Pentagon Nominee Says US Should Be Faster to Aid Ukraine Than It Was in 2014

Jan. 13, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

In 2014, Celeste Wallander was the senior director for Russia and Central Asia at the National Security Council, under President Barack Obama, when Russia launched its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, seizing the territory from Ukraine.

Now, nearly eight years later, Wallander is President Joe Biden’s nominee to be assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and Russia is once again threatening to invade Ukraine, massing troops along the border and thus far resisting calls from NATO members to de-escalate the situation.

Looking back at what happened in 2014, the U.S. needs to be faster and more forceful in response to any Russian aggression, Wallander told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee at her confirmation hearing Jan. 13.

“I believe that the lessons of 2014 were that the United States needs to be, first and foremost, unified with our allies and partners, not only in Europe, but globally, in order to promote a unified front to the Kremlin and make them understand that they cannot divide us,” Wallander said. “And the second lesson would be to rapidly develop ways to impose costs on the Russian leadership and to support Ukraine in defense of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

Pressed by Sens. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), Wallander added that the 2014 response was “too slow and too incremental” and that to provide aid to Ukraine—weapons such as the FGM-148 Javelin, an anti-tank missile—would have been “appropriate and necessary.”

In 2022, the situation has not yet devolved to the point of open conflict. But there are plenty of fears that it will. On Jan. 13, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau, the chairman-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, warned that the risk of war in Europe “is now greater than ever before in the last 30 years,” according to media reports.

Driving much of those fears is the seeming lack of progress in diplomatic discussions. Russia has demanded that Ukraine be barred from ever joining NATO and that the alliance withdraw all troops and weapons from any countries that joined NATO after 1997. The U.S. has rejected those ideas as “non-starters.”

Some analysts have suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands were never intended to be part of a negotiation and instead might even be a pretext for invading Ukraine.

Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) seemed to voice that very concern in questioning Wallander, saying Putin is “setting up these negotiations to fail, and leaving himself very little option other than either a humiliating retreat or invasion.”

“What do you make of this unusual negotiating strategy where you make demands that you know aren’t going to be met?” King then asked Wallander. “And is this just a pretext for an invasion?”

Wallender seemed to agree.

“Senator, I share your analytical assessment of the possible courses of action and the reasons for the demands that Russia has made publicly,” Wallander said. “And it concerns me greatly for Ukraine’s security and, indeed, for European and Euro-Atlantic security.”

At least for the moment, though, the Pentagon is still publicly holding out hope for avoiding any conflict.

“We have no indication that President Putin has made a decision to launch another incursion into Ukraine,” DOD Press Secretary John F. Kirby said in a press gaggle Jan. 13. “He clearly continues to have a military capability that would allow him to move on Ukraine. And we’ve seen no indication … that he has decreased that capability in any way. But we still don’t believe that a final decision by Mr. Putin has been made. And that’s why we continue to believe that there’s still space for diplomacy and hopefully time for diplomacy, and we support that effort.”

Pentagon Editor Abraham Mahshie contributed to this report.

Report: Nuclear Engines Could Help the US Keep Pace in Space Maneuver Warfare

Jan. 13, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

Maturing nuclear thermal propulsion to maneuver satellites out of the way of attacks could also keep the U.S. apace with Chinese and Russian advancements, according to a new paper.

In the policy paper “Maneuver Warfare in Space: The Strategic Mandate for Nuclear Propulsion,” the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies argues that new nuclear engines are at least as safe as today’s chemical propulsion while more faster and more fuel efficient.

“In either case, the impact on our national security from not operationalizing this technology is far greater than the safety and environmental concerns that have been solved thanks to decades of research and testing,” writes author Christopher Stone, senior fellow for space studies in the institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence.

Stone, in a briefing with reporters Jan. 13, pegged safety fears inspired by Chernobyl-like disasters as the likeliest barrier to speeding up the development of space nuclear propulsion. But the nuclear thermal systems in question—unlike their chemical counterparts—don’t even involve combustion but instead heat up hydrogen gas.

