USAF Aircraft Availability on Long Downward Trend, CBO Says

USAF Aircraft Availability on Long Downward Trend, CBO Says

The Air Force and Navy are both seeing a long-term, downward trend in aircraft availability and flying hours per aircraft, which is actually worse than the Pentagon reports because of the way the Defense Department counts aircraft as ready for duty, according to a new report from the Congressional Budget Office. While USAF availability recovered a little during the COVID-19 pandemic, flying hours continued to fall, the CBO said.

The Pentagon’s stated aircraft availability is higher than the CBO’s because the Defense Department counts some aircraft as ready for action even if they are torn down for maintenance at their owning unit—not in depot—or are in storage, the audit agency said. The Air Force measures “availability” as “mission capable” rates, and these metrics have changed over the last couple of years.  

While the CBO provided only broad graphs and not specific numbers, it showed USAF’s availability for all aircraft as declining from about 60 percent in 2000 to less than 45 percent in 2020, with a similar performance in fighter/attack aircraft (though the F-35 reports differently and was not reflected in the CBO’s charts).

Over the same period, flying hours for all USAF aircraft declined from an average of about 300 per year to about 230. Air Force fighter/attack aircraft flew an average of about 200 hours per year in 2000, gradually declining to about 125 hours per year on average. The peak of both availability and use was in 2008.

For a more granular look, the CBO examined the F-15C/D and F-16C/D and found that their availability declined from just under 70 percent for both aircraft in 2000 to about 55 percent for the F-16 in 2020, while the F-15 came in about 45 percent. In flying hours per year over the same period, both were running about 260 in 2000 but had fallen to about 150 for the F-16 and 110 for the F-15 by 2020. Peak availability for the F-15 and F-16 was in 2008.

For rotary and tiltrotor aircraft, USAF saw availability rates at around 60 percent through 2012; followed by a decline to about 55 percent through 2016; and a subsequent recovery to about 58 percent. Flying hours per aircraft per year were at 275 in 2000, and after ticking up to 300 by 2010, have declined to about 240 hours per year.

With ups and down of as much as 10 percent over the past 20 years, Air Force trainers are where they were in 2000, at an availability of just over 60 percent. From just under 300 a year in 2000, trainer flying hours per aircraft got up to about 320 per year by about 2006 and have since declined to about 270.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

The Air Force saw a bump in availability of all aircraft due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  

The availability rate “rose from 49 percent in February 2020 to a peak of 54 percent in April 2020, falling to 49 percent in September 2020 and March 2021,” the CBO reported. However, USAF saw a precipitous drop in annual flying hours per aircraft.

“In April, 2020, the Air Force flew 69 percent as many hours as it typically did before the pandemic” and was still at only about 82 percent of its pre-pandemic high water mark by February 2021, according to the report. “By March 2021, it had recovered to pre-pandemic levels of flying hours.” The CBO speculated that flying less led to a greater availability of spare parts, thus improving the aircraft availability numbers.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

To illustrate the disparity between how the CBO calculates availability versus the Air Force, it used the Pentagon’s numbers for the F-15C in 2019. In that year, “the Air Force had 304 F-15Cs,” declaring an average of 121 to be mission capable “and possessed  by operators,” the CBO said. However, 110 airplanes were “coded as mission capable but could not be flown on combat or training missions, because 17 were undergoing depot-level maintenance and 93 were in storage.”

By the DOD’s counting, in 2019, “67 percent of F-15Cs were available … [121 out of 180].” The CBO, however, counted “all aircraft, including those in storage or … depot … as part of the fleet. By CBO’s measure, 40 percent of F-15Cs were available [121 out of 304].”

The audit agency suggested that its method is a more realistic way to assess the true availability of aircraft for training or combat, since it is unrealistic to assume that aircraft in storage or heavy depot could be rapidly made ready for action.

The Navy’s decline in availability of the 2000-2020 period was more pronounced than the Air Force, but the Navy flew its aircraft more per tail than USAF did over the same period. The availability of the F/A-18C/D has fallen more than any other fighter that CBO looked at.  

US to Russia: Concessions Must be ‘Reciprocal’

US to Russia: Concessions Must be ‘Reciprocal’

The U.S. will not bar Ukraine or other countries from future entry into NATO, and any concessions with Russia on missile defense or military exercises must be “reciprocal,” State Department Deputy Secretary Wendy R. Sherman told journalists on a press call following eight hours of meetings with her Russian counterpart in Geneva on Jan. 10.

The meeting was the third U.S. Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue since President Joe Biden met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland in June 2021. The Jan. 10 meeting took place as Russia maintains more than 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s border. On Dec. 17, Russia published and shared with the Biden administration a series of demands, including that NATO withdraw missile defenses and troops from the eastern flank of the alliance. Sherman called the conditions “non-starters,” but she highlighted areas that are possible.

