Space Force Foresees Need for Cislunar Space Domain Awareness Within Decade

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

The Space Force’s top officer thinks the U.S. needs to be able to surveil cislunar space as soon as five years from now to defend U.S. interests on and around the moon.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond explained his estimate—the need for cislunar space domain awareness in the next five to 10 years—during a webinar Jan. 19 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

NASA, with its mission of exploration and science, has said it plans to go back to the moon “hopefully here in the not-too-distant-future,” Raymond said. “I think for them to do their job, they have to have a domain that’s safe, and secure, and stable.”

NASA hopes to land astronauts on the moon’s surface by 2025 but will first send its vehicles on two test-flights to cislunar space and back—the first of those flights uncrewed, the second crewed but without a landing. Meanwhile, NASA and companies are planning a number of robotic missions.

Raymond said he views the Space Force’s role as “providing capabilities for our country’s way of life, and our way of war, and making sure that [space] is safe and stable so all can operate in it.” He said the Space Force already has the job, through the monitoring of objects in orbit, of protecting astronauts on the International Space Station. He alluded to dangers such as debris like that caused by Russia’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in November.

“So as the nation goes further away, as the world goes further away, from the Earth, I think there’s going to be a requirement to have, at least—at a minimum—some domain awareness on that environment,” Raymond said. “I would say in … the next five to 10 years, we’re going to have to have some capability to be able to support those operations.”

On the military side, he also acknowledged “utility” in keeping pace with advancements being made by China, “our pacing challenger,” to make sure “that we compete in all areas of the domain, not just in low Earth orbit, or medium Earth orbit, or geosynchronous orbit.”

The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Cislunar Highway Patrol System is an example of the military’s research into how objects move in cislunar space and new ways to track them.

The commander of U.S. Space Command, Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, described space domain awareness in an interview with reporters in August. He differentiated space domain awareness from the well established practice of space situational awareness.

“One is different that the other,” Richardson said. Space situational awareness is more simply “reporting on where something is in space—characterizing it that way,” he explained. Space domain awareness “is a little bit more complicated,” requiring observers to try to understand and assign motive—“the ‘why’—the intent—behind having something in space and where it is.”

What Can Congress, Pentagon Do to Help With Military Spouses’ Unemployment?

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Dozens of programs already provide career assistance to military families. But Congress and the Pentagon can do more to study just how well those programs work and to understand other challenges facing military spouses seeking employment, advocates from the National Military Spouse Network argued Jan. 19.

More than 20 percent of military spouses were unemployed before the COVID-19 pandemic, NMSN President Sue Hoppin noted during the virtual rollout of the organization’s 2022 white paper, “The Military Spouse Employment Dilemma.” That percentage has stayed relatively steady for years now.

At the same time, the number of career-related resources available to military spouses has grown significantly. The paper notes that a 2020 Government Accountability Report identified 45 such programs for military and veteran families across the federal government.

“If you dig deeper and look at some of the military spouse employment pieces, holy cow, the number of resources are just tremendous,” said Sharene Brown, wife of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. “How they include career development, hiring assistance programs, entrepreneurial exploration, federal jobs—you name it, there’s just so much more … The opportunity to be able to help military spouses thrive in the employment world starts from just how to begin and then carries you through. There’s even coaching opportunities along the way.”

That wasn’t always the case, said Mollie Raymond, wife of Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond. When she first became a military spouse, she noted, the biggest adjustment was dealing with employment, or lack thereof.

“I was so excited to have graduated. I have a master’s in business administration. But I couldn’t find a job. I couldn’t find a network to connect with or any of the resources. [They] just weren’t like they are today,” Raymond said. “So I have seen, in these 34 years, so many wonderful resources available to spouses, and I couldn’t be more pleased or excited.”

Though resources are available, obstacles remain. Given the frequent moves that come with being part of a military family, spouses often struggle to find jobs, even compared to similarly educated individuals. There are also other challenges, said Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska).

“I think it’s critical that we should always look for ways to lessen the obstacles for military spouses to be able to get good jobs,” Sullivan said. “And look, that’s a win-win. It’s, of course, a win to the military families. But it’s a win to the communities that those families are in. Too often there are burdensome state or local regulations or federal regulations that inhibit military spouses from being able to fully contribute in their communities.”

And when spouses can’t find jobs, a whole host of other issues are likely to arise, said Heba Abdelaal, an NMSN leader and former congressional aide.

“There’s a reason why, when we talk about food insecurity, child care challenges, housing challenges, it’s always followed up by the fact that a military spouse may or may not be unemployed or underemployed,” Abdelaal said.

