INDOPACOM Commander Says Ukraine is a Wake-Up Call to the US, Cautions ‘This Could Happen’ in Taiwan

March 9, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided a wake-up call for U.S. officials who should now recognize that if China has designs on Taiwan, “We have to look at this and say, ‘Hey, this could happen,’” said INDOPACOM’s commander Adm. John Aquilino.

Aquilino was among the Defense Department officials who appeared before the House Armed Services Committee on March 9 to answer questions about the circumstances in the region.

“We need to be more forward. We need to be more robust,” Aquilino said. That includes his top unfunded priority of a system for the defense of Guam.

China “is the most consequential strategic competitor that the United States has faced,” Aquilino said, and its government is willing to “uproot the rules-based international order to the benefit of themselves and at the expense of all others.”

HASC chair Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said the U.S. should “attempt to be a balancing force to keep the peace in Asia,” especially with regard to the independence of Taiwan.

“The belligerent language that China has been putting out recently is, you know, very, very dangerous,” Smith said. “We could easily see a China-Taiwan situation in the same way we now see a Russia-Ukraine situation.”

Aquilino, addressing the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan—of not saying whether the U.S. would defend it— said some people believe clarifying the policy would serve as a deterrent, “and there are some that would believe that it would be an accelerant.”

He perceived pros and cons to both, saying, “We ought to look very closely.”

At the same time, “trend lines” in regards to U.S. military ties with India “are moving in the right direction,” noted Ely Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs.

Smith wanted to know in part how the U.S. could strengthen its relationship with India and how the U.S. should adjust its activities in the Indo-Pacific.

“Russia and China, as we know, are actively engaged in many parts of the world,” Smith said. “The competition here really is to build broad support amongst partners … to show that partnering with the U.S. and the West is the better option for, frankly, all countries than partnering with Russia and China.”

Ratner said the U.S. partnership with India is making “historic progress” despite India’s reliance on Russia for weapons. The U.S. and India “continue to integrate and operationalize our day-to-day defense cooperation and logistics, enhance information sharing, and grow our bilateral cooperation in emerging domains, such as space and cyberspace,” he added.

The U.S. is “doubling down” on its network of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Ratner said. “With the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of regional peace, we’re deepening our defense cooperation with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, optimizing our alliance force posture, and integrating the alliance into a broader regional security network of like-minded nations.”

Another priority Aquilino mentioned is “integrated and resilient, sustainable [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities—a network that links all of that together and displays it for all forces on the battlefield in a consistent way; and then ultimately the ability to close those kill chains with the correct weapons and fires.”

The “speed and pace” at which countries such as China, Russia, and even North Korea are developing hypersonic weapons are, in part, driving Aquilino’s desire to defend Guam.

In order to “be able to posture forces in places that matter with the right capabilities,” the U.S. military “focused on Guam as a strategic hub,” Aquilino said. “The area in the Indo-Pacific is expansive—half the globe and a lot of it water,” he explained. “About $11 billion worth of construction, as we work through our posturing of our forces, … will end up on Guam, and we have to protect it.”

ULA Won’t Need Russia to Finish Atlas V National Security Space Launches

March 9, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

CAPE CANAVERAL SPACE FORCE STATION, Fla.— A United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket, powered by a Russian-made RD-180 rocket motor, blasted off on a crisp 68 degree Florida day into clear blue skies March 1, carrying the GOES-T National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellite into orbit. Seven years after Congress ordered ULA to find another source for its rocket motors, this launch comes at the lowest point in U.S.-Russian relations in decades.

And though ULA will soon be cut off from further supplies due to sanctions imposed on Russia after it invaded Ukraine last month, ULA and Space Force officials say they don’t expect any National Security Space Launches to be affected.

Later this year, ULA is set to transition to the new Vulcan Centaur rocket, powered by a pair of Blue Origin BE-4 engines. But in the meantime, ULA will continue launching payloads, including National Security Space Launches (NSSL), with the Russian-made RD-180 first-stage engine.