“The preliminary ideas the United States raised today include missile placement,” Sherman told journalists some 30 minutes after concluding her meeting.

U.S. proposals about the possibility of relocating missiles in Europe are consistent with the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which expired in August 2019. The U.S. is also willing to discuss limits on military exercises and training if Russia commits to the same.

“We shared that we are also open to discussing ways we can set reciprocal limits on the size and scope of military exercises and to improve transparency about those exercises, again on a reciprocal basis,” Sherman added, noting that the topic will be brought up again during the NATO-Russia Council meeting Jan. 12. That meeting will also be led by Sherman. On Jan. 13, Russia is set to meet with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which monitors compliance with the Minsk agreement and the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Sherman said Russia consistently referred to the draft treaties it had shared with the Biden administration, which also barred future NATO membership by Ukraine and Georgia and called for ending defense cooperation with the aspiring NATO countries.

“We were firm, however, in pushing back on security proposals that are simply non-starters for the United States,” Sherman said. “We will not allow anyone to slam closed NATO’s ‘open door’ policy, which has always been central to the NATO Alliance.”

Sherman said the United States would not negotiate about NATO, the European Union, or countries such as Ukraine without their participation.

Instead, America’s No. 2 diplomat called on Russia to de-escalate and allow for diplomacy.

“We made it very clear that it’s very hard to have constructive, productive, and successful diplomacy without de-escalation,” she said. “We will see whether, in fact, Russia understands that the best way to pursue diplomacy is for them to reduce those tensions and to de-escalate. We’ll see how serious they are.”

DOD Delegates on Hand

At the Pentagon, Press Secretary John F. Kirby said there had been no meaningful reduction in the number of Russian troops poised on the Ukraine border but acknowledged that DOD was aware of the discussions regarding missile placement.

“We were certainly aware and supportive of the effort to be able to talk about missile capabilities on the European continent as one thing that the administration would be willing to look at,” Kirby said, adding that “some level of reciprocity” by Russia would be expected. Russia is known to have robust anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities on the Baltic Sea in the exclave of Kaliningrad and in the Black Sea in occupied Crimea.

Accompanying Sherman were two delegates from DOD: Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations Lt. Gen. James J. Mingus and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia Laura K. Cooper.

“We want to see the tensions de-escalate, certainly want to see the violence stop,” Kirby said of the low-intensity conflict that persists between Ukraine and Russia-backed separatists in southeastern Ukraine.

“It’s clear that Ukrainian troops are in a hot war every single day in that area in the Donbass region,” he added. “It’s important for the Russians to observe the Minsk agreements, to pull back, and to cease the violence.”

Russia, for its part, indicated at the meeting that its heavy troop and capability presence on Ukraine’s border was not a pretext for invasion, Sherman said.

“Russia indeed said to us, as they said publicly, they do not intend to invade. These are just maneuvers and exercises. But I would note that none of this was notified to anyone,” she said. “They can prove that, in fact, they have no intention by de-escalating and returning troops to barracks.”

Following a last-minute visit to Washington by Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in November 2021, when he requested aerial defense systems, the Pentagon sent an air defense team to Ukraine to evaluate the country’s need.

Kirby said Jan. 10 that team had been “back a while” but that no formal recommendation has yet been lodged. Ukraine says it needs the air defenses to deter a Russian invasion.

The Biden administration has threatened heavy economic sanctions, reinforcement of NATO’s force posture in the east, and additional security assistance to Ukraine should Russia further invade the country.

Sherman said complex issues such as arms control are lengthy processes and were not negotiated at the meeting.

“This was not a negotiation, so we were putting ideas on the table today. And we have a long way to go,” she said. “We didn’t set out a specific timetable for anything. “

Republicans Announce Leadership Shuffle on Key HASC Subcommittees

Republicans Announce Leadership Shuffle on Key HASC Subcommittees

Two key subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee are getting new top Republicans, committee ranking member Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) announced Jan. 10.

Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) will take over as the ranking member of the strategic forces subcommittee, leaving his previous position as ranking member of the readiness subcommittee. Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.) will take over as ranking member of the readiness panel.

The shuffle in leadership was precipitated by Rep. Michael Turner’s (R-Ohio) stepping down as the strategic forces subcommittee ranking member to take over as the top Republican of the House Intelligence Committee, a spot left vacant by the departure of former Rep. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.) from Congress. Turner’s district includes Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

The strategic forces subcommittee is responsible for a broad swath of issues, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and space. The current chairman of the committee, Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.), teamed with Rogers to propose the creation of a Space Force back in 2017.

Lamborn has been involved with Space Force issues as well. His district in Colorado encompasses Schriever Space Force Base, Peterson Space Force Base, and Cheyenne Mountain Space Force Station, and he co-sponsored a bipartisan amendment in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act that would have established a Space National Guard. That amendment was later dropped from the final approved NDAA. 

