to take over Air Combat Command.

As a result of that search, PACAF has worked to expand and modernize airstrips and runways throughout the region . Wilsbach noted last year that this sometimes means clearing away jungle that has overgrown World War II-era airfields.

Yap hosted a Japanese base during World War II. Its Yap International Airport is operational, but needs improvements to support military operations.

“Yap Airport is capable of being an important divert location for aircraft transiting the Indo-Pacific area,” Air Force budget documents state. “However, the runway is too short to adequately support military aircraft operations and lacks other critical required facilities such as aircraft arresting systems capabilities.”

PACAF has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to expand capacity on Guam and Tinian in the Marianas, and on Basa Air Base in the Philippines in recent years. The Army also helped build a basic airstrip on Palau in 2020.

Two F-22 Raptors assigned to the 525th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan, prepare for launch during Exercise Agile Reaper 23-1 at Tinian International Airport, Northern Mariana Islands, March 2, 2023. **U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Hailey Staker**

“Related to infrastructure, we have a number of major posture initiatives underway throughout the Pacific Islands,” said Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs Ely Ratner during a March 14 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Obviously in U.S. territories such as Guam and [the Northern Mariana Islands], in the [Compacts of Free Association] states, in the Marshall Islands and Palau, we have some major projects underway.”

The Compacts of Free Association states—the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau—have unique, close ties with the U.S. Its citizens can live and work in the U.S., join the U.S. military, and the states “are eligible for some U.S. federal programs and services,” according to the Congressional Research Service. They also play a key role in U.S. national security.

“From a national security perspective, the Pacific Islands form an essential part of a strategically vital region,” Ratner said. “The U.S. military’s access and posture in the Pacific Islands are crucial for our logistics, sustainment, and power projection throughout the region.”

The Pentagon exercised that during Cope North 23 last year, conducting operations on Guam, Yap, Tinian, Saipan, and Palau, as well as other islands like Rota and Iwo To.

Air Force, Space Force Budgets Fall Far Short of Need

March 14, 2024 | By Douglas A. Birkey

Last month, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall warned attendees at AFA’s Warfare Symposium: “We are out of time. We are out of time. We are out of time…For at least two decades, China has been building a military that is … purpose-built to deter and defeat the United States if we intervene in the western Pacific.”

Echoing similar themes, President Joe Biden began last week’s State of the Union address warning of the severe threats to America’s security abroad, quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the eve of World War II: “I address you at a moment unprecedented in the history of the Union.”

Kendall and Biden are correct. China, Russia, Iran, and others pose a dire threat to our nation. Yet the fiscal 2025 budget they submitted to Congress is woefully inadequate to confront those challenges—especially for the Department of the Air Force.

Not since the Cold War has America faced such constant and continuous challenges, in every region and every warfighting domain. China and Russia each bring peer capabilities and demonstrated hostile intent to their increasingly belligerent attitudes. Iran and North Korea pose narrower but still challenging threats, and both have shown increasing ability and willingness to align with Russia and China when it suits their purposes. Both seek to undermine U.S. and allied interests wherever and whenever they can—especially Iran, which sponsors numerous jihadist terror organizations that threaten U.S. and allied interests, especially in the Middle East.

Modern-day threats are not limited to ground wars and coastal skirmishes. Drone and missile threats challenge air defenses, cyber threats touch every aspect of military and civil life, space threats are on a steep ascent.

The U.S. has faced elements of this threat spectrum before, but never have we faced so many concurrent dangers across such a broad range. Taking risk in one to invest in another is increasingly impossible given the challenges in play.

Against this backdrop, the Department of the Air Force is unique. Its capabilities—airpower and spacepower—are essential to counter every single one of these threats. Blue water navies are of little use in continental Europe and tanks will not fare well in the oceans of the Pacific. Airpower and spacepower are different. They deliver crucial capability and effects across the globe—and beyond. They do so both as supporting and supported components for joint force operations. Simply stated, you cannot have joint operations without air and space. They are the glue that enable joint warfare and provide the decisive edge for the U.S. in any peer fight.