U.S. Space Force Space Launch Delta 45 commander Brig. Gen. Stephen G. Purdy Jr. said the current crisis and heightened tensions with Russia show how maintaining and expanding America’s space architecture can be threatened by reliance on adversarial actors such as Russia.

“It’s very interesting about having to depend on a foreign supplier,” he told Air Force Magazine during a visit to Patrick Space Force Base, Fla.

“Launch is a big issue,” he said. “You see that right now with the Ukraine activity. The Russians are holding the OneWeb satellites, and they’re not going to launch it.”

ULA plans for Vulcan Centaurs to begin launching sometime in 2022 from Space Launch Complex-41 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and Space Launch Complex-3 at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.

“As we manage the transition to the Vulcan launch system, all necessary RD-180 engines to execute the Atlas V flyout are safely stored in our factory in Decatur, Alabama,” ULA spokesperson Jessica Rye told Air Force Magazine in a written statement.

“We have agreements for technical support and spares, but if that support is not available, we will still be able to safely and successfully fly out our Atlas program,” she added.

A U.S. Space Force spokesperson told Air Force Magazine that Russia’s pullback from space cooperation will not affect NSSL.

“The Space Force does not expect Russian noncooperation in space to affect NSSL launches,” the spokesperson said in a statement.

“The Space Force has four remaining Atlas V launch services,” the spokesperson noted. “All RD-180 engines needed for Space Force missions are in ULA’s possession. Additionally, the Space Force is fully supporting ULA’s development of the Vulcan Launch System, which does not use Russian engines, for future launches.”

“There’s just a few left,” Purdy assured of the launches remaining under his purview.

“This has all been laid in and planned,” he added. “The Vulcan program exists for the purpose of getting off the RD-180 engine, combining the best of the Delta IV and the Atlas V into a new, partially reusable rocket that ULA will use to take us forward.”

Purdy echoed Secretary Frank Kendall’s past statements, saying, “We’re not concerned from that front. We built in a path ages ago, and that’s executing per plan.”

How the Pentagon Says It’s Tackling Inflation in Its 2023 Budget Request

March 9, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Concern over inflation has impacted the Pentagon’s planning for the fiscal 2023 budget request, the Defense Department’s top financial official said March 9. But, the budget is “substantively” complete, and space figures to be a foundational part of it, he added.

Comptroller Mike McCord, speaking at the McAleese conference, teased that there is a “projected date” for the release of the 2023 budget, which has been delayed for more than a month. But that date hasn’t been finalized, and McCord said he still hopes to have the National Defense Strategy, also delayed, rolled out before the budget request.

When the budget does come, many observers will be focused on how it addresses the recent spike in inflation, which has reached record highs. If the budget is built off an assumption of continued high inflation, it could be a “downer” for the stock market; but if it quotes an escalation of just two percent, it could be criticized for lowballing the number and being unrealistic, analysts have said.

“One other thing that’s new for us: having to worry about inflation again, for the first time, certainly since the housing bubble, the housing crash, and the Great Recession of 2008,” McCord acknowledged. “But, actually, it’s been much longer than that that we’ve had to seriously track and worry about inflation. So that’s been a big part of what I’ve been working on in building the [2023] budget, but also just a day-to-day challenge that is not one that we’ve had before.”

At the same time, McCord argued that the commonly cited measure of inflation—the consumer price index, which has risen 7.5 percent in the last 12 months—is not applicable for the DOD. Instead, he cited the GDP Price Deflator, which measures inflations based on prices of goods and services produced inside the United States as well as exports, as a metric that is “fairly accurate for us.” McCord claimed the GDP Price Deflator is “not running at anything like 5 percent.”

“We are not facing 7 percent inflation in the Defense Department,” McCord said. “Now, what’s going to happen in the future, obviously, if I knew that, I would be doing something else for a living. But the big concern that we’ve had, that I’ve had, is catching up. Inflation is a here-and-now thing; we build budgets one year at a time, and inflation tends to get looked at [as] inflation from ’22 to ’23.”

The last time the Pentagon’s budget experts formulated key economic assumptions that inform the budgeting process was more than a year ago, McCord said—before he was confirmed to his position. In this budget cycle, he and his team worked to update those assumptions.

