NATO’s Plan to Grow Trust in Military AI

Dec. 13, 2021 | By Amanda Miller

Western militaries—already “late to the party” in the creation of artificial intelligence—risk unforeseen consequences by adopting AI made for the commercial sector, said NATO’s David van Weel.

That’s why the alliance is publicizing a new plan by which it hopes its governments will get involved in AI development from the start, both for security reasons and to “bridge a gap of distrust” in the technology.

Though he acknowledged that sharing the plan is a bit out of character for NATO, all 30 nations, including the U.S., have signed on.

“We are not known, at NATO, for publishing a lot,” said van Weel, assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges. “We try to keep secrets a lot.”

Van Weel introduced NATO’s AI strategy, published in October, during an American Enterprise Institute webinar Dec. 7. The webinar “Artificial Intelligence: Can We Go From Chaos to Cooperation?” accompanied the release of AEI’s paper, “Artificial Intelligence: The Risks Posed by the Current Lack of Standards.”

As a “pervasive technology,” AI will “have an impact on everything we do,” said van Weel. Setting aside “the killer robot discussion,” van Weel dismissed the notion of excluding AI from all military uses: “The idea that AI would not be used for defense purposes is like saying that the steam engine, when it was invented, could only be used for commercial purposes, or electricity would not be supplied to the military.”

But being behind the private sector in AI development has left governments “in a situation where regulation comes after the broad use and misuse of technology,” van Weel said. “So we need to be early to the party and make sure that we understand new technologies, not to militarize them—no, but to understand the security and defense implications.”

Van Weel said military uses of AI should be regulated, but “you don’t want to over-regulate if you don’t know that you can defend yourself within the regulations that you’re proposing.” He provided the example of drone swarms “that collectively, powered by AI, are able to follow an intrinsic pattern—for example, our water supply or one of our cities. So how do we defend against them? Well, we can’t, frankly, because you need AI in that case in order to be able to counter AI.”

But even among peers, he describes skepticism.

“I’ve been on panels quite a lot where people say, ‘Well, please, I don’t trust the defense use of artificial intelligence,’ and that’s something we need to address,” van Weel said. “We are a trusted user. We—NATO, all the 30 allies—we all subscribe to the democratic values. We all subscribe to the values our societies are built upon, and we’re there to protect them.”

NATO’s strategy proposes six principles of responsible use of AI similar to the Defense Department’s Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence adopted in 2020—but with a plan to verify that the principles are followed. According to NATO’s list of attributes, military AI should be lawful; responsible and accountable; explainable and traceable; reliable; governable; and having bias mitigation.

To engender confidence in the principles, NATO has also proposed a new initiative.

“Principles are nice, but they need to be verifiable as well, and they need to be baked in from the moment of the first conception of an idea up until the delivery,” van Weel said.

To that end, to verify new AI, NATO wants to create test centers, co-located with universities throughout the alliance. This includes “existing test centers with knowledge, where allies that are thinking about co-developing AI for use in the defense sector can come in and verify, with protocols, with certain standards that we’re setting, that this AI is actually verified,” van Weel said.

“It’s not a world standard yet, but if the 30 nations, Western democracies, start out by shaping industry to adhere by these standards, then I feel that we are making an impact, at least in the development of AI and hopefully also in the larger world setting standards.”

70th Annual Operation Christmas Drop Delivers Supplies to Remote Pacific Islands

Dec. 10, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

The Pentagon’s longest-running humanitarian mission hit a new milestone this month as Pacific Air Forces kicked off the 70th annual Operation Christmas Drop on Dec. 5.

Operation Christmas Drop involved Airmen from the 36th Wing, 515th Air Mobility Operations Wing, and 374th Airlift Wing gathering, packing, and dropping pallets of supplies from C-130s to more than 55 remote islands in the southeastern Pacific, including the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

The operation first began in 1952 when a B-29 aircrew flying over the island of Kapingamarangi, 3,500 miles southwest of Hawaii, saw islanders waving at them, according to a PACAF release. The crew dropped supplies attached to a parachute to them, starting an annual tradition.

In 2021, the Air Force and partner nations dropped some 25,000 kilograms worth of supplies, including school supplies, clothing, rice, fishing equipment, and toys, impacting about 20,000 people, said Capt. Dan Mumford, one of the C-130J pilots flying the mission, in an interview released by the 36th Wing.

