Intel Agencies: COVID-19 Not a Biological Weapon, Likely Not Engineered

Intel Agencies: COVID-19 Not a Biological Weapon, Likely Not Engineered

The COVID-19 disease isn’t a biological weapon and probably wasn’t genetically engineered, and Chinese officials likely didn’t know about it before the first outbreak in Wuhan, China, in November 2019, according to a new report from Avril Haines, U.S. director of national intelligence.

But the Intelligence Community has reached no consensus on the specific origin of COVID-19, assessing that it could have started with an infected animal or a lab mishap, and the agencies say China isn’t being helpful in nailing down a definitive answer.

The findings are part of an “updated assessment” of COVID-19’s origins that Haines’ office released Nov. 2.

The virus that causes COVID-19—SARS-CoV-2—lacks “genetic signatures … that would be diagnostic of genetic engineering,” the report said, and no existing coronavirus strain has been found that “could have plausibly served as a backbone” if it had been engineered. Moreover SARS-CoV-2 naturally recombines and mutates, suggesting that the pandemic variant isn’t artificially contrived. Nevertheless, analysts don’t have higher confidence that it’s not an artificial strain because “some genetic engineering techniques can make modifications difficult to identify, and we have gaps in our knowledge of naturally-occurring coronaviruses.”

The IC “remains divided on the most likely origin” of the pandemic, according to the report, narrowing it down to “natural exposure”—most likely in one of China’s “wet markets,” which deal in bush meat and unconventional foods—and “a laboratory-associated accident.”

The IC can’t provide a “definitive explanation” for the origin of COVID-19 without more information, it said. Specifically, it lacks “clinical samples or a complete understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases.”

More information could produce a conclusive answer, but China “continues to hinder the global investigation,” resists sharing information, “and [blames] other countries, including the United States,” the report said. The IC says these behaviors indicate the Chinese government’s uncertainty “about where an investigation could lead” and its frustration that “the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.”

There are “numerous information gaps, particularly related to technical data,” from China, the report said. China will have to offer “greater transparency and collaboration” in order to “close information gaps on the origins of COVID-19.” The IC called on Beijing to reveal more about its coronavirus research that might confirm “a laboratory-associated incident or at least some new insights.”

The IC also noted that China has been uncooperative in allowing World Health Organization investigators access to research sites and claimed that WHO investigations were “politicized” and that Beijing would not cooperate with future site visits because it alleged the WHO was engaging in “conspiracy theory,” according to the report.

China is also “pushing its narrative that the virus originated outside China,” suggesting it came from imported frozen food, which the IC called “an extremely unlikely theory.” China has also charged—”to divert attention away from Beijing,” according to the report—that the U.S. intentionally spread SARS-CoV-2.

The IC said it believes the “first cluster” of cases arose in Wuhan in late 2019, “but we lack insight—and may never have it—on where the first SARS-CoV-2 infection occurred.” In its one nod to China’s theory, the IC said, “it is plausible that a traveler came in contact with the virus elsewhere and then went to Wuhan,” but so far, there’s no “credible evidence” of an outbreak anywhere prior to the first reported cases in late 2019.    

Twelve coronaviruses from 77 percent to 96 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2 have been identified since 2013; one each in Cambodia, Japan, and Thailand, and the rest in China. Ten came from bats, and two came from pangolins. Of the 12, all are at least 77 percent similar to COVID-19, with four being more than 94 percent similar. Even so, “an immediate precursor virus strain and animal reservoir have not been identified.”

The natural exposure hypothesis, to which four segments of the IC subscribe “with low confidence,” is supported by China’s “lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors,” Haines’ report said. China’s wet markets sell “live mammals and dozens of species—including raccoon dogs, masked palm civets, and a variety of other mammals, birds, and reptiles—often in poor conditions where viruses can jump among species, facilitating … novel mutations.” Hubei province, where COVID-19 seems to have started, “has extensive farming and breeding of animals that are susceptible” to SARS-like illnesses, “including minks and raccoon dogs.” China’s regulation of wet markets is “lax,” and conditions in them “increase the probability” that transmission occurred this way.

One segment of the IC assesses with “moderate confidence” that a Chinese scientist caught the disease while working with SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor. The exposure could have come from contact with a lab animal or leakage, and the proponents of this answer “give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.”

