Facing Growing Threats, Space Industry Expands Its Cyber Warning Center

Facing Growing Threats, Space Industry Expands Its Cyber Warning Center

The Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center, a U.S. industry-run nonprofit that helps commercial space operators share data about cyberattacks and other threats, is expanding to the U.K. and other American allies, aiming to build a global organization that will protect civilian space assets as geopolitical tensions and the dangers of extra-terrestrial war grow. 

Set up five years ago in Colorado Springs, Space ISAC has a watch center where analysts from U.S. Space Command and ISAC member companies pore over real-time data feeds recording cyberattacks, space weather events, and other potential threats to satellites, and issue bulletins for members reporting imminent dangers and suggesting defensive measures. 

”From the very beginning, given the global nature of space infrastructure, and the space environment, we anticipated that Space ISAC would be a global organization, with partners all over the world,” Sam Visner, chairman of the Space ISAC board of directors, told Air and Space Forces Magazine. 

The move to the U.K. comes as the war in Ukraine, which opened with a cyber attack against the ground terminals of U.S. satellite operator Viasat, has provided repeated demonstrations of both the centrality of commercial space capabilities to modern warfare and their fragility.  

The Space ISAC have agreements in place to expand to Australia as well, Visner said, mentioning the AUKUS framework, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the U.K. and U.S. focused on defense technologies. Space ISAC is also looking to expand to Japan and possibly South Korea, he added, arguing that democracies have to work together in space. 

“We are allies and partners because our relationships are founded on our values,” Visner said. “There’s a lot we can gain from working with allies and partners, and we think they gain a lot from us.” 

The Space ISAC U.K. forum was established Oct. 10, Space ISAC Executive Director Erin Miller told Air and Space Forces Magazine. 

“That’s the process, first we have a forum, and then we start getting analysts assigned [to work in the watch center] and establish a [U.K.] hub for the watch center,” she said. The time difference would help extend the center’s hours of operation without having to assign analysts to work overnight. “It’s a ‘follow the sun’ model,” she said. 

In the U.S., the Space ISAC’s government partners assign analysts to work in the watch center, she said. It wasn’t clear whether that would also happen in the U.K., but there would be “bi-directional sharing” with government partners. She said that she expected U.K. members would be just as keen to assign analysts to their local watch center hub as their counterparts are in the U.S. 

“Usually they’re eager to do it,” she said, adding the posting offers unique opportunities for analysts to learn new skills and grow their knowledge base. “There’s not very many places you can go, if any, to learn cybersecurity, space, and intelligence all at the same time,” she said. 

One British executive, who wasn’t authorized to speak to the media, described the Space ISAC’s arrival in the U.K. as “the cavalry coming,” referencing the ISAC’s information-sharing portal and the other collaborative tools the organization offered. 

“We need these [collective defense] capabilities,” the executive said. 

The British military’s U.K. Space Command and its civilian counterpart, the U.K. Space Agency, through their National Space Operations Centre, provides bulletins for industry partners about space weather, space debris, and potential orbital conjunctions—where the orbital tracks of two different satellites come close enough that there’s the possibility of a collision. And the National Cyber Security Center, part of GCHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA, runs a Space Information Exchange which distributes a weekly email round up of relevant threat intelligence and cyber attack reporting. But executives say there’s no real time cyber warning service like the one Space ISAC offers available for the U.K. space sector.    

“It comes down to resources. … The government spending on space is an order of magnitude smaller than in the U.S.,” said Kevin Jones, a former RAF aviator who now works for CGI, a multinational IT services and products vendor headquartered in Canada.  

The U.S. government spent about $73 billion on space in 2023, according to Statista, out of a global spend by all governments worldwide of $117 billion. The UK government spent just $1.45 billion. 

The effects of that trickle down into the private sector, Jones explained. “In the U.S., you have the big primes, the 800-pound gorillas. In the UK, the space sector is about 1,700 companies and most of them are small- and medium-sized businesses,” he said.  

The resource issue isn’t just about money, Jones noted. “Another big difference between the UK and the U.S.o is that you have these federally funded research and development centers,” he said, referring to institutions like Mitre’s National Cybersecurity FFRDC and the Aerospace Corporation, both of which are members of the Space ISAC. “That independent advisory role is very important,” Jones said. 