“These islands are some of the most remote in the world. They may get a boat of supplies every 4 to 5 months, but there are no airports and little to no visitors,” Mumford said in the interview. “However, we do communicate with the islands through a system of ham radios, and although many do not speak English, the stories of excitement and gratitude that are sent back to us are touching. The thing that really got me was when I was told the children on these islands don’t believe Santa Claus flies a magical sleigh—he flies a C-130.”

Speaking at a ceremony to commemorate the start of Operation Christmas Drop at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, on Dec. 5, Larry Raigetal recalled his childhood on one such island.

“I was curious where the toys were coming from, much less being fascinated with the Air Force guys standing in the C-130 and tossing down those boxes,” Raigetal said. “I wanted to find out where they came from. I wanted to know what the source was.”

Donated supplies are gathered from private donors, charitable organizations, and the University of Guam and sorted by volunteers before being packed into pallets, Mumford said. From there, crews execute low-cost, low-altitude air drops over the course of a week. And it’s not just a humanitarian mission.

“This training mission is not only a tradition but provides relevant and real training necessary for our Airmen and partner nations in the Indo-Pacific region,” Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, Pacific Air Forces commander, said in a release.

Similar to last year, precautions were taken to lessen the risk of COVID-19. All pilots and aircrew were fully vaccinated; all volunteers handling donations wore face masks and gloves; and pallets were left untouched for hours before being closed.

Ukraine Says It Can Deter a Russian Invasion With Air Defenses; NATO Calls for ‘Adjustments’

Dec. 10, 2021 | By Abraham Mahshie

NATO members closest to the Russian threat are seeking “adjustments” to the alliance’s defense posture to show Russian President Vladimir Putin that America will defend NATO’s eastern flank in the event of hostilities in Ukraine. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian defense official who spoke to Air Force Magazine on condition of anonymity said “a signal” that the U.S. will deliver needed air defenses to Ukraine would be enough to deter Russia from mounting an invasion.

In recent weeks, President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III promised that Ukraine will get the assistance it needs to defend itself. A last-minute visit to Washington by Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov on Nov. 19 detailed an urgent need for air defense capabilities, and an American air defense team visited Ukraine to assess the country’s needs Nov. 29. But still, there has been no new announcement of defense assistance to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Russia appears to be preparing for war.

“First, Russia will use its Air Force and missiles,” said the Ukrainian defense official, describing a buildup of military medical supplies, blood, and plasma along the Russian border with Ukraine that is consistent with casualty care. Further, hundreds of empty tents are positioned and ready for the arrival of Russian combat brigades. Only a small number of those tents are heated for soldiers who maintain the readiness of waiting Russian tanks.

“We have to prepare now,” the official said. “Point No. 1 is air defense.”

The swampy, soft land of the Donbas region in southeastern Ukraine will freeze in January, making it easy for Russian tanks to roll in with air support. American-supplied and Ukrainian-purchased javelin anti-tank weapons will help push them back. But Ukraine’s air defenses are insufficient to stop Russian fighter jets, bombers, and attack helicopters from striking positions in eastern Ukraine “in a matter of hours.” The ability to shoot down Russian aircraft can deter Putin from invading, Ukraine believes.

In Georgia in 2008, several Russian aircraft were shot down in the opening salvo, including a strategic bomber, before Russia pulled back its air offensive.

“Even with weak air defenses, we can shoot down a couple aircraft,” the Ukrainian official said. “How many casualties will they sustain?”

Until now, Russian deaths in the seven-year, low-intensity conflict with Ukraine have been hidden from public view, buried in unmarked graves near the Russian frontline, Ukrainian intelligence has found.

A recent Russian troop buildup of some 100,000 personnel has surrounded Ukraine and its army of 250,000 troops. An estimated 35,000 to 40,000 Russian and Russian-backed separatists are near the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in southeastern Ukraine, requiring a roughly equivalent Ukrainian force on a three-pronged rotation. Russia’s joint Zapad exercises with Belarus in September positioned additional equipment and forces along Ukraine’s northern border, and the Belarusian Army is believed to act at the command of Putin. To the west of Ukraine’s principal port Odessa, on the southern coast, is the disputed Transnistria region of Moldova. An additional 1,500 Russian soldiers are positioned there with reinforcements to assist a potential amphibious attack from the Black Sea, where Russia maintains a powerful naval presence.

