Advancing in Space, China Poses Growing Threat, USSF Leaders Warn

March 28, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The People’s Republic of China’s rapid military advances in space mean the People’s Liberation Army no longer merely threatens American assets in orbit, but now has the space-based sensing and targeting capabilities to better enable its joint forces to threaten the U.S. on Earth, Space Force leaders warned March 27.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman highlighted the risks in the keynote address at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Stutdies’ Spacepower Security Forum in Arlington, Va., where he presented a four-quadrant chart illustrating the competition between U.S. “blue” and Chinese “red” space capability:

In the top left, U.S. forces dominate, Saltzman said: “This is where we lived for a significant period of time. It’s where we want to be, holding space superiority.”

In the lower left, neither side is effective in space. In that scenario, Saltzman said China is advantaged, because the U.S. joint force is so reliant on space.

In the lower right, China achieves space superiority over the U.S., the worst possible outcome for the U.S.

In the upper right. This signals “a space domain where both blue and red can use space capabilities in the way they want, and I would also argue that this favors the PRC again, because of the localities of the Western Pacific,” Saltzman noted.

“Anything other than the top left is very high risk for the joint force and our ability to project power,” Saltzman warned. And right now, “I think we are in the upper right quadrant.”

Both Russia and China have demonstrated the ability to attack satellites with kinetic and nonkinetic means. But Saltzman and deputy chief of space operations for intelligence Maj. Gen. Gregory J. Gagnon said China has moved beyond simply countering U.S. advantages in space.

“It’s not commonly understood, but since the [People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force] in China stood up in December of 2015, they have increased their on-orbit assets by 500 percent,” Gagnon said. “It’s not commonly understood that over the last few years they placed over 200 satellites in orbit each year. And over half of those satellites are for sensing, designed to watch U.S. forces, Japanese forces, Australian forces that are operating in the western Pacific. … So they have profoundly changed not just the threats in space, but the threat from space.”

Saltzman said China’s growing fleet of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites is enabling their “kill webs,” just as the Pentagon is trying to interconnect its sensors and shooters through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

“It has become increasingly apparent over the past decade that the Russians and the PRC are coupling space-based ISR with satellite-aided, precision-guided munitions that can receive SATCOM-updated targeting,” Saltzman said. “Specifically the PRC has more than 470 ISR satellites that are feeding a robust sensor-shooter kill web. … This new sensor shooter kill web creates unacceptable risk to our forward-deployed force. This is something that most of us are just not used to thinking about.”

Kelly D. Hammett, director of the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, noted that while the U.S. private sector has increased the frequency of launches and the number of civilian-owned and operated satellites in orbit, the government is still only in the nascent stage of its long-term program to build a proliferated warfighter architecture. That stands in contrast to the work China has been doing.

“We have a lot of irons in the fire,” Hammett said. “We’re building new capabilities, trying new things, trying to get to assets on range that the operators can test and train against. It’s not the force structure overall that we’re going to need to be able to compete and deter and potentially fight and win against the vast array of assets the Chinese are putting on orbit. There are 400 ISR birds, they’re launching 100 satellites a year, and most of them are very insidious. Well over half of them are space warfighting satellites. They’re not largely commercial.”

Saltzman says the U.S. must counter that threat through “responsible counterspace campaigning,” with weapons and methods that hold Chinese satellites at risk while avoiding destructive acts that would create orbital debris and befoul the domain.

What that means is still not fully clear. Retired Gen. Kevin Chilton, Explorer Chair for the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence, engaged Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb on the issue of balancing offensive and defensive capabilities in space, and also on how much of that should be brought out into the open. Plumb argued the value of strategic ambiguity, acknowledging some level of capability without offering enough that a rival could “engineer against it.”

A fully functional Space Force is a military branch, and must be capable of exerting military power in its domain, Hammett suggested. That means having the capability to hold Chinese satellites at risk.

“There are a number of evolving threats, and we need to have a full array of … capabilities to address those threats,” Hammett said. “We primarily are the Department of Defense, so we defend and protect, but some of the capabilities we’re working on will have varieties of tactics, techniques, and procedures that [U.S. Space Command] will employ.”

F-22 Retirement in 2030 Unlikely as USAF Looks to Spend $7.8 Billion on It Before Then

March 27, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force seems to be rethinking its plan to start retiring the F-22 around 2030, as its spending plans for the air dominance fighter go well beyond that date, according to the service’s fiscal 2025 budget request.

The Air Force’s planned F-22 budget through fiscal year 2029 includes $4.7 billion for procurement and $3.1 for research, development, test, and evaluation, for a total of $7.8 billion. While the RDT&E line closes out in FY29, procurement beyond that date—labeled “to completion” in budget documents—comes to $1.2 billion.

Senior Air Force leaders have described the F-22 program now through 2030 as a “bridge” to the Next-Generation Air Dominance Fighter and its family of systems, and several have said that the technologies being developed for the F-22 in its waning service years will be directly applicable to NGAD.

The budget assumes the F-22 fleet will be reduced by 32 aircraft, to about 153 airplanes, but the documents say only 142 will receive the full lineup of improvements.

The 32 jets the Air Force wants to divest are of the Block 20 configuration, and Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said it would cost upwards of $50 million each to bring them up to Block 30, the most up-to-date standard. The Air Force prefers to spend that money making the younger models more capable against the anticipated threat; mainly the air-to-air challenge posed by China’s fifth-generation fighters and advanced air-to-air missiles.

