HASC’s Smith: U.S. Should Abandon Quest for Military Preeminence

HASC’s Smith: U.S. Should Abandon Quest for Military Preeminence

April 22, 2021 | By Shaun Waterman

The U.S. military needs to wake up to the fact that global dominance is no longer a viable strategy for national defense, because pursuing that unrealizable goal is making the country less safe, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said April 22.

Emerging defense technologies like swarms of cheap, attritable drones have ended the era of unipolarity and U.S. military preeminence, Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash) told the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t just be so big and bad that no one’s going to take you on, because they can take you on with a tiny little drone,” he said. Earlier this year, U.S. Central Command boss Marine Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. called the proliferation of small, cheap commercial drones, “the most concerning tactical development” since the rise of the improvised explosive device in Iraq 15 years ago. He said concerns were amplified by the lack of dependable, affordable countermeasures.

“Swarms of these drones … [costing] next to nothing, can deliver more firepower than an F-35, which can’t get into the zone because of the surface-to-air missiles that are guarding it,” said Smith, painting a bleak picture of “a situation where maybe we’ve got $100 billion worth of airplanes that can’t get in after our adversaries, but they can kick the crap out of us with $75,000 worth of drones.”

Smith highlighted Russia’s ability to achieve similar asymmetric strategic capabilities “on the cheap” through hacking and disinformation campaigns as an example of the eroding barriers to entry into global geopolitical competition.

“In the world we live in today, no one [nation] is going to dominate because the barriers to entry are so low. So you’ve got to be a lot more nimble, a lot smarter, and a lot more diversified in how you achieve your national security objectives,” he said.

Discussing the National Defense Strategy, Smith noted that, though it purported to recognize the end of U.S. global military preeminence, it didn’t actually deal with the consequences of that transformed situation. “It was an admission [that the era of unipolar dominance is over], but it wasn’t a transition into an actual policy that recognizes the true implications of that admission,” he said.

As a consequence, the NDS was “overly ambitious, and therefore makes it very difficult for us to actually accomplish anything. Because it just envisions a world that is impossible. So we’re constantly chasing our tail, and unable to do what [the NDS] says we’re supposed to be able to do. That needs to get more realistic.”

He said that, rather than seeking to dominate all its adversaries, the U.S. military should look for ways to change their calculus, to make it clear that conflict was not in their interests. “Deterrence, not dominance, is what I’m really kind of looking at us being able to do here,” he said.

In his remarks, Smith also expressed frustration with a lack of urgency from the White House when it came to President Biden’s fiscal 2022 budget proposal. “Now I know from the White House perspective, we don’t need to pass the budget till Oct. 1, so what’s the rush?”

But if the budget doesn’t arrive in Congress before May 10, he explained, there wouldn’t be enough legislative days on the calendar to draft and properly markup the annual defense appropriations and policy bills before the fiscal year starts Oct. 1. That would make the now annual ritual of a continuing resolution, at least for the first month or so of the new fiscal year, inevitable, he said. “There is not time to get through the legislative process if we don’t get this thing before May 10.”

Smith added that he expected Congress to “waste enormous amounts of time fighting over whether or not we’ve got to add a few more dollars or cut a few more dollars.” Arguing over the top line budget number misses the point, he noted.

Smith, who last month called the F-35 a “rathole” and suggested the Defense Department stop buying the fifth-generation fighter, said there needed to be less attention paid to the overall budget number and more focus on getting value for money for every dollar spent.

“The culture at the Pentagon needs a lot of work,” he said. “They don’t encourage individual decisions, they encourage process. And process takes time … If you’ve got to go up 10 levels of command before you can make that decision, by the time you get up there, software has changed and you need something else.”

“I want the Pentagon to feel some measure of physical pain every time they spend a dollar. And I want them to just make sure that they do it in the most cost effective, intelligent way because they just want to get the most out of it, not because they know Congress will always come along and just throw them a bunch more money and paper over the problem.”

