Air Force Inspector General: ‘Human Error’ Enabled Andrews Breach

March 11, 2021 | By Jennifer-Leigh Oprihory

A complacent defender failed to prevent an intruder from accessing Joint Base Andrews, Md., on Feb. 4, the Air Force Inspector General found. In a report released March 11, the IG said the intruder came upon a malfunctioning gate and, because of other Airmen’s mistakes, accessed the Andrews flight line and boarded a C-40B aircraft assigned to the 89th Airlift Wing.

Getting On Base

During a March 11 call with reporters, AFIG Lt. Gen. Sami D. Said said that “three layers of breakdown” made the events of Feb. 4 possible.

The first, he said, was that a 316th Security Forces Squadron Airman allowed the man to enter a base gate “without the proper credentials.”

The intruder shouldn’t have been allowed on base since he lacked a Defense Biometric Identification System card or other alternate ID that would’ve given him access, and wasn’t on Andrews’ Entry Access List, the report stated.

The defender who let him through said they couldn’t recall whether the intruder “presented his driver’s license or any other form of ID prior to driving through the gate,” even after watching a video replay of the incident, it stated. During questioning, the Airman admitted to have gotten “complacent” and ignoring standard procedures in letting him on base, the report added.

The Airman has been disciplined, but Said wouldn’t disclose what that looked like.

“Command action [has] been taken against the Airman at the gate, and as you know, we don’t disclose the specifics just out of privacy for the particular individuals,” he said. “We don’t want to undermine that or embarrass them, but yes, action against that particular Airman is complete.”

The Airmen’s mistake wasn’t the result of broader training or operational issues, Said added.

“At the end of the day, it was a human error at the gate,” he said. “We didn’t find any particular indication that overall training is deficient, [or that] overall tactics, techniques, and procedures are deficient. It was an individual failure by an Airman that clearly then said, ‘I know what I’m supposed to do. I didn’t do it because I was distracted … and failed to follow through.’”

However, Said said, in response to the AFIG inquiry, the base “reemphasized to all their security forces personnel all the basic steps that are required and the protocols and the procedures at the gate.”

Accessing the Flight Line and Getting on the Plane

After getting on base, the intruder then entered the Andrews flight line via an automatic gate that malfunctioned and remained about a foot and a half open, Said said.

“That gate had been previously written up as having a problem fix, and in the preceding days to this incident, had not been identified as having any additional problems,” he said. “However, on the date of the incident, it remained open, which is a repeat of [a] deficiency identified earlier, so had the gate closed as it should have, he couldn’t have accessed the flight line physically.”

Andrews is putting a bigger emphasis on ensuring repairs made to “fences and gates that give access to sensitive areas” can be validated in order to prevent future security gaps, he said.

Finally, an Airmen on the flight line—both “roving security forces patrols and Airmen” who were training on the aircraft—”failed to challenge the individual as to why he was on the flight line.” Said said Airmen didn’t spot the intruder while he walked from the malfunctioning gate to the aircraft, and then didn’t challenge him as he boarded it.

“Security Forces personnel were present and should have seen [the intruder] and intercepted him before he accessed any resources,” the report states. “89 AW personnel on the aircraft should have challenged [him] when he boarded the aircraft without a [restricted area badge], but they were focused on training with a reasonable expectation of security while parked inside a restricted area.”

Said said the people who should’ve challenged him potentially assumed he was a contractor with permission to be on the flight line.

“The individual wasn’t attempting to disguise themselves, but … was wearing clothes that could have been confused as a contractor,” Said said. “Normally, it’s bluish in color.”

Luckily, Said said, once defenders were tipped off to his presence in the base’s passenger terminal that’s located beside the flight line and his confused state, they “apprehended him pretty darn quickly—the minute he came off the plane.”

No Threat Found

The intruder had no known ties to Andrews, and while the Air Force found wire cutters in his vehicle, he said his office has “zero reason to believe” the intruder meant to harm anyone.