Along with other members of Colorado’s Congressional delegation, he has also raised objections to the Pentagon’s decision to base U.S. Space Command at Redstone Arsenal, Ala., instead of in Colorado Springs at Peterson.

“It is no secret that China is undergoing a rapid, unprecedented nuclear build-up including testing new hypersonic missiles. Russia’s nuclear program has undergone significant modernization of all three legs of its triad, including the development of anti-satellite weapons that significantly threaten the space domain,” Lamborn said in a statement. “It is vital that our military has the resources and capabilities necessary to keep our country safe, particularly in light of these new and growing threats. I will continue working with my colleagues to ensure our nation is prepared for any attack, whether on land, water, air, or space.”

The readiness subcommittee oversees issues of training, military construction, logistics and maintenance, housing, and base realignments and closures, among others. Waltz is a former Green Beret who also served as a policy director in the Pentagon and the White House.

“At such a pivotal time for our military, I am grateful to Ranking Member Rogers for the opportunity to lead the Subcommittee on Readiness to ensure America’s warfighters are trained and equipped at superior facilities in order to address the multitude of threats facing our country,” Waltz said in a statement. “It’s imperative that the Department of Defense has the best resources to defend against the Chinese Communist Party’s march towards global dominance, Russia’s increased malign behavior, new terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, the Iran Regime’s march towards a nuclear weapon, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal proliferation and missile development, and threats to freedom in the Western Hemisphere from Venezuela and Cuba.”

Should Republicans win back a majority in the House in the 2022 midterm elections, Lamborn and Waltz would be poised to take over as subcommittee chairs in 2023.

Secretary Austin Back to the Pentagon After Negative COVID Test

Secretary Austin Back to the Pentagon After Negative COVID Test

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has tested negative after experiencing mild symptoms during a bout with the COVID-19 virus. Austin returned to the Pentagon on Jan. 10 after completing an at-home quarantine during which he continued to work remotely.

“The Secretary has tested negative for COVID today and will return to the office tomorrow,” Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said in a statement Jan. 9.

Austin last met with his staff at the Pentagon on Dec. 30 before going on leave. Kirby confirmed that no more senior Pentagon leaders had tested positive for the virus.

“Secretary Austin is grateful for efficacy of the vaccines he was administered. He knows that they rendered much less severe the effects of the virus,” Kirby added.

Austin’s COVID-19 condition was first made public after a positive test Jan. 2. The Secretary’s return to in-person work occurs on the ninth day since his symptoms began the evening of Jan. 1.

Revised Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations advise those testing positive for COVID-19 to isolate at home for five days and wear a mask for an additional five days.

Kirby said Austin will continue to follow CDC guidelines as well as the Pentagon’s Health Protection Condition (HPCON) Charlie protocols, which were put back into place Jan. 6. The Pentagon lowered its HPCON level to Bravo in 2021, briefly lifting a mask mandate until a surge of the delta variant prompted the return of universal mask-wearing in the building.

The increased Pentagon restrictions were reimposed because of the “extremely high rate of new cases and positive test results” in the Washington, D.C., area. The restrictions that began Jan. 10 included maximum telework and flexible scheduling to allow for an occupancy rate of 25 percent; mask-wearing indoors; six feet of physical distancing; and meetings limited to fewer than 10 people.

Austin maintained “the same battle rhythm” he had while working from the building during his at-home quarantine, including participation in a virtual summit with Japan alongside Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Kirby said Jan. 4.

As of Jan. 5, 1.6 million service members were fully vaccinated and 336,000 were partially vaccinated against the coronavirus. Of the 273,724 total Defense Department cases so far, 86 service members have died from the disease, while 2,333 service members remain hospitalized. The Department of the Air Force has tallied 49,423 COVID-19 cases to date. The department required all Active-duty members to be fully vaccinated by Nov. 2, 2021, while the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve had until Dec. 2, 2021, to become fully vaccinated.

From Warning to Tracking: Defending America Against Hypersonic Missile Attacks

From Warning to Tracking: Defending America Against Hypersonic Missile Attacks

China’s August launch of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circumnavigated the globe before reentry demonstrates the need for innovative solutions to spotting and tracking such threats. Unlike conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles, which follow a predictable ballistic arc, China’s hypersonic glide vehicle circled the world at low-Earth orbit, a path current missile warning systems cannot easily track.  

Gen. Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, called the missile test akin to a “Sputnik moment,” highlighting China’s rapid advancement and raising the stakes for missile defense in the modern age. 

Millennium Space Systems, a subsidiary of The Boeing Company, sees this challenge in line with the U.S. Space Force’s Track Custody Prototype program.  