Over the long term, spouses are often unable to take advantage of benefits such as retirement plans because employers require them to spend a certain amount of time with the company before investing in those programs, Abdelaal said.

In order to address the employment and career development issues, NMSN offered five recommendations in its paper:

The Defense Department should establish “a standard set of metrics” to evaluate career assistance programs across federal, state, and local levels; and should make the findings of those metrics publicly available.
Congress should study “the inability of military spouses to benefit from financial vesting programs.”
The federal government should expand its use of the Domestic Employee Teleworking Overseas program, which allows federal employees to keep their jobs while temporarily working remotely overseas.
The Small Business Administration should create a Military Spouse SBA Small-Business Concern classification to provide support to military spouse entrepreneurs.
Congress should “consider authorizing the development of a military spouse experience map through the lens of employment, and what employment benefits/resources are accessible to a military spouse through each phase of the military life cycle.”

There has already been some Congressional action. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision, co-sponsored by Sullivan, mandating that the Defense Department conduct a study on military spouse employment. And the Military Spouse Hiring Act, introduced by Rep. Antonio Delgado (D-N.Y.), is currently pending.

Speaking Jan. 19, Delgado urged military spouses to advocate for the bill and to direct their energy to the proper officials, noting that the bill doesn’t fall under the purview of the House Armed Services Committee. Because it authorizes a tax credit to businesses who hire a military spouse, the legislation instead falls under the House Ways and Means Committee, “which handles tax policy,” he said.

“It’s understanding that dynamic that gives you the best chance to get the outcome you desire,” Delgado said.

While advocates continue to push for sweeping change, Raymond urged military spouses to take advantage of resources in their local communities.

“I just want to reiterate that local communities, whether you have a military spouse career coalition or not, they want to help spouses. They want to help the military in their communities. So don’t hesitate to reach out,” Raymond said. “And to spouses who might just be starting out, please look for resources. They’re out there. And we want you to follow your dreams professionally and financially, and we want you not to give up, so don’t give up. Look for resources. And know that you’re not alone and that your talents, your adaptability, your resilience, your hard work, your loyalty are valued.”

NATO Publishes ‘Overarching’ Space Policy, Outlines 4 Roles It Could Play

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

NATO isn’t looking to develop any space capabilities of its own, but it does want to bolster its space support for operations and missions. Any space-based attack on an ally could trigger the alliance’s collective defense policy, it said in its first public space policy document released Jan. 17.

NATO’s newly released “overarching” space policy follows the alliance’s adoption of a previous space policy in 2019, but details of that policy weren’t released publicly.

The new document pledges that NATO “is not aiming to become an autonomous space actor.” But given the increasingly crowded and contested nature of the domain, the alliance “will seek to complement and add value to the work of Allies and to engage with other relevant international organizations, as appropriate, avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.”

In particular, the policy outlines four key roles for NATO to play in the space domain:

Integrating space and space-related considerations into the delivery of NATO’s core tasks;
Serving as a forum for political-military consultations and information-sharing on relevant deterrence and defense-related space developments;
Ensuring effective provision of space support and effects to the Alliance’s operations, missions, and other activities;
Facilitating the development of compatibility and interoperability between Allies’ space services, products, and capabilities.

Those key roles will be supported by nine “lines of effort,” ranging from space support to space domain awareness to training and exercises.

The issue of space support is particularly important, the policy states, as it is needed for everything from space situational awareness to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications to weather monitoring; and missile warning to position, navigation, and timing. In order to fulfill those missions, NATO will identify and develop mechanisms to define its space support needs, the policy states.

“Allies’ capabilities, and, if necessary, trusted commercial service providers should be leveraged to meet these requirements in the most secure, efficient, effective, and transparent manner,” the policy adds.

Other lines of effort are centered around a push that the U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly endorsed—the adoption of an international set of rules or norms for operating in space. Even more fundamentally, the policy calls for NATO to “develop a common understanding of concepts, such as the role of space in crisis or conflict.”

But even while the policy states that free access, exploration, and peaceful use of space are “in the common interest of all nations,” it acknowledges that potential adversaries are developing capabilities to attack space assets, such as anti-satellite missiles and in-orbit weapons.

Such attacks would “present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance … and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack,” the policy states, adding that those attacks could lead to the invocation of NATO’s Article 5, under which members of the alliance commit to collectively defend each other and to respond to armed attacks.