“He had nothing with him that could’ve harmed anybody, and then when we questioned him several times as to why he was there, his response was, ‘I just wanted to see airplanes,’” Said said.

According to Said, the intruder also stood no chance of reaching Air Force One.

“You know physically, it’s a long ways away, but more importantly, the layers of security that individual would have to go through and get anywhere close to the portion of [the] flight line where the presidential aircraft is kept, there is no way he’s gonna get to that.”

Different parts of the Andrews flight line are guarded at different protection levels, ranging from PL-3 (the lowest level, which the C-40B section of the area fell under) to PL-1 (the highest protection level, which applies to the area where Air Force One is kept), he explained.

The Department of the Air Force Officer of Special Investigations on Feb. 4 determined that the intruder possessed “an extensive arrest history” in addition to “an active warrant for his arrest,” and that he was homeless and unemployed at the time of the breach, the report stated.

Additional Fixes

In addition to reupping defenders’ awareness of gate rules and procedures and ensuring that mechanical fixes to its fences and gates actually take, Andrews also is working on “long term fixes” in response to the AFIG’s findings, including beefing up “physical security structures from a variety of things,” Said said.

“I don’t want to get into details because they’re a little bit security sensitive, but you’d guess, cameras, some additional detection equipment that would help in case you have another breakdown in human failure, individual failures, you’ll have some backup systems that might help us out,” he said.

This is notable, because the report found that the base couldn’t account for the intruder’s whereabouts for at two stretches of time:

Between his entrance to the base at 7:16 a.m. EST and his arrival at its exchange parking lot at 8:10 a.m. EST
Between his exit from the lot at 9:34 a.m. EST and the time personnel spotted him in the passenger terminal around 11:45 a.m. EST

Overall, Said said, he’s “comfortable and confident” the base understands his office’s findings “and that they’re actually going … the extra mile to make sure they cover down and prevent something like this from happening again.”

The Department of the Air Force’s separate review of security at all USAF and USSF installations, which was triggered by the Feb. 4 breach, is being handled by the service’s A/4 directorate. It kicked off approximately two weeks ago and “will take a few months to do,” Said added.

On Guard, But Not Immune

Andrew’s reaction to the AFIG investigation hasn’t made it immune to breach attempts, however.

On the afternoon of March 6, a 29-year-old man unaffiliated with the Defense Department used a Ford F-150 to ram “a swing arm at the” base’s main gate “multiple times,” a base spokesman wrote in a March 11 email to Air Force Magazine.

“U.S. Air Force Security Forces Airmen deployed mechanical road barriers, so the individual veered across the median and into a field,” the spokesperson added. “He then crashed into a fence on the base’s perimeter; the reinforced fence stopped the vehicle.”

The would-be intruder was then detained and found to pose “no threat” to base operations, they wrote. However, base defenders discovered “drug paraphernalia on” the intruder’s person, the spokesperson wrote, noting that “he appeared to be under the influence of an illegal substance.”

“Security Forces cited the man for federal charges and he was later turned over to local law enforcement for additional unrelated civilian charges,” the spokesperson wrote.

First Air Force to Become SPACECOM’s Air Component

March 11, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

First Air Force will provide Air Force support to the recently re-established U.S. Space Command, making the organization responsible for both protecting the homeland and now supporting operations in space, the department announced March 11.

The numbered Air Force also will continue to support U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

“First Air Force was the natural choice to serve as Air Force component to U.S. Space Command,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. said in a release. “In this new role, First Air Force will be better able to identify and address gaps and seams when integrating space power into the support of the homeland defense mission. This will also inform efforts to better fuse space operations into air operations centers around the globe.”

Air Combat Command is working out how to organize, train, and equip First Air Force for the new mission, with initial operational capability expected by the end of calendar year 2021.