“The threats are here now and they’re getting more advanced, so that’s why the Space Force pivoted to this Track Custody Prototype contract,” said Jason Kim, CEO of Millennium Space Systems.  

Today’s Space-Based Infrared System (SIBRS) satellites fly in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) some 22,236 miles above the Earth and use infrared sensors to detect heat from the missile plumes of ICBMs during launch. 

“[SBIRS] was developed more for the traditional ballistic threat that focuses on being able to identify missile boosters and make a prediction of where that threat is going,” said Dr. Kevin Paxton, Senior Technical Fellow at The Boeing Company. China’s weapon changes that equation because it does not follow that same path. “Hyperglide vehicles can be deployed from that booster and seeing those hyperglide vehicles without a rocket plume behind them becomes much more challenging. That’s really the crux of the problem: Being able to identify these dimmer threats and transition from missile warning to missile tracking.” 

Tracking is critical because the hyperglide vehicle has navigational capability. 

“The hyperglide vehicle can actually change directions, so now we need to follow and contain its entire trajectory within our tracking system,” Paxton said. “That pushes us toward using a much more proliferated network of satellite constellations so we can have more eyes in the sky to follow these threats through their entire trajectory, compared to just the beginning of that trajectory.” 

Millennium Space Systems’ proposed satellite constellation is flexible across orbits, including medium-Earth orbit (MEO) and low-Earth orbit (LEO). 

“Most of these target threats are flying at a fairly low altitude compared to some of the more traditional ballistic threats,” Paxton said. “So instead of being out at GEO, we’re lowering the altitudes of those orbits down to the MEO and LEO regimes to get closer to the target threat so that it’s easier to see.” 

Flying at MEO—between 1,243 and 22,236 miles above Earth—and LEO—altitudes up to 1,243 miles—has its own unique challenges. 

“The GEO altitude is very specific, because the satellite is going around the Earth at the same rate that the Earth is turning so that when the satellite looks down, it sees exactly the same place on Earth all the time,” Paxton said. “As you move to these lower altitudes, however, the satellite is actually going faster than the Earth’s rotation, so you end up with relative motion between the satellite and the places on the Earth you’re trying to watch.” 

That relative motion is similar to the blur experienced when looking out the side windows of a moving car. 

“From a technology perspective, we have to find creative ways to suppress that relative motion so that we can find those target threats,” Paxton said. “Going back to the car analogy, if you look through the window and focus on a tree as it goes by, you can see the tree very crisply. This is because your eyes are tracking that spot—called ‘back-scanning.’ We can do the same thing on a satellite. The idea is that we’re just going to look at one spot on Earth at a time and change where we’re looking as the satellite flies along.” 

The complex nature of this solution doesn’t stop at relative motion, however. Each orbit comes with its own distinct advantages and disadvantages. 

“The beauty of GEO is that you can cover the entire Earth with fewer satellites—but if it’s a dim target, you may not be able to see it,” Paxton explained. “If you go to the other extreme, at LEO, you’re close enough that you can identify a dim target, but the target may move outside of your field of vision, so you end up needing a lot of satellites to cover the Earth. MEO almost strikes a balance in between, where you pick up the advantages of being closer so that we can track dim targets, but also have the opportunity of being able to see more of Earth with fewer satellites.” 

Millennium Space Systems sees an opportunity to strike a balance by building its tracking constellation using satellites across multiple orbits.  

“It definitely requires a layered, robust architecture where it’s not just a single orbit of systems to do this mission,” Kim said. “Consequently, we’re developing commonality across our spacecraft and payload designs where there’s potential for a lot of economies of scale across all those orbits. That way, when you look at a layered architecture to address all these advanced threats, there’s a potential to be efficient.” 

Millennium is also applying the latest design and engineering technologies to ensure its design and manufacture is as efficient and proven as possible before launch.  

“We’re doing model-based systems engineering and digital engineering upfront so that we can manufacture these large constellations smoothly and efficiently, delivering them on faster schedules than before,” Kim said. “Then once launched, we’re end-to-end, so we‘re able to operate those systems more efficiently in-orbit with more autonomy and onboard processing, which enables us to reach a future where we need fewer humans to operate these systems and speed up the timelines from sensor to shooting.” 

This digital design process follows the conclusion of Phase 1 of the Track Custody Prototype program, in which various approaches were considered. The Space Force awarded Millennium Space Systems a Phase 2 contract, and the company began in May an 18-month Payload Critical Design Review of their mission architecture. 

“This program enables Space Systems Command to ‘try before you buy,’” Kim said, referring to Chief of Space Operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond’s preference for greater assurance before committing vast resources to a project.  

If the design review is successful, the Space Force can pursue Phase 3, which would be to build and host the technology on a bus for flight-tests and demonstrations in space.  