The Air Force has also said that a congressional mandate to upgrade the older F-22s—which have been used only as training jets—couldn’t be accomplished until it was almost time to retire them. They would also need all the new capabilities the F-22 is receiving, to preserve fleet standardization, at even greater cost.

Pentagon officials agreed that, despite the urgency of the threat, it would be foolish to upgrade the F-22s at such expense and retire them a few months later. One said that the timing of the F-22’s retirement “hasn’t been decided … and it depends on progress with NGAD” and other factors.

Budget justification documents for the F-22 say that the procurement activities over the next five years will upgrade “the air vehicle, engine, Operational Flight Program (OFP), and training systems to improve F-22 weapons, communications, navigation, pilot-vehicle interface, and electronic warfare suite.”

Updates called out in the documents show the Air Force is giving the F-22 stealthy, range-extending drop tanks, infrared sensors, identification, friend-or-foe improvements, better Link 16 connectivity, software upgrades, and electronic warfare and navigation enhancements, as well as new weapons and hardware changes to make it more reliable and available.

The long-range tanks and infrared systems were revealed in artwork released by Air Combat Command in mid-2022, without explanation at the time. Test aircraft sporting the new underwing tanks and IR sensors have since been photographed near western test ranges, but the Air Force has declined to discuss them.

Among the new capabilities being prepared for the F-22 Raptor are the still-classified AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, evoked here in an image released in 2022 by Gen. Mark Kelly, head of Air Combat Command. Developed by Lockheed Martin, JATM is an air-to-air weapon designed to attack targets beyond visual range. It is needed to counter China’s next-generation PL-15 weapon. **USAF illustration**

The budget documents say the critical design review for the stealthy tanks took place in early 2023 and that technology demonstrations have been underway since. “Required Assets Available” with the tanks, which usually translates to initial operational capability, is set for the second quarter of fiscal 2026.

The infrared detection system (IRDS), which is likely to be the two slender, chiseled pods on the outer wing of the F-22 in the artwork, will enter full-up flight test in the first quarter of fiscal 2026. Production is to begin in early 2028, with deliveries the following year.

A sensor enhancement package for the F-22 includes IRST and possibly radar and other detection systems. Together, they will “improve the F-22’s sensing and tracking and ensures Air Superiority by preserving the first-look, first-shot and first-kill capabilities of the 142 Block 30/35 F-22 aircraft,” according to the justifications.

“The first 71 Sensor Enhancements Group A kits were purchased under F-22’s Rapid Fielding Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) program authority,” the Air Force said. The new sensors are slated for flight demonstration in FY24. A follow-on production decision is scheduled to follow closely. Developmental Test and Evaluation is scheduled for the third quarter of FY25, and in the last quarter of FY26, Operational Test and Evaluation will begin.

The low-drag tank and pylons “are advanced technological designs” which will “minimally increase drag” while permitting longer range, even at supersonic speed, for the F-22.

“The pylons are equipped with smart rack pneumatic technology to accurately control ejection performance and maintain minimum drag without stores,” the documents said.

The program calls for 286 each of the tanks and pylons—enough to fully equip 143 jets, at two for each jet. They have to work at a speed of at least Mach 1.2. Wind tunnel and ground tests were completed in fiscal 2023, and flight testing is targeted to begin in the second quarter of fiscal 2024, shortly after which a critical design review is scheduled. The initial lots will be bought later in FY24. Developmental and operational testing is set to conclude in mid-fiscal 2026, with required assets available soon after.

The F-22 will also get a new Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna to help it navigate in a “GPS-degraded environment,” and achieve resilient position, navigation and timing. Retrofits will be made on 142 F-22s, of which 27 will be operated by the Air National Guard. There will be a production readiness review in June of this year, and flight testing starts in early 2025.

A series of reliability, availability, and maintainability program (RAMP) initiatives meant to make the F-22 more ready when needed are also in the funding plan. Candidates were selected for their ability to rapidly reduce maintenance workload or increased durability of the F-22’s stealth features. There is “high variability in the number of projects and kit quantities,” the Air Force said in its budget justification books.

“The RAMP program includes funding for retrofit installation labor and modifications which address corrosion, reduce maintenance hours, increase safety and provide urgent response requirements identified by the user to the F-22 fleet,” the Air Force said. These projects are also addressing safety-of-flight issues and to ease “technology insertion.” One such program replaces old fiber-optic cabling; another for a “Low Observable Mighty Tough Boot … leads to an estimated three percent increase in aircraft reliability.”

What was originally an ad-hoc Link 16 connectivity program now gives the F-22 a transmit/receive capability with Link 16 rehosted to a system that also plugs it into the Multi-functional Information Distribution Service/Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS/JTRS), with an open architecture to speed insertion of new capabilities.

Much of the F-22 RDT&E request is for software to integrate and exploit all the new sensors and equipment the fleet will receive. The Air Force is attempting to “leverage commercially-based agile software and hardware best practices and tools” to speed the introduction of new capabilities. It’s also funding Software Integration Labs for most of the specific systems.