In its current role, First Air Force provides aerospace control and air defense of the continental United States, and coordinates air response for natural disasters such as wildfires.

“We have a staff of seasoned professionals with decades of proven success in protecting the air domain in defense of the homeland. We look forward to supporting USSPACECOM in their efforts to defend against threats to the space domain,” said Lt. Gen. Kirk S. Pierce, First Air Force commander, in the release.

USAF assets already provide support for human space flight, with missions such as rescue aircraft and Airmen on alert for launches.

“The U.S. Air Force is a critical contributor to the U.S. Space Command mission as evidenced by their support to Human Space Flight,” said U.S. Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, USSPACECOM commander, in the release. “We welcome First Air Force to our joint team.”

24th SOW Using Machine Learning to Prevent Injuries in Special Tactics Airmen

March 10, 2021 | By Jennifer-Leigh Oprihory

Tech company Sparta Science is pairing force-plate technology with machine learning to help Air Force Special Operations Command’s 24th Special Operations Wing predict and prevent injuries in its special tactics Airmen.

“The 24th SOW Human Performance team is consistently looking for innovative ways to assess, maintain, and enhance the health and performance of our most valued asset, our special tactics Airmen,” Hunter Treuchet, the Human Performance program director with the wing, said in a release. “Acquiring force plates and machine learning technology allows for an objective assessment and identification of potential musculoskeletal issues, which could impact operator readiness.”

Sparta Science Founder and CEO Dr. Phil Wagner told Air Force Magazine a force plate can be likened to “a high-power bathroom scale.”

“It measures how you stand or jump in three different directions in about 3,000 points a second,” he explained. The process involves scanning an individual while they’re in a plank position, while they balance on one foot, and during a jump, according to a video demonstrating the process.

Video: Sparta Science on YouTube

According to Sparta’s website, these force plate scans gauge “unique movement qualities” and machine learning lets the company chart how an individual measures up against an in-house “database of over 2 million scans, generating your Movement Signature instantly.”

From there, Sparta and its partners—who also include other segments of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and U.S. Special Operations Command—can focus on injury prevention, since Sparta’s software generates personalized training plans based on individuals’ force-plate scans.

This technology means troops can track their progress as they work to counter these musculoskeletal vulnerabilities, since subsequent scans can be compared with one another. It can also theoretically be used to create a service member profile, from Military Entrance Processing to their eventual squadron assignment, so they can train to stop injuries and enhance their performance, said retired Army Maj. Gen. Malcolm B. Frost, the former head of the U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training who now serves as a strategic advisor with Sparta.

“I think the ultimate goal we’re trying to do is create this vital sign, so … wherever you are, like, you can quickly be measured by this compared against your history or others’ so you get the best plan to be healthy, right?” Wagner said.

Wagner said this innovation, collectively referred to as “Force Plate Machine Learning,” or FPML, for short, enables Sparta to create profiles for what a scan from a member of a certain service or a service member within a particular AFSC might look like.

“How do we fit both the occupational role and the injury risk from all this data coming in?” he said.

Wagner said that while ACL vulnerabilities are among the most common when scanning athletes, “the big three” kinds of injuries Sparta sees within the Air Force special tactics community impact the lower back, knees, and ankles. The lower-back troubles can be traced back to rucking and the use of body armor, he said.

Frost said these observations make sense when one remembers that special tactics Airmen work “side by side with” elite forces like the Navy SEALs, Special Forces personnel, and U.S. Army Rangers.

“It is in line with a lot of what I would kind of call that classic, high-end infantry-type mission, … although they do some other special things, and that rides right into, you know, the injuries, the types … [we are] seeing through the machine learning,” he said.

Sparta’s also collaborating with the Air Force Research Laboratory to see if FPML can be used to help predict and prevent neck pain in USAF pilots, Wagner said.

“Jets are faster, helmets are heavier, right, and so as a result, there’s quite a significant amount of stress on the head and the neck region,” he said. “And so we have a plank test, and so doing that plank position on the plate allows us to identify neck pain and potential neck injuries.”