On the other hand, the technology could unlock the ability for the military to move satellites rapidly between Earth orbits or out to cislunar space and back versus staying limited to predetermined orbits and station-keeping-type maneuvers for slight corrections. Considering how little fuel satellites have onboard, defensive maneuvering could amount to “bleeding out propellant,” Stone said.

With longer, more fuel-efficient run times than chemical engines and lower mass, nuclear thermal-powered vehicles “can achieve higher velocities, hence shorter flight times,” Stone writes.

Underlying much of the military’s space planning—its new point of view of space as a “warfighting domain”—is the fact that its existing satellites probably couldn’t withstand or avoid an attack such as by a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon to knock it to pieces or an in-space laser to confound its optics. Russia tested an anti-satellite weapon by destroying a defunct Soviet satellite in November 2021.

Stone said the people who designed today’s satellites weren’t thinking defensively.

“The situation is now radically different,” he writes. “China has already shifted to a strategy of maneuver warfare in space that leverages space-based and ground-based weapons systems”—and by 2040, they expect that architecture to include satellites with nuclear thermal propulsion.

“Do we want to be behind the power curve?” Stone said.

The paper says the U.S. should:

“Rapidly adopt a new space force design capable of decisive maneuver warfare in space.”
Develop and field nuclear thermal propulsion in partnership with NASA and the Department of Energy.
Advance the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s DRACO program—Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations—from science and technology development to a program of record. DRACO’s low enriched uranium requires less oversight to launch (the President doesn’t have to sign off) than high enriched uranium.
“Deploy ground-based and space-based kinetic ASAT weapons systems capable of holding Chinese and Russian targets at risk. … DOD could achieve this objective by repurposing existing initiatives, including its standard missile and ground based mid-course missile defense interceptor programs.”
“Hedge against risk by deploying the [Mission Extension Vehicle] to provide GPS and other vital satellite constellations the ability to conduct limited defensive maneuvers while preserving their onboard chemical propellant.”

The paper says the Space Force, in particular, should “educate the public and Congress on the growing threat to U.S. space systems and the need to create a more robust force design that will enhance deterrence.”

Civil Agency Should Take Over Space Traffic Management, Says Pentagon Nominee for Space Policy

Jan. 13, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The push to move responsibility for space traffic management from the Pentagon to a civil authority has stalled, frustrating members of Congress who want the Department of Commerce to take over the mission from the Space Force.

The first-ever nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy endorsed that effort during his confirmation hearing Jan. 13 and pledged to help Congress determine what is needed to make that happen.

John Plumb, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, called space traffic management “absolutely essential” to the domain. And in response to questions from Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), he promised to increase DOD transparency on the cost of that mission, an issue Shaheen said was preventing Senate appropriators from allocating the proper amount of funds to the Commerce Department.

“I do agree that it should be conducted by a civil agency, not the Department of Defense, and I will commit to you to work to help discover the right amount of resources and training and opportunities needed to make that shift,” Plumb said. “It is a difficult shift, but I think it’s needed.”

The question of space traffic management took on renewed importance after a Russian anti-satellite weapon test this past November created a massive debris field, forcing astronauts on the International Space Station to take shelter in return ships and threatening access to space for countries around the world.

That test—the latest conducted by the Russians and similar to a 2007 test by China—underscores the need for “norms and rules of behavior” in space, Plumb said, echoing a common refrain among Defense Department and Space Force officials over the past few months.

“I think one of the issues that makes space unique is that a destructive test like the Russians have recently conducted challenges access to all spacefaring nations, and we need to find ways to prevent that type of problem,” Plumb said.

The most direct way to do that would be an international treaty to ban kinetic anti-satellite tests, a measure Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen H. Hicks endorsed at a recent meeting of the National Space Council and one Plumb also said he supports.

But while China and Russia have co-sponsored treaties submitted to the United Nations seemingly aimed at avoiding a space arms race and destructive tests, their actions in the domain have proved them to be “disingenuous,” Plumb wrote in advance policy questions submitted to SASC.

Those treaties, Plumb wrote, “do not provide pragmatic, equitable, or verifiable mechanisms that would enhance U.S. national security interests.”

Speaking at the confirmation hearing, though, Plumb stopped short of saying he thought the U.S. would never be able to find common ground on the issue with China and Russia.