Unfortunately, over the past three decades, the Pentagon has sacrificed modernization of our air and space assets, using those accounts as billpayers—first as part of a post-Cold War peace dividend, then to fund combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. From 2002 to 2021 alone, the Pentagon spent $1.3 trillion more on the Army than it did on the Air Force. Over that same period, our nation also spent $914 billion more on the Navy.

Underfunding our Air Force exacted a steep price. So many planned modernization efforts were cancelled, curtailed, and deferred that today’s U.S. Air Force is the oldest and smallest in its entire history. Now the bill is due and mounting.

The Air Force can’t buy enough aircraft fast enough. Aging fleets like the E-3 AWACS early warning aircraft, B-1 bomber, F-15C/D fighter, T-38 trainer are all dramatically beyond their anticipated lifespans. So too are older-model F-16 fighters, MH-60 and UH-1 helicopters, and KC-135 tankers.

The Minuteman III ICBM enterprise is now a half-century old, reliant on outdated technology, and in dire need of replacement. Even “new” capabilities like the C-17 are aged, having achieved initial operational capability over 30 years ago. A persistent 2,000-pilot shortfall cripples much of the service, with the shortage of experienced pilots making it harder to season junior ones. Readiness accounts—spare parts, flying hours, aircraft mission-capable rates—are all well below even the hollow-force years of the 1970s.

Space, meanwhile, is undergoing a radical evolution. Adversaries are moving aggressively to contest the domain, putting the Space Force behind in developing the resiliency to operate through attacks on its satellites and ground stations. China and Russia are also looking past standard earth orbits and are increasingly seeking to project military power out to the moon, making cislunar space the next region to contest standards and norms.

The official party for the U.S. Space Forces Europe & Africa activation ceremony stand at attention during the USSPACEFOREUR-AF activation and assumption of command, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Dec. 8, 2023. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Edgar Grimaldo

Space is crucial to the American way of war, and without it the entire joint enterprise crumbles. Yet for fiscal 2025, the administration is incongruously proposing to cut the Space Force’s budget by 2 percent.

Meanwhile, the Air Force budget submission seeks Congress’ permision to retire 250 aircraft, while acquiring just 91—a capacity death spiral at odds with the growing demands for more more, not less airpower from virtually every combatant commander.

The cash crunch is so bad the Air Force had to cut orders for new fighters in the fiscal 2025 budget, cutting both the F-35 and F-15EX, even as older fighters retire without direct backfill. With a shrinking and aging bomber force—the youngest B-52 is 63 years old—the Air Force should be making forward-leaning investment to more rapidly build new B-21s later this decade. Yet no such funding was included.

Money to boost readiness is likewise too thin, especially to improve mission capability rates and to reverse the pilot shortfall.

This is obviously not what Department of the Air Force leaders wanted. Unfortunately, 2024’s Fiscal Responsibility Act stipulated untenable defense spending caps. Further tradeoffs within the Department of Defense’s topline failed to happen at the scale needed. To that end, the Army and Navy are continuing to pursue long-range surface-to-surface missiles reported to cost over $50M per shot regardless of affordability or practicality. Likewise, the Army’s pursuit of an airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft that replicates capabilities already resident in the Space Force and that would not survive in a contested environment.

It is not that the effects delivered by such systems aren’t important; they are. But they can be delivered more effectively and efficiently through alternate means. Given the fiscal pressures in play, the Pentagon must apply a cost-per-effect approach to such decisions and fully implement actual joint collaboration, not just talk about it in speeches.

The defense budget is now in the hands of Congress. Members should note that China’s defense budget increased 7.2 percent this year, while Russia shows no signs of backing off its fight in Ukraine. It is vastly outpacing the Western alliance in artillery production at a time when the U.S. and its allies are failing to back their rhetoric about boosting production capacity without the necessary means. Meanwhile, rogue actors like the Houthis stress our forces—highlighting capability gaps and challenging our ability to defend our forces and our allies.