Sparta aspires to spread the use of FPML not only more widely within the Defense Department, but also to allies overseas, Wagner said.

Though Wagner couldn’t provide numbers as to how accurate these force-plate scans for the military are, he said that when the same technology is used for athletes, its “sensitivity specificity is about 76 percent.” For context, he said, mammograms are typically around 72 percent, and blood pressure cuffs are around 80 percent.

“So, you know, at least compared to other standards, within data we’ve published and research, it’s right up there with a lot of common diagnostic tools, whether it’s [a] blood pressure cuff or a mammogram,” he said.

The longer military units utilize Force Plate Machine Learning, the more data they’ll accrue and the more predictable the resulting reports will become, Frost noted. However, he said, U.S. military organizations and units have reported back that the technology is “absolutely a factor that’s helping,” he said.

The company is also working to ensure that its fast database of scans doesn’t pose an unintended threat to operational security, Wagner added.

“We’re actively pursuing an ATO authority to operate with different branches to operate within the government intranet, and … pursuing FedRAMP certification, which is [a] services-wide approach of being on the government intranet,” he said. “In the interim, most organizations within the military are using an offline, air-gapped solution, so it’s only on that device, so there’s no way to actually penetrate that through the internet, or, you know, other outside means.”

U.S. Poorly Integrates CCMDs, Hasn’t Figured Out Hybrid, Hyten Says

March 10, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

The current system of integrating the responsibilities and actions of regional commanders in chief doesn’t work well, and the U.S. is still failing to address hybrid warfare coherently, Gen. John E. Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said March 10.

He also discussed China and Russia’s strategic activities, how to approach modernizing NORAD, and his efforts to inject more speed into the joint requirements process.

Speaking on an online seminar of the Canadian Conference of Defence Associations, Hyten said the U.S. is struggling with “the integration piece” of its system of regional combatant commands, and who has responsibility for threats and conflicts that overlap the commands’ areas of regard.

“We’ve learned that we actually don’t know how to do that very well,” Hyten said. “We don’t effectively operate in an integrated manner.” The U.S. is experimenting with ways to close those seams through exercises and wargames, some alone and some in concert with allies, “especially in Europe,” he said.

“So, we’ve achieved the first step of the 12-step process, but we haven’t moved beyond,” he joked.

The impulse is to re-organize the system, he said, but “in almost every case … that’s the worst place to start dealing with the problem.” The first task is to “figure out what you need to do, … who needs to do what, how it needs to work, and then say, ‘Am I organized correctly to do that?’”

The analysis is being done within the Joint Warfighting Concept, he said, with all the combatant commands, allies, and partners playing a role.

“I’m not sure we’re organized incorrectly,” he cautioned, noting that the CCMDs are the direct connection to individual and groups of allies in theaters, and those relationships are key.

Almost every CCMD, for example, has a responsibility to deal with Russia, Hyten noted. Even U.S. Southern Command is dealing with Russia’s relationship with Venezuela, he said.

“You can’t look at each COCOM as a unique function that only deals with that territory, because all problems are global,” Hyten asserted.

In that context, the recent proposal to move responsibilities with Israel from U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command is not a “fundamental change” in the construct, he said.

On the subject of refreshing the North American Aerospace Defense Command, Hyten said the U.S. and Canada need to “sit down together and figure out what aerospace defense really means. Let’s look at the threats and what we have to do,” and then decide if NORAD is doing too much or too little, and whether it is too big or too small. That should drive decisions on how and what to modernize it, he said.

“You don’t modernize just to modernize. You modernize to do something, and the only way to [do that] is to figure out what that is,” Hyten said. Absent that step, “Modernization just means, we want you to build new stuff for all your old stuff.”

The U.S. has not “done a good job of understanding the hybrid threat, and therefore we haven’t done a good job of responding” to it, Hyten said of Russia’s mix of information and kinetic warfare.