But he ended his remarks on a note of optimism, saying “I have never in my 24 years [in Congress] been in a situation where there seemed like more hope, more urgency to make those changes.”

He said a recent briefing on the B-21 bomber had been unexpectedly encouraging. Smith said he had been joking with colleague Rep. Derek Kilmer (D-Wash.) as they went in. “They’re going to tell me that it’s on time, it’s under budget, and it’s performing better than they expected … And I of course, was being a wise ass. But it turned out to be the case.”

He said the B-21 program team had “learned the lessons of the F-35 … They’re making it work in a very intelligent way.”

By spending more upfront to buy out the vendor’s technology “to own that [intellectual property], … you can avoid vendor lock-in long term” and save money down the road, he said.

Strike Options Should Compete on Cost Effectiveness, Study Says

Strike Options Should Compete on Cost Effectiveness, Study Says

April 22, 2021 | By Tobias Naegele

The proliferation of long-range strike options under development across all the U.S. armed forces should prompt a comprehensive review by civilian leaders, a new report by two influential think tanks concludes. 

The civilian review should ensure theater commanders have the most cost-effective mix of options available should they be needed in a peer fight, while eliminating duplicative capabilities, said Mark Gunzinger, director of future concepts and capability assessments at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies; Lukas Autenried, a Mitchell analyst; and Bryan Clark, director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute. 

Titled “Understanding the Long-Range Strike Debate,” the report argues that while a mix of options is always advantageous, the true cost of those options must be well understood and the opportunity cost of pursuing more options could deprive commanders of better options over time. It was unveiled at a virtual Aerospace Nation event April 22.

“Our report coming out today is not about the parochial interests of any particular service,” Gunzinger said. The problem is not a lack of new weapons options, but rather too many. “All of the services are pursuing new capabilities to meet [today’s] shortfall. We recommend [the Defense Department] take a balanced approach to filling its long-range strike shortfall, which, quite frankly, was created by its failure to acquire next-generation strike weapons and platforms over the past few decades.” 

Clark said having a range of land-based, sea-based, and air-launched strike options can be valuable, citing recent comments by both Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John E. Hyten and the newly confirmed commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. John C. Aquilino. 

“Having ground-based fires does support some advantages,” Clark said. “They’re more persistent. They don’t necessarily require as much overhead … so they can provide this ability to deter or impact the adversaries’ thinking in advance of conflict—in a way that air-delivered fires or surface-delivered fires [from ships] don’t necessarily do.” However, he added, those advantages evaporate in a contested environment. 

Naval strike capabilities are significantly more expensive, carrying the costs of shipbuilding and a large crew, while potentially getting closer to an adversary, he said. But in a conflict with China, with its own large naval force and long-range anti-access/area denial weaponry, Clark said, U.S. ships may be preoccupied defending themselves and unable to focus on long-range missions. 

Another aspect of what Clark calls “overhead” is the command and control needed to manage long-range strike. “One of the overhead items that you have to think about for strike is, how do you get the targeting information to the shooter? And how do you get the commander in there to be able to make a decision on whether to shoot or not, and what to target?” Clark said. 

The Air Force, Navy, and Space Force are already there, while the Army would have to develop something new. He questioned the Army’s plan to develop its own tactical space network as “pretty redundant to what has already been pursued by the Space Development Agency, the Space Force, and DARPA, and also in the commercial world.” 

The cost of individual weapons is also a factor. While an aircraft costs more to build and operate than a land-based launcher, the cost comparison of the munitions is the opposite. Like a cheap ink-jet printer, where the up-front cost is less but the cartridges are expensive, it’s only cost-effective if used sparingly. “Costs stack up really fast,” said Autenried. “That doesn’t mean there aren’t targets that are so high value and so important that it’s worth actually spending that money to go strike them, but those are going to be few and far between.”  