If the Houthis stress our forces, just imagine what advanced threats might look like against a peer foe in the Pacific. We lack the means to deal with them effectively and sustainably.

Secretary Kendall and President Biden are right to signal the severity of the challenges facing the U.S. today. Now Congress must better align the ends, ways, and means to counter those challenges.

Some will undoubtedly question the price of that investment. They must likewise consider the cost of the alternative. When a deterrent is no longer credible and global tensions escalate to war, the costs go skyward. Most importantly, the price too often translate to lives lost. The price of peace demands we invest in a strong defense today—most especially in airpower and spacepower.

Douglas A. Birkey is Executive Director of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

SDA Plans $25.5 Billion in Spending Over the Next Five Years

March 13, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Development Agency plans to spend roughly $25.5 billion from 2025 through the end of the decade building out its massive constellation of low-Earth orbit satellites, budget documents show.

The Space Force unveiled its fiscal 2025 budget request on March 11, with the service’s $29.4 billion request marking its first-ever year-over-year cut. SDA, the agency at the forefront of revolutionizing space acquisition and driving the Space Force toward launching smaller satellites in larger numbers, similarly saw a decline in spending, from 2024’s total of $4.7 billion to $4.2 billion.

After that, however, budget documents project SDA’s funding rebounding quickly and reaching $6 billion by fiscal 2027, followed by more than $5 billion in both 2028 and 2029.

SDA Projected Budget

SEGMENT	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	TOTAL (continuing)
Launch	$357.18	$457.94	$1,235.12	$827.56	$396.24	$3,274.04
Transport	$2,126.85	$2,277.60	$2,252.88	$2,182.23	$2,366.69	$11,206.25
Tracking	$1,730.82	$1,887.81	$2,553.74	$2,066.04	$2,788.69	$11,027.11
TOTAL	$4,214.85	$4,623.35	$6,041.74	$5,075.83	$5,551.63	$25,507.39

in millions

Right now, SDA has 27 satellites in orbit as part of what it calls Tranche 0 of its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. The PWSA has two “layers,” one for missile warning/missile tracking and one for data transport and communications.

By the end of fiscal 2029, SDA plans to be in the midst of Tranche 3 of the PWSA, with more than 450 satellites launched and future tranches already contracted out. The goal is to create a constellation of satellites that form a mesh network in low-Earth orbit, connecting sensors and shooters around the globe and helping to detect and track novel missile threats like hypersonic weapons while decreasing the efficacy of an adversary’s attempt to shoot down a U.S. spacecraft.

To get there, SDA is buying batches of satellites on fixed-price contracts and looking to launch within three years. Director Derek M. Tournear has stated he wants to keep the cost per satellite down, relying on technology advancing and getting cheaper.

However, increasing the number of satellites per tranche will require more funds. Tranche 0 is meant for “warfighter immersion,” to demonstrate the constellation’s capabilities. Tranche 1 will provide regional coverage, and Tranche 2 will provide full global coverage.

A major portion of SDA’s planned budget is its missile warning/missile tracking satellite program. In fiscal 2025, it is asking for $1.73 billion to:

Prepare Tranche 1 for launch and conduct early on-orbit operations

Continue work on Tranche 2 ahead of planned launches in April 2027

Start preliminary work on Tranche 3

Support demonstrations and work on ground integration

Conduct other testing and work on “fire control” satellites and payloads

The missile warning/missile tracking budget is projected to grow modestly in 2026 before jumping to $2.55 billion in 2027, around the time that Tranche 4 contracts might start being awarded.

SDA is not alone in planning to expand its missile warning/missile tracking efforts. Space Systems Command, the Space Force’s main acquisition arm, is working on its own constellation for medium-Earth orbit, and officials have said the two organizations are collaborating on their efforts.

The SSC plan is slightly behind SDA—its first batch of satellites (dubbed Epoch 1) will launch in fiscal 2027. That effort is projected to get $846 million in fiscal 2025, surpassing $1 billion by 2027.