“We are well-positioned to meet the ultimate delivery timelines of 2025 on our Track Custody Prototype contract and we can accelerate the schedule with the appropriate funding and resources,” Kim said. “We have the expertise, the processes, the manufacturing capabilities, the digital design, digital engineering and model-based systems engineering capabilities that have been proven in multiple domains. We’re positioned to provide high-performance in these high-stakes critical missions like missile warning and missile tracking on very fast timelines, and we look forward to seeing progress on fielding systems for the Track Custody Prototype program that will address these advanced threats.” 

Boeing’s Updated Valkyrie Reveals Evolving Hypersonic Design

Boeing’s Updated Valkyrie Reveals Evolving Hypersonic Design

Boeing has revealed an updated concept for its Valkyrie reusable, unmanned hypersonic aircraft that indicates new design approaches for inlets and shaping.

Shown in an artist’s concept illustration provided to Air Force Magazine—and in the form of a model at this week’s American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics meeting in San Diego—the aircraft shows several design departures and revisions from Boeing’s previous concept, made public in 2018. The previous iteration showed an aircraft shaped much like the 1980s National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) concept, with a pointed nose, deep spine, and “2-D” rectangular intakes co-located under the fuselage. The new version shows more of a “waverider” shape with a blunt nose, flattened top, and rounded, separated intakes running the length of the aircraft to twin booms with nozzles apparently using aerospike technology.

Boeing provided a comment about the design to Air Force Magazine, saying that “over the past several years, we have advanced our vehicle design concepts, developed innovative integration solutions, and matured enabling technologies in the challenging areas such as propulsion, thermal, materials, guidance, navigation and control, and engine/airframe integration.” The company noted that it has “successfully designed, built, and flown hypersonic vehicles for the last 60 years” and that its research and technology units have been “developing hypersonic vehicle concepts and technologies in support of potential future defense applications.”

The previous iteration was revealed in a seeming effort to counter Lockheed Martin’s release of a design concept it dubbed the “SR-72,” intended to be a reusable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.

Though Boeing designed and flew the X-51, the first vehicle to sustain air-breathing hypersonic flight, it was not selected in a series of mid-2010s contracts for a variety of potential hypersonic vehicles and missiles. Last year, however, Boeing was funded to develop HyFly2, a Navy program for a hypersonic missile. The Valkyrie seems meant to remind the defense industry that Boeing is very much in the hypersonic game, even though the aircraft is not aimed at any known unclassified program.

Analyzing the Design

Air Force Magazine asked Mark J. Lewis, executive director of the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technologies Institute, to offer observations about Boeing’s concept. Lewis, a leading hypersonics authority, was director of defense research and engineering under the Trump Administration and had previously been briefed on the company’s hypersonics efforts.

“Boeing has been working on this for a while,” Lewis said. “I think that previous configurations that they were showing at conferences and meetings did not accurately represent the configurations that they’ve been developing.” However, the latest model is probably “a little bit closer to what they’ve been working on.”

Boeing’s aircraft is a combined-cycle aircraft, Lewis said, meaning the vehicle can take off from a runway using a gas turbine engine and, when sufficient supersonic speed has been achieved, transition to hypersonic air-breathing flight using a scramjet engine. Boeing officials have previously suggested that the gas turbine air flow path is closed off, allowing hypersonic airflow to move through the scramjet engine.

“Designing a propulsion flow path that goes from Mach 0 to Mach 5 or Mach 6” is a daunting task, Lewis said, and “the devil is really very much in the details. Boeing, I know, has put a tremendous amount of effort into studying that propulsion flow path. And … I think the most recent model reflects their understanding of the challenge.”

Lewis said Boeing’s design draws on lessons learned from NASA’s X-43 program.

“We did a large number of design iterations,” he said, “and we discovered that the most important driving factor in picking a new configuration was actually not the hypersonic performance, but actually the transonic performance.” Various hypersonic shapes, “once you got into the high mach range, they all did about as well. The real question was how much drag they had when you get to Mach 1, and could you even push through Mach 1 with a hypersonic shape? The Boeing folks really understand this well.”

While the overall waverider shape is consistent with other hypersonic concepts, Lewis said the unusual cranked-arrow wing planform and its odd step-join with the fuselage likely has to do with subsonic or transonic control and performance.

The departure from the “2-D” inlet to an ogival, or rounded “3-D” shape, tracks with what other hypersonics technology efforts are doing, Lewis said.

The 2-D inlets were used on the NASP—which never got to a flying prototype—in part because “they were easier to analyze,” but computational tools for more complex shapes make more efficient designs possible now, 40 years later, he said.

“NASP was a large enough vehicle that it was very well known that you’d have to do parallel engine modules,” he said, referring to the gas turbines to get up to speed and the scramjets for hypersonic travel.