This is why a cost-effectiveness analysis is so important, Gunzinger said. “When most people talk about cost, they tend to think about the unit cost to buy a weapon, or a jet, or ship, or whatever,” he said. “But what matters more is the cost to complete a specific task, like destroying a target or achieving a mission kill that renders a target incapable of continuing operations. That’s what a cost effectiveness analysis would get.”

Such an analysis must take into account “the cost of weapons expended to achieve those effects, the cost of the launch platform, the logistics needed to sustain them, and then the costs to defend them and their operating locations against enemy attacks,” Gunzinger said. 

Clark agreed. “If we think we’re going to be faced with a situation where a few weapons might be needed to be launched, well, an Army missile battery may be the cheapest way to do that,” he said. “It doesn’t require a ton of defenses, doesn’t have the infrastructure or the fuel farms or anything else to protect, so … it gives you some escalation options at a lower level instead of having to flow bombers in to attack Mainland China. …. But once things become contested, they’re very hard to defend.” Airpower would then be more cost-effective. “Bombers could be coming from a more distant base that doesn’t require as much defense.”

CENTCOM Looks to Help Afghans Maintain Aircraft After Withdrawal

CENTCOM Looks to Help Afghans Maintain Aircraft After Withdrawal

April 22, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

U.S. Central Command is searching for “innovative” ways to help the Afghan Air Force turn wrenches on their planes after U.S. and coalition forces withdraw from the country, though the command’s boss acknowledges it’s not going to be easy.

“The U.S. contractors will come out as we come out. That is part of the plan [to] withdraw that we have in place right now,” CENTCOM boss Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. said during an April 22 Pentagon briefing. “We’re examining alternatives to assist the Afghans in their maintenance effort from a distance. I don’t want to minimize that problem or make it appear to be easier than it’s going to be.”

There are about 17,000 contractors in Afghanistan today, and the Afghan Air Force relies heavily on U.S. contractors from companies such as Sierra Nevada Corp. to keep their aircraft flying. The contract presence is so critical that in March, John F. Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said that without contract support, “no Afghan airframe could be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months.”

McKenzie said the Afghan Air Force has proven to be a “very, very important force multiplier for the Afghan military. They fly effectively, they deliver ordnance, and they’re actually a deal changer in many ways in the fight against the Taliban.”

He is concerned because the airplanes require continuous maintenance from trained maintainers, and “if we leave, we’re gonna have to find a way to replace them.”

“Aircraft maintenance, … you have to do it every day,” he said. “It requires engagement every day in order to do that.”

Remote video conferencing with U.S. contractors living outside the country is one option being considered to help Afghan maintainers work on the aircraft, while in-depth maintenance can be done at a centralized location.

“We’re going to try all kinds of innovative ways,” McKenzie said. “The one thing I can tell you is we’re not going to be there on the ground with them. We want them to be successful, that remains a very high priority.”

HASC Won’t Plus Up F-35 Request in Fiscal 2022 Budget

HASC Won’t Plus Up F-35 Request in Fiscal 2022 Budget

April 22, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

The 97 F-35s added to service budgets over the last five years are a “self-inflicted wound,” as they have played havoc with sustainment, House Armed Services Committee tactical air and land forces and readiness panel leaders said in a joint April 22 hearing. They vowed not to compound the problem by adding extra jets beyond the services’ requests in the fiscal 2022 budget, and perhaps not thereafter.

“I can assure you that this year, if anybody suggests a plus-up” of service requests for F-35 fighters, “there will be one hell of a fight, and I don’t propose to lose it,” said Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.), chair of the readiness subcommittee, who offered similar warnings at a recent hearing of his own subcommittee. Garamendi said he has “allies” in his thinking.

Tac Air chairman Rep. Donald Norcross (D-N.J.) voiced the committee’s concern that sustainment of the F-35 is far exceeding what the services have budgeted, and it’s “unaffordable” in the case of the Air Force.

The problem could “result in a 47 percent reduction in the Air Force planned inventory goal of 1,763 aircraft, just to remain in their budget,” Norcross said.