Another major part of SDA’s surge in funding for 2027 is the jump in the number of launches the agency wants to buy that year. Right now, the plan is to purchase 12 launches for $1.24 billion in 2027, compared to four for $357 million in fiscal 2025.

Space launches are often “bought” months or even years before the actual launch. Budget documents note that SDA’s 2025 launch funding is for “delivery of Tranche 2 [satellites],” which won’t actually start going into orbit until 2026. Therefore the 2027 launch funding will likely be for Tranche 3 or beyond.

Finally, SDA’s funding for its Transport Layer of satellites is split between two programs, but the combined 2025 value is $2.13 billion. Like the Tracking Layer, these funds will support work across Tranches 0-3.

Study Shows Higher Rates of Some Cancers in ICBM Personnel

March 13, 2024 | By Chris Gordon

The Air Force found increased rates of breast and prostate cancers in service members who worked on nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles compared to the general population, according to a preliminary study of data publicly released on March 13.

“What we don’t know is whether these rates specifically for breast and prostate are due to increased screening or access to care or whether these are due to unique military exposures,” Col. Tory Woodard, a doctor and the head of U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM), said in remarks at a Feb. 23 town hall, according to Air Force Global Strike Command, which maintains the nation’s 400-plus land-based strategic missiles.

The Air Force is in the midst of a wide-ranging Missile Community Cancer Study, sparked by renewed concerns that surfaced in early 2023 of possible increased cases of non-Hodgkin Lymphoma, a blood cancer, at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. The service previously dismissed those concerns in 2001 and 2005 reviews.

The newly analyzed data does not show increased rates of non-Hodgkin lymphoma, the specific cancer that sparked the new study.

Missileers and other personnel working on decades-old Minuteman III missiles and older systems have long had health concerns related to their service, which often require them to work in underground bunkers for 24-48 hours at a time. Security personnel, maintainers, and other individuals also worked at ICBM sites.

Air Force officials cautioned that the information was preliminary and drawn from a limited dataset of around 2 million military personnel, with a focus on 84,000 “missile community members” who were around ICBM facilities, including 8,000 missileers.

The data only includes Department of Defense electronic medical records from 2001-2021, capturing those who were diagnosed with cancer through the Military Health System (MHS), including through the Tricare health insurance program. Cases outside the Military Health System were not included in the analysis.

For the initial phase, the military was “unable to determine cancer cases diagnosed prior to 2001 or outside of the MHS/TRICARE,” Woodard wrote in a March 6 memo. The Air Force anticipates the initial data makes up fewer than 25 percent of the total cancer cases that make be captured during the study.

“What is important to understand is that the epidemiology study is still nascent but progressing to eventually deliver responsible data to draw conclusions from at the end of the study,” an AFGSC spokesperson said.

The results were presented during the town hall held by Air Force Global Strike Command boss Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere, along with medical experts from USAFSAM and AFGSC. USAFSAM is leading the Missile Community Cancer Study, which has been ongoing for the past year.

Capt. Isabella Muffoletto, U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine bioenvironmental engineer, labels different samples at L-01 missile alert facility, or MAF, near Stoneham, Colorado, July 13, 2023. U.S. Air Force photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.

Comparisons of cancer rates between the ICBM community and the general population are “difficult at this time due to incomplete case counts within this data set,” read a slide presented during the town hall.

Subsequent phases of the study promise to include data from the Veterans Administration’s cancer registry dating back to 1976, death certificates dating back to 1979, DOD cancer registry data dating back to 1986, and those diagnosed in the VA system dating back to 1991, along with data from state and other cancer registries.

That data is expected to come this summer, according to the Air Force. That review will also include data on personnel from bases that no longer have an active ICBM mission, the service says. The study team is also considering conducting a study of reproductive health in the missile community.

“We have five other data sets to study, and each additional data set will build our knowledge base and help to shape the larger picture,” Woodard said. “That picture will not be complete until we complete all phases of this Epidemiology Review.”