Other RDT&E efforts include cryptographic upgrades, technology demonstrations, “threat modeling support,” engine enhancements cybersecurity and open mission system (OMS) integration. Software is to be delivered “using a scheduled cadence for capabilities as they mature.”

The RDT&E program also includes “Project Geyser,” described as an “advanced capability” that will be assessed for “fielding configuration options.” No details were given about this project, but there will be “continued flight demonstrations and … test fleet modification into planned production configuration” in fiscal 2025.

Saltzman Pushes Need for ‘Actionable’ Space Domain Awareness

March 27, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

The Space Force is ramping up its investment in domain awareness to stay ahead in the increasingly contested space environment, and Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman described the effort as essential to his “Competitive Endurance” theory meant to guide the entire service.

“We cannot, as a country or a service, miscalculate the capabilities, force posture, or intentions of our potential adversaries,” Saltzman said at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Security Forum on March 27. “We must have timely and relevant indications and warnings to help us avoid operational surprise in crisis where appropriate to take defensive actions. This means we need to have access to and invest in actionable space domain awareness.”

Space domain awareness includes the monitoring of space objects and activities, tracking environmental conditions, detecting adversary operations, and ascribing intent to actions. That missions has grown vastly more complex—Saltzman noted a 700 percent surge in active satellites since 2008, with many of those satellites possessing new technology and capabilities. That’s in addition to the increasing possibility of collision and space debris.

“We see an incredibly sophisticated array of threats, from the traditional SATCOM and GPS jammers, to more destabilizing direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons across almost every orbital regime, to on-orbit grapplers, optical dazzlers, directed energy weapons, and increasing cyberattacks both to our ground stations and the satellites themselves,” Saltzman said.

As Russia and China advance and demonstrate such capabilities, experts have warned the U.S. space infrastructure, designed to promote the peaceful use of space, is left largely defenseless and exposed to potential attacks from these nations, underscoring the urgency to strengthen domain awareness.

“Specifically, the PRC has more than 470 ISR satellites that are feeding a robust sensor shooter kill web,” Saltzman said. “This new sensor-to-shooter kill web, it creates an unacceptable risk to our forward deployed forces.”

The sensor-to-shooter kill web network system streamlines the process of launching attacks by enhancing data sharing and automating processes, with an aim to enable strikes within seconds.

Although the Space Force’s fiscal 2025 budget request is decreased by 2 percent compared to the previous year, there is notable growth—nearly 30 percent—in the allocation for space domain awareness systems, from $373 million to $484 million.

“We have to make sure we have a sensor network, so you’ll see investments in putting new sensors, Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability that we have and we’re developing, is in the budget,” Saltzman said. He also pointed to the need for a sensor network to maintain data flow and work with allies and partners to bolster surveillance.

Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) is a ground-based system that detects and tracks deep space objects around the clock. In December, the U.S., the U.K., and Australia announced a joint DARC initiative, leveraging wide coverage locations to improve object detection and tracking in deep space.

“But I think there’s another important piece and that’s ‘Do we have the tools that pull that data together and contextualize it, so decision-makers can make timely, relevant operational decisions?’” Saltzman said. “And I think that’s where we’re also trying to invest, is to get those tools together that actually make the most out of the data that we are collecting and will be able to take on even more data and make more sense of it faster.”

The service’s FY25 R&D budget outlines plans to complete research on laser-enabled real-time space domain awareness, particularly for imaging satellites during Earth’s shadow periods, and eventually transferring this capability to Space Operations Command.

In addition, it aims to improve technologies for continuous optical and infrared imaging of objects near Earth and in GEO orbit. This includes identifying timelines for tactical purposes and spotting small satellites near important space assets. The plan also seeks to enhance daytime detection of satellites, allowing for tracking and imaging even when ground-based optical systems can’t see them.

Space domain awareness will also be powered by commercial capabilities, as noted by SpOC commander last month. Miller emphasized the importance of balancing commercial advantages with government-owned systems, stressing affordability, reliability, and meeting mission timelines. The service is on the brink of unveiling its long-awaited commercial strategy within the next month, which will offer a path forward for enhancing collaboration with the private sector.

Learning to Win the Electromagnetic ‘Chess Game’ with This Space Force Aggressor Squadron

March 27, 2024 | By David Roza

Occupying terrain is a fundamental principle of warfare, even if that terrain is the electromagnetic spectrum and mostly invisible to the naked eye. That’s where the Space Force’s 527th Space Aggressor Squadron teaches a wide range of military units how to hold their “ground.”

“When you call up an aggressor unit, you’re getting an opportunity to train against a thinking adversary and better prepare for the real thing,” Maj. Kyle “Gambit” Schroeder, chief of weapons and tactics for the 527th SAS, told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “We can replicate a disgruntled guy with some communications equipment in his garage all the way up to a well-trained electromagnetic attack force.”

Electromagnetic attacks often come in the form of jamming access to satellite communications or position, navigation, and timing systems such as GPS. At its core, jamming means blasting a more powerful signal on top of the signal being jammed. The 527th SAS teaches techniques to overcome jamming, depending on the training audience’s expertise and equipment.