If the program “continues to fail to significantly control and reduce” sustainment costs, “we may need to invest in other, more affordable programs, and backfill an operational shortfall of potentially over 800 fighters.” Norcross noted that “we don’t have unlimited resources” and that he “would not support any request for additional aircraft beyond what is contained in this year’s President’s Budget request.”

In recent years, the Air Force has requested 48 F-35s a year, but Congress has upped that to 60. Witnesses in the hearing said the additional aircraft strained the repair, sustainment, and depot system with unplanned volume, and also challenged parts and materials vendors to meet the demands of both production and maintenance.

Garamendi drew a breath and said, “I’m going to … try to contain my anger at what is going on here.” The F-35 is “over budget, fails to deliver on promised capabilities, [and] mission capability rates do not even begin to meet the service threshholds.”

He warned witnesses, “the easy days of the past are over.” The “industry solution” of asking taxpayers “to throw money at the problem … will not happen.” He vowed that the F-35’s sustainment issues will be addressed and “resolved in this committee, this year.” Witnesses included Gregory M. Ulmer, Lockheed Martin vice president for aeronautics; Matthew F. Bromberg, president of Pratt & Whitney military engines; Joint Program Office Director Lt. Gen. Eric T. Fick; Air Force F-35 Integration Office Director Brig. Gen. David W. Abba, and the Government Accountability Office’s Diana Maurer, director of military structure and operations issues.

Asked to estimate the additional costs of the extra jets, Fick said “100 extra aircraft, at 250 hours [per year is] 25,000 extra hours,” at a cost, in today’s dollars, of over $41,000 per hour.

“That is added sustainment cost being borne by the services that they otherwise wouldn’t have to bear,” he said. This has “hurt us from a supply perspective.”

Maurer put the 47 percent overage in context:

“If, starting tomorrow, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney announced that all spare parts would be free for the rest of the program, that still would not be sufficient to close the gap” in sustainment costs. “Bottom line, …the services have a plane they cannot afford to fly; at least not in the way they want to fly it, long term.”

There are three possible ways forward, she said.

  1. “Squeeze more cost savings” out of the program, which she said would be difficult because the structure of fees, sustainability rates, and other measures are “baked in,” and were based on optimistic thinking 20 years ago.
  2. “Take a hard look at requirements” in terms of flying hours, readiness, and the number of aircraft to be bought. These are “significant tradeoffs,” she allowed, adding that GAO does not have a position on any of those tradeoffs.
  3. “Simply … spend more.” The sustainment targets were set by the services, and they can change them, she said. But that could potentially cost “billions more. That could potentially crowd out other priorities.” She advised Congress to “pay close attention to how the program is closing these capability gaps when you decide how many new aircraft to purchase.”

Ulmer noted that Lockheed and the JPO have pushed to open 60 depots by 2030. Although that will help with repair and rework, it also has taxed the availability of spares and trained maintainers because they are spread out over a greater number of locations.

“This is at the heart of why we have a supply problem,” Fick observed. “We also had a couple of years were we didn’t buy any spares, and that hurt us, too.”

As production hits peak, and “as we crest that wave, and we’re leveling out, we’ve proven we can make” the ordered number of aircraft. “We just need to settle at that rate, allow the system to recover, deliver the parts that we need, follow through with our commitments to stand up the organic depots inside the U.S. and [overseas], that will help us from a global capacity perspective to fill out the solution around the world.”

Garamendi slightly softened his tone at the end of the hearing, thanking the managers for their efforts and saying, “We’re all in this together.”

Military Officials Defend Triad, Warn Lawmakers That Nuclear Modernization Can No Longer Be Delayed

Military Officials Defend Triad, Warn Lawmakers That Nuclear Modernization Can No Longer Be Delayed

April 22, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

The Air Force and U.S. Strategic Command know there’s going to be critical looks at the service’s plans for nuclear modernization, they just want to lay some things out first.