“I do think there is a need for rules and for norms in space behavior. And I hold some deep kernel of hope that we could come to an agreement with Russia and China on that in some not-too-distant future,” Plumb said. “At the same time, nothing there would, in my mind, prevent us or preclude us from pursuing both offensive and defensive capabilities to ensure that we can defend our own assets and prevail in a conflict.”

One capability the U.S. can and should build to discourage destructive behavior, Plumb said, is resiliency in its satellite constellations so that DOD can “withstand a blow to one or several satellites.”

“I think being able to reconstitute quickly and having a resilient architecture makes the attractiveness of a target much less, and I think that’s a really important place,” Plumb said. “I don’t think we’re moving fast enough, and we need to get going.”

Resiliency in space architecture is a topic other Pentagon and Space Force officials also have stressed, as plans for a large constellation of low-Earth orbit satellites unfold. The hope is that by launching larger numbers of satellites, the destruction of some by an anti-satellite weapon wouldn’t cripple the Pentagon’s space capabilities.

“As soon as you start moving out of single-digit spacecraft, the ability to stitch them all together in a resilient communication mesh is going to be a critical enabler to overcome the threats and the challenges that we face and [to] build a much less brittle architecture,” Stephen Forbes, Blackjack program manager at DARPA, said at a recent Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event.

Plumb aligned himself with previous comments from top DOD space officials on one other front during his confirmation hearing. When asked by Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.V.) if he believed there should be a Space National Guard, Plumb said his personal belief was that “there is value in Guard and Reserve support for the Space Force.”

Airmen, Guardians Now Allowed to Include Pronouns in Signature Block

Jan. 13, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Airmen and Guardians are now allowed to include their pronouns in the signature block of emails, memoranda, letters, and papers.

The change, made official in the Department of the Air Force’s writing guide, was announced Dec. 20.

The inclusion of pronouns, such as he/him, she/her, and they/them, in signature blocks has become an increasingly common practice in the business world and helps to ensure that transgender and nonbinary individuals are identified as they desire. It also helps individuals with gender-neutral names.

The department’s change makes it the first military department to have an official policy on pronouns in signature blocks, according to Military Times. It was advocated for by the LGBTQ Initiatives Team, or LIT, a subgroup of the DAF Barrier Analysis Working Group, along with the Pacific Islander/Asian American Community Team and the Women’s Initiatives Team.

“The change request was driven by awareness of a restrictive policy that was being used against transgender Airmen and Guardians who were authentically representing themselves,” said Lt. Col. Bree Fram, an LIT Transgender Policy Team co-lead, in a statement. “It was also important for many individuals often confused as being a different gender in their communications.”

According to an Air Force press release, official signature blocks should include name, rank, service affiliation, duty title, organization name, phone numbers, and social media contact information. Pronouns are now authorized but not required and should be placed immediately after the name in parentheses or on a separate line within the signature block.

“An inclusive force is a mission-ready force, and I’m thankful to the LGBTQ Initiatives Team for helping us realize this opportunity to be a more inclusive force,” Undersecretary of the Air Force Gina Ortiz Jones said in a statement.

The effort to introduce this change in the official writing guide was started by Master Sgt. Jamie Hash, the other LIT Transgender Policy Team co-lead, as part of her base’s Diversity and Inclusion Committee, the Air Force said.
The Air Force officially stood up its department-wide Office of Diversity and Inclusion in January 2021.

Since then, the Air Force has updated standards such as those involving women’s hair in an effort to better address differences in hair texture and density, and Jones became the first openly lesbian and second member of the LGBTQ community to serve as undersecretary. Since then, she has championed several diversity initiatives within the department.

How the SDA’s Satellite Swarm Will Track Hypersonic Missiles Where Others Can’t

Jan. 12, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

A satellite constellation specially suited to tracking hypersonic missiles could be up and running by 2025.

Director of the Space Development Agency Derek M. Tournear laid out the advantages of the Tracking Layer of SDA’s still-envisioned National Security Space Architecture in a virtual talk Jan. 12 hosted by the Mitchell Institute Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence.

