Space Force Plans for Simulators, Adds Advanced Training to Rotations

Dec. 1, 2021 | By Amanda Miller

The Space Force has carved out personnel rotations to accommodate advanced training and turned to units for training ideas while envisioning what the service’s operations chief called an “operational test and training infrastructure,” including new space simulators.

With the military’s newfound ability “to talk about space as a warfighting domain, as a contested domain,” the Space Force can get started providing advanced training to Guardians on tactics, such as maneuvering satellites, said Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, the deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber, and nuclear, in a Nov. 29 webinar by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

The infrastructure would provide, for the first time, “the ability to have a virtual environment where we can practice our tradecraft, test our tactics against a thinking adversary, and get better and develop over time,” Saltzman said. Current space simulators are “designed to provide procedural currency to efficiently and effectively operate the weapon systems” he added, noting that procedural currency is “necessary but not sufficient.”

Like the Defense Department’s satellites in orbit, the people operating them weren’t “designed for a contested environment,” Saltzman said. “So we have to shift in both areas.”

To carve out time for training, Saltzman said he drew from the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Wings and Groups model that “preserves some institutional capacity to do advanced training.” By contrast, right now, “we’re all in, 100 percent of the time, to accomplish the services that are currently necessary worldwide.”

In defining the new training requirements, he said the service is “actively working with the units” to define them, not just for space operators but for support personnel, mission planners, engineers, intelligence personnel, and others, “so that they are ready to address a threat in a contested environment.”

Another “critical component” will be the infrastructure—a “modeling and sim environment to validate the tactics: ’Will this work in the domain? Do the physics work?’” Saltzman said. “What we really haven’t had is simulators where our operators can practice tactics in a virtual environment against a thinking adversary. That’s the piece—it’s the range complex; it’s a professional aggressor force—that’s the comprehensive tapestry, if you will, that makes up what an advanced training program requires.”

Saltzman said “tactics” as currently envisioned might include “a combination of maneuver. It’s a combination of taking advantage of the capabilities that are inherent on the spacecraft, whether it’s beam-forming, beam-shaping; whether it’s about denial of a directed-energy weapon to affect our systems by shutting certain systems off and timing and tempo.

“[There are] a number of tactics that we’ve currently developed, and I would project that there are a lot that we have yet to develop,” Saltzman said. “The ability to mitigate a directed-energy threat, if you will—whether it’s [radio frequency] energy, lasers, etc.—sometimes that’s maneuver, sometimes that’s repositioning, and sometimes that’s subsystem operation on the satellite itself to try to mitigate those capabilities.”

During a dynamic time in the space security environment, “I really see it as the birth and the initial evolution of this capability,” Saltzman said.

Continuing Resolution Blocks Air Force New Starts, Production Boosts, MILCON

Dec. 1, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

With just a few days left until the current continuing resolution funding the government expires, the Department of the Air Force enumerated 16 new starts and four production increases that will be blocked until Congress appropriates money for the Pentagon’s fiscal 2022 activities. Also stymied will be seven military construction projects and the transfer of satellite communications capabilities from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the Space Force, as well as exercises and readiness efforts.

Continuing resolutions “immediately disrupt major exercises and training events, impede readiness, delay maintenance, impose uncertainty on the workforce, curtail hiring and recruitment actions, and include inefficient and constrained contracting practices,” the Department of the Air Force said in a statement. The CR “reduces aircraft availability/maintenance, curbs modernization efforts, and hampers the continued development” of air and space systems needed for “tomorrow’s complex global security environment.”

Besides blocking new starts, “the department cannot implement new policies [or] procedures,” the Air Force said. “Not only can’t we start new programs, we can’t increase the rate of production of ongoing ones, even if that’s what our contracts call for.”

The CR, which is slated to expire on Dec. 3, also blocks “new technology development in support of national security priorities.”

The CR will hamper the standup of U.S. Space Force by blocking “Army, Navy, and Air Force transfers to Space Force for SATCOM (Satellite Communications); Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM), and Base Operating Support (BOS),” impeding its ability to reach full operational capability and “meet mission objectives,” according to the department.

It also impacts readiness by slowing spending on FSRM projects, weapon system sustainment, and contracts until 2022 funding is approved.

Sixteen new starts are on hold, including secure, Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information voice and video modifications to C-32, C-37, C-40, and VC-25A VIP transports; the Next Generation Aerial Target (NGAT); E-4B Full Motion Flight Deck Simulator; and B-1B test assets for Air Force Materiel Command.