CGI’s U.K. Space Defence and Intelligence business unit, which provides secure ground systems for space operators including the U.K. Space Agency and U.K. Space Command, is one of the first sign-ups for Space ISAC’s U.K. forum. 

“Obviously, we see the value in being able to contribute to and consume threat data whether it be about natural hazards or a man made cyber or electromagnetic attack against any of our systems in the space domain,” said Jones. 

CGI is sending one of its analysts to study at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs campus, taking a new course to train space information systems security officers. It’s the only training program designed to combine cybersecurity and space expertise, he said. “It’s brand new and it’s very exciting,” he said. 

The ISAC also represented a “fantastic opportunity” to learn more about the capabilities other companies were bringing to the table, said Jones. “The space sector is experiencing phenomenal growth. So keeping track of who is doing what in the sector, knowing who is bringing what to the party, that is a good value.” 

Jones added that CGI’s experience demonstrated all three of those value propositions: “We’ve raised our collective defense, because we can understand, identify and mitigate threats and attacks. We’ve improved our intellectual capacity. We’ve improved our ability to network and talk,” he said.  

Jones added that the expansion is not just timely, but badly needed.  

“Space ISAC is an industry-paid for, industry-led vehicle. Industry is taking responsibility to get after this problem,” said Jones. 

Thousands of North Korean Troops Prepping to Join War Against Ukraine, US Says

Thousands of North Korean Troops Prepping to Join War Against Ukraine, US Says

About 8,000 North Korean troops are in Russia’s Kursk region preparing to join the war against Ukraine, the Biden administration said Oct. 31. In its most complete estimates of North Korean support for Russia’s war thus far, officials said there are some 10,000 North Korean troops now in all of Russia.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken disclosed the troop levels at a press conference alongside their South Korean counterparts following annual security talks. 

South Korea was the first to cite North Korean troops traveling to Russia and the U.S. eventually confirmed the assessment. North Korea has provided millions of artillery shells and numerous ballistic missiles to Russia, according to U.S. and South Korean officials, but to this point, it had not provided troops. Participating in combat marks a major escalation of Pyongyang’s involvement. 

It is not yet clear what Russia is offering in return. Moscow could provide Pyongyang help with conventional and even nuclear weapons technology, the South Korean government has suggested.

“We’ve not yet seen these troops deploy into combat against Ukrainian forces, but we would expect that to happen in the coming days,” Blinken said. 

“Russia has been training DPRK soldiers in artillery, UAVs, basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, indicating that they fully intend to use these forces in front-line operations,” Blinken added, using the acronym for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

U.S. officials say the deployment of North Korean troops exposes Russian president Vladimir Putin’s desperate need for manpower. Russian forces are suffering more than 1,000 casualties per day, according to Western estimates, and the Kremlin wants to avoid the politically unpopular step of mobilizing more troops. 

The U.S. has not said how it plans to respond, saying it is consulting with allies.

“Make no mistake, if these North Korean troops engage in combat or combat support operations against Ukraine, they would make themselves legitimate military targets,” Austin said.

Whether that was an indication the U.S. might change its policy on its military support for Ukraine is unclear. A range of American adversaries—North Korea, Iran, and, to a lesser extent, China—have been providing arms to Russia or assisting Russia’s defense industry. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly appealed for permission to use American-made long-range weapons to strike inside of Russia. But the Biden administration has not allowed that, seeking to avoid escalation with Russia and downplaying the military utility of those weapons. 

South Korea, meanwhile, has raised the possibility that it could counter the North’s support for Russia by providing Ukraine with weapons made in South Korea. 

“We need to see the level of involvement of the DPRK forces in Russia, and we also need to watch what kind of quid pro quo the DPRK will be receiving from Russia,” South Korea’s foreign minister Cho Tae-yul said in the joint press conference. “So we will have to watch that before making a decision as to the weapons support that we will be providing to Ukraine.”

Update to Study Finds No Higher Cancer Rates in Missile Community

Update to Study Finds No Higher Cancer Rates in Missile Community

Based on an updated and expanded data set, the Air Force now says the preliminary statistics show no significant difference in cancer rates between Airmen who worked on nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles and the rest of the Air Force or the general population. 