527 space aggressor — U.S. Space Force Master Sgt. Lane Dorenbusch, 527th Space Aggressor Squadron flight chief of weapons and tactics, observes multiple frequency levels during Exercise HEAVY RAIN 23, Nov. 16, 2023 at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. **U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Edgar Grimaldo**

For example, when satellite communications are down, one of the most basic techniques is to find a different method of communication, such as a cell phone or a walkie-talkie. A more sophisticated technique is to use a spectrum analyzer, which displays what’s going on in the electromagnetic spectrum. The analyzer does not show whether signal interference is intentional, but the 527th teaches how to read the waveform for clues.

“We teach a few techniques like, ‘hey, this type of waveform indicates a little more thought went into building this, a little more intentionality went into the placement of it,’” Schroder explained. “And then if I move my signal, and if that adversary signal follows me, now I’ve got a little more information like ‘OK, maybe I’m dealing with someone who knows what they’re doing.’”

The tactics get more complex from there: dummy signals for an adversary to target but which are not actually passing data, or hiding a signal in a noise floor.

“If you think of a pool of water, if I put something underneath that water, then it’s more difficult to see,” the major said. “There are techniques to hide under the noise floor where I don’t even see it, unless I’m really looking or I have very specific tools in order to do that.”

Then there are more brute force techniques, such as taking up a lot of territory on the spectrum and cornering the targeted signal into a small slice of it.

“They can take up a ton of space on the electromagnetic spectrum, to the point where I’m not able to deny that signal with the equipment that I have,” Schroeder explained. “It’s essentially like you are putting it in a tank: it doesn’t matter if you shoot at it, it’s still gonna go.”

Choosing the right technique and responding to the enemy’s move is like a game of chess, he said, and it helps to know your enemy. The 527th works with information gathered by the intelligence community to simulate real-world threats from possible enemies such as Russia or China.

“We use that intelligence to paint a picture for the training audience: ‘hey, based on this exercise and this adversary threat that you’ve asked us to replicate, we think it would be employed in this particular way against you to achieve these desired effects,” the major said.

The 527th traces its roots back nearly 50 years to the Constant Peg program, where Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter pilots battled against American-flown MiG fighters, giving crews the skills and confidence to beat them in real combat. Though Constant Peg shut down in 1988, aggressor fighter squadrons live on in all three services at exercises such as Red Flag, where military aircrews from around the world train against each other in mock air battles.

In 2000, the 527th, a former fighter aggressor squadron that flew F-5s in the 1970s, was reactivated to deny GPS at Red Flag. Over time, the 527th grew to include denying satellite communications and started an orbital warfare flight, which in 2021 split off to become the 57th Space Aggressor Squadron. More recently, the 527th sprouted a cyber flight, which the Space Force intends to split off into its own squadron, Schroeder said.

The cyber flight is the largest in the 527th, and they can make a mess for the training audience, the “Blue Force” by severing communications or stealing data and alerting the enemy to blue’s plans.

“We’ve had a lot of success simply causing havoc in a network,” Schroeder said.

527 space aggressors — Military personnel assigned to the 527th/26th Space Aggressor Squadron and 2d Multi-Domain Task Force provide real-time monitoring of health and wellness for military satellites during Exercise HEAVY RAIN 23, Nov. 16, 2023 at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. **U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Edgar Grimaldo**

Cyber aggressors often work on “cyber ranges” that are isolated to avoid damaging real-world networks and hardware.

“We’re seeing a rising number of actors that are government-sponsored, and are very highly capable of exploiting organizations,” Schroeder said. “So it’s critically important that we have the cyber aggressor mission in-house. It’s growing, they’re going to be more evolved, they’re just still in the stand-up phase right now.”

While the cyber flight tends to work with highly-specialized professionals due to the high bar for cyber literacy required, the EW side works with just about anyone in the military, including Army and Navy special operations and Air Force expeditionary communications troops.

“I’ve seen every level of knowledge, all the way from highly-experienced to ‘this is my first day pointing an antenna at a satellite,’” Schroeder said. “When it comes to [radio frequency] or jamming, it’s everyone who has to interact with that radio or that communications equipment.”

For exercises in the continental U.S., the 527th can usually provide effects by firing at satellites from its dishes at Schriever Space Force Base, Colo., but it can send teams with jamming equipment farther afield if necessary. No matter where the effect is generated, a team of aggressors will often hit the road to provide in-person instruction.

“It’s a lot better to put a face to a name,” Schroeder said. “Part of our charter is to teach, so we want to not only provide that effect, but also explain to you ‘hey this is the adversary, this is what they are capable of, here is how you can mitigate that.'”

527 sas — Members from the 527th Space Aggressor Squadron pose for a group photo on Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado, Aug. 16, 2023. **U.S. Air Force photo by 1st Lt. Charles Rivezzo**

In 2023, the 527th was named the Department of the Air Force’s Outstanding Level II Electromagnetic Warfare Unit of the Year.

“It is better to lose to the aggressors 100 times than to lose to a near-peer adversary once,” squadron commander Lt. Col. C. Gene “Shocker” Adams said in a press release at the time.

The squadron’s mission has expanded over the years, and its ranks now include embedded detachments from the Navy and Marines. But the Cold War-era aggressor spirit remains in the form of Soviet red stars painted on the squadron’s satellite dishes and woven into its morale patches. Despite the enemy colors, the purpose of the 527th is to make “the good guys” better. Shroeder recalled working with the 53rd Space Operations Squadron after it transitioned into the Space Force from the Army, where it was called the 53rd Signal Battalion.