“I’m a big fan of a debate,” said Lt. Gen. James C. Dawkins Jr., the deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, during an AFA Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies virtual event on April 22. “I think we need to have a national debate. It’s something that we have not had, necessarily, in the past. And these weapons are so important to our defense of our nation that it’s good to have this debate. But I’ll caveat that with it needs to be an informed debate.”

As the new Congress begins deliberations on the budget and the Biden administration plans a new Nuclear Posture Review, STRATCOM and USAF are publicly laying the groundwork for this discussion, saying:

“The challenge is because our nation has deferred modernization several times over the past 20-30 years, delivering these programs on time is critical to our strategic deterrent,” Dawkins said. “I want to reinforce: all the Air Force programs are on track.”

The Requirement for GBSD

The biggest target for cuts in nuclear modernization has been the ICBM leg of the triad, and the Air Force’s Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, which will replace the Minuteman III and upgrade silos and alert stations.

STRATCOM boss Adm. Charles A. Richard, in two Capitol Hill hearings and a press briefing, repeatedly said though USAF maintainers have been essentially practicing magic to keep the Cold War-era missiles and ground systems viable, the margin has depleted. The Air Force has told STRATCOM it can keep the Minuteman III viable to the initial operational capability date of GBSD, which is set now for 2029.

“I am fully confident that they are able to go do that,” Richard said during an April 22 press conference. “What I’m trying to point out is, that if you want to push that further, you are going into uncharted territory. We may be able to chart that territory, but there is an enormous amount of detail that has to go into that, and the only organization that I know who is capable of working through all of that detail is the United States Air Force. … It’s not simply a matter of saying, ‘Well, the rocket will work and a couple of other things.’ It’s a weapon system” that has many components that are aging out and unable to be replaced.

As an example, Richard noted there are switches in use in the alert stations that cannot be replaced. To cut GBSD and instead life-extend Minuteman III, components like that will have to be re-engineered with vendors starting new production to make old parts.

“I want us to recognize that you can’t indefinitely life-extend anything,” Richard said. “You can’t take stuff that you got back at the end of the Cold War and to think somehow, forever, you can continue to make it work, right? There’s a point where it becomes not cost effective to do that. And there’s another point out there where it’s not possible at all. And I want to make sure that as we think through these decisions, we recognize that those points exist and look for them.”

The Pentagon has repeatedly looked at the feasibility and affordability of extending the life of the Minuteman III instead of the GBSD, notable in 2014 with a full analysis of alternatives. That effort, along with reviews at every milestone of the GBSD program, has shown it is “more expensive to life-extend Minuteman III than it is to continue on with GBSD,” Dawkins said.

While extending the old system would require new vendors and suppliers for the old parts, GBSD is using new design efforts such as digital engineering to produce a system that is entirely modernized.

“Why would we want to spend more money to life-extend Minuteman III and not have increased safety, not have increased security, not have increased effectiveness or increased reliability that we’re getting with GBSD?” Dawkins said.  

Some on Capitol Hill have criticized the funding for replacing Minuteman III, arguing the money is better suited for other DOD programs or priorities outside of the military, and that keeping the current system viable is better than a complete overhaul.

But Dawkins argued that the system has not “really been modernized” since 1980, so it needs to be maintained now while going forward with modernization efforts.

NC3 and B-21

While there is partisan disagreement on modernizing ICBMs, Dawkins said, “If there’s one bipartisan issue that everybody can jump on and support it’s (nuclear command and control). Whether you have 10 or 1,550 nuclear weapons as dictated by New START, without a reliable and secure NC3 system, you really don’t have a deterrent.”

“The NC3 enterprise is very complex, and it’s going to take some time to continue ensuring that it is always there for our worst day so that no matter what, the President can get his direction down to the force,” Dawkins said.