Three other IC segments were “unable to coalesce” around a single explanation without more information.

“Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps,” the report said.

The report said the IC conducted a 90-day study of the issue, during which the DNI encouraged them to “emphasize points of agreement” and “solidify consensus.”

DOD to Brief Congress on China’s Military Progress

DOD to Brief Congress on China’s Military Progress

Defense Department officials will visit Capitol Hill on Nov. 3 to brief staffers on the department’s annual report on the Chinese military amid heightened concerns about China’s military buildup, a DOD spokesperson confirmed.

The report, “2021 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”, commonly called the “China Military Power Report,” comes amid technological developments by the Chinese military that reportedly surprised members of the U.S. intelligence community, plus the apparently rapid growth of the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile program and aggressive moves toward Taiwan.

Since the last report was released in August 2020, China’s aim to achieve a world-class military by 2050 and challenge the United States has evidently marched on with continued growth, testing, and modernization efforts. That now includes asymmetric capabilities, as the Financial Times revealed in a recent report that China tested a nuclear-capable orbital hypersonic weapon in August.

While the Pentagon declined again Nov. 1 to comment on the orbital test, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark A. Milley acknowledged the test in an interview with Bloomberg TV and said China’s developments were “very concerning.”

Meanwhile, since October, 150 aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force have entered the Taiwanese air defense identification zone. China watchers have pondered whether the show of force is a mere exercise or practice for an invasion.

In July, private research groups studying satellite imagery noticed that China had built more than 100 new ICBM silos in its western desert.

The release in September of the book “Peril” by reporters Bob Woodward and Robert Costa revealed conversations between Milley and his Chinese counterpart during the final months of the Trump administration, an apparent effort to de-escalate tensions at a time the Chinese reportedly thought conflict could be imminent.

Milley was harshly criticized for reportedly saying he would notify the Chinese in advance of an attack, but he defended the calls as typical of his position.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has labeled China America’s “pacing challenge” and personally chairs high-level biweekly meetings on China’s military.

While this year’s report was concluded in December 2020, news of more recent developments including China’s nuclear buildup, hypersonic development, and aggression against Taiwan are well known. The closed-door briefing will not be televised, but officials may be asked to explain how DOD’s thinking has evolved with the latest developments.

The Pentagon will release the report midday Nov. 3 following the Hill briefing.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated at 6:45 p.m. Nov. 2 to reflect that unnamed Defense Department officials will visit Capitol Hill.

UN Committee Advances Proposal on Rules Governing Behavior in Space

UN Committee Advances Proposal on Rules Governing Behavior in Space

A United Nations panel overwhelmingly approved a resolution Nov. 1 to create a working group aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, setting up the measure to pass in the General Assembly.

The resolution, introduced by the United Kingdom with the support of more than 30 other nations, including the U.S., would establish an open-ended working group that would “​​make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors relating to threats by States to space systems.”

The measure was approved by the U.N.’s First Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security threats, in a landslide 163-8 vote, with nine abstentions. Those opposed included Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Syria.

The U.K. introduced the resolution Oct. 14 after its Permanent Representative to the U.N.’s Conference on Disarmament, Aidan Liddle, told the First Committee that the body “must look broadly at the behaviors, actions, and omissions that could lead to conflict, not only at capabilities or placement of weapons.”

The resolution echoes that language, saying the working group would “consider current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible.”

If approved by the General Assembly, the working group would meet twice for five days each in both 2022 and 2023 and submit a report to the General Assembly at its 78th session, scheduled to begin in the fall of 2023.

U.S. civil and military officials, including Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, have increasingly pressed for countries to adopt a basic set of norms and rules for operating in space. In April, Raymond compared the domain to the “Wild West.”

In July, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III signed a memo pledging the Pentagon to follow five “tenets of responsible behavior in space”—operating in space with “due regard” for others and in a professional manner, limiting the creation of space junk, avoiding harmful interference, maintaining separation and safe trajectories, and communicating to enhance safety and stability.

The U.S. has also introduced the Artemis Accords, a document that articulates principles for the peaceful exploration and use of the moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids, looking to build on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 

However, Russia and China, two of the biggest global spenders on space programs, have not agreed to any set of norms nor the Artemis Accords.