Tournear explained that maneuverability has brought about the need for infrared tracking to be done closer to Earth, from low Earth orbit (LEO) in addition to the 40,000-kilometer-high orbits where missile tracking takes place now.

DOD’s existing tracking systems in high geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) and polar orbit can detect the launches, but maneuverability has introduced the need to also track missiles throughout their flight, Tournear said. His comments come one day after North Korea claimed to have tested another hypersonic missile. Although the U.S. refers only to the missile as “ballistic,” officials agree the missile launched Jan. 11 is more advanced than one launched just a week earlier.

At the dawn of missile tracking, when ballistic missiles flew along predictable trajectories, “you knew essentially where … the missile would come from, and then once you had early detection”—the hot, bright plume of a rocket launch in infrared—“you could predict the impact point very rapidly,” Tournear said.

But missiles are hardly ballistic anymore.

“They’re all maneuverable, whether or not they’re fractional orbital, or even some of the more ballistic ones, and then especially once you get to the hypersonic glide vehicles,” Tournear said. “They all can change their impact point, and so you need to be able to detect them throughout the flight.”

Simply because of how heat dissipates the atmosphere, the higher satellites can’t detect the cooler, dimmer phases of flight.

LEO orbits, on the other hand, top out at 2,000 kilometers.

“In the lower orbit, we can actually detect signatures that are lower, that are essentially dimmer, than what you can detect in these higher orbits,” Tournear said. Targets become detectable not just at launch, “but you can [also] see the hypersonic glide vehicles as they’re maneuvering and getting hot.”

A lower orbit calls for more satellites to cover the globe. Twenty-eight satellites launched in 2024 and 2025 will form the “kernel” of the tracking ability, Tournear said.

But the proliferation brings another advantage.

Several satellites will be able to detect a given flight, allowing for “different ‘look’ angles … to calculate the three-dimensional track very accurately,” Tournear said.

‘Russia Has a Choice’: NATO Meets with Russia to De-escalate Ukraine Crisis

Jan. 12, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

Each of the 30 NATO members took their turn on Jan. 12 giving a Russian delegation in Brussels an earful about the crisis on the border of Ukraine precipitated by Russia’s presence of 100,000 troops. But despite the scolding at the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council since 2019, de-escalation was not promised and an eastern flank member tells Air Force Magazine they are concerned the United States will make security concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Head of the U.S. delegation Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman said after the four-hour meeting that Russia did not broach the possibility of de-escalation. Sherman also said it is still not clear if the week of intense discussions that began with a U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue Jan. 10 in Geneva and ends with a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Jan. 13 in Vienna was ever meant by Putin to be substantive.

“It was truly a remarkable expression of the power of diplomacy,” Sherman told journalists in Brussels. “The NATO Allies spoke in complete unity in support of a set of critical international principles.”

America’s No. 2 diplomat, who led negotiations Jan. 10 and headed the American delegation Jan. 12, said each of the 30 Allies addressed the Russian delegation, affirming an ironclad position that all countries must be free to choose their own foreign policy, sovereignty and territorial integrity “are sacrosanct,” and all nations must be free to choose their own alliances.

In recent weeks, Russia has called for a rollback of NATO membership, removal of missiles and troops from the eastern flank of the alliance, and a guarantee that Ukraine and Georgia not be allowed to join the alliance.

Not only were those demands dismissed again in Brussels, but NATO allies called on Russia to de-escalate.

“It ended with a sober challenge from the NATO allies to Russia, which came here today to express its security concerns,” Sherman said, painting Russia’s worries about Ukraine as an aggressor as unrealistic.

Instead, she said Allies called on Russia “to de-escalate tensions, choose the path of diplomacy, to continue to engage in honest and reciprocal dialogue so that together, we can identify solutions that enhance the security of all.”

Ahead of the meeting, an eastern flank NATO official told Air Force Magazine that he believed Russia would only negotiate bilaterally with the United States, and the NATO and OSCE meetings would not be taken seriously by the Russian delegation.

“I don’t think there’s gonna be any substantial progress,” the official said on condition of anonymity. “They came because they were pressed by the U.S. and kind of convinced that otherwise, some kind of progress in the bilateral track will not bring results if they don’t come to the NATO table.”