That finding marks a change from eight months ago, when the service released results from the first phase of an epidemiological study showing increased rates of breast and prostate cancers among the missile community. 

However, still more data remains to be analyzed, and officials cautioned that final takeaways from the study are not yet determined. 

Officials shared their findings during a virtual town hall with scores of participants Oct. 31, the latest in a series of updates on the Missile Community Cancer Study that has been going on since March 2023.  

In addition to environmental sampling at ICBM bases, researchers from the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine are looking to see if missileers and other support forces are diagnosed with cancer at higher rates. In February, they released the results of “Phase 1A” of that study, which drew data from Department of Defense electronic medical records from 2001-2021, capturing those who were diagnosed with cancer through the Military Health System (MHS), including through the Tricare health insurance program. 

For “Phase 1B,” released Oct. 31, the study expanded to include data from Department of Veteran Affairs electronic medical records and both the Department of Defense and Department of Veteran Affairs’ cancer registries, going back as far as 1976 in some cases, said a USAFSAM official.

More data will be included in the future by pooling data from state cancer registries. 

“Phase 1 Bravo included considerably more data, capturing nearly 11 times more cancer cases compared to Phase 1 Alpha … The study team anticipates finding two to three times more cancers in Phase 2 using the virtual pulled registry,” the official said. “And no definitive conclusion should be drawn until Phase 2 is complete and all data sources have been incorporated.” 

Officials also noted one major change they made between Phase 1A and Phase 1B. 

“One significant adjustment required individuals to serve for a minimum of one year in the career field,” the official said. “Standard occupational cancer studies generally require a minimum of one-year duration of employment to be included in the analysis.”

This excluded some 205,000 previously included individuals, including 19,000 from missile-related career fields.

After adjusting for demographics and using slightly different metrics for comparing the missile community to the rest of the Air Force than it did with the general population, the results “suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in the incidence of most types of cancers” compared to the rest of the Air Force. Furthermore, compared to the general population, “almost all the standardized incidence ratios were less than 1.0, suggesting that the missile community had lower relative risk for developing these types of cancers.” 

Yet officials were quick to caution that their findings were not final. 

“The release of the preliminary information is just an attempt to be transparent, not definitive in the discovery journey yet,” said Col. Greg Coleman, AFGSC surgeon general. “We still have another 50 percent of the data to go through. So the data is instructive. But I just want to caution folks, don’t draw definitive conflict conclusions from the data yet, until the report is done and all the data analysis is done.” 

AFGSC boss Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere also sought to preempt concerns that the study was sweeping the missile community’s concerns aside, as previous studies in 2001 and 2005 did. 

“I sense in the community writ large that there is some skepticism based on the results of the 2001 and 2005 reports. I share, and I’ve been very vocal about my unsatisfaction with those two reports,” Bussiere said. “But this study, this effort, and this energy is significantly more focused and engaged than those two times.” 

DOD Investing in Tech for Base Defense and Drone Swarms

DOD Investing in Tech for Base Defense and Drone Swarms

The Pentagon’s science and technology office is investing to develop new solutions for defending far-flung bases, controlling satellites in space, and enabling autonomous drones to collaborate, said Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mission Capabilities Thomas Browning.

Browning’s office oversees the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER), launched in 2021 to tackle “joint problems, those areas that fall into the gaps,” he said at the Hudson Institute. The program funds prototyping and experiments for technologies that could later be transferred to the services, where they would become programs of record. 

RDER was created to answer needs identified by the Combatant Commands that couldn’t be answered with existing solutions. Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, speaking not long after the program started said it was, for “the first time, fulfilling a COCOM’s capability shortfall at the joint level.” 

Most RDRER projects are classified, but Browning did say the projects operated in two-year “classes,” with a focus on specific missions or challenges. The first “class” focused on long-range fires for the Pacific. Browning said RDER took on 23 projects, but did not offer further details except to say four of the 23 successfully transitioned to the services and will become programs of record. Another dozen or so could still move forward, he said. 