Russia “and others” see hybrid warfare as “another means … to their end state.” Russia is “trying to change the perception of others around the world … They believe they can walk up to a line and not cross the line and still achieve their objectives in the ‘gray zone’” of influence.

The U.S. and its allies needs to “open our eyes and realize … that is a strategy. We have to study it just like we study conventional warfare or … nuclear warfare, just like we’ve studied counterterrorism.” If hybrid is not treated with the same discipline of analysis and response, “you will not be effective … because it is a focused effort by a nation-state in trying to challenge the West,” he said.

Hyten said his biggest concern is that “we have not taken a fresh look at it, and therefore, everybody’s idea of how to deal with it is based on their own perceptions … That’s not how we deal with every other element of warfare, but somehow that’s what we’ve fallen into.”

China and Russia have to be faced with “open eyes,” Hyten said, and dealt with based not on wishful thinking but their behavior.

“It’s important to be realistic,” he warned. “If [China is] building a nuclear triad … [and] massive and powerful space capabilities, if they’re building and using cyber capabilities inside the United States [and Canada], they’re doing it for a reason. They’re not doing it because it’s … kind of fun.” America’s adversaries are “using enormous amounts of national treasure to build things that basically threaten the West; not just the United States …To threaten the liberal order that was developed after World War II, that we’ve operated under for the last eight decades.”

The COVID crisis has been a revelation about China, Hyten said.

“We saw China show their true colors,” he asserted. “They still have not been transparent about what happened in Wuhan. They still have not been transparent in helping the world deal with the virus … They still have not been transparent on supplies.” The U.S. and its allies need to view China “not just from a [physical] security perspective—am I going to be attacked—but what are the other elements going on that impact our everyday existence? And China over the last year has not helped the world in our everyday existence, and they still aren’t. So it’s important that we open our eyes and understand that.”

Likewise, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shouldn’t be ignored, he said, but all its aggressions looked at “with open eyes” and realism.

Hyten said he “hasn’t fixed the problem” of injecting far greater speed into the joint requirements process, something he hopes to advance in his last months in the job. He noted that in 2000, the military moved from a threat-based process to a capabilities-based system, wherein it was reasoned that, “if we just develop the capabilities, we’ll be able to stay ahead of any adversaries as far in the future as you can see.” That approach, though, led to a risk aversion that drove all decisions to the Pentagon “and away from the field,” slowing things down and building an elaborate bureaucracy.

“We have to get back to the way we did it in the 1950s,” he said, explaining that Thule Air Base, Greenland—with an early warning radar, 10,000-foot runway, two hangars for B-52s, and a town for 2,500 people—was built “in 91 days, … 600 miles from the North Pole” at the order of former head of Strategic Air Command, Gen. Curtis LeMay, and held up for many decades of use. The Pentagon needs to emulate that and delegate authorities to lower levels “and allow people to do their job.”

His goal is to tell the services, “Here’s your joint requirement, just go build it, and go fast. That’s what we’re trying to do. It’s frustrating, but we should all take ownership of the fact that we’ve become bureaucratic and slow, and we have adversaries that move very fast.”

Austin to Head to the Pacific in First Overseas Trip

March 10, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on March 13 leaves on his first international trip, aimed at “revitalizing” relationships with Indo-Pacific allies while top U.S. diplomats will meet with Chinese officials.

Austin will begin the trip by visiting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, at a time when INDOPACOM is pushing for a large increase in its deterrent fund. In Japan, he will join Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken for a meeting with their Japanese defense and foreign affairs counterparts.

Austin and Blinken will also meet with South Korea’s foreign minister and minister of defense, according to a Pentagon statement. Then, in India, Austin will meet with that country’s minister of defense and other senior leaders “to discuss deepening the U.S.-India major defense partnership” and discuss other ways to increase cooperation, according to the statement.