Production Increases are blocked, including:

F-15E Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) —18 units
Small Diameter Bomb II—242 units
E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN)—two aircraft
ICBM Fuze modification—20 units.

The CR delays seven military construction projects, including:

Two Basic Military Training dormitories at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas
A Nuclear Command Control and Communications acquisition management facility at Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
A Ground Based Strategic Deterrent software sustainment center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah
A KC-46 depot maintenance hangar at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla.
A B-21 Raider bomber facility at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D.
A fire crash rescue station at Joint Base Andrews, Md.
An F-16 mission training center at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C.

Spangdahlem AB to Keep F-16s, at Least for Now

Dec. 1, 2021 | By Abraham Mahshie

Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, will keep its fighter mission after the Pentagon’s Global Posture Review permanently reversed a Trump administration decision to shift the base’s F-16s to Italy and to cancel plans to move tankers and special operations forces there.

U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) confirmed to Air Force Magazine on Dec. 1 that the recently approved Global Posture Review preserves the strength of forces in Europe and the vital role played by NATO partner Germany.

“We’re not abandoning Europe or NATO,” USAFE spokesperson Capt. Erik Anthony said by phone from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. “We are here. We’re committed. And by the way, it’s probably going to look like a plus-up of forces.”

In the since-rescinded policy decision announced by the Trump White House in June 2020 and given a specific execution plan by Pentagon leaders a month later, U.S. troops stationed in Germany were to be capped at 25,000. Shedding more than 12,000 troops would have required the shifting of Airmen and 52nd Fighter Wing assets to Aviano Air Base, Italy.

“The Global Posture Review included select near-term adjustments to DoD forces in Europe… but does not identify the specific realignment of forces at Spangdahlem Air Base or Aviano Air Base,” Anthony said. “There are plans that were being written and posturing to execute those moves, but the actual realignment of those forces never happened.”

Trump’s strategic policy decisions were initially made in response to Germany not meeting a NATO goal of spending 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. After taking office, President Joe Biden in February reversed the 25,000-troop cap, triggering Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III to freeze prior reorganization decisions.

Though details remain classified, Pentagon leaders said the plan is to bolster forces in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters. Anthony cautioned that force adjustments in Europe are still a possibility if they support mission requirements.

“There’s nothing written in stone right now,” he explained.

“There’s planning that’s taking place … as to what that looks like with the current environment that we live in today,” Anthony added. “That’s not to say that forces couldn’t move between [Spangdahlem and Aviano], if that makes sense.”

The GPR provided a framework for force posture decisions, not specific movements. The Pentagon, however, announced that 500 troops who were part of a U.S. Army Multi-Domain Task Force and Theater Fires Command will remain in Wiesbaden, Germany, and seven military sites in Germany and Belgium previously slated for return to host country will remain in DOD hands.

“There’s going to be future planning based on the GPR, but there’s a lot of steps that those plans are going to have to go through before they’re approved and we start executing,” the Air Force spokesman said.

Rendering ASATs Obsolete, Tweaking Missile Defenses in Light of Russian, Chinese Tests

Nov. 30, 2021 | By Amanda Miller

Recent Russian and Chinese tests of space weapons are a “natural consequence of military behaviors,” and the U.S. must now “mitigate this threat,” the Space Force’s operations chief said.

Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman theorized on Russian and Chinese mindsets during the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies’ virtual Spacepower Forum on Nov. 29. The panel was moderated by retired Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, a former space shuttle mission commander and past commander of U.S. Strategic Command who is Mitchell’s Explorer Chair for Space Warfighting Studies.

“When you are behind, you look for ways to seek vulnerabilities of your adversary and your competitor so that you can regain the strategic advantage, and we’re seeing that play out,” Saltzman said. “We’ve had an advantage for a long time. They’ve watched how we’ve prosecuted campaigns from Desert Storm and beyond, and they know that if they can take those capabilities away from us”—such as those enabled by the Space Force’s satellites or ground-based radar stations—“that it can bring more parity to the strategic military environment.”

Saltzman described the Space Force’s strategy for addressing kinetic anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs, as in the case of the Russian test, as a mix of diplomacy in the form of “international peer pressure” and of rendering such weapons obsolete with dispersed constellations.