“Of 23, probably six-ish are not going to transition right away—that’s amazing math,” he said. But the Senate Appropriations Committee is less sanguine about RDER’s success. Its version of the 2025 defense spending bill, released in August, criticized RDER, saying it “could be better positioned” and failed to transition enough programs in 2023. That measure would cut funding. 

Browing professes confidence howerver, explaining that the program will take an “enduring look at the INDOPACOM fight” in 2025, empasizing disrupting adversary kill chains and assuring U.S. combat effectiveness. In 2024, the program focused on “underserved” categories, including contested logistics and base defense. 

“We got some amazing inputs,” Browning said. “We had inputs from the J4 where quite often logistics aren’t even allowed at the table. And so we got a nice list of very logistics-focused activities, a nice list of forward base defense activities, and we’re executing the prototyping on those right now.” 

Both are important to the Air Force. Air Mobility Command has spent months working on how to surge forces to the Pacific in the event of a conflict with China and concerns about base defense span the gamut, from combat commanders to mobility chiefs.  

The Air Force expects to disperse units to remote airfields, highlighting some of the issues RDER is trying to address: Base defense is an Army mission and the Air Force has been working with the Army for months to make that work. Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin, asked at the recent Military Reporters and Editors conference if the Air Force would be willing to share costs with the Army for air defense assets, demurred, as the primary mission for base air defense falls to the Army. 

Looking ahead to 2026, leaders just recently selected the two areas it will focus on: space control and support for the terrestrial fight, and autonomous collaboration. 

“How am I leveraging space to help that joint fight fully evolve” as low Earth becomes crowded with thousands of satellites, Browning said. “And then the second one … was this idea, if we’re going to put a whole bunch of unmanned vehicles out there in the forward edge of the fight, how are they not killing each other? How are they talking to each other? How are they synchronizing?” 

While the first of these projects will inevitably involve the Space Force, the matter of coordinating drones is of intense interest to the Air Force, which is developing Collaborative Combat Aircraft that can team with manned platforms. RDER, however, will focus on a missing capability in the U.S. arsenal, drones that work together “independent of human interaction.” Sometimes called drone swarms, these closely coordinated aircraft could be highly effective at shutting down airports or creating hazards to disrupt base operations.

Lockheed Ups Pace of F-35 Deliveries to New High to Start Clearing Backlog

Lockheed Ups Pace of F-35 Deliveries to New High to Start Clearing Backlog

Lockheed Martin is making good on predictions that it can deliver F-35 fighter jets at a rate of 20 per month, helping clear a backlog created by a yearlong hold on deliveries that was lifted in mid-July.

The contractor has also increased its estimate for how many F-35s it will deliver in calendar 2024.

A Lockheed spokesperson said that at the end of June——before the delivery hold was lifted—the company had delivered 990 F-35s. By the end of September, that number had risen to 1,040. Now, it is above 1,060.

“We have delivered 60+ jets in three and a half months,” the spokesperson said. She added that while the original delivery estimate for calendar 2024 was 75-110 of the fighters, Lockheed is revising that figure upward to 90-110, “based on deliveries so far” this year. That would indicate deliveries of between 15 and 23 more jets per month by Dec. 31.

Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office reported the Defense Contract Management Agency believed Lockheed could theoretically reach 20 deliveries per month, even though it had never before exceeded 13. Lockheed declined to provide detailed specifics.

The government stopped accepting F-35s in summer 2023 because they were being built with Tech Refresh 3 hardware, but the associated TR-3 software was still being tested. Lockheed continued to build new F-35s, but the jets went directly into storage, awaiting the conclusion of TR-3 testing. TR-3 is the hardware and software package which undergirds the Block 4 upgrade of the F-35, permitting new electronic warfare, communications, navigation, and weapons systems to be used.

In June, the Joint Program Office lifted the hold on deliveries, saying Program Executive Officer Lt. Gen. Michal Schmidt was satisfied that a truncated version of TR-3 software was sufficiently stable and safe for flight. It was also necessary that deliveries resume to avoid significant disruption of units awaiting the new aircraft, both in the U.S. and overseas.

Lockheed Aeronautics president Greg Ulmer told Air & Space Forces Magazine in September that the priorities of deliveries have been adjusted to accommodate special needs of various users. Australia, for example, needed its new aircraft first to achieve full operational capability, and received priority for deliveries. Other users offered no complaints, he said.