“You couldn’t do one engine module to power the vehicle. And the best way to stack engine modules side by side is to have them be two-dimensional.” Also, NASP had to fly from Mach 0 up to Mach 25, so there had to be a variable-geometry inlet. Also, a rounded shape means less contact between the air and the inlet, and lower weight.

“For a given volume of air moving through the inlet, a round shape has less surface area than a squared-off shape. So that’s an advantage,” Lewis said.

A rounder inlet is also a “more efficient pressure vessel. So if you’re worried about loads inside the inlet leading into the combustor, round shapes have advantages.”

While it was initially thought that rounded inlets had to be optimized for a particular speed, that has since turned out not to be true, Lewis noted. It was also thought that rounded inlets would be prone to engine unstarts, also since proven not to be true, he said.

“The bottom line is, if you look at almost every … hypersonic configuration that we’re looking at today … they’re all rounded inlets. So it’s not surprising” that Boeing’s fresh concept has them. “And in fact, I think it’s safe to say that the squared-off inlets were always kind of a red herring.”

Pluses and Minuses

He called the separation of the inlets an “interesting design choice,” with a “lot of pluses and minuses.” While separating the engines offers “packaging advantages” providing “a lot more internal volume,” separated engines pose a danger of sudden violent yaw torque if one engine unstarts. This was a periodic problem with the triple-sonic SR-71. “The pilots describe that as a fairly harrowing experience,” he observed.

The biggest challenge with a combined-cycle aircraft such as Boeing is working on “is having those engine cycles overlap with each other. The big technical issue you face is … when the gas turbine engine stops working at a mach number below the mach number at which a scramjet can take over, you have to bridge this gap in some way.”

One option is to push the gas turbine to as high a mach number as possible; the other is to reduce the startup speed of the scramjet as low as possible. Or, “You might have what’s called a dual-mode operations, so you’ve got one engine which can be both a ramjet and a scramjet.”

Declining to offer further comment on whether Boeing has solved this conundrum, Lewis said the company “has paid a lot of attention to this.”

A lot of the solution is “not just the propulsion, but it’s the entire flow path. So it’s optimizing design of the inlet, optimizing the design of the nozzle, being able to adapt the inlets and the nozzles to whatever mach number you’re operating in.”

The SR-71, which flew at a high mach number but not at hypersonic speed, accomplished this with an inlet cone that shifted position depending on its speed.

To deal with the high temperatures encountered at hypersonic speed, Lewis speculated that Boeing has resorted to a “hot structure.” He explained that a “cold structure” uses materials that don’t handle high temperatures well but have some kind of thermal protection. The space shuttles, for example, had an aluminum structure protected by silica tiles that absorbed and dispersed heat.

The SR-71, the F-15, and the never-built X-20 all used a “hot structure,” in which the materials themselves are high-temperature tolerant. They are also better for maintenance, an important consideration—“remember what a nightmare those space shuttle tiles were. But I honestly don’t know which approach the Boeing folks have converged on.”

The SR-71’s materials expanded during the high temperatures in flight, meaning that it had to have gaps on the ground and leaked a lot. “But you know, our structural design tools are so much more sophisticated than they were back in the 1950s when the SR-71 was designed.”

The half-conical boom-like exhausts are “very straightforward,” Lewis said. “That’s a classic design for any of our individual hypersonic configurations.” The reason has to do with equalizing the pressure of the exhaust with the ambient air.

Unlike a rocket bell, “you essentially do what’s called an aerospike design,” he explained. “An aerospike design is, you take the nozzle and you turn it inside out, so instead of having a bell-shape, and the flow is expanding inside the bell, you’ve got a spike, and the flow is expanding along the spike.” While at slower speeds, the thrust would come out somewhat sideways. “The nature of a supersonic flow is such that you’ll maintain basically a contiguous stream of air … coming out of the engine, and it will gradually expand.” The stream is contained “because it’s moving so fast … And the beauty of that is if you do it right, it expands to atmospheric pressure, or pretty close to it.”

So, “for any hypersonic configuration, you’re almost certainly going to use an external expansion nozzle of the type the Boeing folks show.”

Lewis declined to offer much comment on the canted verticals, saying they could have something to do with yaw stability or “artistic license.”

The flattish shaping of the vehicle is also good for stealth, Lewis said, and its thermal signature will not be as much of a giveaway as one might think.

It’s “kind of a misnomer that you often hear, that a hypersonic vehicle is going to be glowing super hot. … But if you have designed it correctly, really, only the leading edges are going to be super hot. In fact, the sorts of shapes that lend themselves to efficient hypersonic flight tend to actually have relatively small cross section. So they tend to be these really slender shapes.”

Lewis agreed that the Valkyrie release is likely a reminder that Boeing is still a player in hypersonics.