Breast and prostate cancers have long been a concern for service members in all fields and services, according to a 2023 study published in the American Cancer Society’s medical journal. The study’s authors analyzed cancer data for service members and found “higher rates of prostate and breast cancers, particularly in 40- to 59-year-olds” compared to the general population. However, the study authors did not say military service was the definitive cause of the cancers and “may result from greater cancer screening utilization or cumulative military exposures.”

Doctors from USAFSAM also led a study of Air Force pilots published in 2021 that found that “compared with the U.S. population, male fighter aviators were more likely to develop and die from melanoma skin cancer, prostate cancer, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma.”

The Missile Community Cancer Study is also conducting environmental sampling of ICBM facilities. All three active ICBM bases—Malmstrom, F.E. Warren, and Minot air force bases, with Minuteman III fields spread out over Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, Colorado, and Nebraska—show “air, water, & soil samples below acceptable regulatory levels for any chemicals or hazards,” according to a slide presented at the town hall.

Toxic chemicals known as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) were found in some isolated places at those bases, but AFGSC says those facilities are in the process of being cleaned and made safe or have already reopened. The production of PCBs were banned in the United States in 1979, and Air Force officials said the removal process began in the 1980s.

It is unclear how long and at what level the PCBs were present before the current mitigation efforts. The study team recently finished environmental sampling at Vandenberg Space Force Base, the Minuteman III test launch facility, but the Air Force says it has not yet received results.

“There remains a significant level of interest and engagement,” Bussiere said at the town hall. “I ask that you be persistent in highlighting areas that need to be highlighted to help us to get things right, but that you also be patient because there is still a lot to be done.”

Air Force Programs Boss: No Need to Decide on More than 100 B-21s for at Least a Decade

March 13, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

While former generals, airpower experts, and even the head of U.S. Strategic Command have all endorsed the idea of the service buying more than 100 B-21 bombers, the Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs suggested a formal decision on that front isn’t coming anytime soon.

“The decision point, with lead time accounted for, to go past 100 is not until the mid to late ’30s,” Lt. Gen. Richard G. Moore Jr. told lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee on March 12. “So the commitment right now is to 100 aircraft. That takes us for procurement into the late ’30s. The decision whether or not to go past that may very well not be based on China, because it will be made at a time when we don’t foresee the security environment and we don’t need to.”

Lt. Gen. Richard G. Moore Jr., Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs testifies before House Armed Services Committee March 12. Screenshot

For years now, the Air Force has planned on buying a minimum of 100 B-21s to replace its B-1 Lancers and B-2 Spirits. All the while, multiple heads of Air Force Global Strike Command and other observers have suggested the service really needs more of the stealth bombers to effectively counter the likes of China.

Most recently, STRATCOM boss Gen. Anthony J. Cotton told lawmakers Feb. 29 that the bomber’s low production rate was “the only thing that I wish we could do a little quicker.”

“The fact that that is an incredible sixth-generation platform, all indications are that the weapons system is moving along at a great pace as far as delivery,” Cotton added. “The ability for production and the number of production, as a warfighter, obviously, I would love more.”

There is one B-21 currently in flight testing that the Air Force has acknowledged, and at least five aircraft in some stage of construction. At least five of the six B-21s will be dedicated to test activities, but after developmental and operational testing is complete, those aircraft will have their test instrumentation removed and be modified into operational bombers.

Getting from six to 100 aircraft by 2039 will require between six or seven bombers to be built per year.

The exact rate per year, however, is unclear—much about the B-21 program is shrouded in secrecy, and the Air Force has not disclosed the exact number of aircraft included in the five lots throughout the Low-Rate Initial Production phase, or how long that phase will last. The Congressional Research Service estimated in 2021 that there will be 21 aircraft across those five lots.

Manufacturer Northrop Grumman received its first LRIP contract after the B-21 had its first flight in November from Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif. That bomber has moved to Edwards Air Force Base for more flight testing.

Moore said it is premature for the Air Force to make a call on whether it needs to acquire more than 100 airframes at this juncture.

“This is not a decision that needs to be made now, but it is one that we need to continue to think about,” Moore noted. “Gen. Cotton has probably the best insight of anybody on this and certainly on active duty he has the most experience both in depth and breadth. So his counsel is well taken.”