The Air Force’s new B-21 Raider nuclear bomber, set to replace the B-1 and B-2, is a bright spot in military acquisition because it is “on track, it’s doing well,” Dawkins said. When it comes online, the B-21 will have increased capabilities over the current stealth B-2 while also in greater numbers. The service’s current bomber fleet is 141 airplanes total, including B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s. The service eventually plans a force of 75 B-52s and “no less than” 100 B-21s, but the Air Force wants that number to go up.

“We’re really hoping for about 145-ish B-21s because we think that the bombers are just such a valuable part of our nation’s defense, not only from a nuclear standpoint but just as important from the conventional standpoint,” Dawkins said. Through efforts such as bomber task force deployments, “We look bigger than we actually are because we’ve got bombers that are able to range across the world unimpeded by places to land. Basically, they can take off from the United States, they can fly (refueled by) tankers, and they can strike any target on the globe and come back to the United States. So they don’t need basing rights, like so many of our other platforms. And so if you really want the definition of long-range fires, or what we call long-range strike, the bomber already proves that capability.”

USAF Releases New Airpower Doctrine

USAF Releases New Airpower Doctrine

April 22, 2021 | By Amy Hudson

The Air Force released a new doctrine that outlines the basic tenets of airpower, how and why the service fights, and reiterates the Air Force core values of “integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.”

In an email to retired and active general officers, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., said the doctrine serves as a “new cornerstone of airpower philosophy.” The updated document, referred to as Air Force Doctrine Publication 1, or AFDP-1, distills two volumes of airpower doctrine (Volume 1 and Volume 2) down to 20 pages. It highlights the critical role of joint all-domain operations, looks to empower Airmen to challenge the status quo by rapidly putting innovative new ideas into action, and makes the Air Force’s new Agile Combat Employment strategy a foundational operating concept.

Notably, the new doctrine focuses solely on the importance and role of airpower, leaving space doctrine to the U.S. Space Force—the newest military service, which falls under the Department of the Air Force. However, it notes that “all services have equities in cyberspace,” Brown wrote in the email.

“In today’s complex global security environment, victory goes to the rapid integrator of ideas. These ideas are driven by training and the distilled knowledge all Airmen bring to the fight,” Brown wrote in the publication’s introduction. “I’m relying on every Airman to innovate and incorporate concepts and technologies that will develop new best practices to shape future doctrine. We must prioritize and make difficult choices as we field a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting joint force. Leaders must push decisions to the lowest competent, capable level using doctrine as a foundation for sound choices.”

Brown doesn’t want the service to “reinvent the wheel” with each new contingency or operation, saying doctrine should serve as a “starting point” and all Airmen have a responsibility to learn from it and understand it.

“Doctrine is an opportunity to educate, empower, and prepare for the future fight,” wrote Brown. “It guides us but does not bind us. I’m relying on every Airman to understand the lessons of doctrine, and then draw on them to innovate and incorporate concepts and technologies that will develop new best practices to share future doctrine. This is how we solve difficult problems, make necessary changes, and how we accelerate change in our Air Force.”

The new doctrine further elaborates on Brown’s cornerstone “Accelerate Change or Lose” white paper, released shortly after he took the helm as the service’s top uniformed officer in August 2020. Like the white paper, the new doctrine acknowledges that U.S. adversaries are rapidly pushing out advanced technologies that could “reduce airpower’s ability to conduct global operations across the competition continuum, reduce freedom of maneuver, and challenge the Air Force’s ability to operate.” Brown reiterates that this new operating environment requires all Airmen to understand their enemy: how they think, plan, decide, and act across all domains.

The doctrine maintains the Air Force’s role is to provide global vigilance, global reach, and global power with the goal of defending the homeland, remaining “the preeminent military power,” ensuring “the balance of power remain in our favor,” and advancing “international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.”

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass said in the doctrine that Airmen are what give the U.S. a “competitive edge” over its adversaries, and Airmen are “the reason we are the world’s greatest Air Force.”

The doctrine says “Every Airman is a leader,” whether they have command or not, and every Airman has the ability to influence others and accomplish the mission. It tasks Airmen with understanding the “breadth, scope, and uniqueness of airpower,” as well as what it brings to joint all-domain operations.