The GAO estimated it would take Lockheed at least a year to clear the backlogged jets—estimated to have been just over 100 airplanes—because Lockheed continues to build new F-35s and is delivering them alongside the stored ones. It was decided to do it that way to disrupt the production and delivery process as little as possible, Ulmer said.

Each stored airplane gets four checks—two company, two government—before being delivered, and each received two of those checks before being put into storage, he explained. The withheld airplanes received power-ons and active care during storage and were not simply mothballed, Ulmer said. This was done to expedite the delivery process once the JPO gave the green light.

Ulmer expressed confidence that the backlogged airplanes will all be delivered sometime in 2025, pegging the process as taking 12-18 months. He said he expects the F-35 delivery tally in 2025 to be “156-plus” aircraft. There are now 19 countries either operating the F-35 or signed on to buy the fighter. There’s been no letup in production because demand remains strong, he said.

The 1,000th F-35 was delivered with little fanfare to the 185th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard at Truax Field, Wisc., in July.

US Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria as Militants Attempt Comeback

US Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria as Militants Attempt Comeback

The U.S. conducted a series of airstrikes against Islamic State camps in Syria on Oct. 28, as the Pentagon continues its efforts to thwart the militant group from making a comeback.

The latest wave of airstrikes, which targeted multiple senior Islamic State leaders, was announced in a Oct. 30 statement by the U.S. Central Command.

The command said that several camps were targeted in the “Syria desert,” an apparent reference to the Badiya desert in central and southern Syria, and that as many as 35 members of the group were killed. There were no indications of civilian casualties, CENTCOM added.

“The airstrikes will disrupt the ability of ISIS to plan, organize, and conduct attacks against civilians, as well as U.S., allies, and partners throughout the region and beyond,” the command said in its Oct. 30 statement. “CENTCOM, alongside allies and partners in the region, will continue to aggressively degrade ISIS operational capabilities to ensure its enduring defeat.”

The U.S. conducted similar airstrikes on Oct. 11 and Sept. 26 in Syria and has also conducted multiple raids with Iraqi forces in recent weeks.

The Islamic State group’s self-declared caliphate was defeated in 2019 by the U.S. and its regional allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces. The U.S. military has been working with the SDF and Iraqi forces ever since to try to preclude the group from regaining strength in Syria and in Iraq.

The group’s operations in Syria remain a major concern, especially since Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian allies have been more focused on suppressing opponents of the Syrian regime than battling the militant group in the Badiya desert, U.S. officials say.

“There’s a reason that we’re not talking about moving capability out of Syria,” a senior defense official said earlier this month. “It’s really ISIS in Syria that is the kind of the core area where ISIS still has combat power, and a lot of the leadership continues to persist. … What you’ve seen out of this administration is a lot of continuity on keeping capability in Syria even after [Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023], because we do see the ISIS threat is being something that warrants that.”

The U.S.-led coalition that has been helping Iraqi forces fight ISIS is being phased out by September 2025. Iraq’s prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani is under political pressure domestically to wind down the presence of American and other Western forces.

But the U.S. hopes to transition to a “bilateral security partnership” after that point, which Pentagon officials have yet to define in detail. The agreement with Iraq will also enable the U.S. to sustain its presence in neighboring Syria by providing logistical support from northern Iraq until at least September 2026.

The U.S. currently has some 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in Syria. U.S. officials have not provided details on how the end of Operation Inherent Resolve, as the coalition’s counter-ISIS mission is dubbed, will affect American troop levels. But they have acknowledged the U.S. will likely have fewer troops in Iraq.

Bipartisan Buy-In Could Help New Defense Industrial Base Plan Survive Election

Bipartisan Buy-In Could Help New Defense Industrial Base Plan Survive Election

The Pentagon’s new plan to implement its defense industrial base strategy—coming in the 11th hour of the Biden administration—could survive the upcoming election because extra time was taken to get buy-in from all involved agencies and from both sides of the congressional aisle, according to the official who led its development.

The National Defense Industrial Strategy was unveiled at the beginning of the year, but its implementation plan, expected in March, wasn’t released until Oct. 29.