While the B-21 ramps up, Chinese military officials disclosed in March 11 interview with a Chinese state-owned newspaper that the new Xi’an H-20 bomber could soon be revealed to the public. While details about the aircraft’s specifications and procurement numbers are scarce, reports have compared the Chinese bomber to the U.S. Air Force’s B-2 and the incoming B-21.

Air Force Delays T-7 IOC Another Year, Slashes 2025 Production

March 13, 2024 | By David Roza

The Air Force is poised to start buying production T-7A trainer jets in fiscal 2025, but at half the rate previously planned. Budget documents also revealed that the service is pushing back planned Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from 2027 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2028. IOC is generally when end users can start operating and maintaining new equipment.

The Air Force first awarded Boeing a contract for the T-7 in 2018 and rolled it out with fanfare in 2022. Air Force and Boeing officials hailed it as as a pathfinder for digital design. But issues with wing rock, ejection seats, faulty parts that have slowed the aircraft’s progress.

The original IOC for the T-7, which is supposed to replace the Air Force’s deteriorating fleet of aging T-38s, was 2024. Technical issues have delayed different milestones several times now.

In its fiscal 2024 budget proposal, the Air Force said its plan was to buy 14 jets in fiscal year 2025, on the way to a total buy of 351 jets. In its 2025 request, though, the service proposed buying seven jets in 2025, and a total buy of 346. The cut corresponds to a slight delay in the planned Milestone C decision for the program—which clears it to enter low-rate initial production—from the second quarter of 2025 to the third quarter.

Production is now slated to ramp up to 23 aircraft each in 2026 and 2027, followed by 36 apiece in 2028 and 2029.

The slight dip in total inventory corresponds with a slightly lower cost-per-aircraft. The fiscal 2024 estimate was $21.78 million per aircraft, while the fiscal 2025 estimate is $19.72 million per aircraft.

However, the delay in IOC is likely to slow Air Force efforts to address its pilot shortage, which has persisted for years.

Part of the problem, officials have said, is the aging T-38 fleet, which Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said is slowing the service’s pilot production pipeline.

“The problem is the pipeline to produce,” he said March 7 at the McAleese defense programs conference. “And the biggest impediment in that is the T-38, and its reliability.” The T-38 is old, its engines are getting hard to repair, and the Air Force is “waiting for the T-7 to come online and replace it.”

In August 2023, 19th Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Clark Quinn said more than 900 Airmen were stuck waiting to enter the pilot training pipeline. More than 200 had been waiting more than nine months for training cockpits to become available.

“The mission capable rates of the T-38 are not good,” Quinn said, noting that engine problems have forced the 19th Air Force to limit flying hours—and, in turn, prevented it from reaching its goal of producing 1,500 pilots per year.

The Air Force currently owns at least two prototype T-7s, one of which is undergoing developmental flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., while the other just wrapped up climate testing at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

Boeing and Air Force officials told reporters in September that another T-7 will join the first at Edwards, while a fourth and fifth were due later in 2023. A Boeing spokesperson confirmed that a third T-7 prototype was delivered at the end of 2023, and the fourth and fifth will be delivered “very soon.”

KC-46’s New Remote Vision System Likely Delayed Until 2026

March 13, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The KC-46’s improved Remote Vision System, dubbed RVS 2.0, is “likely” to be delayed into 2026, the Air Force’s top acquisition executive said March 12.

Air Force assistant secretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics Andrew P. Hunter also said the service is poised for progress on two other refueling tanker projects: the KC-135 replacement, previously called the bridge tanker or “KC-Y,” and the Next-Generation Aerial refueling System, or NGAS.

On KC-46, Hunter cited “schedule pressure” and “the FAA airworthiness certification process” as factors weighing on the Boeing tanker.

Rep. Donald Norcross (D-N.J.) asked Hunter as he testified March 12 if the timeline for RVS 2.0 was still on track—the latest projection was to start fielding in October 2025.