He alluded to potential tweaks to existing missile defenses, including the addition of artificial intelligence, that could make them more suitable for tracking different objects than they were originally designed and for defending against new long-range weapons, such as China’s suspected fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), thought to be able to carry a nuclear warhead, and of Russia’s long-range cruise missiles.

Deterring ASAT Weapons

Russia’s Nov. 15 anti-satellite test created an estimated 1,500 pieces of orbital debris big enough to be tracked, and the Space Force is “now spending a tremendous amount of our time, energy, and capacity to characterize the nature of that debris field,” Saltzman said. The Space Force is responsible for identifying and cataloging space objects and characteristics of their trajectories.

“At a minimum, we know that it poses a hazard to the astronauts on the [International Space Station]—at a very minimum,” Saltzman said. “And it’s one of our basic responsibilities to make sure that we characterize all of the objects that are on orbit to protect not just humankind up there on the ISS but all of these very expensive, exquisite satellites that we spend blood, sweat, tears, energy, [and] national treasure to put into orbit.”

Saltzman said deterring a war from starting in space is one of the new service’s “primary responsibilities,” and the Space Force currently views deterrence as a two-sided coin: on one side is negating any benefits of a destructive act; on the other is imposing costs for violating accepted norms.

In terms of negating the benefits of a destructive act, the Space Force is “focused on resiliency,” which could include “more disaggregated capability on orbit,” Saltzman said, referring to the likes of dispersed constellations. “If they don’t know what to shoot at, then what’s the benefit of shooting? That’s the basic logic. And so we are actively pouring our resources into building a resilient architecture that no one satellite destruction would dismantle.”

On the other side of the coin is imposing costs for violating accepted norms. Of course, to be in violation, the norm has to exist. Saltzman said Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III’s Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space “is one of the ways in which we hope to start to combat this kind of behavior.” Tenets include limiting the creation of “long-lived debris” and maintaining safe trajectories. Saltzman cautioned not to underestimate the importance of setting a framework as a foundation for holding other nations accountable, such as through the United Nations or other international coalitions: “I think that international peer pressure is actually pretty valuable,” he said.

Inviting numerous countries to share a satellite, for example, “so that many nations are affected by a single satellite’s destruction … would raise the threshold for an adversary to take that kind of action,” Saltzman said. “If they think they can get away with things Scott-free, then it changes the calculus. … I think we [should] at least go through the research and development required to see what it would take to impose costs.”

Tweaking Missile Defenses

Saltzman addressed speculation that Chinese testing this summer, reported in October, could have been of a nuclear first-strike weapon, saying it is “front and center because this is a very forward-edge technology capability,” in part because it likely can stay in orbit for long periods. However, he cautioned, “the words that we use are important so that we understand exactly what we’re talking about here. I hear things like hypersonic missile, and I hear suborbital sometimes, and so this is a categorically different system.”

For one thing, space objects have “inherent overflight capabilities” and the proposition “that you could routinely orbit a nuclear weapon over a country.” Analysts frequently point out that the Space Force’s X-37B autonomous spaceplane amounts to the same thing.

In terms of detecting such a weapon that can go into orbit then deorbit, his point was that it’s not a ballistic missile with a predictable trajectory.

“A lot of our warning is based on ballistic missiles because that’s been the primary threat for so many years,” Saltzman said. “So it’s incumbent on the Space Force, in my mind, to make sure that we’re developing the capabilities to track these kind of weapons—before they’re launched, ideally, but then throughout their life cycle, either on orbit or in execution of their mission set.

“And if we can track, we can attribute. And if we can attribute, I think we can deter,” he added.

Saltzman hinted at one way the Space Force might advance its ability to track in a discussion of defending against Russia’s long-range cruise missiles.

“We own a great number of radars that provide missile warning. We own overhead capabilities from an [infrared] standpoint that can track some of these capabilities,” he said.

“So it’s incumbent on us to make sure we get the most out of those sensors to be able to maybe use them in a way they weren’t designed. We have a long history of this. We’ve gotten the most out of our systems because we have some really talented engineers that can change the way data is fused on the ground and actually pull more information out of the sensor data that we collect. So when we see a new threat, we immediately start pouring resources and brainpower into it.”

Air Force Moving Toward Multi-Domain Munitions, Away From ‘Exquisite’ Types

Nov. 30, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force is moving away from weapons meant to strike specific types of targets and instead toward generic munitions with “low-cost, swappable” payloads that can be used in a variety of ways, Air Force Global Strike Command planner Maj. Gen. Jason R. Armagost said Nov. 30.