The policy does not, however, definitively say what attacks in space will trigger Article 5, instead stating that those decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s principal political decision-making body.

The council will also be tasked with considering “a range of potential options … across the conflict spectrum to deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Allies’ space systems.”

Interoperability and cooperation are recurring themes throughout the policy as well, with NATO calling on member nations to share best practices with each other, coordinate their capabilities and information-sharing, and include space considerations in their military exercises.

DOD Condemns Iranian-Backed Houthi Attack on Partner UAE

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthi rebels attacked U.S. partner the United Arab Emirates on Jan. 17 with a combination of drone and missile strikes targeting two of the country’s airports and an oil refinery, killing three and setting off multiple explosions in the capital of Abu Dhabi.

Houthis have primarily targeted Saudi Arabia and its oil fields in the past with Iranian-made drone attacks. In a first, the terrorist attack against the UAE injured several foreign nationals in an attempt to discourage support for the Yemeni government, which has been in conflict with the Houthis since 2014.

The Defense Department condemned the attack on the regional partner and promised to seek ways to help the UAE better defend itself.

“The Department of Defense joins me in strongly condemning yesterday’s terrorist attack in Abu Dhabi,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement Jan. 18.

“We remain committed to the UAE’s security and ability to defend itself and stand united with our Emirati partners in defending against all threats to their territory,” the Secretary added.

In a briefing Jan. 18, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby went further, underscoring the foreign military sales relationship with the UAE and noting that the U.S. would seek ways to strengthen the partnership.

“We take these attacks on the Emirati seriously,” Kirby said. “We’re going to continue, again, to look for ways to make that defense partnership and their ability to defend themselves stronger and better.”

U.S. foreign military sales to the UAE total $29.3 billion and include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9B remotely piloted aircraft.

The Air Force relies on the UAE’s Al Dhafra Air Base, where 3,500 U.S. personnel are stationed for regional operations including over-the-horizon efforts in Afghanistan. Al Dhafra also served as a staging point in the August 2021 Afghanistan noncombatant evacuation operation, hosting thousands of Afghan refugees before onward movement to Europe and the United States.

The UAE attacks, dubbed “Operation Hurricane Yemen,” targeted Dubai and Abu Dhabi civilian airports, the Musaffah oil refinery, and other sensitive sites, according to press reports quoting Houthi spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree.

The statements, reportedly made on the Houthi-owned Al Masirah TV channel, claims that five ballistic missiles and a large number of drones were used in the operation.

Kirby said the DOD was still assessing the attack and could not rule out whether American personnel were at risk, noting that the “evolving” drone threat has been persistently used by Iranian-backed groups throughout the region to attack Americans.

“Even the best of systems isn’t necessarily going to get every single individual threat,” Kirby said. “In this case, it was the Houthis supported by Iran, but we continue to see in Iraq and Syria, militia groups supported by Iran sort of choose this tactic, this way of conducting attacks using UAVs.”

Air Force’s Major Accidents Trending Down Slightly

Jan. 18, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Numbers of major accidents involving Air Force aircraft are down slightly over the past five years, the service reported Jan. 18. There were fewer Class A accidents in fiscal 2021 but a slight increase in Class B mishaps during the year, the third year Class B accidents have increased.

In fiscal 2021, the Air Force saw 21 Class A aviation accidents, down from 30 in fiscal 2020 and “well below the five-year average” of 27.2, the service said. Class A mishaps result in a death or permanent disability, cause more than $2.5 million in damage, or result in the destruction of an aircraft.

Class B mishaps, however, increased from 41 in fiscal 2020 to 42 in 2021, which USAF said was “consistent” with a five-year average of 42.5 such accidents. A Class B mishap causes permanent partial disability; causes damage valued at between $600,000 and just under $2.5 million; or hospitalizes three people, not counting those admitted for observation or administrative purposes who are treated and released.

The Class A accidents in fiscal 2021 resulted in four deaths, including one contractor pilot, compared with seven who died in Class A events during fiscal 2020. Eight aircraft were destroyed—versus 14 the year before—of which two were Air Force-owned manned airplanes, five were USAF-owned unmanned aircraft, and one was a manned contractor airplane. Six unmanned aircraft were involved in Class A accidents in fiscal 2020.

The data provided were as of Dec. 15, 2021.