That may change with the formation of the new working group. Michael Byers, co-director of the University of British Columbia’s Outer Space Institute, called a working group “the first step in treaty negotiations” during an Oct. 12 webinar. Byers is UBC’s Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law and also a law professor at Duke University. He is among a number of experts who signed an open letter in September calling for a limited-scope treaty to ban kinetic anti-satellite weapon tests similar to past tests performed by the U.S., China, Russia, and India.

Also included in the U.K. resolution is a provision that “encourages those States that have not yet become parties to the international treaties governing the exploration and use of outer space to give consideration to ratifying or acceding to those treaties.”

Biden Nominates Navy Adm. Grady to Replace Hyten as Vice Chairman of JCS

Biden Nominates Navy Adm. Grady to Replace Hyten as Vice Chairman of JCS

President Joe Biden has nominated Adm. Christopher W. Grady, head of the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command, to take over as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just weeks before Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten is set to retire from the position.

The nomination, received in the Senate on Nov. 1, was first reported by Politico and Military Times and officially announced soon after.

Hyten, who took on the role of vice chairman in November 2019, announced last year that he would not seek another term as the military’s No. 2 officer behind the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In recent weeks, Hyten has made headlines by criticizing over-classification, bureaucracy, and risk aversion in the Pentagon, warning that China could soon overtake the U.S. in military power if action is not taken.

Now, with less than three weeks remaining before Hyten’s departure date of Nov. 20, Grady’s nomination would have to be rushed through in near-record time to avoid a vacancy. Hyten’s own nomination process stretched on for more than five months, and every Chairman and Vice Chairman in the last decade has taken at least a month to be confirmed by the full Senate.

Grady has led the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command/U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command since May 2018. He has also held the duties of commander for U.S. Naval Forces Strategic Command and U.S. Strategic Command Joint Force Maritime Component since February 2019.

Prior to that, Grady also served as commander of the 6th Fleet and the Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, as well as deputy commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa. He has also worked on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as an aide to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Assuming Grady is confirmed by the Senate, it will mark the first time since July 2015 that an Air Force general will not be serving as either Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley ascended to the role of Chairman in October 2019, and his term is set to last until 2023.

AF Research Lab’s Newest Executive Hired to Cater to the Space Force

AF Research Lab’s Newest Executive Hired to Cater to the Space Force

The Air Force Research Laboratory has named the new senior official who will represent the interests of the lab’s Space Force customers and be a single USSF point of contact within the AFRL leadership.

Andrew Williams, an 18-year veteran of AFRL’s Space Vehicles Directorate, will be the first full-time permanent deputy technology executive officer (D-TEO) for space science and technology, the lab said in a press release Nov 1.

The appointment means the changes the lab laid out last year to make it more responsive and useful to its new Space Force customers are finally complete.

Williams’ new role “will ensure integrated development and execution of Space S&T efforts across AFRL and serve as the primary focal point for AFRL integrated Space [science and technology] activities,” the announcement states. As previously reported, the role is that of a “conductor”—ensuring that all of the lab’s directorates, not just the four centered on space, are focused on the needs of the new service as the directorates plan and execute their research activities.

The appointment was welcomed by Joel Mozer, chief scientist for Space Operations Command and whose job it is to tell AFRL what the new service needs for its operations. “Great choice,” he told Air Force Magazine by email. He said Williams would be “excellent” in the role because “he has the background and experience to cover the broad AFRL space portfolio.”

“Dr. Williams is exceptionally well-qualified, experienced, and a respected leader within AFRL, the USSF, and our Science and Technology stakeholders,” said AFRL Commander Maj. Gen. Heather L. Pringle in the release.

Williams takes the post from Kelly Hammett, the head of the lab’s Directed Energy Directorate, who has been dual-hatted in the new role on an interim basis since September 2020. In that post, Hammett headed a working group that drew up the plans to serve the new Space Force by realigning the lab’s governance, rather than reorganizing or restructuring it to break off the space-related parts of the institution.

The new permanent D-TEO position is just one of a series of changes the AFRL leadership has made to ensure the lab is more responsive and useful to its new customers, Hammett told Air Force Magazine in October.

Pringle praised Hammett’s performance in the interim role. “I couldn’t have had a better leader to take on this challenge, and I am grateful to Kelly for putting us in a fantastic position to carry out the space technology of the future,” she said.