“Any weapon is a deterrent,” the Ukrainian defense official said.

“It’s the signal,” the official added, describing how Ukraine can prevent a Russian invasion with U.S. defense assistance. “It can declare openly that, ‘We will provide assistance with the appropriate capabilities.’”

NATO’s Defense Posture

The Eastern flank of NATO, from the Baltic countries to Poland to the Black Sea countries of Romania and Bulgaria, were part of the Soviet Union or members of the Warsaw Pact. The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad shares borders with both Poland and Lithuania, and Russian-occupied Crimea is just 200 miles from Romania on the Black Sea. These heavily defended non-contiguous outposts are separated by a buffer zone of non-NATO countries. The largest country among them is Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drift to the West, including a constitutional mandate to seek European Union and NATO membership, has been a redline Putin has sought to stop.

The 2014 Russian invasion by “little green men” that bore no identifying flag on their shoulders seized Crimea and created a low-intensity conflict in the Donbas region of southeastern Ukraine. A full-scale Russian invasion would destabilize Europe and bring Russia closer to the NATO borders of the countries that once formed part of the Russian Empire.

The Biden administration and the Defense Department have indicated that deterrence on the eastern flank is currently sufficient. Eastern flank defense officials who spoke to Air Force Magazine said otherwise.

“We kind of signaled to the U.S. that certain adjustments [should] come, even right now, to signal resolve,” an eastern flank defense official close to discussions at NATO headquarters in Brussels told Air Force Magazine.

“We suggested some kind of a visible signal of resolve and then preparing options for possible escalation,” the official said. “Then, the U.S. and NATO in general should be in position to be prepared, should be prepared basically, to reinforce the east.”

Former George W. Bush-era deputy assistant secretary of state Mark Gunzinger said the eastern flank nations have serious concerns about the possibility that Putin would invade Ukraine.

“He already successfully seized and occupied Crimea,” said Gunzinger, now director of future aerospace concepts and capabilities assessments at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

“If he should do that in the eastern provinces of Ukraine, that escalates tensions throughout Europe, of course,” he continued. “So should we expect that three, four, or five years from then, maybe he makes a similar move against Estonia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, under the pretense of, ‘Well, we’re protecting our Russian nationals in the eastern provinces and countries—this is defensive in nature.’”

Gunzinger added: “It could erode, frankly, confidence in NATO and its ability to deter threats.”

The U.S. has committed to support a Baltic integrated air and missile defense system. All that currently exists in the three nations sandwiched between Kaliningrad and Belarus are a hodgepodge of small European and Soviet-era systems for short and medium-range air defense. The Baltic nations are also without an air force and depend on European NATO air policing aircraft to regularly push Russian jets out of NATO airspace. All while heavily guarded Kaliningrad is armed with Russia’s most exquisite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon system, the S-400.

“Kaliningrad Oblast remains the most militarized area in our region,” a Lithuanian defense official told Air Force Magazine, noting that 500 U.S. troops are currently in Lithuania as part of a rotational battalion.

“[It] continues to pose a threat to all of the Baltic region, as well as a majority of the Western European capitals, because of the operational reach of weapons systems that are deployed,” he added.

The official said that similarly, preventing a Russian invasion of Ukraine is a matter of national security for the Baltic nations.

“We should do everything to prevent that,” he added. “Doing everything that’s possible, both from Lithuania and, collectively, to prevent anything like Russia occupying Ukraine. So, that would be the main objective.”

The NATO posture on the eastern flank is not designed to do that.

“This is not a process that is meant to deter a Russian incursion into Ukraine,” the Brussels official said of alliance capabilities in the region. “This was meant in terms of the reinforcement of the eastern flank.”

The official said nonetheless additional U.S. presence and capabilities to counter Russian A2AD and long-range precision strike capabilities are still needed to deter Russia.

“I don’t think that the intent of the U.S. right now is to deter militarily Russia from attacking Ukraine,” the official said, citing President Biden and National security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s warning to Russia about strong economic sanctions and political measures should Russia invade Ukraine.