“Remember, Boeing built the X-51. They know how to build a hypersonic airframe. They were eliminated from the DARPA competition. They are now back in the game,” he said. “The Joint Hypersonics Transition Office is funding Boeing to do a hypersonic air-breathing missile concept called HyFly2. And they are, to put it bluntly, kicking butt in their design. They’re doing a really nice job.”

Proliferated Architecture Necessary for Future Satellite Communications

Proliferated Architecture Necessary for Future Satellite Communications

When it comes to the Defense Department’s plans for satellite communications, the Pentagon will need all different kinds of space architectures, two top Pentagon officials said during a Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies webcast Jan. 7.

David Voss, director of the Spectrum Warfare Center of Excellence at the Space Warfighting Analysis Center, and Stephen Forbes, Blackjack program manager at DARPA, addressed the need for proliferated architectures while discussing a recent Mitchell Institute policy paper, “The Backbone of JADC2: Satellite Communications for Information Age Warfare.”

The paper by retired Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton and senior analyst Lukas Autenreid recommended that the Space Force “distribute, disaggregate, diversify, and expand its SATCOM options,” particularly by building out a constellation of low Earth orbit satellites and linking them with laser communications to create a mesh network. 

Such moves, Chilton and Autenreid argued, would complement DOD’s current satellite systems, most of which are in geosynchronous orbit and use radio frequencies (RF). Geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellites, Chilton argued, are “incredibly capable, but they’re incredibly vulnerable,” quoting former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John E. Hyten in calling them “big, fat juicy targets.”

But that’s not to say that GEO satellites don’t have some value, Chilton and Voss agreed. Indeed, while Voss spent much of his early career working on small satellite low Earth Orbit (LEO) architectures for the Air Force Research Laboratory, he said his perspective on the larger, more distant satellites has changed.

“I have come to really grow to appreciate and understand a lot of the value that GEO brings to the community,” Voss said. “When you look at an information architecture as a whole, each of the orbits bring a value function that is nice to have at an enterprise level. And so, the ability to see the entire globe from GEO, as your paper highlighted, really was why we went there from the first point. It gives you an efficiency both within the networking architecture, and it gives you the ability to see a very large geographic area.”

Similarly, analysts and observers have been warming to the idea of free-space laser communication, or lasercom, as key to future satellite communications due to it being faster and more secure than radio waves. And in their paper, Chilton and Autenreid recommended that DOD use lasercom to link its LEO satellites, increasing coverage and resilience. 

Yet even as he touted the benefits of lasercom, Forbes said RF can’t be abandoned.

“As soon as you start moving out of single-digit spacecraft, the ability to stitch them all together in a resilient communication mesh is going to be a critical enabler to overcome the threats and the challenges that we face and build a much less brittle architecture. And optical is a great way of doing that,” Forbes said. “[But] it’s not well suited for serving mass users. It is not well served for folks that have weather … And that’s why I also believe that, especially when you get out of the … backbone class of the portion of the network, that RF will always have its place to serve the users.”

The Space Development Agency is currently in the midst of developing the National Defense Space Architecture, a constellation of satellites that will be used for tracking targets as well as missile warning, communications, data coverage and sharing, and other capabilities. And as part of that, the agency has looked to procure dozens of satellites

At the same time, the Space Force has indicated an interest in using commercial satellite communications, too. And in developing its broader architecture, the Pentagon will need both, Voss said.

“This foundational layer—it’s critical that it embraces the multi-orbit aspects that are highlighted [in the paper], that it takes advantage of the global perspective that GEO brings as well as the proliferative nature that LEO brings,” Voss said. “This foundational layer [has] the natural inclusion of commercial capabilities within a diversified architecture. It gives us that path-agnostic capability that was identified, not only within a contested environment, just to the nature of the complexity of delivering these communications systems for either 5G or even future 6G applications.”

The emphasis on using every available technology, orbit, and asset available is necessary for resiliency, Chilton said. Based on their recent actions and developments, China and Russia will seek to disrupt the U.S.’s space-based communications in a potential future conflict, he predicted.

“I find it hard to believe, given that they’ve demonstrated the capabilities to reach those orbital altitudes with anti-satellite weapons, that our adversaries would not be planning on doing such to put themselves in an advantage in the area of operations where we’re going to be fighting,” Chilton said.

Beyond resiliency, though, a proliferated satellite architecture is also helpful for offensive capabilities, Autenreid said. And as the Pentagon continues to develop its joint all-domain command and control concept to connect sensors and shooters more efficiently than ever, having different capabilities to meet different situations is critical, Voss added.

“I think that the challenge we’re at right now as we’re doing some of these big data analytics is, what is the recipe and how much of each do you need against that JADC2 problem, as you look up provisioning the various types of users across the different services?” Voss said.

DARPA’s New Public Tools Teach AI Developers to Defend Against Attacks

DARPA’s New Public Tools Teach AI Developers to Defend Against Attacks

For the military to trust commercially sourced or even internally developed artificial intelligence, the technology will have to be defended. Now developers have a set of open-source tools to learn new defensive techniques and to test their products against simulated attacks.