Williams received his bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Texas A&M University, his master‘s in aerospace engineering from the University of Colorado, and his Ph.D. in engineering from the University of New Mexico.

His career in the Space Vehicles Directorate culminated as the directorate’s Space Mission Area lead. In that role, “I oversaw AFRL’s space science and technology investment strategy, ensuring synchronization with the technology needs for Space Force, Space Operations Command, and Space Systems Command and that experience will be very valuable in my new role,” he said in the release.

He reflected on the profound transformation of the space domain that occurred over his nearly two-decade tenure.

“Throughout my career I’ve experienced the dramatic changes and challenges that led to the stand-up of the Space Force, and I’m excited as the D-TEO to be part of that and ensure AFRL delivers science and technology necessary to advance our national defense, in the space warfighting domain,” he concluded.

Pentagon Cites Safety in Removing 140,000 Afghanistan War Photos, Videos From Public Site

Pentagon Cites Safety in Removing 140,000 Afghanistan War Photos, Videos From Public Site

The Defense Department said Nov. 1 that to protect the identity of Afghans who helped U.S. and coalition forces, it has archived more than 124,000 photos and 17,000 videos from the Afghanistan War previously available to the public on its official media distribution site.

“We were concerned that [the Taliban] were going to seek out people who helped us over time, or relatives and families,” Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby told journalists.

“I think those concerns were valid, and we make no apology whatsoever for making this decision,” he added.

For 17 days in August after the Taliban took over Afghanistan, the U.S. military helped evacuate 124,000 American citizens, Afghans, and third-country nationals in round-the-clock C-17 flights that departed from Hamid Karzai International Airport. Since the U.S. departed Aug. 31, the State Department believes about a hundred Americans remain and several thousand Afghans desire to relocate to safety in the United States.

The Defense Department’s Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, or DVIDS, makes available DOD-related photos, videos, and stories from across the globe on a daily basis. The images of Afghans going back more than a decade will be archived until an undisclosed time.

Kirby said he personally made the decision and that it was coordinated with the National Security Council and the State Department, which is still helping to evacuate endangered Afghans and their families.

“My guidance was I want any imagery that could be used to identify individuals and or family members over the last 20 years of war—I want it to be unpublished for a temporary period of time,” he said. “It was done out of an abundance of caution.”

Kirby said there was no specific threat or indication that the Taliban was using DVIDS to identify and target Afghans.

He added that DOD had been quietly archiving the media content throughout the noncombatant evacuation effort in August and into September.

“I still believe that was the right thing to do,” he said. “Nothing’s been deleted from the record. It’s simply being archived until we believe it’s the appropriate time to put them back up.”

Air Force Discharges Trainees, Prepares to Discipline Troops Who Aren’t Vaccinated

Air Force Discharges Trainees, Prepares to Discipline Troops Who Aren’t Vaccinated

The Department of the Air Force is preparing to discipline thousands of Airmen and Guardians who will miss a Nov. 2 deadline for full vaccination against COVID-19.

The Pentagon confirmed that some have qualified for exemptions. Meanwhile, a security expert told Air Force Magazine that the department is likely monitoring for any effects that numerous discharges could have on readiness.

As of Oct. 25, an estimated 10,000 Airmen and Guardians remained unvaccinated, with vaccination levels improving only slightly over the past several weeks, the department said.

While disciplinary action against uniformed service members will not be administered by their commanders until after Nov. 2, the Air Force recently discharged nearly 40 basic military and technical trainees as of Oct. 26 for refusal to vaccinate.

“An Airman or Guardian who is not vaccinated by Nov. 2 will be in violation of a lawful general order and subject to discipline under Article 92, [Uniform Code of Military Justice],” the department told Air Force Magazine in a statement. “Even if a service member has stated they will refuse the vaccination, the order would not be violated until the deadline passes.”

Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said during a Nov. 1 press conference that some of the 10,000-or-so Airmen and Guardians who have not been vaccinated have already received exemptions.

“The Air Force has received and has granted some exemptions, administratively and from a medical perspective,” Kirby said. “So, some of that number—that is definitely going to be inside approved exemptions.”

While thousands of Airmen potentially face discharge, RAND defense manpower specialist Beth J. Asch told Air Force Magazine the Air Force is ready for shocks like this.