‘De-escalation and Diplomacy’

Briefing journalists after President Biden’s 90-minute Dec. 9 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a separate call with the Bucharest Nine group of Eastern European NATO allies, a senior administration official said Biden told Putin that Ukraine would receive additional defense assistance “if Russia further invades Ukraine.” That is, after a potential invasion.

That assistance would be coupled with economic sanctions and further capabilities for NATO allies on the eastern flank. The official said Biden called on Putin to choose “de-escalation and diplomacy.”

“What I can say from the President’s perspective is that he did make very clear to President Zelensky what he had also said to President Putin, which is a strong and ongoing commitment by the United States to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, [citing] the continuing security assistance that we have been continuing to provide to Ukraine,” the senior administration official told reporters.

The Ukrainian defense official said Russia reacts to strength and Putin is provoked to act when he sees weakness and opportunity.

The range of creative solutions to deter Russia from invading Ukraine has included diverting bought and paid for military hardware that was originally intended for the former government of Afghanistan; inviting U.S. aircraft to land and refuel at Ukrainian air bases; and an invitation for the U.S. to train troops further east than the Yavoriv Combat Training Center, where the Florida National Guard’s 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team recently arrived for a training mission.

“It would show the flag,” the Ukrainian official said, referring to the deterrent effect of U.S. troops on Ukrainian soil.

So far, those offers have been declined, with Biden saying Dec. 8 that the option of U.S. troops in Ukraine was “not on the table.”

The Brussels official said there is a split between Eastern and Western European NATO allies over defense support to Ukraine.

“This can only be done by individual allies,” the official said.

“We welcome U.S. assistance to Ukraine,” the official added. “We think that is a step to deter possible aggression—if it’s effective, if it’s in time. Air defenses would certainly provide dilemmas to Russian plots.”

Members of Congress wrote a letter Dec. 8 calling on the President to deliver more defense assistance to Ukraine. In addition, a hefty Ukraine defense assistance package lingers as part of the as-yet un-passed National Defense Authorization Act, though enacting and delivering such a thing could take months or years.

Only the President can use drawdown authorities to authorize and quickly deliver defense assistance to Ukraine as he did with a $60 million package when Zelensky visited Washington in August.

“I don’t think he would give it the level of assistance that would be needed for Ukrainian forces to inflict that kind of a punishment against an invading force,” Gunzinger said.

“This is more than a temporary crisis involving Ukraine,” he added. “This involves defense of NATO’s eastern flank, and more needs to be done.”

Space Command’s Goal of Uniting All US Military Space Functions

Dec. 10, 2021 | By Amanda Miller

The leaders at U.S. Space Command plan to figure out over the long term how to turn their command’s service-affiliated component commands—units from the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy—into “functional components.”

The Space Force, on the other hand, already contributes “the lion’s share of what we have,” said U.S. Space Command’s deputy commander, Space Force Lt. Gen. John E. Shaw, during the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies’ virtual Spacepower Forum on Dec. 10.

Shaw said he’d seen “tremendous change” not just within the command but “across the space enterprise” since becoming deputy commander in November 2020. That’s included “integration” of U.S. Space Command and the Space Force into other military services and other combatant commands “and across the department of defense and beyond—allies and partners and other parts of our government.”

Bringing on service-affiliated component commands, such as 1st Air Force with its mission of homeland defense, brings together the abilities that all services have to reach space one way or another.

“For example, the Navy may have some terrific radars on some of its vessels that are capable of reaching up into—beyond—the atmosphere and tracking objects in orbit,” Shaw said. “The Army may have some sort of a similar capability to conduct electromagnetic warfare that could extend into the space domain. Gen. Dickinson needs that capability,” he said, referring to U.S. Space Command’s commander Army Gen. James H. Dickinson.

“We need the capabilities of all services, and we need integration with all of the services, to make sure that we are providing space capabilities to joint warfighters in the terrestrial domains—but also to leverage everything that all of the other services can bring to meet Gen. Dickinson’s missions,” Shaw said.

Formalizing the relationships between the joint-service combatant command and the service-affiliated components will address how they coexist in terms of “giving orders as joint functional components,” Shaw said.

Space Command already has two functional components, Shaw said: Combined Force Space Component Command at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., and Joint Task Force-Space Defense at Schriever Space Force Base, Colo.