During its Army days, the 53rd provided satellite communications for Soldiers but had no experience with electromagnetic warfare. In a training event, the 527th fired live energy at a 53rd SOPS satellite, but it took the new squadron two days just to notice it.

“It’s not a dig against them, we just didn’t set them up or frame them for success at all as a space community,” Schroeder said.

The 527th showed their fellow Guardians how to detect and mitigate the threat, and the 53rd leapt at the chance to try it again.

“It was just extremely exciting for me to see that,” the major said. “Here’s this community of people that had been treated as a cable company, and we got them the opportunity, the reps to train against an adversary and they absolutely loved it. They were highly motivated to improve and do whatever they could in order to prepare for that great power competition.”

USAF Wishlist: $3.5 Billion for Exercises, Construction Projects, Spare Parts

March 26, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force’s $3.5 billion Unfunded Priorities List for fiscal 2025, forwarded to Congress last week, skips the requests for more aircraft that have highlighted past years. Instead, the annual “wishlist” of things that got cut from the service’s budget request focuses on housekeeping accounts such as spare parts, exercises, military construction, and some money for the new “re-optimization” plan.

In the past, the Air Force has asked for more F-35s, F-15EXs, or KC-46s. But this year, the list emphasizes fight-tonight readiness; following on Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s acknowledgement that the actual budget proposal of $188.1 billion “protects modernization.”

The largest single item on the list is $1.5 billion for “single spares restock for aircraft projected to be grounded due to lack of spare parts, impacting aircraft readiness,” the Air Force said in a briefing deck obtained by Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“This option was partially funded during FY25, but the full requirement could not be resourced,” the document said. “The fiscally constrained environment necessitated difficult decisions and it was not possible to fully fund key programs while still meeting other Air Force priorities.”

Referring to the request as a “spare surge,” the Air Force added that “this is intended to be a single year, single spares restock request with no impact to future FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] funding lines.”

The second-biggest item is $1.16 billion for 26 military construction projects.

“Due to requirements growth and inflation, there [were] not sufficient funds to properly fund all USAF foundational accounts,” the document states. The projects are all either mission-oriented or affect quality of life, it said.

“If funding is provided, it would allow the USAF to reprioritize worldwide projects across the FYDP to buy down the $46.8B backlog on defense infrastructure and facilities preparing for Great Power Competition,” the service document added.

The largest item in the MILCON list, at $215 million, is a classroom and dining facility complex at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. Another $158 million is for a strategic air operations center at an undisclosed location, while $148 million is marked for a “multi-domain operations complex” at Beale Air Force Base, Calif.

At $612 million, the third-largest single item on the unfunded priorities list is money to create nine new “deployable Mission Generation Force Elements (MGFE) with existing personnel and fighter aircraft,” USAF said.

This is characterized as funding needed for the “re-optimization” effort—the service has said it wants to develop “combat wings” that have all the equipment, personnel, and support needed to deploy as a whole unit. MGFEs are the elements that actually conduct the operations and maintenance.

The Air Force said its re-optimization projects were “not developed in time for [the] FY25 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission since analysis was on-going alongside the USAF’s effort to Re-Optimize for Great Power Competition (GPC). The additional forces generated by this submission will be additive to current force generation capabilities, bolstering service posture.”

The money would be spent on “readiness spares packages, aviation support equipment, and munitions support equipment necessary to re-organize the fighter force structure to produce nine additional mission generation force elements (MGFE), which would make available up to 208 combat-coded fighter aircraft in the existing USAF inventory. Funds for sustaining equipment and aircraft are already funded throughout the FYDP.”

A fourth item, for $266 million, is seed money for major, every-other-year exercises to practice Agile Combat Employment, in which the Air Force will deploy small units to various extant and austere bases, generate sorties, then pick up and move in a rapid fashion.

Again, the Air Force said this line item wasn’t developed in time to make the fiscal 2025 budget.

“There was no funding for a Theatre-Wide ACE rehearsal provided in FY24 or FY25 budgets. This request will fund the first Theatre-Wide ACE exercise,” USAF said. It “addresses Air Force and Combatant Commander requirements for high level campaigning and integrated training.”

The off-budget request “enables Pacific Air Forces, along with other MAJCOMs [Major Commands], joint, allied and partner forces to execute the first Theatre-Wide ACE Exercise in FY25 and request continued resource support in future program year FYDPs,” the Air Force explained.

Major cross-command exercises in the Pacific were another focus of the re-optimization effort.

“The exercise would execute biennially with the funding required in FY27 to execute the second event and every other year after. $5M is required in preceding FYs to plan and posture to execute the biennial exercise.”

By law, the unfunded priorities list is to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four committees that chiefly oversee defense spending—the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees—10 days after the annual defense budget request is submitted to Congress. The 2017 law arose from a tradition of Congress asking the services what they would buy if they had additional funds beyond what the administration in office proposed.

Last year, Defense Department leadership came out in favor of repealing the law. Comptroller Michael McCord told Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a critic of the lists, that the wishlists are disruptive to the budgeting process because, after priorities have been set, the services can end-run the process.