Laura Taylor-Kale, the assistant secretary of defense for industrial base policy, said during an Oct. 30 event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that the lengthy delay was due to her team ensuring that the plan “really reflects” the needs of the entire Department of Defense, Congress, industry, and foreign partners.

“We spent the last six to nine months really engaging closely with industry, getting feedback on this strategy, as well as iteratively on the six implementation priorities; what they should be and also what should go in them,” she said.

Concerns about the long-term health of the defense industrial base grew after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the U.S. and its allies delved into their stockpiles to donate weapons and demand for all kinds of munitions and equipment outstripped the base’s ability to surge production.

At a Pentagon press conference to release the plan, Taylor-Kale noted that “today’s geopolitical undercurrents have impacted every part of the defense industrial base. We have seen how quickly we need to ramp up capacity in response to conflict. World events have forced us to prepare for the long-term and plan differently and we have experienced technological advancements that require a fundamental shift in our thinking.”

In order to succeed, the strategy “must be enduring,” Taylor-Kale added at CSIS.

To accomplish that, “we’ve really worked across political spectrums. We’ve gotten feedback and engaged with Republicans and Democrats both,” Taylor-Kale said. She said the plan made its way through both chambers of congress, including more than a dozen committees. The plan similarly made its way through affected departments in the Commerce and State Department, the Pentagon’s cost analysis shop, and the services.   

Because national defense is a “bipartisan issue” and has traditionally been less controversial than other areas of political disagreement, Taylor-Kale said she is hopeful the implementation plan will continue even after a new administration—under either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris—starts in January 2025.

The next administration “will have an analytical framework” for how to invest in the defense industrial base as a result of the work, she said, and need not start from scratch.

She also said the plan has been coordinated with—and will be managed taking account of—export controls, the Foreign Military Sales System, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

The implementation plan should be “a living document,” she said. It’s slated for an annual update, with both a classified and public version to be released.

At the heart of the plan are six implementation priorities requiring the most urgent action to secure the U.S.’s ability to prevent war or prevail if drawn into war. The military services must “align the plan to the budget review process” and have already had to integrate the priorities with their fiscal 2026 budget plans, Tylor-Kale told CSIS. Every program will now have to explain how it buys down risk in the industrial base.

The priorities are:   

  • Indo-Pacific Deterrence: Invest in the increased production of interchangeable munitions, missiles and, most recently with Australia, the submarine industrial base, strengthening partnerships with traditional and new allies.
  • Production and Supply Chains: Invest to make the supply chain more resilient—especially for key items like microprocessor chips and rare earth elements. The plan also calls for bigger weapon stockpiles and re-establishing or invigorating domestic production of critical materials and items.
  • Allied and Partner Collaboration: Co-produce commonly-used weapons, such as 155 mm mortar shells, with partners and allies worldwide. Taylor-Kale also said the U.S. must learn to rely on the technical sophistication of allies if they have a superior approach to certain capabilities.
  • Capabilities and Infrastructure Modernization: Upgrade and overhaul military depots and nuclear weapons production and maintenance facilities to ensure “scalability” to larger-scale production.  
  • New Capabilities Using Flexible Pathways: Use rapid prototyping to develop and field new weapons at scale, like the Pentagon’s “Replicator” initiative, Mid-Tier Acquisitions and “Other Transactional Authorities” authorized by Congress to speed the fielding of new systems.
  • Intellectual Property and Data Analysis: Recognize that protecting intellectual property rights and investments fosters competition.

“At the end of the day, we need to really think about what’s the risk of not doing something, as opposed to what’s the risk of doing something,” Taylor-Kale said.

The third priority recognizes that “working with our allies and partners must be a priority for global defense production and capabilities,” she added. “We now talk about ‘co-“ everything. So, co-development, co-production, co-sustainment. We also recognize that certain allies have capabilities that are particularly useful in the region, or it can supplement or really complement the work that that our forces are doing.”

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante, under whose signature the plan was released, “meets regularly with his counterparts” in other countries, Taylor-Kale said, and the plan provides better tools to determine when to share classified information with allies by analyzing the pros and cons of doing so.

“The time is now” to “build the defense industrial ecosystem that we need,” she said.