The official suggested that Russia’s list of demands, since deemed “non-starters” by U.S. officials, was a negotiating tactic to extract other vital concessions. Sans swift acceptance of its demands, Russia has indicated it may forgo future talks and move forward with its own plans involving Ukraine.

“My problem is that as NATO we haven’t really kind of clearly rejected those treaties,” the official said of the Russian term for the demands published and shared with the United States on Dec. 17. “Some of the Allies would just like to kind of be a bit more vague in the communication in order to keep the Russians at the table.”

Potential U.S. Concessions to Russia

Polish security analyst Wojciech Lorenz of the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw told Air Force Magazine Jan. 12 that his country is concerned the United States would be willing to give into Russian demands in order to decrease tensions.

Moscow has long eyed with disdain U.S. troops and missile defenses in Poland.

“Poland is especially concerned that the U.S. might decide to withdraw a majority of its troops stationed on Polish soil on a rotational basis,” he said of the estimated 5,500 American troops now in the country. The analyst added there may be a temptation to stop the deployment of the U.S. armored brigade combat team (ABCT) present in Poland since 2017.

Lorenz said the ABCT has helped to strengthen the credibility of deterrence in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014.

“Even if the U.S. decided to maintain the presence of almost 1,000 troops in the framework of the NATO battle group, withdrawal of ABCT would have serious negative psychological, political, and strategic consequences,” Lorenz said. “Poland is also worried that the U.S. administration may try to stop the development of the missile defense base in Redzikowo, which is a part of the U.S./NATO missile defense system.”

Poland is poised to host the second American Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Europe after one was made operational in NATO Black Sea Ally Romania in 2016. The system is supposed to defend Europe against missile attacks from the Middle East and it is inherently defensive, contrary to the Russian S-400 anti-access/area denial systems bordering NATO in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and occupied Crimea whose missiles have the capability to reach European capitals.

“The presence of this system infuriated the Kremlin because it amounted to a permanent U.S. military presence,” Lorenz explained of the Aegis Ashore in Poland. “With such U.S. assets located in Poland it would be more difficult for Russia to turn Poland into a military buffer zone, an area where conflict with NATO could be fought.”

The NATO official believes there are nonetheless some areas of common interest with Russia, particularly limits on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Once covered in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, repeated Russian violations led the United States to withdraw from the treaty in 2019.

A second issue proposed by the U.S. side in Geneva were limits on military exercises. The U.S. Defender series has recently helped the alliance’s newest members in the Black Sea, Balkans, and Baltic region to practice reinforcement in the event of a crisis. Russia regularly exercises with partner Belarus and its presence of 100,000 troops on the border of Ukraine has been characterized as an exercise.

Sherman highlighted that the Russian troops had conducted live fire exercises on the very morning of the NATO Russia Council meeting.

In previewing the Brussels meeting Jan. 11, U.S. permanent representative to NATO Amb. Julianne Smith said any discussion with Russia must involve “reciprocal” actions

But, the NATO official said even a reciprocal agreement with Russia on limiting exercises would harm NATO much more than Russia.

“You have to exercise reinforcement of Baltic states and Russians are just behind the border,” he said. “Providing reciprocal measures will basically render us unprepared to reinforce them.”

The official added: “Those proposals have been met with a lot of skepticism in the Alliance.”

Notwithstanding continued concerns about a potential U.S. concession to Russia, Sherman declared in a Jan. 10 wrap up following the bilateral meeting with Russia that troop movements were not on the table, and were not on the agenda for the NATO-Russia Council meeting.

“We did not have discussions about American troop levels,” she said. “American troop levels were not on the agenda for today.”

Following the meeting, the NATO official said the Russian delegation was “not particularly offensive and did not walk away,” while “the Allies were rather united.”

Sherman said the ball is now in Putin’s court.

“Russia has a choice to make,” she said. “Everyone, Russia most of all, will have to decide whether they really are about security, in which case they should engage, or whether this was all a pretext, and they may not even know yet.”