Speaking on an AFA Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies webinar, Armagost said the munitions of the future will be made of lightweight materials and be either very fast or stealthy for survivability. Other goals are to increase production numbers, reduce cost, and expand the types of targets that can be struck on a single mission while avoiding weapons “exquisitely” tuned to a specific purpose.

The new “multi-domain” munitions will comprise the main body of USAF’s conventional weaponry, with the only specialty weapons likely to be lightweight, high-speed, long-range missiles to attack mobile targets and heavy munitions geared to take out “hardened, deeply-buried” targets.

“Those are two very different [targets] that require some very different characteristics,” he said. For other targets, generic weapons with selectable effects are the way forward.

The virtual event was held to discuss a Mitchell paper, “Affordable Mass: the Need for a Cost-Effective [Precision-Guided Munition] Mix for Great Power Conflict,” written by Mark A. Gunzinger. The paper said the Air Force needs to “fill the gap” between standoff and direct attack munitions with affordable munitions that can be produced en masse. Gunzinger said USAF will need more munitions in the future because adversary air defenses will be able to shoot down individual weapons, meaning more missiles or bombs will be needed to destroy fewer targets. He also said submunition technology may make it possible to take out “more targets per weapon, instead of just … targets per sortie.”

Armagost noted that he “lived through the ‘Great Hellfire Drought of 2018,’” when there were shortages of preferred precision munitions.

“You don’t want to get into a situation where you’re having to get creative with legacy weapons that don’t really answer the mail in a high-end fight,” he said. “It’s arguably not a sustainable answer to the military problem at hand.”

The new weapons need to have “utility across the range of force structure and weapons platforms.” They need to connect to the existing kill chain “and/or, in the future, a long-range kill chain,” he asserted, in which targets are “developed … en route,” especially for long-range strike platforms that “take off many hours before the action takes place,” Armogost said.

The defense industry is rapidly developing new multimode seeker technology, which is making such munitions possible, he noted.

And just as the industry is adjusting to open-systems architecture, Armagost said the Air Force will take the same approach with weaponry. “We don’t want vendor lock” nor to have munitions that are “tied to a specific platform,” he said.

Armagost said Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has shared his thinking on munitions.

“He has said that future munitions need to be long range, they need to be relevant—and part of that relevance calculus is cost—and we need a sufficient volume of fire,” Armagost said. “How do we design that back into the strategy, … make our weapons-capabilities mix fit with our fifth-generation force and our legacy force.”

The conclusion is that “everything has got to be multi-domain,” added Armagost. “We can’t think in strict terms of, ‘This weapon is designed for this specific target.’ … It’s inherently multi-mission, … it has to have that flexibility built in.”

Armagost said Kendall has shown a “willingness” to take some short-term risk in buying fewer legacy weapons and investing in the development of new ones, with an eye toward, “What can you do for $300,000 per weapon?” That’s what Gunzinger argued is likely the “sweet spot” for munitions that have a broad range of applicability across the battle space.

“That may involve a mix of boosted weapons,” Armagost added, with an “additively manufactured” motor coupled to existing munitions to give them more standoff range. Another approach would be “low observable, lifting-body kind of designs, [or] we may design a seeker that gets us under” the $300,000 mark, he said. Armagost said the Air Force is anxious to “capitalize on the work that’s already been done” by allies or partner nations in these respects, “to really get the most bang for our buck.”

It’s important that “we don’t … design a force that lasts 10 days,” he said, referencing a chart in the Mitchell paper that said the Air Force would likely run through its standoff munitions inventory in just over a week in a Pacific conflict, given the profusion of targets.

Armagost said it’ll be a “series of ongoing decisions … and tradeoffs” to decide when to let go of the current family of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and other precision-guided munitions and to move on to a new future family of multi-domain munitions. The transition will occur as concepts of operation and the nature of the kill chain evolves, he said.

Gunzinger said ideally the transition would have taken place “five years ago,” so it needs to happen “as quickly as possible.”

China and Russia are “not waiting,” Gunzinger said. “They’re building up their forces and next-generation weapons. We’re already behind. We’re in a deficit. We have a force that’s too small for one war, and we know that. So, we’ve got a lot of work to do to catch up.”

Retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, head of the Mitchell Institute, said the JDAM is “kind of like a P-40” fighter from World War II. “It’s time to move on. … The Air Force needs to get serious about investing in … new concepts, and doing it fast.”

Deptula also said the discussion about the DOD-wide portfolio of weapons needs to rationalize how the money is spent, noting that the current cost estimate for the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon is $40 million each. For the cost of two of those, the services could buy “66 or more Stand-in Attack Weapons, and hit 66 aimpoints” instead of two, Deptula argued. Hypersonic missiles are “not a level-of-effort weapon,” he said.

ISR Missions for Space Force ‘Just Make a Lot of Sense,’ USECAF Says

Nov. 30, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

While the Air Force is in the midst of a push to modernize its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, it’s the Space Force that could wind up taking on more ISR missions in the years ahead, Undersecretary of the Air Force Gina Ortiz Jones hinted Nov. 30.

Speaking during an Air Force Association Air and Space Warfighters in Action symposium, Jones was asked about the Department of the Air Force’s vision for the future of ISR. In response, she pointed to the USSF.

“When we think about ISR, I think what’s important is ensuring that we are thinking … not just from the Air Force perspective, but also from the Space Force perspective,” Jones said. There are many things that just make a lot of sense to do from space, in the interest of resiliency, in the interest of capability. And so [it’s about] ensuring that there’s a right balance there.”

As Air Force leaders increasingly emphasize strategic competition with China, an emphasis has been on acquiring and fielding platforms that will be better equipped for a high-end fight.

This led to the Air Force requesting to cut back on ISR operations in its fiscal 2022 budget, specifically by the MQ-9 Reaper drone. The service has also sought to retire its E-8C Joint STARS fleet. The intent behind these moves, leaders said, is to free up money for modernization efforts, such as making the MQ-9 more survivable in contested areas and further developing the Advanced Battle Management System, an ambitious effort to connect sensors and shooters using advanced technology and artificial intelligence.

The Space Development Agency, meanwhile, is in the midst of an effort to build out the National Defense Space Architecture, a constellation of satellites that will be used for tracking targets as well as missile warning, communications, data coverage and sharing, and other capabilities.

The first layer of the NDSA is the Transport Layer, aimed at ensuring data and connectivity across the globe. Tranche 0 of that layer is expected to launch by March 31, 2023, with Space Development Agency Director Derek M. Tournear saying he hopes to roll out new capabilities every two years.

“If you hear [Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall] talk about our space architecture, it’s one of our strategic advantages, but we’ve got to make sure it continues to be that and how we [might] identify some opportunities in the ISR domain … in the space realm,” Jones said.

The Space Force, for its part, has already expressed an interest in the ISR mission. Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond said back in May that the service will get involved in providing tactical ISR, normally the realm of the Intelligence Community. The proliferation of small satellites and the dropping cost of launches made such a move possible, Raymond said, and it is “complementary” to the service’s existing missions.

Correction: A previous version of this article incorrectly identified the agency responsible for building out the National Defense Space Architecture. The Space Development Agency is responsible for procuring satellites for the NDSA.

Lack of Trust in Leaders Prevents Airmen From Serving to ‘Full Potential,’ Jones Says

Nov. 30, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

When Gina Ortiz Jones walks into the Pentagon, the undersecretary of the Air Force has a clear goal—“to be the undersecretary that I wish I would have had when I was a cadet.”

There’s a particular reason for that. When Jones was first joining the AFROTC at Boston College, she had to sign an agreement saying she would not participate in homosexual behavior as part of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in place.

That experience was “very formative,” Jones said during an Air Force Association “Air and Space Warfighters in Action” symposium Nov. 30—as formative as her later deployment to Iraq as an intelligence officer.

“So my opportunity to get an education, my opportunity to serve our country, my opportunity to die for our country, all that goes away, just because at the time we didn’t have enough leaders who had the courage to say anybody ready and willing to serve their country should have the opportunity to do so,” Jones said.

Now, Jones said, she wants to be a leader that ensures Airmen can serve to their full potential. And that means working to bridge the divide between commanders’ perceptions of personnel issues, what lower-ranking Airmen say is happening, and their trust in leaders to fix it.

Those gaps in trust and perspectives were highlighted in several recent disparity reports released by the Air Force’s Inspector General, which gathered data on promotions, discipline, and ascensions based on race, ethnicity, and gender, but also gathered feedback from Airmen and Guardians on how they believe the Department of the Air Force handles issues such as harassment and discrimination.