After “executing operations day to day through those functional components, we are looking at a way to make this look, maybe, more like other combatant commands where we … have service components also serving as functional components,” Shaw said. “How do we, maybe, look at this long term.”

Dickinson announced U.S. Space Command’s initial operational capability in August.

Addressing when the command might reach full operational capability, Shaw said that likely depends on when it finds out where its permanent headquarters will be. The Defense Department’s Office of Inspector General and Congress’ Government Accountability Office are investigating the Trump administration’s decision to base the command at Redstone Arsenal, Ala.

Editor’s note: This story was updated at 2:20 p.m. Dec. 14 to reflect that Space Command is the organization with two functional components.

New NDAA Takes Aim at F-35 Sustainment Costs, Joint Program Office

Dec. 10, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

Sweeping changes could be in store for the F-35 program starting in 2027, if the latest version of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act is approved.

The latest draft of the NDAA, passed by the House on Dec. 7 and now awaiting passage in the Senate, calls for transferring “management, planning, and execution” of all F-35 sustainment activities from the Joint Program Office to the respective services by October 2027, followed by the transfer of all acquisition functions by October 2029.

And that’s not all. A separate provision in the NDAA would put pressure on the JPO, the services, and contractors to drive down sustainment costs by threatening the future size of the F-35 fleet.

Variations of these provisions were included in previous drafts of the NDAA passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House, respectively. This latest version represents a compromise bill between the two that was unveiled by leading lawmakers from both chambers on Dec. 7.

The provision to potentially cut back on the F-35 fleet based on sustainment costs was first introduced by House Armed Services Committee chair Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.). Initially, Smith called for limiting the number of F-35As the Air Force could maintain starting in October 2026, with the exact number of airframes determined by how much sustainment costs in fiscal 2025 exceed the service’s stated goal of $4.1 million per tail per year.

The latest version of the NDAA tweaks that provision. Instead of starting in 2026, the limitations would not kick in until October 2028. And instead of using the $4.1 million per tail per year figure, the bill would give the Secretary of the Air Force until October 2025 to set a goal for sustainment cost.

That goal cost would then be divided by the actual sustainment cost per tail per year in fiscal 2027, and the resulting number would be multiplied by 1,763—the planned number of F-35As for the Air Force—to determine the size of USAF’s fleet.

In a July 2021 report, the Government Accountability Office found that the Air Force’s 2020 sustainment costs were roughly $7.8 million per tail per year. If that cost were to stay the same and the Air Force Secretary were to keep the goal cost at $4.1 million per tail per year, the fleet would be limited to 927 fighters.

Regardless of how large the fleet winds up being, the NDAA would require the transfer of all sustainment and acquisition activities for the F-35A to the Air Force by the end of the decade. A previous version of this provision included in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of the bill only touched on the F-35’s sustainment activities.

The provision also calls for the Pentagon to present a plan for carrying out the transition to Congress by Oct. 1, 2022.

What exactly this provision would mean for the Joint Program Office, which has existed in some form for more than two decades, remains unclear. The JPO is the “implementing agency” for F-35 sustainment and follow-on development for seven international partners, and it has signed foreign military sales Letters of Offer and Acceptance with six other partner nations.

And that number is slated to grow—Finland announced Dec. 10 that it will order 64 F-35As in an $11.3 billion deal. The Scandinavian nation joins Switzerland, which said in June that it would buy 36 fighters, though that deal is not finalized.

The NDAA also includes a provision calling for new engines in the current and future F-35 fleet, with installs starting in 2027.

Kendall’s Top Seven Priorities to Cope With Peer Adversaries Include Two New Aircraft

Dec. 9, 2021 | By John A. Tirpak

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s top seven priorities are oriented toward giving the Air Force rapidly deployable capabilities relative to China and Russia, putting greater attention on previously “unfocused” technology development efforts, and adding two new programs of record, he said Dec. 9.

In a virtual Defense One symposium, Kendall listed his top seven priorities, saying all of these areas are coming under intense scrutiny in order to get the “direction right” for technology and organizational efforts and “improving our ability to function as an institution.”

His priorities include:

Space Order of Battle

“We’ve got to get that right,” Kendall said. “We’ve got to bring the Space Development Agency into the Air Force pretty soon.”

This will lead to “distributed architectures that are more resilient, as well as capitalizing on commercial applications.”