US Imposes Sanctions in Response to North Korean Missile Tests

Jan. 12, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

The Biden Administration has economically sanctioned five individual North Koreans, a Russian national, and a Russian company in response to six missile tests conducted by Pyongyang since September, which the Administration says violate U.N. Security Council resolutions. The sanctioned individuals are based in China and Russia.

The test of a hypersonic missile on Jan. 11 is “further evidence” that North Korea “continues to advance prohibited programs despite the international community’s calls for diplomacy and denuclearization,” said Brian Nelson, undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a statement for the press.

The sanctions target North Korea’s “continued use of overseas representatives to illegally procure goods for weapons,” and are aimed at countering Pyongyang’s “weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs,” Nelson said.

The latest provocative launch occurred Jan. 10, when North Korea conducted a test of a hypersonic missile, which maneuvered before coming down in the Sea of Japan, some 435 miles from its launch point near the Chinese border. North Korea state media said it was the third test of a hypersonic missile, during which the vehicle made a “glide jump flight” followed by “corkscrew maneuvering.” The missile was first tested last September, it said. It was the second test in a week—another was made Jan. 5. Pyongyang said both tests were successful, although some missile experts doubted the same missile was used in both instances.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who was present for the launch, said the hypersonic missile development is one element of the nation’s “war deterrent.”

North Korea hypersonic — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, right, observed the hypersonic missile test launch held at the Academy of Defense Science on Jan. 11, 2022. Korean Central News Agency.

A More Advanced Missile

Photos released by Pyongyang showed a launching ballistic missile with a nosecone shaped like a hypersonic vehicle. South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff issued a statement that the vehicle reached a speed of Mach 10 and an altitude of 37 miles; roughly half the distance to where space begins. The South Korean military leaders also assessed that the missile fired “is more advanced than the missile North Korea fired on Jan. 5,” but said they are working with the U.S. to characterize and analyze the test.

The South Korean government said its military has the ability to “detect and intercept this projectile, and we are continuously strengthening our response system.”

Nelson said the five sanctioned individuals provided goods, services, or cash to North Korea’s Second Academy of Natural Sciences, believed to be the overseer of the missile program. Their “activities or transactions … have materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery,” he said. Any assets they have in the U.S. will be frozen and no American company can do business with them. Any U.S. or foreign company doing business with the sanctioned individuals or company will also be penalized.

The sanctioned persons were involved in obtaining metal alloys, software, and chemicals, as well as telecommunications equipment from Russia.

The Jan. 11 hypersonic test came just hours after five nations—Albania, France, Ireland, Japan, and the U.K., along with the U.S.—condemned the Jan. 5 test and called on U.N. member states to enforce sanctions they agreed to impose on North Korea. The U.N. Security Council has banned Pyongyang from conducting any tests of ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command issued a statement Jan. 10 saying they were aware of the launch and are “consulting closely with our allies and partners.” The command said the launch “does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” but it “highlights the destabilizing impact” of North Korea’s “illicit weapons program.” It added that the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and South Korea “remains ironclad.” Indo-PACOM did not describe the missile as hypersonic, though, calling it “ballistic.” U.S. Forces Korea said that no U.S. or South Korean territory or personnel were at risk due to the launch.

A Pentagon spokesman added that the U.S. “takes any new capability seriously” and repeated the condemnation of Pyongyang’s testing of ballistic missiles, “which are destabilizing to the region and to the international community.”

Coincidentally, Derek M. Tournear, Space Development Agency director, said at an AFA Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event Jan. 11 that satellites in low earth orbit will be deployed to detect hypersonic missiles by their heat signatures.

At about the same time as the North Korean missile launch, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a “ground stop” of air traffic in the West Coast region, saying it was a “matter of precaution,” but full operations were resumed within 15 minutes. However, air traffic controllers were confused by the alert and told some airborne aircraft that a “national” ground stop was in effect.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command said they did not issue any warning relative to the North Korean missile launch.

Air Force Releases New Enlisted Force Development Action Plan

Jan. 12, 2022 | By Amy Hudson

The Air Force on Jan. 12 released a new Enlisted Force Development Action Plan that outlines 28 force development objectives to be completed over the next two years. The objectives are aimed at better preparing Airmen to compete and win in a high-end fight against China or Russia.