According to the 80-page plan, more than $37 billion of the fiscal 2025 defense budget request would go toward fulfilling the priorities, most of it earmarked for munitions.

Taylor-Kale told reporters at the Pentagon that the implementation plan will “foster transparency by providing industry and other partners insights into our plans and investments,” so they can align those plans with their own.

“Our approach has generated strong interest from industry and common goals have built closer ties between allied partners. We have greater support from internal and interagency stakeholders and Congress,” she said.

10,000 More Recruits in 18 Months: How Easing Rules Made the Difference

10,000 More Recruits in 18 Months: How Easing Rules Made the Difference

Easing the rules that barred some recruits from joining the Air Force helped bring in 10,000 Airmen and Guardians over the past 18 months, said the head of Air Force Recruiting, Brig. Gen. Christopher Amrhein on Oct. 30.  

The rule changes that enabled those recruits to join the force came out of work by a cross-functional team organized to identify and eliminate “barriers to service” that were driving otherwise qualified recruits to seek out other options, including joining the Army and Navy.

But one thing the Air Force is not doing is dropping standards, Amrhein said. That includes putting potential recruits through preparatory classes to help them pass the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery of tests.  

Victory Lap 

Amrhein and the other services’ recruiting chiefs spoke to reporters in the Pentagon briefing room to celebrate meeting recruiting goals for 2024 after falling far short in 2023. 

Amrhein credited the reduction in barriers and the team that worked on the problem in the spring of 2023, led by now-Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin. That team advocated to allow recruits in who have small hand and neck tattoos; allowing some qualified applicants a chance to retest after testing positive marijuana use; and enabling accelerated naturalization for non-citizens, among other changes.

All told, the changes enabled “more than 10,000 total force Airmen and Guardians to join the Air Force or space force” over the past 18 months or so, Amrhein said. That’s equivalent to about 22 percent of the 44,318 recruits his command brought into the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Space Force in fiscal 2024.  

As he did at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference last month, Amrhein credited the success not to one particular change but to “a broader shift in how we approach recruitment.” 

“Multiple levers such as barrier removal, incentive adjustment, increasing medical review support, and a honed focus on recruiter development all played a critical role to our total force recruiting successes,” he said. 

The single biggest factor, however, was change the Air Force’s rules on body fat. Last year, the Air Force dropped its service-unique requirements and aligned USAF body composition standards with the minimum requirements set by DOD policy.

“Since then, we’ve brought in over 5,800 Airmen [thanks to that change],” Amrhein said. “And under that DOD standard, we’ve had one washout of BMT for physical fitness reasons.” ”

Amrhein said he’s frequently asked if the standards have declined. He says no: “The [physical fitness test] standards have not changed for our basic training and that policy adjustment offered 5,800 very high-quality folks to come into our service, and we lost one person for it.” 

Higher Goals Ahead 

Now the Air Force Recruiting Service is one month into a new fiscal year with a substantially higher goal: 49,579 total force recruits, up 11 percent from fiscal 2024. The goals break out this way: 

  • 32,500 recruits for the Active-Duty Air Force 
  • 7,600 for the Air Force Reserve 
  • 8,679 for the Air National Guard 
  • 800 for the Space Force 

Amrhein said those goals will be achieved with the help of 370 new recruiters and support personnel, but the emphasis will remain on individual recruits who can do the job—not recruits who need a crash course for to meet physical fitness or academic standards. 

“There’s not the overarching, compelling requirement that we’ve seen” to create such programs, he said. 

The Army and Navy, which have higher recruiting goals and, for many jobs, lower academic standards, have benefited greatly from their prep courses. The Army has graduated nearly 25,000 recruits from its course over the past two years and the Navy put more than 5,000 recruits through its program in the past year. 

Students at the U.S. Army’s Future Soldier Preparatory Course work on math skills during a class at Fort Jackson, S.C. The Air Force does not provide a comparable course and has no plans to do so. (U.S. Army photo by Jason Norris)

Like the Air Force, the Marine Corps also has refrained from adding prep classes.

But the Air Force does provide some assistance to prepare incoming recruits for the intensely rigorous special warfare program, among its toughest-to-fill jobs. 