But it must all be made more coherent, in concert with the Intelligence Community, and be integrated into a Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system, he said.

Air Base Resiliency

Kendall said the Air Force depends on forward air bases for all its tactical aircraft deployments, but China and Russia are “building mechanisms to attack those bases. We’ve got to figure out what mix of hardening, deception, dispersion, … Agile Combat Employment, and other measures we can take to give us the capability we need there.”

ABMS

“What we need to do there is focus it more than it has been in the past [toward] operational return on investment,” he said. The Air Force should emphasize ABMS elements that “really pay off in an operational sense. That linkage hasn’t been clear, so far.”

Air and Ground Moving Target Indication

“If we’re going to be in a many-on-many situation, we’ve got to sort out a lot of targets and get that information to the people who can engage [them], preferably at long range,” Kendall said. “How do we do that? It’s a combination of space sensors and airborne sensors, … a tight coupling of ABMS and JADC2.”

Kendall later said the Air Force is looking at potentially buying the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail as a bridge system to a still-undefined space-based moving target indicator system.

The E-7—or other platforms under consideration which Kendall didn’t mention—would “fill a gap temporarily” to those space-based systems. The E-3 AWACS and E-8 Joint STARS have become too vulnerable and too attractive as targets to continue using them for the long term, he said. While once it would have taken a prohibitive number of enemy fighters and missiles to reach them and shoot them down, recent analysis indicates that adversaries “would probably spend that many fighters … trying to get to [them] and kill them.”

How the Air Force Goes to War

Kendall said he’s looking for vulnerabilities in the supply chain, including the industrial base, “our logistics systems, our personnel systems, [and] our transportation systems.” He plans to take “a hard look at all that,” to determine where the chain may be more vulnerable “than we can tolerate” and take steps to mitigate those.

A New Unmanned Fighter

“Basically, the idea here is that you have, … nominally, up to five” unmanned aircraft escorting a single F-22, F-35, or the fighter platform element of the Next-Generation Air Dominance system. The pilots of these aircraft are “essentially, calling ‘plays,’ and … using those other unmanned combat aircraft … as a formation to do things that make sense, tactically.”

This approach will create a wide range of combat “opportunities,” Kendall said. But the exact mix of aircraft and the “pre-programmed … plays … are all things that we have to sort out, so we’re getting that one started.”

A New Unmanned Bomber Escort

“The B-21 is a very expensive aircraft” and Kendall wants to “amplify” its capability with more range and weaponry, delivered by escort aircraft, although he said the term “escort” or “accompanying” is not necessarily how it will be employed.

“The tactics are very much to be determined,” he said.

These aircraft will be networked together, controlled by an operator onboard the B-21, to operate “as a formation in some loose sense … against a modern enemy.”

The unmanned aircraft build on the “Skyborg” demonstrations of the last few years, but “what I’m describing is an acquisition program; a weapon system procurement program,” Kendall said. He told press last week that he plans to get the two new aircraft into the fiscal 2023 budget submission.

“We’re going to go from demonstrations and experiments and technology maturation and risk reduction into full-scale development, or engineering, manufacturing, development, production,” he said. While it will take some time to “sort all that out, … we’re going to get on with building something … It’s a commitment to go forward.”

He said that despite previous efforts, “we hadn’t committed to [a program of record] before. So that’s a major change, actually.”

There’s “a fair amount of analysis work to do,” Kendall said, and he’s moved his analysis shop from the A9 to the Secretariat, “to support both the Air Force and Space Force.”

The emphasis, he said, will be on “moving fast,” as it has been for several years, but “going in the right direction is pretty important, too. And so we want to make sure we do the work up front to make sure we’re going in the right direction and … get to meaningful opportunities [and] operational capability as quickly as we can.”

The two new aircraft programs, he said, will be “acknowledged classified” programs, meaning that their funding will be public but details of the systems will be held closely to avoid giving China “a head start” in figuring out countermeasures.

Kendall also said that he’s uninterested in technologies that don’t contribute “meaningfully” to combat efforts.

“One or two of something often isn’t meaningful … It’s interesting and it helps you learn, but it doesn’t get you where you want to be, operationally.”

Although Kendall acknowledged that the B-21 is expected to fly in 2022, “You’re not going to see much of it,” to avoid compromising its technologies, he said.