The Air Force is in the process of overhauling its talent management system to include a new force development strategy expected to be released this summer, said Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass and Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. during a recent virtual “Coffee Talk.”

The action plan outlines core focus areas, each with multiple objectives to help the Air Force accomplish its goals. The plan also includes a timeline for when each objective is to be completed, with the first round due in April and the last in December 2023; as well as identifies the entity responsible for making sure the task gets done.

Each of the objectives support at least one of Brown’s four previously released Action Orders—Airmen, Bureaucracy, Competition, and Design Implementation.

“Currently, we employ an enlisted force development system that was predominantly built in the 1900s,” wrote Bass and Brown in a letter to Air Force leaders. “While effective for the needs of yesterday’s Airmen, it does not meet the needs of today’s Wingmen, Leaders, and Warriors.”

The enlisted force makes up 75 percent of the Air Force’s military personnel. The action plan emphasizes that Airmen are the Air Force’s greatest asset, and the service must continue to invest in them and empower them through “career-long” education and training.

The goal is “to produce motivated, resilient, adaptable, agile, and multi-capable Airmen who fight and excel in Air Force, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational, and most importantly … contested environments,” states the plan.

That’s a lofty goal, which Brown acknowledges cannot be accomplished overnight, but he said it’s imperative the service start now.

“This is about ACTION … not talk,” wrote the two leaders. “We cannot do this all at once. We will not wait to begin.”

Source: Air Force Enlisted Force Development Action Plan

GBSD, LRSO, B-21, NGAD All Face Lengthy Delays if Continuing Resolution is Extended, Brown Warns Congress

Jan. 12, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Billions of dollars are on the line if Congress cannot pass a defense appropriations bill in the coming month and instead decides to fund the Defense Department through a continuing resolution for the rest of fiscal 2022, service chiefs and top Pentagon officials warned a House panel Jan. 12.

A yearlong CR also would cost the military an even more precious resource—its efforts to modernize and counter China and Russia, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. told the House Appropriations defense subcommittee.

“As much as this affects the Air Force fiscally, the impact it has on our way to change is more shattering,” Brown said. “Time is irrecoverable. And when you’re working to keep pace against well resourced and focused competitors, time matters.”

Brown said some of the Air Force’s signature modernization efforts would face delays of a year or more under a long-term CR, starting with two areas where Russia and China have built up their own capabilities as of late: the nuclear triad and hypersonics.

Air Force Concerns

Under a continuing resolution, the Air Force is unable to start more than a dozen new programs and ramp up production in several others. All told, Brown said, the Air Force would lose around $3.5 billion in purchasing power if the CR is extended through the end of fiscal 2022.

In keeping with his focus on the importance of time, though, Brown spent much of his testimony highlighting the delays a long-term CR would have on modernization.

“A yearlong CR could irreversibly delay the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent initial operating capability past 2029, the Long Range Standoff Weapon by over a year, and the conventional initial operating capability and nuclear certification of the B-21 up to a year,” Brown said.

“Additionally, the advancement of our two conventional hypersonic weapons could be prevented,” Brown added. “I’d like to point out that our pacing challenges have either modernized their nuclear enterprise and/or are fielding hypersonic systems. Meanwhile, we are still in the beginning phases of both.”

The GBSD program is already facing pressure from some corners of Congress, and the Air Force’s Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon hypersonic missile has taken some criticism after multiple test failures. Further delays to the programs could have a “compounding impact,” Brown added, “when you think about what our adversaries are doing and how they’re pacing out.”

But it’s not just nuclear and hypersonic weapon programs that could face issues under a CR. The development of the Next-Generation Air Dominance program, the Air Force’s planned sixth-generation fighter, would be delayed “by about two years,” Brown added, if the CR is extended. Improvements in the F-35 program also would be delayed a year, he said.

Space Force Concerns

Like Brown, Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond cited China and Russia as key reasons why Congress needs to pass an appropriations bill quickly, saying the Space Force needs funds to strengthen the military’s space capabilities, funds that aren’t available under a CR.