“The current statutory practice of having multiple individual senior leaders submit priorities for additional funding absent the benefit of weighing costs and benefits across the department is not an effective way to illuminate our top joint priorities,” McCord wrote in a letter, noting he was speaking for Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Air Force Sends Surveys to Thousands of Airmen, Guardians on Communications, Aircrew Life

March 26, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

The Department of Air Force is asking tens of thousands of Airmen and Guardians to fill out two separate surveys related to its communication efforts and enhancing aircrew retention, it announced March 25.

The Aircrew Engagement Survey will close March 28, while the “Where Airmen and Guardians Get Information” survey will open in the coming week, according to two different releases.

The so-called “WAGGI” survey will be sent to most Guardians and approximately 12,000 randomly selected Air Force military and civilian personnel. The biennial effort aims to help senior leaders understand service members’ information needs, preferences, and trends in their external information sources, which can help leaders communicate more effectively.

“The surveys help us focus on areas where Airmen and Guardians have concerns about how we’re communicating, or where we might be able to reinforce a positive trend,” Dr. Tadd Sholtis, chief of strategy and assessments for Secretary of Air Force Public Affairs, said in a release. “The focus groups give us the best ideas about how they think we should do that. We really need good, thoughtful participation in both to deliver what people need and want.”

Since 2011, the department conducted multiple surveys, with 2022 marking the first year Guardians were considered separately from Airmen. Insights gathered from previous surveys have influenced strategic decisions, including transitioning from print to digital media, refining how senior leaders engage on social media, and formulating communication strategies for the Space Force.

The findings from the 2022 WAGGI stated that while Airmen felt the Air Force is doing a moderate to good job of keeping them informed, Guardians felt communication was not as effective. The sentiment was linked to the volume of pending actions, indicating that communication in the Space Force may have been hindered by the amount of tasks on Guardians.

The 2022 survey recommendations included several call-to-actions for service leaders, such as providing units with more lead time for detailed communication and ensuring urgent messages be shared through accessible channels like meetings, emails, or social media. An Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the service employs a method to track the implementation and progress of these recommendations.

This year’s survey, available for four weeks, is optional and has a section for open-ended comments. Following analysis of the survey data, in-person and virtual focus groups will be conducted at various locations to gather feedback. In 2022, qualitative feedback was gathered from 157 Airmen and 22 Guardians during these sessions. Anonymity is assured for all responses and feedback.

“When we ask people what we can do better as a department or a service, communication is usually toward the top of the list,” Sholtis said. “The WAGGI is a very important tool that gives us solid data and personal perspectives about how to improve our command information plans and products.”

The service is also tackling ongoing pilot shortage issues through then annual Aircrew Engagement Survey, which opened Feb. 15 and was sent to 40,000 Air Force aircrew members with the goal of enhancing retention and facilitating communication with leaders. Brig. Gen. Travolis Simmons, director of training and readiness under the deputy chief of staff for operations said the survey is part of an “enduring force management strategy.”

“By measuring data longitudinally, we expect results to inform recruitment, development, and retention efforts while enabling a more holistic approach to aircrew management,” Simmons said in a release.

Last year’s survey revealed that aviators often left service due to unstable home life, financial concerns, and non-flying duties, which prompted the department to focus on stationing flexibility and boosting incentives. In November, the Department announced upgraded retention bonuses for pilots, which include monetary rewards ranging from $15,000 to $50,000 per year for additional service.

General Atomics Exec: CCA Will ‘Go Down in History’ for Putting Drones Front and Center

March 26, 2024 | By Shaun Waterman

The Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, which will pair unmanned drones with manned platforms, is the start of a paradigm shift in the U.S. military’s thinking about the use of uncrewed and autonomous aircraft, beginning for the first time to place them at the core of the service’s missions, according to David Alexander, president of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.

“If you look at what the Air Force is doing with the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, and embracing uncrewed mass numbers for air-to-air combat, that’s a first,” he said at a Hudson Institute event on March 26, “To me that’s the big shift that we’re seeing right now.”

For two decades the Air Force has relied on remotely piloted aircraft (RPA or drones) for “over the horizon ISR [and] strike” missions, and in that context has come to see them as central rather than peripheral.

But though drones like the MQ-1 Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper have for years had the capability to fire air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, the use case in ground attack or air combat “never caught on because that’s always been seen as a manned aircraft mission,” Alexander said.

All of that is changing now as Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and the service have reached a tipping point, he said. Through Kendall’s advocacy for CCA and other uncrewed programs, he “has really moved the bar on that … in a big way. And that’s huge,” Alexander said. “I think it’ll go down in history as the time that it was truly embraced.”

General Atomics is one of five companies that have received contracts for the CCA program thus far. The service is planning to pick two or three to proceed in the next few months.

The embrace of autonomy hadn’t yet extended to attritable swarms, noted event co-moderator and Hudson senior fellow Bryan Clark, pointing out that the first tranche or increment of the CCA “is shaping up to be a pretty expensive airplane.”

Alexander responded that was partly because the aircraft needed be useable in different scenarios. The tyranny of distance in the vast Pacific theater meant they must have the range for long flights from distant permanent bases “as needed.” But they also had to be suitable for deployment in agile combat operations where they will be taking off from temporary bases on “island hopping” missions.

“I think you have to do both,” he said, and without requiring air-to-air refueling. “I’ve seen some concepts where you’ve got these collaborative combat aircraft sipping off of [airborne] tanks. I can’t think of any worse Keystone Cop idea out there, you have hundreds of these little things, trying to take fuel when the important, bigger fighters behind them really need to get on those hoses.”