“For our Special Warfare accession pipeline, we do have a very deliberate development program for them,” he said. “So as folks identify or are interested in the Special Warfare Air Force Specialty Codes, there is a very deliberate development program, both from a mental resiliency standpoint, but also a very in-depth physical training regimen to prepare them for that pipeline.”

Those preparations are not the same, however, as a special course, he said. 

Space Force Wants Your Help Naming All Its Satellites

Space Force Wants Your Help Naming All Its Satellites

The Air Force has the F-22 Raptor. The Navy has its Nimitz-class (CVN-68) aircraft carriers. The Army has the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Now the Space Force wants in on the name game, and is planning to start naming its satellites, radars, and other weapons recognizable names.

Guardians can help. Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman’s latest “C-Note” memo to Guardians went out Oct. 25, inviting Guardians to put their heads together to come up with the best ways to identify USSF spacecraft. 

“How do we talk about our equipment in the Space Force?” Saltzman asked. “How do we name the systems we operate? Do those names accurately reflect the Guardian spirit—the space warfighting culture that we are working to build? I am not convinced that they do. But we are making strides to rectify that.” 

Space Force systems are typically known by clunky, unpronouncable acronyms—SBIRS for Space-Based Infrared System, or GSSAP for Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program, or SCN for Satellite Control Network. Naming them could make them more memorable and recognizable to the public.

Last October, the Space Force established a new designation system for future platforms with Space Force Instruction 16-403, but that move did nothing to change existing naming conventions. “It is a tremendous step to move from where we are today,” Saltzman wrote in his C-Note, “to a world in which all our systems are named to reflect the culture of their operators.” 

The CSO asked Guardians to share ideas for satellite naming “themes” by Nov. 30. To prime the pump, he offered ideas of his own: “For example, should we name the systems within our Missile Warning and Tracking activities after birds of prey? Or systems within SATCOM activities after canines? Should we leverage mythology? Natural phenomena?” 

Saltzman listed 10 activities of interest:  

  • Cyber warfare 
  • Electromagnetic warfare 
  • Missile Warning and Tracking 
  • Navigation Warfare 
  • Orbital Warfare 
  • Reconnaissance 
  • Satellite Communications 
  • Space-Based Sensing and Targeting 
  • Surveillance 
  • Theater Electromagnetic Warfare 

The service is not looking for names of specific platforms at this stage, but themes for these specific categories, an official told Air & Space Forces Magazine. Names could come later, once themes are selected. 

Saltzman directed Guardians to read Space Force Instruction 16-403 before submitting suggestions. That document, released with little fanfare last fall and updated in July, sets requirements: Names should be “no more than two short words,” must not infringe on any copyrights (take note, Sci-Fi fans), and must not sound like the names of some existing weapons system; names should also be “within scope of DOD values and morals.” 

The designation system for Space Force weapons is similar to the Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System. The first component describes the mission and environment of the system, while the second component signifies “the design number and the design series.” The system also includes optional prefixes if the system is experimental, a prototype, or has an otherwise modified mission. 

For instance, a communications satellite constellation located in low-Earth orbit, like the one being developed by the Space Development Agency, could be designated CL-1 or some other design number. GPS, a navigation warfare system in medium-Earth orbit, could be designated NM-3 or some other number. 

The instruction notes that the designation system will only be required for new systems developed after October 2023, to include systems currently in development. Each system will require a designation no later than preliminary design review, and a designation and popular name prior to System Fielding Decision. 

However, Guardians can request that today’s fielded systems also receive a designation and name, the instruction notes. 

Space Force Weapons System Designations

Modified Mission (optional)Basic MissionEnvironment
T – Test/Training/RangeA – AttackC – Cyberspace
Y – PrototypeB – Battle ManagementD – Deep Space
X – ExperimentalC – CommunicationsG – Geosynchronous Orbit
Z – Scientific/CalibrationD – DefendM – Medium-Earth Orbit
E – Electromagnetic WarfareH – Highly Elliptical Orbit
K – SupportL – Low-Earth Orbit
M – MeterologicalT – Terrestrial
N – Navigation WarfareV – Various
P – Pursuit
R – Reconnaissance
S – Surveillance
W – Warning & Tracking