“Airpower is fundamentally distinct from other forms of military power. Its inherent flexibility allows it to be applied independently or in concert with other forms of military power. Airmen have a distinct point of view forged from air operations throughout history and our unique operating domains,” the doctrine states.

Specifically, the doctrine notes that Airmen support joint all-domain operations “in, from, and through” the air domain, the information environment—which includes cyberspace—and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The doctrine outlines seven tenets of airpower:

  • Mission command: The command and control of airpower. “Mission command is an approach to C2 that empowers subordinate decision-making for flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness in the accomplishment of commander’s intent.” The doctrine recognizes that there will be “uncertain, complex, and ambiguous elements” to warfare, and commanders must “accept prudent risk.”
  • Flexibility and versatility: Flexibility enables airpower to “seamlessly transition” between missions while simultaneously exploiting “the principles of mass and maneuver.” Versatility, on the other hand, is the “ability to employ airpower at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare.”
  • Synergistic effects: The coordinated force across multiple domains to affect an adversary’s intent and capability.
  • Persistence: Allows “forces to visit and revisit multiple targets without occupying terrain or remaining in proximity to areas of operation to bring force upon targets. Persistence denies an adversary an opportunity to seize the initiative or to directly accomplish assigned tasks,” according to the doctrine.
  • Concentration: “Focusing overwhelming power at a decisive time and place.”
  • Priority: With sometimes limited resources, airpower should be applied where it can make the biggest impact.  
  • Balance: “An air component commander should weigh combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly forces.”
After Leaving Somalia, U.S. Troops Now ‘Commuting to Work’ From Other Nations

After Leaving Somalia, U.S. Troops Now ‘Commuting to Work’ From Other Nations

April 22, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

Since U.S. forces withdrew from Somalia earlier this year, they have been “commuting to work” via aircraft to help train Somali troops and for potential counter terror missions, but without a ground presence there is limited intelligence understanding, the head of U.S. Africa Command told lawmakers.

In December 2020, former President Donald J. Trump ordered U.S. troops to leave Somalia and reposition at other bases in the region. In about 60 days, a task force of about 13,400 troops from around the globe came together and “executed this high-risk mission ahead of schedule,” AFRICOM boss Gen. Stephen J. Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee. This included USAF C-130s flying about 200 sorties, and moving 4 million pounds of cargo largely at night, Air Force Magazine has reported.

There is still a “limited footprint” of less than 100 troops remaining in Somalia with the U.S. embassy, and other forces are based at locations outside the country, such as Kenya and Djibouti. AFRICOM forces work virtually with partners from these bases, and “then we fly in to conduct training and to advise and assist our partners,” Townsend said.

U.S. troops have conducted four of these operations within the past 90 days, with one ongoing currently, Townsend said.

AFRICOM is “continually revising and improving the way we do that to make it as effective as we can,” he said. “There’s no denying that the repositioning of forces outside Somalia has introduced new layers of complexity and risk.”

Specifically, limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with less interaction with Somali forces, means “our understanding of what is happening in Somalia is less now than when we were there on the ground physically located with our partners,” he said. “So, we’re working to make this new mode of operation work.”

At the same time, the broader Defense Department is undergoing a global posture review focused on where U.S. forces should be deployed. AFRICOM is presenting options to Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on the way ahead in both Somalia and across Africa. Without getting ahead of the decisions, Townsend said his biggest requirements are having the right amount of personnel recovery and casualty evacuation where forces are located, enough ISR, and funding to help train partner nations.

Air Force to Upgrade MQ-9’s Mission and Capabilities for Near-Peer Fight

Air Force to Upgrade MQ-9’s Mission and Capabilities for Near-Peer Fight

April 21, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force is upgrading the MQ-9 Reaper fleet to give it new relevance against near-peers, make it more survivable, and extend its useful life another 10-15 years, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center announced. A delivery order contract covering 19 production aircraft to prime contractor General Atomics, worth $272.3 million, was awarded April 21.