Pentagon spokesman John F. Kirby told reporters March 10 the trip is “about working to revitalize our alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.” The majority of the U.S.’s treaties are with countries in the region, and the Defense Department wants to “re-energize our commitment to those treaty alliances.”

“We know we need strong allies, and partners, and friends in that part of the world, and there’s a lot going on,” Kirby said. Meanwhile, on March 18, Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan will meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi, the director of China’s Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, in Anchorage, Alaska, according to a State Department release.

Watchdog Report Highlights ‘High Risk’ Areas of Afghan Reconstruction

March 10, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

The rate of Taliban violence continues to rise despite the now one-year-old peace deal aimed at ending the war in Afghanistan, and the Afghan military still struggles with maintaining its equipment and readiness, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

SIGAR on March 10 released its 2021 “High Risk List,” which outlines specific areas of the U.S. government’s $143 billion reconstruction effort in the country. The report comes as the U.S. military considers abiding by the guidelines of the February 2020 peace deal, which calls for a full withdrawal by May.

“Although Afghanistan’s leadership have often stated that their goal is self-reliance, Afghanistan today is nowhere near to being self-reliant—especially in funding its government operations, including military and police—from its own resources,” the report states. “And, as highlighted in our report, reconstruction aid helps keep Afghanistan from reverting to a terrorist safe haven.”

There are between 55,000 and 85,000 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, and their attacks have increased since the deal was signed. Each quarter of 2020 saw more enemy-initiated attacks compared to the same time in 2019, the report states.

John F. Sopko, the head of SIGAR, spoke at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event on March 10 outlining the report, highlighting specific shortfalls in the Afghan government and military that puts the U.S. in a difficult position.

The Pentagon estimates the Afghan military will need about $4.3 billion for fiscal 2021, and the Afghan government itself expects to contribute $610 million. While this total seems “paltry” in comparison to the American share, it still represents about 24 percent of Afghanistan’s total domestic revenue, Sopko said.

As such, the Defense Department no longer considers the goal of having Afghanistan’s military being self-sufficient by 2024 to be “realistic.” The Afghan government “still cannot manage money it currently receives from international donors,” he said.

Currently, there are about 18,000 Defense Department contractors in Afghanistan—6,000 of whom are American, 7,000 are third-country nationals, and the last 5,000 Afghans. The Afghan military relies on U.S. contractors to maintain equipment and supply chains. The Afghan National Army, for example, conducts less than 20 percent of its own maintenance work, relying on contractors for the rest.

The Afghan Air Force also heavily relies on contractors to maintain its fleet. A further drawdown of contractors and closure of bases would “effectively end all in-country aviation training contracts,” he said.

Without contract support, “No Afghan airframe could be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months,” Sopko said.

Retiring from Service? Take Advantage of Your FEDVIP Enrollment Period

March 9, 2021

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is proud to welcome retiring members of the uniformed services to the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP).

Sponsored by OPM, FEDVIP is a voluntary, enrollee-pay-all dental and vision insurance program. It replaced the former TRICARE Retiree Dental Program (TRDP). In general, retired uniformed service members, their families, and survivors are eligible for FEDVIP dental coverage and, if enrolled in a TRICARE health plan, FEDVIP vision coverage. Please note: Opportunities to enroll outside of open season are limited.

Retiring uniformed service members are considered newly eligible for FEDVIP. This includes Retired Reserve members who are age 60 and older and under age 60 (gray area reservists) not yet receiving retired pay.

If you’re retiring from the uniformed services, you have a 91-day enrollment window to enroll in a FEDVIP dental and/or vision plan. You may enroll between 31 days prior to your military

retirement date and 60 days following. It’s important to remember, enrollment is not automatic. If you choose to enroll in FEDVIP, you must enroll prior to your military retirement date to prevent a gap in dental coverage between your active duty or reserve dental plan and your FEDVIP plan. If you do not enroll within 60 days from your retirement date, you must wait until the next open season.