Hunter hedged: “I cannot guarantee you that we would be in a position to field in ’25,” he said, referring to the revised delivery date set in the fall of 2022. “Maybe ’26. That is actually likely.” Hunter promised to get back to the lawmaker “with a more detailed timeline for where we see the state of play of fielding.”

An Air Force spokeswoman declined to offer further detail and Boeing did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

The KC-46’s Remote Vision System is necessary because in this tanker, the boom operator cannot look directly out the back, as in conventional tankers. Instead, the operator views the connection on a computer screen. But the original RVS was compromised in certain lighting situations, causing operators to bang the rigid, telescoping refueling probe into other aircraft while trying to connect. The black-and-white display washes out or blacks out in direct sunlight, and operators struggled with depth perception. The issue was particularly problematic for low-observable aircraft, such as the F-35 and F-22, because accidental damage from the probe could compromise the fighters’ radar-absorbing properties.

Boeing and the Air Force struck a deal to fix the problem in 2020, and in December 2022 Boeing offered a sneak peak of RVS 2.0’s upgraded cameras and color display to reporters. But progress has been slower than expected, apparently, and while the Air Force and Boeing have “made a ton of progress” toward gaining FAA certification, there is still more work to do, Hunter said.

Air Force and Boeing leaders have called RVS 2.0 a “quantum leap” forward in capability, including potential automation of the process, Hunter said.

“I actually recently had the opportunity to fly on a KC-46 and observe how the crew operates, both in the flying of the aircraft and also with the boom operations,” he said. “And I think there is a substantial opportunity to leverage autonomy in both areas of the airplane. Interestingly enough, one of my takeaways was that the RVS 2.0 is a key enabler for potentially a greater degree of autonomy in the refueling operation itself and the boom operations because the greater clarity of the camera system will support a higher degree of high-fidelity automation in that process.”

NGAS and KC-135 Recap

The Air Force, meanwhile, continues to pursue two other refueling tanker programs. The KC-135 Recapitalization Program seeks to ensure “continuous tanker recapitalization” between the end of KC-46 procurement and the beginning of the next-generation NGAS program.

He said the Air Force’s request for information on an interim tanker program yielded responses from Boeing and Airbus, and the service is now crafting its acquisition strategy for those tankers. The Air Force asked for $13.7 million for this effort in fiscal 2025, when it anticipates issuing a request for proposals. Spending would ramp up to $188.6 million in 2026 and $243.7 million in 2027 under present plans.

Exactly how many tankers that might buy is still unclear—“the total number of Tanker Recap aircraft procured will be influenced by the FY 2024 NGAS Analysis of Alternatives and dependent on NGAS’s first delivery,” budget documents state.

The 2025 budget includes $7 million “to complete the AOA, do some of the early stage modeling and simulation work that will support the AOA and also stand up the future tanker program office,” Hunter said. That office “will manage both NGAS and the Tanker Recapitalization effort,” he added.

Hunter declined to offer details on NGAS, besides acknowledging that stealth is one consideration for the aircraft. “I think it’s a huge element of the analysis of alternatives, to look at, what are the different technologies that can help us do refueling in a contested environment,” he said. “And what are the different ways to solve that very challenging operational problem? …. We’re leveraging the expertise of our force, we’re leveraging modeling and simulation to help us think through what might work to help us enable that.”

Hunter also said NGAS will draw upon the Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter program. “These programs are closely related, both in their concept—how they operate within the force design—and also, I’m going to be pleased to tell you, in the way that they’re functioning and the way that they’re working together,” Hunter said.

NGAD, the planned sixth-generation fighter, will assuredly be stealthy. Hunter said NGAS will also draw upon the Air Force’s acquisition experience with NGAD. It will “leverage expertise from the agile development office to help them get started and take what I call the next-gen approach to our acquisition programs,” Hunter said. “We have large vendor pools, continuous competition, and iterations of capability that we can deploy in a relatively good timeframe.”