The Reaper fleet’s mission “is now shifting” from providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/strike against Counter-Violent Extremist Organizations (C-VEOs) to missions in contested airspace, AFLCMC said.

The suite of new capabilities is “closely held,” but the first upgrade will be a self-protection anti-jam antenna system, the Air Force said. Other improvements will include Link 16, new weapons, “increased electric power,” and upgrades to the aircraft’s electro-optical and infrared systems. The aircraft will also have a new open-architecture design to facilitate rapid upgrades and improve “mission resiliency.”

Together, these improvements will shift the aircraft’s nomenclature to the MQ-9 Multi-Domain Operations (M2DO) system. The suite includes previous upgrades already installed on some MQ-9s, such as longer wings.

The service expects to have 71 MQ-9s upgraded to M2DO configuration. Retrofits are “already ongoing in the field,” AFLCMC said. The Air Force has about 270 MQ-9s, and the type also serves with three allied countries and are on order with three others.

A contract to cut-in the M2DO configuration on the General Atomics production line is still in negotiation and is expected to be awarded in January 2022, AFLCMC said.

“With these smart investments, the Air Force projects that MQ-9 will remain operationally viable through the end of the platform’s projected service life of 2035,” AFLCMC said in response to a query.

The service said it would not answer questions about an electronic warfare capability for the MQ-9 platform, despite the acknowledgment of an increased electrical power capability.

Air Combat Command “has directed us to add technology into the platform, which signals the MQ-9 can offer more capability than just C-VEO operations over the next 10 to 15 years,” said Lt. Col. Nick Jordan, AFLCMC Material Leader for MQ-9 Production and Retrofit. “It can remain relevant with these added and upgraded technologies.”

The upgrades will “allow the platform to offer a host of new capabilities for combatant commanders and warfighters around the world,” AFLCMC said in a press release.

Air Force leaders have said in recent years that they need an enhanced, low-observable aircraft—notionally, an “MQ-X”—to fill the Reaper’s ISR/strike mission in contested airspace. AFLCMC said that while the M2DO is underway, “the Air Force will continue to evaluate options to find a more viable solution in the future.”

JADC2 Strategy in Final Stages, With Unclassified Version Coming

JADC2 Strategy in Final Stages, With Unclassified Version Coming

April 21, 2021 | By Brian W. Everstine

The Pentagon’s overarching joint all-domain command and control strategy, a document outlining the entire Defense Department’s effort to link sensors and shooters together, will be presented to Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III in the coming days.

USMC Lt. Gen. Dennis A. Crall, the Joint Staff’s chief information officer who is overseeing the effort, said at C4ISRNET’s virtual conference April 21 that the strategy has been briefed to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley and is now going through edits, which will be done in days. With Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks already expressing support, the strategy should move forward quickly.

The JADC2 Strategy has been in the works for months, as the Air Force has progressed on its own Advanced Battle Management System effort along with the Army’s Project Convergence and the Navy’s Project Overmatch. The goal is to align these efforts and provide the framework for decision making going forward.

Crall said there will be a “pretty satisfying” unclassified version of the strategy released to improve the public’s understanding of the effort. This document has not been approved yet, but will outline the multiple lines of effort the strategy will address. Much of the line of effort focusing on the nation’s nuclear command and control apparatus will remain classified, but overall, “readers will be able to get the full sense of the direction JADC2 is heading, and maybe some of the delivery milestones that we’re looking to achieve.”

Following the release of the strategy, Crall said two other documents will quickly follow. The first is a posture review, or “gap analysis” that outlines what is missing in order to get to the strategy’s goals.

“That’s a pretty significant requirement for finding plans to make sure that these things are resourced properly,” he said.

Then, there will be an implementation plan to lay down the “plan of attack and milestones,” with specific delivery dates. “So really, the rubber meets the road in that document,” he said.