FEDVIP is popular among the more than 3.5 million people already enrolled in the program, giving the program high marks for quality and value. With 12 dental and 5 vision carriers to choose from, FEDVIP offers great flexibility when selecting the right coverage for you and your family, such as:

regional dental plans as well as nationwide dental and vision plans with international coverage
most plans feature both high and standard options
a choice between three enrollment types: self, self plus one, or self and family

To familiarize yourself with the program, explore BENEFEDS.com/military. BENEFEDS is the secure online portal to enroll in FEDVIP, to research FEDVIP’s current list of carriers and plans, and use the plan comparison tool to view rates, benefits, and coverage information.

Don’t miss this opportunity! Consider including the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP) in your retirement plan today.

BENEFEDS is administered by Long Term Care Partners, LLC, with oversight by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.

DOD Extends Guard Presence at U.S. Capitol

March 9, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin on March 9 approved an extension of the National Guard deployment to the U.S. Capitol complex for about two months.

National Guard troops have been deployed to the building to help U.S. Capitol Police with security in the aftermath of the January 6 insurrection, and the police department has requested an extension of the presence as there are concerns about continued threats. The extension includes about 2,300 troops, about half the amount that had been deployed, according to a Pentagon statement.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said March 9 that a formal request had been working its way through the building. The current deployment was set to end on March 12.

Kirby said the deployment is to help the Capitol Police “fill some of the gaps” in that department’s capabilities across the complex. He would not speculate if the deployment would be further extended, but said that as the police “look at themselves as an institution” and what they need in the long term, the Guard could help.

The deployment of the troops, from Jan. 6 to the end of this week, is expected to cost about $500 million, according to the Associated Press.

Editor’s note: This story was updated at 7:35 p.m. March 9 to reflect that the deployment extension had been approved.

KC-46s Could Be Available for Limited Ops As Early as June

March 9, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

U.S. Transportation Command is looking to integrate the KC-46 into operations as soon as June, following Air Mobility Command’s move to free up the troubled tanker for ops to relieve stress on legacy refuelers.

TRANSCOM boss Army Gen. Stephen R. Lyons recently visited KC-46 officials at McConnell Air Force Base, Kan., and said he is “encouraged by recent (Air Force) efforts that will make the KC-46 available for limited mission requirements as soon as June,” the command said in a Twitter statement.

The statement is an update from Air Mobility Command’s announcement Feb. 24 that it would clear the KC-46 to be tasked by TRANSCOM this year. AMC boss Gen. Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, in announcing the step, said it would be a conditions-based process, with the aircraft only tasked with missions it has been cleared to fly in operational testing. This could include U.S.-based refueling of certain aircraft, or overseas missions to refuel deploying fighters—such as F/A-18s—using the centerline drogue system.

“We will now commit the KC-46 to execute missions similar to the ones they’ve been conducting over the past few years in the Operational Test and Evaluation plan, but can now include operational taskings from U.S. Transportation Command,” Van Ovost told reporters. “For example, today the KC-46 may provide aerial refueling for F-16s participating in a U.S.-based training exercise. Under this new approach, if AMC is tasked to provide AR support for an operational coronet mission to move F-18s overseas or an operational B-52 mission, the KC-46 is on the table, which frees up KC-135s and KC-10s to execute other combatant command deployments that the KC-46A is presently unable to support with its existing deficiencies.”

The aging KC-135s and KC-10s are heavily tasked with overseas combat deployments, along with a constant need to support training, exercises, and testing at home. By making KC-46s available to TRANSCOM, those crews would be more available for required combat missions or be able to spend more time resting and training at home. KC-46s would not be used for combat deployments until cleared after the installation of the improved remote vision system, expected to begin in 2023.

The Air Force has received 44 KC-46s, and expects to have 60 by the end of the year, as it builds to the total fleet of 179.