“The Air Force has made this a readiness issue,” Asch said. “From a service perspective, there’s always a focus on deployability.”

Asch said the Air Force has one of the highest retention rates in the military and that typically, fewer positions are available than people willing to re-enlist after the first term. Should Airmen face the most severe punishment of discharge for refusing to vaccinate, Asch believes the Air Force can make the adjustment.

“It’s not trivial, but it’s not like, ‘Oh, my God, the force is going to be hollowed out because of this, either,’” Asch said. “What they might do is just allow more people to stay in than they might usually.”

Kirby clarified that Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III does not want commanders to use the most severe punishment for those who refuse to vaccinate.

“He wants them to execute the mandate with a sense of compassion and understanding,” Kirby said.

The spokesman also declined to say whether Austin considers a non-vaccinated service member deployable.

“The Secretary will delegate that specific decision down to commanders at the appropriate level,” he said in response to a question from Air Force Magazine. “When you say deployable, what does that mean? There are different units—different services define deployments differently—and so he wants to let the services manage that decision-making process for themselves and commanders specifically.”

Since September, recruits have been briefed on the requirement to vaccinate and the consequences of refusal. Beginning Oct. 10, trainees were required to also sign a memorandum stating that they understood the requirement to vaccinate against COVID-19 upon entry into the service. Ninety-nine percent of trainees had arrived fully vaccinated or had started their vaccinations at BMT as of Oct. 19.

“If [trainees] refuse the COVID-19 vaccine, their squadron commander will issue a written order that states they must receive the vaccination. If they refuse a second time, meaning they have now disobeyed an order twice, they will then be processed for an entry-level separation,” Air Force spokesperson Rose Riley said in a statement Nov. 1.

Riley said the department is preparing to release midday Nov. 3 a breakout of Total Force vaccinations and exemptions by type. Department of the Air Force exemptions to vaccination include administrative exemptions, such as a religious exemption, and medical exemptions.

The Air Force declined to elaborate further on the types of exemptions available, the numbers of outstanding applications for exemptions, or any update to the number of vaccinated Airmen and Guardians since the Oct. 25 numbers were released.

Prior to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, service members have access to health care providers and chaplains to answer their questions or address concerns about the vaccine.

Commanders, meanwhile, “retain the full range of disciplinary options available to them under the UCMJ and must consult with their servicing Staff Judge Advocate for additional guidance on vaccination non-compliance,” an Air Force statement read.

Riley said the range of disciplinary actions extends from verbal counseling to discharge. 

She added that the Air Force does not maintain a breakdown of vaccination by Air Force Specialty Code, which would indicate how many specialists are refusing vaccination and could potentially impact readiness.

As of Oct. 25, 96.4 percent of the Air Force was fully or partially vaccinated. Kirby said 97 percent of Active-duty service members across the DOD have received at least one dose of the COVID vaccine, with Sailors at 99 percent, Marines at 93 percent, and Soldiers at 90 percent.

In recent weeks and months, civilian and military Air Force leaders have encouraged service members to vaccinate by the deadline, but a review of the archives of recent weeks of vaccination rates indicates only a minor improvement overall.

Asch said Air Force personnel experts likely will be studying specifically who is refusing to vaccinate.

If, for example, many who refuse have similar time in their careers, a significant pool could be unable to transition to a given rank.

The department has “capability for dealing with this sort of thing. Things happen, and they have to respond,” Asch said. “I have no doubt that they’ll be looking at this closely and figuring out what they can do to make up gaps.”

Photos: B-1 Escorted by Fighters From 4 Partner Nations in Flight Around Arabian Peninsula

Photos: B-1 Escorted by Fighters From 4 Partner Nations in Flight Around Arabian Peninsula

A B-1 bomber flew with aircraft from four U.S. partner nations Oct. 30 as it circled the Arabian Peninsula during a bomber task force mission.

F-15s from Saudi Arabia and Israel and F-16s from Bahrain and Egypt escorted the bomber during a five-hour mission that “originated in the Indian Ocean, flew over the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman,” according to a press release from U.S. Central Command. At least one American KC-10 also participated in the exercise.

“We are stronger together,” Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., head of CENTCOM, said in a statement. “Military readiness for any contingency or mission—from crisis response to multilateral exercises to one-day presence patrols like this—depend on reliable partnerships.”