Air Force Looks to Reusable Hypersonics as ARRW Ends and HACM Gears Up for Testing

March 13, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force Research Laboratory is shifting its hypersonics efforts away from missiles and toward reusable platforms optimized for reconnaissance and strike, Lt. Gen. Dale White, USAF’s uniformed deputy to the service acquisition executive, told the House Armed Service Committee on March 12.

White also said the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), built by Lockheed Martin, will soon conclude testing with no follow-on production currently requested, and that the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), to be built by Raytheon, will enter flight tests next year.

“The focus of the Air Force Research Laboratory Technology development efforts will shift to less-mature technologies that are needed to develop future reusable hypersonic platforms, which will provide multimission intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as strike capabilities,” White said at a hearing on the Defense Department’s various hypersonic weapon efforts. Due to classification, the hearing adjourned to resume in a classified facility.

White gave no timetable for development of a reusable hypersonic platform, but AFRL officials have previously forecast that such technologies could be available for operational use in the early 2030s.

The AFRL is coming off a run of “many enduring contributions to the field of hypersonics,” with “significant successes with their recently-completed High-Speed Strike Weapon technology maturation program,” White said.

The HSSW “transitioned over 30 technologies to various DOD hypersonic programs ranging from advanced materials to propulsion technologies to vehicle designs,” White reported.

“Based on these successes, we look forward to the launch of [technology maturation] to further develop and transition technologies for next-generation hypersonic capabilities in fiscal year 2025.”

It wasn’t clear if White was referring to the HACM, but he said testing of the air-breathing HACM will take place in 2025.

“The Air Force awarded the HACM contract in September of 2022 and is developing the weapon using the middle-tier acquisition rapid prototyping authority,” White said. “We are working to mature HACM to critical design, along with other development activities to enable the flight test activities in fiscal year 2025.”

These efforts “to develop and field an operational hypersonic air-launched weapon will enable us to hold high-value, time-sensitive targets at risk in contested environments from standoff distances,” White said. “A hypersonic weapon, in concert with a wider weapons force mix, is key to providing a war-winning Air Force.”

The ARRW is “undergoing the final test of the all-up round with a planned test program completion by the end of second quarter fiscal year 2024,” White added.

Images of an all-up ARRW missile at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, were published last week by the Air Force, which said B-52 flight and ground crews were receiving “familiarization training” with the weapon there. Notices to Airmen and the positioning of test apparatus in the vicinity of the Kwajalein test area suggested that the final test flight of the ARRW in the Pacific was imminent.

“This test will launch a full prototype of the operational hypersonic missile and is focused on the ARRW’s end-to-end performance,” White told lawmakers.

The Air Force has been cagey about what it plans to do next with ARRW. Although service acquisition executive Andrew Hunter said definitively last year that ARRW would not be pursued into production after the test effort concludes, service officials briefing on the fiscal 2025 budget this week have said the Air Force will look at the results of the final test and then decide what to do.

“Future ARRW decisions are pending final analysis of all flight test data,” White said in the hearing.

“We do not have the ARRW in the ‘25 budget book,” he added. “However, we are continuing to analyze the test data that we have from that that capability.” He also said the Air Force is “pleased to report that the ARRW rapid prototyping program has been a categorical success to date,” despite mixed results from its flight test program, which resulted in several test failures. The most recent tests have been reported as successes.

Air Force budget documents indicate the service wants to invest $517 million in research, development, test, and evaluation for HACM in fiscal 2025, with planned investment of more than $1 billion through 2029. However, its funding profile declines every year through ’29, which is described as the development completion date.

An artist’s rendering of the HACM missile. Image courtesy of RTX

The HACM funding profile in the RDT&E accounts calls for:

2025: $516.97 million

2026: $448.55 million

2027: $274.10 million

2028: $200.83 million

2029: $202.59 million

However, there is no money to procure HACM in Air Force budget documents, even though a typical program would already be laying in long-lead money for procurement. The Air Force spent $387.3 million on HACM in fiscal 2023 and requested $381.5 million for it in fiscal 2024.

The Air Force was not immediately able to comment on planned HACM procurement funding.