“When we think about the moment in time that we’re in, … we don’t have time or talent to lose, and it’s important, as we think about the pacing challenge, that we are a place where folks understand they can serve to their full potential,” Jones said. “And that is why our policies, everything we do, everything we say, is an expression of the value that we place or do not place on somebody’s service.”

Jones offered an example of a particularly “eye-opening” disparity report, which found that 24 percent of female Airmen and Guardians who had been pregnant while serving said they delayed reporting the pregnancy to superiors out of fear that it would negatively impact their professional opportunities.

“When I talk about, we don’t have time or talent to lose, that is fundamentally about a lack of trust in your leader’s ability to ensure you can serve and make decisions about how you serve,” Jones said.

“This is fundamentally about leadership,” Jones added. “And when we talk about ensuring people can serve to their full potential, you’ve got to understand that there are some unique challenges that folks have that are certainly out of their control, but we as leaders can create an environment that takes down barriers.”

By and large, the reports found that Air Force and Space Force leaders often think they have the tools needed to adequately address those issues—but the rank and file sometimes have a far different view. Nineteen percent of minority Airmen and Guardians said they didn’t trust their chain of command to address issues of “racism, bias, and unequal opportunities,” while 10 percent of female Airmen and Guardians said they didn’t trust leaders to appropriately handle “derogatory comments and behavior that are sexual in nature.”

“In some places there is a significant gap in how leaders understood how well things were going and how the rank and file understood how things were going,” Jones said. “And that’s important, because, again, you can’t lead folks if you don’t know what their challenges are. … And more importantly, if you don’t have a strong understanding of what is underlying some of these challenges, your approach is going to at worse be seen as tone deaf, or potentially be seen as not effective, or potentially counterproductive, right?”

In particular, Jones cited the rate of trust, or lack thereof, women of color in the Air and Space Forces have in their chain of command. Jones publicly pushed for the department to further study the data to understand the intersection of race and gender, and a subsequently released addendum found that Black women in particular had the least trust in leadership to address those issues, with Hispanic and Native American women also reporting relatively low trust.

Those findings, Jones said, are especially important given the findings of another recent study, conducted by the RAND Corporation, that looked into propensity for military service compared to the total eligible population and found women of color have an especially high rate.

Knowing that, Jones said, the Air Force needs to do a better job of addressing incidents like the deaths of Airman 1st Class Natasha Raye Aposhian and Army Spc. Vanessa Guillen, both women of color who were killed by fellow service members.

“If we know who’s got a higher propensity to serve, yet we are not seen as truly understanding just how significant those events were, then we’re going to do ourselves a disservice and not be seen as a place where people can serve to their full potential,” Jones said.

Undersecretary of the Air Force Gina Ortiz Jones speaks about the challenges today’s leaders face, from addressing disparities within the force to preparing for a future fight against a peer adversary such as China.

Biden to Nominate LaPlante to Succeed Lord as Pentagon Acquisition and Sustainment Chief

Nov. 30, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak and Abraham Mahshie

President Joe Biden will nominate William LaPlante as undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, moving to fill a crucial and long-vacant Pentagon leadership post, the White House announced Nov. 30. LaPlante, a defense management veteran, enjoys solid support on Capitol Hill and should be confirmed easily, although the Senate may not take up his nomination until early 2022.

LaPlante, who served as the Air Force’s acquisition, technology, and logistics chief from early 2014 until late 2015, was the architect of the B-21 bomber contract, the subsequent success of which has earned praise even from harsh Pentagon critics such as House Armed Services Chair Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.). If confirmed, LaPlante will succeed Ellen M. Lord, who held the top acquisition and sustainment job from early 2018 until early this year. In the nine months since, Stacy A. Cummings has filled the role in an acting capacity.

LaPlante is “a seasoned national security leader with nearly four decades of experience in acquisition, technology, sustainment and the defense industrial base,” the White House said. While serving as the Air Force service acquisition executive, LaPlante realized “nearly $6 billion in ‘should cost’ savings” in service programs.

When Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall held the post LaPlante is nominated for, and LaPlante was the Air Force acquisition executive, the two reportedly had an effective working relationship.