Techniques to defend already-trained AI algorithms, or models, are as new as the attacks themselves—in other words, “brand new,” said Bruce Draper of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 

In an attack, “the goal is to fool an AI system—make it behave incorrectly,” said Draper, DARPA’s program manager for the newly available set of tools called GARD. (It’s Guaranteeing AI Robustness against Deception.) In an interview, Draper said an attack might trick an AI system into misidentifying faces, for example, or even interfering with AI systems that detect conventional attacks.

Similarly to how AI is so broadly applicable, the team surrounding GARD hopes a common set of techniques will apply broadly across AI models.

“We’re trying to get the knowledge out so developers can build systems that are defended,” Draper said. That includes the military itself, other parts of the government, and the private sector. A related program will address the military more specifically. When utility companies upgrade their networks to protect from cyberattacks, for example, AI will likely factor in.

DARPA brought together researchers from IBM, Two Six Technologies, MITRE Corp., the University of Chicago, and Google Research to assemble the elements of GARD: 

  • Building on a pre-existing open-source library of tools and techniques by IBM, the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox, GARD “made it better,” Draper said.
  • Google Research pitched in a self-study repository with so-called “test dummies” to teach developers common approaches to defensive AI.
  • Data sets within GARD’s APRICOT library (Adversarial Patches Rearranged In COnText) are there to help developers try to attack and defend their own systems, such as by altering what an AI system observes in its environment.

DARPA isn’t alone in questioning the security of AI. 

The Air Force’s cyber policy chief Lt. Gen. Mary F. O’Brien has said that to be effective, AI has to be reliable—troops have to trust it. In using AI to augment human decision-making, for example: “If our adversary is able to inject any uncertainty into any part of that process, we’re kind of dead in the water.”

Western militaries—already “late to the party” in the creation of AI—risk unforeseen consequences by adopting AI made for the commercial sector, said NATO’s David van Weel

Meanwhile, the now-concluded National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommended in its 2021 final report that the Defense Department incentivize offices to adopt commercially available AI for business processes. The commission also acknowledged that “commercial firms and researchers have documented attacks that involve evasion, data poisoning, model replication, and exploiting traditional software flaws to deceive, manipulate, compromise, and render AI systems ineffective.”

For now, the defenses of commercially developed AI remain questionable.

“How do you vet that—how do you know if it’s safe?” Draper said. “Our goal is to try to develop these tools so that all systems are safe.”

Army’s Kurilla Tapped to Lead CENTCOM, Get Fourth Star, Reports Say

Army’s Kurilla Tapped to Lead CENTCOM, Get Fourth Star, Reports Say

The next leader of U.S. Central Command has reportedly been identified. Army Lt. Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla has been nominated for a fourth star by President Joe Biden, according to Congressional records.

And while the Senate Armed Services Committee record specifies only that Kurilla will be “assigned to a position of importance and responsibility,” reports from the Wall Street Journal and The Associated Press indicate he will take over as commander of CENTCOM if confirmed.

Kurilla currently serves as commander of the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C.—the Corps deployed thousands of Soldiers to Afghanistan this past summer as part of the evacuation process. 

Prior to that, Kurilla worked as chief of staff for Central Command. He also spent every year from 2004 to 2014 in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, commanding forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to his official bio. In 2005, Kurilla, then a lieutenant colonel, was wounded in Iraq during a firefight.

Kurilla’s nomination comes as current CENTCOM commander Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. is set to retire in the coming months. McKenzie’s tenure began in March 2019. He oversaw the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan after 20 years of war, culminating in the August evacuation that ended with 13 service members dying from an ISIS suicide bomb attack.

McKenzie also later acknowledged that a U.S. drone strike during the withdrawal mistakenly killed 10 innocent civilians. He, along with Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, faced a bipartisan grilling on Capitol Hill in the aftermath of the withdrawal.

Kurilla is likely to face plenty of tough questions in his own nomination hearing, as he is poised to take over a combatant command facing an inflection point. 

Pentagon leaders have increasingly emphasized competition with China and Russia as the major challenges facing the U.S. in the years ahead, as the American troop presence in the Middle East continues to shrink. At the same time, though, officials have said the military’s task of countering terror threats from the region is far from finished. In recent days, CENTCOM has had to repel drone strikes and destroy a rocket site, presumably belonging to Iranian-backed militias.

With a reduced troop presence, officials have said they plan to rely on “over the horizon” capabilities to monitor terror threats. For places such as Afghanistan in Central Asia, the closest base from which the U.S. can conduct ISR operations is Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, hundreds of miles away. There have been reports that the Pentagon is working to secure basing rights in other nearby countries, but thus far, no agreement has been announced.