“Our adversaries are accelerating. This is not the time to be slowing the development and fielding of modernized capabilities for our forces,” Raymond told lawmakers.

“We remain the best in the world of space. We’ve got incredibly exquisite capabilities, but they were built for a different domain. They were built for a benign domain without a threat,” Raymond added. “The domain that we see today is threatened from a full spectrum of threats, everything from reversible jamming to kinetic destruction, as demonstrated by Russia. We have to modernize, we have to make that shift, and we are losing time. That’s why not having a CR is so critical to us. We have to move out to modernize a more resilient, defendable architecture that can meet the demands of a contested domain.”

The impact of a long-term CR would be bad for all the services, Raymond acknowledged. But he argued it would be especially painful for the Space Force, as the young service enters its third year of existence and works to establish itself.

Most obviously, the Department of the Air Force has said that under a CR, the Space Force won’t have the funds to complete the transfer of satellite communications capabilities from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Raymond said a yearlong CR would cut the Space Force’s budget by $2 billion, a substantial chunk of the tiny service’s funding.

“We view our ability to provide space capabilities and the advantage that they provide to our joint forces a sacred duty, and you can’t take that for granted anymore,” Raymond said. “The continuing resolution is going to impact our ability to modernize our forces, to be there in the face of a growing threat and reduce our readiness, and [it] will hinder long-term impacts to our Guardians and their families.”

The potential impact on personnel is especially crucial. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, passed in mid-December, included a 2.7 percent pay raise for troops. However, if there is no accompanying appropriations bill, the funding for that pay raise will have to come out of other personnel-related accounts, officials said. One of the most likely ways the services will look to do that is by limiting the number of new service members who access.

For the Space Force, in particular, this would be especially harmful, Raymond said.

“One of the biggest benefits that we’ve realized after establishing the Space Forces is our ability to attract incredible talent. This talent is highly technical, it’s highly educated, and it’s sought after. And they have other options,” Raymond said. “And if we enter into this delay, we’d have to do reduced accessions and put hiring freezes in place to help pay for the much-needed and deserved pay raise. [And if we do that,] they’re going to other places, and those are people that we will not be able to get back.”

Other service chiefs mentioned potentially limiting permanent change-of-station moves for service members as another way to fund the pay raise. And if even that isn’t enough, Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord warned, things such as bonuses could be sacrificed next.

Ways to Adapt?

This is far from the first time the Pentagon has had to operate under a continuing resolution. Indeed, the department has started the fiscal year under a CR 12 times in the past 13 years.

The fear of a long-term CR, however, is rising among certain officials and lawmakers. The most recent CR is set to expire after Feb. 18, but there has been speculation that some Republican lawmakers will push to extend the continuing resolution through the end of the fiscal year, preferring the spending levels set under former President Donald J. Trump to the budget proposed by President Joe Biden and Democrats.

On Jan. 12, however, such a possibility was criticized on all sides while Republican and Democratic representatives laid the blame for the stalled appropriations process on each other.

The difference between the Pentagon’s fiscal 2021 budget, established under Trump, and what was requested for 2022 under Biden is roughly $8 billion, McCord noted in his written testimony to the committee. But the true impact of a year-long CR would be much greater than that, he claimed.

“We would estimate that the lost purchasing power is more on the order of triple the $8 billion account level only,” McCord told lawmakers.

There are several reasons for that, he said, pointing to differences in military construction and the collapse of the Afghan national security forces that were initially slated to receive billions of dollars in aid.

“It is very difficult to get a precise number because you have to go down to a program level all across the department, but at the more general level, about triple the $8 billion,” McCord said.

That kind of loss is significant, McCord added. While a recent Government Accountability Office report found that DOD has adopted practices to manage the constraints of a continuing resolution, there is only so much the department can do.

“We have a lot of experience, sadly, now with CRs. So we certainly have some lessons learned,” McCord said. “But in general, there’s no strategy to combat math, right? If you don’t have enough money, you can’t operate the way you need to. You can’t pay the troops more … with the same amount of money and not have an impact come out some other way. So, yes, we have adapted on the contracting side, and we’re thinking about prioritization, … but again, this is fundamentally a math problem.”