If confirmed, LaPlante will need to tackle the challenges of sustaining the F-35 program as it transitions from development to mature system; increase the size of the Navy; manage the modernization of the nation’s nuclear triad; and work with the defense industrial base to provide new capabilities and the capacity needed for a multipolar, great-power competition world. He will need to adapt new congressional authorities to accelerate defense procurement and sort out a byzantine and parochial defense software enterprise.

LaPlante is president and chief executive officer of Draper Laboratory, a nonprofit engineering innovation company. Prior to that, he was senior vice president and manager of national security programs for the Mitre Corp.

While LaPlante’s nomination is a big step in getting the Pentagon firing on all cylinders, there are still 13 positions requiring Senate confirmation for which there are still no nominees, including Secretary of the Navy. In addition, some 22 nominees are waiting for a confirmation hearing or vote. Another 22 have been confirmed. The most senior other vacancies are deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, which would be LaPlante’s No. 2, and deputy undersecretary for intelligence and security.

An engineer with a doctorate in mechanical engineering from Catholic University, LaPlante has served on a range of scientific boards. At Mitre, the federally funded research and development center, he spearheaded public-private partnerships to help develop advanced command and control, system of systems concepts, as well as new cyber and supply-chain approaches.

Among the many boards LaPlante served on are the National Defense Industrial Association, the U.S. Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, and the Naval Research Advisory Committee.

2022 NDAA Hits More Hurdles in Senate as Continuing Resolution Deadline Looms

Nov. 29, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

Back from a Thanksgiving week recess, the push to pass the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act hit another snag Nov. 29, as the Senate failed to vote to end debate on its version of the bill.

The 45-51 vote fell well short of the 60 votes needed, ensuring that the effort to invoke cloture failed and seemingly pushing the timeline for passing the annual defense policy legislation back. At the same time, Congress is staring down a Dec. 3 expiration date for its continuing resolution to keep the government funded. Under a CR, the Pentagon and other branches of government continue to operate with funding levels set from the previous year, delaying new programs and potentially costing money.

In remarks on the Senate floor just before the vote, Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, accused Senate Majority Leader Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) of trying to “jam [the bill] through the Senate without adequate consideration.”

Inhofe also said that Schumer mishandled the Senate schedule, resulting in a last-minute rush that precluded an “open and robust” debate on amendments.

Inhofe’s comments follow a Nov. 19 sequence of events in which an effort to have separate floor debates and votes on 19 key amendments was derailed when a number of Republican Senators raised objections in protest of their own amendments not being considered. Among those 19 amendments was legislation that would repeal the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Iraq; prevent the Pentagon from taking adverse personnel actions against service members who refuse the COVID-19 vaccine; and reduce topline spending. It is unclear if or when those amendments will now be considered.

Inhofe’s counterpart on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), argued that the process of putting together the NDAA has been “bipartisan” and included plenty of consideration of amendments, pointing to more than 100 amendments adopted in committee and 57 included in a “manager’s packet” as part of the bill considered on the main floor of the Senate.

“This is an unusual departure from what is typically the custom of this body, particularly when we’re beginning with a bill that has so much bipartisan support,” Reed said of the latest vote against cloture.

As multiple Senators noted, Congress has passed an NDAA every year for six decades now. That process can sometimes take until the very end of the year, but even by recent standards, the 2022 bill is behind. Even after the Senate does pass its version of the NDAA, the House and Senate will have to undergo the conference process, which is now likely to have its latest start since the 2013 bill.

Despite this, both Inhofe and Reed said they are confident the NDAA will eventually pass.

“We will have to do the NDAA. It will be done. I think Senator Inhofe is as committed to that as I am,” Reed said. “And we will have to use the procedures that are appropriate to get it done.”

Of the 57 amendments adopted in the manager’s package and awaiting passage, one from Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) calls for the Air Force to present to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees “a strategy for the Department of the Air Force for the acquisition of combat rescue aircraft and equipment.”

The Air Force’s combat rescue fleet is currently in the midst of a transition, as the HH-60W Jolly Green II is slated to replace the HH-60G Pave Hawk over time. The HH-60W, however, has faced potential delays due to protests of a roughly $1 billion contract for upgrades, and while the helicopter has completed developmental testing, it is still undergoing operational tests.

Another amendment, offered by Reed and Inhofe, would give the Space Force the authority to vary the number of officers considered for promotion to major general until the end of 2022. The Space Force’s current corps of general officers is light on two-stars—just three are currently in the service, compared to 10 brigadier generals and six lieutenant generals.