Moving towards swarm operations, Alexander said General Atomics was developing what he called “a large small” aircraft, air-launched with a weight of about 200 pounds, which allows for a 40-pound payload and a kilowatt of power. “That’s the sweet spot,” he said.

“It could be huge,” he said of the impact of the aircraft, noting that in Ukraine, it would enable penetration of the Russians’ Integrated Air Defense System, or IADS, without precipitating a massive expansion of the conflict. “Yeah, we could penetrate IADS with the F-35, right? And then we’ve got World War III. Now if they’re in there with a bunch of smalls, [the enemy] is gonna shoot some down, but if you launch them, some with exquisite decoy electronic warfare in them, combined with [some equipped with] warheads and you don’t know which one is which. If you had that at scale, it’d be very a big deal right now.”

The war in Ukraine has also shown the effectiveness of uncrewed systems at sea. Alexander said he believed the U.S. Navy was also adopting a central role for uncrewed aircraft, at least in some mission sets where they offered unique surveillance and sensor management capabilities in the maritime domain. “The big blue water, long persistence, it’s a natural fit. I think it’s the next frontier for Medium Altitude Long Endurance aircraft,” he said, predicting that the next generation MQ-9B Sea Guardian, which had payload packages including sonar buoy distribution and sonar buoy management, would see Navy duties as soon as next year.

New Report: U.S. Should Stand Up a 10,000-Man Cyber Force

March 26, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

A new report calls on Congress to create a stand-alone military Cyber Force to Lead the Pentagon’s cyber capabilities, and an influential lawmaker endorsed the idea this week.

Report authors retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery and Dr. Erica Lonergan from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs came to their conclusion after interviewing 76 active and retired military cyber professionals. Writing for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, they propose creating a Cyber Force modeled in part on the U.S. Space Force, and housing it inside the Department of the Army.

They join a growing chorus of advocates who say spreading cyber expertise across the military forces waters down the potential expertise that could be gained from more centralized leadership.

Montgomery and Lonergan note that the military services are struggling with recruiting, acquisition, readiness, and leadership.

“This paper is a criticism of the current system of force generation in cyber, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, even Space Force now,” said Montgomery. “That system is not working.”

The services are not recruiting the right talent, too often focusing on the kinds of people who fit the physical demands of their other missions.

“What’s happening now in the services, we get the best most cyber relevant person the service happened to have recruited,” Montgomery said. “Unless of course, that person is needed as a special operator [or] a nuclear operator in the Navy.”

Cyber training, certifications, and pay standards vary among the services, Montgomery said, so troops with the same skills are sometimes paid at vastly different rates. In some cases, cyber units are completely reliant on a very few people for certain missions.

“There are units that do complex work with malware development, and less than 10 percent of the unit is doing 90 percent of the work, because they’re the only ones who are qualified to do it,” Montgomery said. “Can you imagine going to an F-22 squadron and having the CO say, ‘I know I’ve got 25 pilots in here, but I just use two of them’?”

Nor is there any guarantee that commanders of cyber units have the relevant background.

“Interviewees for this project cite numerous examples of senior officers who have little to no experience in the cyber domain—even though the services have had 13 years since the creation of CYBERCOM to develop qualified senior leaders,” the report notes.

And because no service owns the cyber mission, cyber acquisition tends to get lower priority than other missions, despite its importance across all domains. Congress has sought to remedy that by giving U.S. Cyber Command, a joint-force combatant command, more acquisition authority, but that arrangement is inconsistent with the military services’ missions, which are to recruit, train and equip their forces.

“I actually think Cyber Command has done the best job it could have possibly done dealt the cards it had,” Montgomery said. “But if it’s going to do the job we expect it to do three years, five years, 10 years from now, we need a new model.”

A rendering of a prospective seal for U.S. Cyber Force **(Design by Daniel Ackerman/FDD)**

Montgomery and Lonergan argue for placing a new Cyber Force within the Department of the Army, just as the Marine Corps is in the Department of the Navy and the Space Force is in the Department of the Air Force. Once established, each military department would lead two service branches. Yet the similarities end there. The Marine Corps was created as naval militia, and its role as a naval service dates to its foundation; likewise, the Space Force was formed almost entirely from elements of the U.S. Air Force.

But military cyber skills are spread throughout the other military services, so drawing them together into a single branch would be a major hurdle.

The bulk of Cyber Force billets would draw the 133 teams from all the services that conduct everyday cyberspace operations. These teams make up what CYBERCOM calls the Cyber Mission Force. Once combined, the authors envision a service of some 10,000 personnel managing a budget of $16.5 billion to start—roughly analogous to the Space Force, which is by far the smallest military service.

Each of the individual services would retain some cyber-focused personnel, primarily to conduct defensive cyber operations tied to their military capabilities and information networks.

A counter argument to a unified cyber force would be to treat CYBERCOM more like U.S. Special Operations Command, which also draws forces from across the services and has some of its own acquisition authorities. But that comparison misses some nuances, said Lonergan.

“In the SOCOM model, each of the services is still providing the personnel to SOCOM to be employed, and those individuals are all trained in their unique domain-specific warfighting competency,” Lonergan said. In other words, Navy SEALs operate from the sea, while Army Green Berets operate on land. “But cyberspace isn’t like that,” Lonergan said. “There are no domain-specific functions that only a particular service is able to provide.”

Retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis, former head of U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command, has also advocated for a cyber force, as has retired Army Lt. Gen. David W. Barno. The Military Cyber Professionals Association, an advocacy group that has dozens of general and flag officers among its board of advisors, has also called for such a change.

But the idea faces resistance in both the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. Late last year, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy Mieke Eoyang said creating a new service would come at significant costs. “Be careful what you wish for,” she warned. Lawmakers considered tasking the Pentagon to study a cyber force last year, but dropped the idea from the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act before passing it.

Yet there are also signs of shifting opinion. An earlier NDAA passed by Congress required the Pentagon to “study the prospect of a new force generation model” for U.S. Cyber Command, and then-CYBERCOM boss Gen. Paul Nakasone said shortly before his departure that “all options are on the table except status quo.”

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc.), chair of the House Armed Services cyber, information technologies, and innovation subcommittee, endorsed more study of the Cyber Force idea.

“I’m disappointed that we didn’t get the provision for a more fulsome study across the finish line in last year’s NDAA,” Gallagher said at the rollout of the new report. “But I hope we can in [the 2025] NDAA.”

Gallagher stopped short of calling for a Cyber Force explicitly and he has cited the potential for bureaucratic bloat and inefficiency in the past. But he said the new report is “so powerful that it’s challenging my priors.”

Gallagher won’t be in Congress to get such a measure approved, however. He announced in March that he is resigning effective April 19, leaving the Cyber Force without the kind of clear champion on the Hill that helped get the Space Force across the finish line. Reps. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) and Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) led the charge for the Space Force.

Congress Boosts Air Force 2024 Budget With More F-35s, Engine Spares

March 25, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

Congress added three extra F-35s to the Air Force’s fiscal 2024 buy in the appropriations bill passed and signed this weekend and boosted the fighter’s F135 engine account as well.

The final bill adds $541 million for F-35-related procurement, of which $277 million will buy the three additional A-variant fighters and $264 million will buy “engine spares,” split evenly between Air Force F-35As and the Navy and Marine Corps F-35Bs and Cs. It was not immediately clear whether the engine money would buy full-up spare engines or spare parts, but Congress has shown interest in improving F-35 readiness, which has suffered in the past due to engine and engine parts shortages.

The figures appear in the bill’s joint explanatory statement.

Of note, while the Air Force has included additional F-35s on most of its “Unfunded Priorities Lists” in recent years, it did not include the F-35 on its list for fiscal 2024.

The add would raise the Air Force’s 2024 buy to 51 F-35As, up from the 48 requested in FY24. In the new FY25 budget just presented to Congress this month, the Air Force only asked for 42 F-35s, explaining that it had to make cuts to several portfolios, including fighters, to live within the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which carved $2 billion out of USAF’s spending plan.

Lawmakers have voiced frustration with the Air Force for saying it needs 72 fighters a year to stop a steady decline in the fighter inventory and its average age, yet still continuing to divest older fighters and not replacing them on a one-for-one basis. In the FY25 budget, the Air Force only asked for 66 fighters—12 of which are F-15EXs—and capped the EX program at 98 aircraft, having originally planned to build as many as 188, and most recently, at 104.

In total, the FY24 bill funds a total of 86 F-35s for the armed services, including 16 for the Marine Corps and 19 for the Navy. The Pentagon asked for only 68 F-35s, across all services, in fiscal 2025.

The F-35 Joint Program Office said it is “aware of the additional three F-35As and will bring this new requirement into the Lot 18-19 negotiations” with Lockheed Martin, which have been underway for more than a year.

Program and industry officials expect unit costs of the F-35 to increase in the next lots, due to inflation, higher labor costs, and the fact that the Block 4 aircraft will be a more advanced platform than its predecessors, with more electronic warfare features and capability for more weapons, among some 80 upgrades.

Asked for comment, a Lockheed spokesperson said that increased quantities are among “the main drivers to keep the F-35 affordable and are key to ensuring economies of scale and affordability across the life cycle of the program.”

The Air Force’s high water mark of F-35s bought in a single year was 60 in fiscal 2021. Since then, it has asked for fewer, explaining that it prefers to buy more future jets with the Block 4 configuration rather than have to later retrofit pre-Block 4 models to that standard. Under original program plans, the Air Force expected to be buying 110 F-35s per year by 2025. The service has never changed its total objective of 1,763 F-35s, set 25 years ago. At its current pace, it will not achieve that inventory until the 2040s.

Lockheed Martin has produced—but not delivered—dozens of F-35s since last fall, because they are configured with the Tech Refresh 3 suite of processors and software that is still being proven in flight tests. The TR-3 is the processing and software foundation of the Block 4. Lockheed is storing some 70 F-35s at an undisclosed location until the hold on deliveries is lifted, which industry and government officials expect to happen in late summer.

The JPO said it is “exploring the possibility of truncating the TR-3 with our industry partners, the U.S. services, and International Partners to ensure warfighters have the aircraft and capability needed,” but has not predicted when that decision might come. Pentagon officials have said they may be open to permitting deliveries to resume because the jets are needed to maintain the pace of delivery and absorption and to match pilot training requirements. Deliveries might resume first to international partners, one official suggested.