The Saudi Arabian and Israeli air forces also took to social media to feature images and videos from the mission.

While Central Command’s press release did not specify where the B-1 flew from in the Indian Ocean, B-1Bs and Airmen from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., recently deployed to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for the first time in 15 years as part of a bomber task force mission. Diego Garcia is located more than 2,000 miles from the Arabian Peninsula.

This marks the fifth “presence patrol” mission U.S. bombers have undertaken in the Central Command area of responsibility this year. It is the first since March and the first to involve a B-1. In January, B-52s flew over the Middle East on three occasions, followed by another mission in March.

The Air Force introduced bomber task forces in 2020 as an alternative to continuous bomber presences outside the continental U.S. In addition to the B-1Bs at Diego Garcia, B-1s from 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron of Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, deployed to RAF Fairford, England, in October as part of a bomber task force for U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

Re-Engining the F-35: How GE’s AETP Could Boost Speed, Payload, and Range

Re-Engining the F-35: How GE’s AETP Could Boost Speed, Payload, and Range

Fighter jet engines are an inherent compromise. If you want more power, you pay by giving up range. Want more range? It’s going to cost you in power. Each generation of jet engines has dealt with this unbreakable rule.

But maybe there really is another way to meet that challenge.

GE’s work in the Air Force’s Adaptive Engine Technology Program overcomes that inherent trade-off by incorporating the ability to change the power dynamics on the fly. Its XA100 engine can reconfigure itself in flight to produce power of greater efficiency.

“The Air Force came to the conclusion in the early 2000s that with the existing fighter-engine technology, trying to squeeze out the next incremental improvements in legacy architecture wasn’t going to get them where they wanted to go,” said David Tweedie, general manager for Advanced Combat Engines at GE Edison Works. “They determined they needed a generational leap in propulsion capability.”

Getting more efficiency out of the turbofan engines that power the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon, and now the F-35 Lightning II, didn’t seem possible. The Air Force needed another solution. Now, 14 years after the Air Force began adaptive cycle engine technology programs, GE says it has an answer that’s ready to deliver that generational leap in capability—not just an incremental improvement—for the F-35A and F-35C.

The GE XA100 and its three-stream, adaptive-cycle engine design offers critical advantages never seen in a single fighter jet engine: 

  • Flexibility: The XA100 can adapt on the fly from high thrust for maximum power to high efficiency for long endurance and loiter time. 
  • Improved thermal management: The XA100’s third-stream architecture enables the engine to keep on board computers cool–a critical need on the F-35–which is packed with sensors and computer hardware that generate a tremendous amount of heat. 
  • Advanced manufacturing: The XA100 leverages techniques proven through millions of hours of operation in GE’s commercial engines, including advanced ceramic matrix composites and additive manufacturing that improve performance, reduce parts count, and increase time on wing to bring down hourly operating costs.

“The F-35 is a great aircraft,” Tweedie said of the aircraft Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. C.Q. Brown Jr. dubbed the “cornerstone” of the Air Force fleet earlier this year. “What our engine offers is drop-in capability that significantly enhances F-35 capability, providing huge returns on the Air Force’s investment.”

The XA100 enables a 30 percent increase in range, 20 percent increase in acceleration, and doubles the engine’s thermal-management capacity. The engine’s advanced materials provide increased durability and readiness in harsh operating environments. All these improvements align with Air Force and F-35 Joint Program Office objectives to increase the capability of a jet that’s flown around the world. 

“The F-35 is what our allied partners are going to fly for decades to come,” Tweedie said. Those allies need range. “The XA100 helps overcome the tyranny of distance.” 

A second-order effect of extending range and loiter time is less demand for tankers and the ability for tankers to stay further away from contested airspace. There’s also another advantage to the engine’s fuel efficiency: less fuel means less CO2 put into the atmosphere, a growing consideration as the military looks at options to reduce its carbon footprint.

“There’s already a significant amount of Air Force and GE money invested in this technology and the XA100’s design,” Tweedie said. “The engine is not a concept. We’ve successfully tested one engine and are currently testing the second, and the data we’re gathering continues to validate the engine’s unmatched capability.”

“What that amounts to is the XA100 as the lowest-risk solution with the shortest timeframe to bring dramatic capability improvements to the warfighter.”