Mishap data — The most serious Air Force accidents—Class A mishaps—were down in fiscal 2021, but the number of less-serious Class B mishaps was on a three-year rising trend, although still below the peak of fiscal 2018. Source: Air Force Safety Center

Of the 2021 “flight mishaps,” 19 were Class A and 30 were Class B, for a total of 49. “Ground operations” accidents tallied two Class A and 10 Class B, for a total of 12, and there were two Class B accidents under “flight-related mishaps,” for a grand total of 63 Class A and B mishaps combined in fiscal 2021.

Although the trend line for Class A accidents is down with 2021, the number has risen and fallen over the past five years. The number was 29 in fiscal 2017; rose to 30 in 2018; fell to 26 in 2019; then surged again to 30 in 2020; before falling sharply to 21 in 2021.

Class B accidents are actually on a rising trend line over the past three years. In fiscal 2017, there were 44 Class B accidents, but in fiscal 2018, there were 47—a five-year high. Class B accidents fell sharply to 36 in fiscal 2019 but jumped to 41 in 2020 and rose again to 42 in 2021.

The Air Force did not provide data on Class C accidents, which cause damage valued at up to $600,000 or result in injuries causing loss of workdays.

The total combined Class A and B accidents—63 in fiscal 2021—is meaningfully less than the 72 in fiscal 2020 and 2019. The recent peak was fiscal 2018, with a combined 74; following 70 in fiscal 2017.

The Air Force Safety Center has noted that statistics “fluctuate from year to year,” so it looks at trends in the data in search of significant changes or common issues.

Raymond: Yearlong CR Would Cause ‘Ripple Effect,’ Could Push Back 2 Space Launches

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

Going the full fiscal year funded by a continuing resolution would cost the Defense Department the ability to procure two space launches and cause a “ripple effect for years to come.”

Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond addressed the effects of a continuing resolution on the National Security Space Launch program Jan. 18 online interview hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

SpaceX and United Launch Alliance are the NSSL providers.

President Joe Biden signed the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act in December, authorizing the procurement of five launches under the program.

But until Congress appropriates money to be spent, the government has to operate at fiscal 2021 levels. The current continuing resolution funding the government expires Feb. 18.

“The way we do launches [is], we procure launches two years in advance,” Raymond explained. “So the launches that would slip would be those launches we procure in ’23 for launch in ’24.”

If Congress passes the full budget in February, the Space Force will move ahead with procuring the five launches, Raymond said. But “a long-term CR” would delay two of those.

Pushing off the two launches would then bump two more, setting off the ripple effect, Raymond said: “It’s more than just a one-year impact.”

Without specifying, Raymond said the Space Force knows which two launches it would delay—“and they’re really important launches to us as we compete to turn and win against Russia and China, our pacing challenge.”

He pointed out that the payloads planned for launch will already have been built.

“I cannot stress enough the importance of getting a budget passed,” Raymond said.

Air Force Activates Two New Fighter Generation Squadrons at Moody

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force inactivated one squadron and activated two new ones at Moody Air Force Base, Ga., on Jan. 14, as Air Combat Command works to better align fighter operations and maintenance.

The 23rd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron is making way for the 74th and 75th Fighter Generation Squadrons. The shift is part of ACC’s Combat Oriented Maintenance Organization, a new structure whereby aircraft maintenance squadrons will be transitioned to fighter generation squadrons.

“The inactivation of the 23rd AMXS and the simultaneous activations of the 74th FGS and 75th FGS are driven by our transition to COMO,” Col. Jason Purdy, 23rd Maintenance Group commander, said at a ceremony. “This organizational change is being taken as our Air Force continues its evolution and strives to improve synchronization between maintenance and operations.”

Fighter generation squadrons are composed of maintainers “responsible for airpower health and generation” and paired with a complementary fighter squadron, ACC announced in April 2021. “The two units will work collaboratively both in garrison and during deployments,” ACC added.

The 74th and 75th Fighter Generation Squadrons will carry over responsibilities of the 23rd Maintenance Group to maintain a mission-ready status for A-10s stationed at Moody, which are similarly organized into two squadrons under the 23rd Fighter Group—the 74th and 75th Fighter Squadrons.

“Men and women of the 74th FGS, this is special,” Maj. Lawrence Morris, 74th FGS commander, said at the activation ceremony. “No man thinks more highly than I do of your families, your dedication to serve, and your abilities to accomplish the mission. I look forward to joining the team and embarking on our journey to greater heights.”

“As the new commander of the 75th FGS, our squadron can expect that we will look for improvements to the way we do business through continuous process improvement, theory of constraints, and exploring new metrics that are helpful to our aircraft maintenance managers and increase our capabilities,” added Maj. Ammon Hennessee, 75th FGS commander.