The NGAD has been underway since Kendall was the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, but has gone beyond the technology demonstrator stage, he said. It has “moved forward very well” and will be the next-generation fighter after the F-35, but as part of a system of systems, Kendall noted. The other elements of the system, he said, “will be backward compatible” to fourth-generation aircraft, as well.

Combat Role in Iraq Ends, US Troops Remain in Country in Advise and Assist Role

Dec. 9, 2021 | By Abraham Mahshie

The United States ended its combat mission in Iraq and will transition to an “advise, assist, and enable” mission supporting Iraqi forces, reported Combined Joint Task Force-Inherent Resolve Dec. 9.

“Many brave men and women gave their lives to ensure Daesh never returns, and as we complete our combat role, we will remain here to advise, assist, and enable the [Iraqi security forces],” Maj. Gen. John W. Brennan, Jr., commander of CJTF-OIR, said in a press release, using the Arabic word for Islamic State.

The U.S. military’s 2,500 troops made the transition to a non-combat role ahead of its Dec. 31 deadline, and will now remain in Iraq at the invitation of the government.

“We are confident that the fruits of our strong partnership will ensure Daesh will not reconstitute and threaten the Iraqi people,” Brennan added.

Four years after the defeat of the Islamic State group in Iraq, Iraqi Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul Amir al-Shammari, deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command for Iraq, said Iraqi soldiers have “demonstrated their ability to maintain the defeat of Daesh.”

The announcement of the transition to a non-combat role came at the conclusion of military technical talks between the governments of Iraq and the United States that began in July.

According to the new agreement, coalition personnel will be guests on Iraqi bases and protected by Iraqi forces.

Pentagon spokesman John F. Kirby said Dec. 9 that the U.S. forces operating in Iraq will continue to maintain the right of self-defense.

“We have to assume that threats to U.S. forces remain credible in Iraq,” he said of American troops, who have been fired on by Iranian-backed militias.

“We always have the right and the authority and the capability to defend our troops, to defend our resources, wherever we are, that doesn’t change,” he added.

Kirby also said the transition to a non-combat role has been a long time in the making.

“We had been making this transition for quite some time,” he said. “They have been working themselves out of offensive combat operations against ISIS for quite some time. And the … vast majority of what they’ve been doing for a while now has been advise, assistant, and train.”

Brennan said, “Daesh is down, but not out. We will advise and assist our partner forces to enable the protection of the people of Iraq.”

The end of combat operations in Iraq comes about four months after the U.S. withdrew its forces from Afghanistan after two decades of war.

U.S. officials continue to caution about the ongoing threat not only from violent extremists like the Islamic State group, but also from Iran and its proxies, though U.S. Central Command’s director of operations was optimistic about the current state in Iraq.

“In Iraq and Syria, I see a lot of reason for hope,” said USAF Maj. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, director of operations for U.S. Central Command, during a Dec. 6 virtual AFA event. “I see ISIS still on the ropes. I see the potential for some real progress in Iraq. There’s plenty of risk there. Things could certainly go wrong. There’s people who want to make them go wrong, particularly in Tehran. But, there’s a lot of reasons for hope, and we should all be proud of the trajectory that that’s on.”

Air Force Releases Policy for Dealing with Unvaccinated Airmen, Guardians

Dec. 9, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

Airmen and Guardians who are denied a medical, religious, or administrative exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine requirement will have five days to start the vaccination process, file an appeal, or request to separate or retire, according to a new Department of the Air Force memo issued Dec. 7.

Should the appeal be denied or the request to separate or retire denied, the five-day clock will restart, and those who still refuse the vaccine “will be subject to the initiation of administrative discharge,” according to the memo signed by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

The administrative discharge process includes a counseling process and takes time. It can also vary for service members with different levels of experience, an Air Force spokeswoman told Air Force Magazine.

The deadline for Active-duty Airmen and Guardians to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 was Nov. 2, while the deadline for those in the Reserve and Guard was Dec. 2.

According to the most recent data from the Air Force, 3,234 Airmen and Guardians across the total force have verbally refused the vaccine, putting them in line to make one of the three choices. Requests to separate or retire are contingent upon the absence of or a limited Military Service Obligation.