With the activation of the 74th and 75th Fighter Generation Squadrons, all aircraft maintenance organizations assigned to Moody have now transitioned to the new COMO structure. Units at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., and Hill Air Force Base, Utah, both reorganized in the fall of 2020, and other units at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., and Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, have also reorganized in the past few months.

Read, Listen, Watch: Here Are the Latest Additions to CSAF’s Leadership Library

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. added two new books, a podcast, and a documentary series to his leadership library Jan. 18. The books are aimed at educating Airmen on a pair of men credited with helping shape decades of American tactics and strategy, while the podcast and series focus on two generations separated by half a century.

This is what Brown has to say about each selection:

The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy, Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts

“The story of Andrew Marshall … is a profound account of a virtually unknown, yet brilliant strategic thinker who was enormously influential in shaping American military thought for nearly half a century. Today, Marshall’s hallmark methodology, the ‘Net Assessment,’ remains an essential diagnostic framework for understanding strategic competition through the lenses of capabilities, challenges, and perceptions.”

The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Grant T. Hammond

“Last September, I wrote a Letter to Airmen emphasizing a culture of innovation in our Air Force. ‘The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security’ is as much the story of Boyd’s innovative spirit as his groundbreaking ideas on warfare. Alongside a tenacity for out-maneuvering bureaucracy, Boyd was a maverick, and had innovation baked into his DNA. Who is the ‘Maverick’ in your squadron?”

Gen Z and Leadership, Dr. Meghan Grace’s #GenZ podcast

“Today, a new generation of strategic thinkers and mavericks defend our nation. Dr. Meghan Grace’s #GenZ podcast … reveals insights into the values and behaviors of Generation Z so that leaders at all echelons, myself included, can better relate to what defines and motivates our youngest cohort of professional Airmen.”

Five Came Back' Documents The Famous Forefathers Of Modern Combat Cameramen - Task & Purpose

Five Came Back, Netflix

“The idea of ‘why’ is a timeless concept that motivates across generational gaps. The critically acclaimed Netflix docuseries, ‘Five Came Back,’ is a mesmerizing examination of our nation’s ‘why’ before and during World War II through the lens of five prominent Hollywood directors. Their stories will leave you with a renewed sense of awe for the Greatest Generation.”

Countries Take Small Steps Toward Limiting Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

United Nations countries couldn’t agree on limiting lethal autonomous weapons, but those seeking a treaty may have made headway nonetheless.

The U.N.’s Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons concluded its Sixth Review Conference in December, a meeting held once every five years, without moving ahead on treaty negotiations.

But the fact “that the conversation is happening at all” may have amounted to progress, said Elisabeth Braw, senior fellow with the American Enterprise Institute and author of the policy paper, “Artificial Intelligence: The Risks Posed by the Current Lack of Standards,” in an interview to talk about the conference’s outcome.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres had said before the meeting that the conference “must swiftly advance its work on autonomous weapons that can choose targets and kill people without human interference.” But officials reportedly told Reuters after the meeting that India, Russia, and the U.S. were among the countries that, unsurprisingly, objected to the negotiations.

The Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons began addressing lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2013. An informal meeting of experts followed in 2014, then the creation of a group of governmental experts in 2016, and the adoption of 11 “guiding principles” relating to lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2019.

In addition to countries such as Austria, Belgium, Brazil, and New Zealand to name a few, nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have taken their arguments to the U.N. or stated positions on the issue.

NATO’s David van Weel articulated why countries such as the U.S. might broadly oppose limits on autonomous weapons, putting the issue in terms of a hypothetical attack by a swarm of drones. “How do we defend against them? Well, we can’t, frankly, because you need AI in that case in order to be able to counter AI,” he said.

Countries probably all realize rules are inevitable for restricting lethal autonomous weapons, said Braw, who hosted van Weel in the webinar. But the technology—the artificial intelligence enabling the autonomy—could be more difficult to regulate than, for example, nuclear weapons, which fewer countries could conceivably make.

Braw speculated that for a mishap to generate enough public pressure on U.S. politicians to get the government engaged in treaty negotiations, the cost might have to be as serious as “the loss of life on our own side.” She thought the European Union, even though it’s not a military alliance, might be a regulatory body other than the U.N. that could tackle the issue, possibly drafting a rudimentary agreement addressing only the “most egregious uses” of autonomous weapons as a start.

“It is so complicated—and at the same time as we should worry about huge dangers posed by AI, we should realize that it has many useful applications,” Braw said. “It’s a force for good as well.”