That number, however, will almost certainly grow in the coming weeks—another 10,560 Airmen and Guardians are currently seeking a religious exemption, but not a single such request has been granted thus far. Department of the Air Force policy calls for a decision within 30 business days on requests for religious exemptions to mandatory vaccines from Airmen and Guardians within the continental U.S., but that timeline will likely be delayed for some as the department sorts through a massive backlog.

There are another 4,261 Airmen and Guardians recorded as “not vaccinated,” meaning they are not coded as having refused the vaccine but are still unvaccinated without a pending or approved accommodation.

The Air Force has granted 2,222 medical exemptions to the vaccine, though that number could also fall—some exemptions were granted on a temporary basis for reasons such as pregnancy and will expire. The service has also given 2,521 administrative exemptions, which includes those who submitted a request to retire or separate prior to Nov. 2, 2021, with a retirement or separation date on or before April 1, 2022.

Those who refuse the vaccine and face separation “will not be eligible for involuntary separation pay and will be subject to recoupment of any unearned special or incentive pays,” the memo adds.

Kendall on Nov. 18 hinted that the move was coming, saying it’s a “pretty straightforward” question as to whether those who refuse the vaccine will be separated from the service. He also questioned whether those who remain unvaccinated, even with an approved exemption, will be deployable. Those who are unvaccinated will not be able to PCS to a new assignment, according to a recently issued Air Force memo.

The five-day window puts the Air Force in line with guidance issued by the Navy, which also gave Sailors five days after a denied exemption request to start the vaccination process. The Marine Corps also has said that unvaccinated Marines who are separated won’t be eligible for involuntary separation pay and may have to repay unearned special or incentive pays.

A total of 97.3 percent of the Active-duty Air Force and Space Force are at least partially vaccinated against COVID-19, along with 92 percent of the Air National Guard and 91.8 percent of the Air Force Reserve.

Hands in Pockets, Phones While Walking, Untucked PT Shirts All Allowed Under New Air Force Rules

Dec. 9, 2021 | By Greg Hadley

For years, Air Force rules prohibited Airmen from putting their hands in their pockets, using their phones, or taking a drink while walking, but no more.

A raft of new dress and appearance rules officially went into effect Dec. 3, loosening restrictions on what Airmen can do while walking in uniform, among other things. Service members are now allowed to drink water and use personal electronic devices while walking in uniform, and they can put their hands in their pockets while walking or standing.

The changes to the Department of the Air Force Instruction covering dress and personal appearance, recommended by the 2020 Air Force Uniform Board, were announced back in August and were initially expected to go into effect in October.

A total of 26 changes were made to the instruction, covering everything from actions while walking to hair length to morale patches to PT uniforms.

Among the changes not previously announced, women will now be allowed to have eyelash extensions, as long as they are the Airman’s natural eyelash color and do not exceed 14 millimeters.

New PT uniforms are still coming—in August, the service announced that the new gear, the first PT uniform update in nearly two decades, is expected to be available in October 2022, with a four-year transition period following.

More immediately, though, Airmen are now allowed to wear sweatbands during organized and individual PT. On top of that, PT shirts can now be untucked, though the shirt must “extend to the bottom of the side pocket on the shorts and pants but will not cover the shorts reflective material.” Commanders also have the authority to standardize whether shirts are tucked or untucked during organized unit physical training.

On the other hand, the new rules give commanders the authority to allow the tucking in of Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) coat for duty as necessary, as well as rolling up the sleeves.

The new rules also offer some clarification on previous updates. While the Air Force announced in September 2020 that all Airmen, regardless of their natural hair color, are allowed to dye their hair another natural color, the latest update adds that those natural hair colors can be blended together so long as they do not “present an unnatural appearance between colors.” For example, “salt and pepper” dyed hair is allowed, while “ombre” or highlights are not.

While the new rules still do not allow for Airmen to grow beards without a waiver, medical officials can now authorize waivers, instead of just commanding officers.

As previously announced, men will now be allowed to grow their hair to a bulk of 2.5 inches from the scalp, up from the previous 2 inches; double what was allowed up until September 2020. Men will also be allowed cosmetic tattoos on their scalp to create a natural hair appearance.

Women will now be allowed hair accessories up to two inches, up from one inch, and will not have to wear hosiery while in dress uniform.

Additionally, wing commanders will now be allowed to authorize the wearing of approved morale patches on Fridays and special occasions.