“The biggest near-term concern that we have, really, is the inflation that did occur in [2021] that was higher than projected, inflation that is occurring in [2022] that is higher than projected,” McCord said. “So my emphasis has been on getting us caught up on that as best we can.”

A failure to do so would result in a budget where prices are already outdated. McCord compared it to shopping for groceries, only to arrive at the checkout and realize “prices have changed, everything we put in the shopping cart was priced over a year ago [and] are no longer accurate prices.”

For the general public, perhaps the most urgent concern about skyrocketing prices is gas—fuel costs have reached all-time highs, and those costs are expected to remain high as President Joe Biden has banned the import of Russian gas, coal, and liquefied natural gas into the U.S.

The Defense Department is the federal government’s largest consumer of fuel, but McCord indicated that soaring gas prices won’t affect the budget like other inflation.

“Of course we track the fuel market. We consume 75 percent of the federal government’s energy, so we are very much interested in fuel prices,” McCord said. “We don’t control fuel prices. We can’t impact fuel prices. We are big enough to have a big bill, but way too small to have any impact on the markets. But that has its own mechanism—basically me working with DLA to adjust prices that we charge and then messaging Congress if we need more or less money for that.”

Just as rising fuel costs won’t directly impact the 2023 budget, McCord also said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which led to Biden’s import ban, is not substantively altering the budget.

“I want to emphasize that it is not, it’s not a budget that was rewritten at the last minute because of what Putin is doing in Ukraine,” McCord said. “There’s been a lot of reasons, I’m sure familiar to all of you, about why this is taking time.”

Still, McCord acknowledged that Putin’s actions likely will affect how the budget is received by the public, pointing to support for increased defense budgets in Europe in recent weeks.

“I do think that public views are going to change,” McCord said. “And it clearly was shocking to a lot of Europeans to see full-scale war on the European continent. Clearly, if you look at Germany, for example, what could be more striking than their sudden change, and I think a welcome one. But I think that there’ll be a not-quite-as-dramatic impact, but a similar directional … impact in the United States.”

McCord’s comments were short on specifics about what will actually be in the budget, but he did offer a brief preview, highlighting the importance of the space domain.

“I would say … space … is probably emerging in our internal reviews as the most important foundational area for everything that we’re doing, everything that we need to be doing, whether it’s versus China, versus Russia, anybody else,” McCord said.

For fiscal 2022, the Space Force requested a $17.4 billion budget, roughly a 13 percent increase year over year. The appropriations bill currently being considered by Congress would boost that total to $18 billion.

Kelly: Russian Air Defenses Work Well for Ukraine

March 9, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Ukrainian forces are making good use of their Russian-made air defense systems, and Russia’s slow progress in Ukraine is an indication of how important it is to have air superiority, Air Combat Command boss Gen. Mark D. Kelly said March 9. However, the U.S. needs new weapons to equip its fighters because adversaries are getting better at detecting even low-observable aircraft.

Speaking at a McAleese and Associates conference in Washington, D.C., Kelly said Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are “operating pretty well, operated by Ukrainians.” Unconfirmed reports indicate dozens of Russian aircraft have been shot down in the week-old invasion of Ukraine. Russia has also bogged down due to “logistical challenges [and] morale challenges,” Kelly said.

But “one challenge they do not have [is] … an air base defense challenge. They just don’t, because they operate layer upon layer upon layer of S-300s and S-400s, as well as SA-23s, etc.” These nested air defense systems have provided Russian forces with good protection against air attack, Kelly said.

“The Russian Air Force has not adapted agile combat employment, for a couple of reasons,” Kelly assessed.

“One, my opinion, they’re not capable of doing it,” he said. “Two, they don’t need to. They can operate pretty … safely from their main air bases with that layer of air defense over them.” But he said Russian air units are “struggling with [using] Russian systems [without] adhering to Russian doctrine. And we see the challenge that they have, but we also see the challenge of what happens if your joint force is organized, trained, equipped to operate with air superiority and not remotely designed to operate without air superiority. What happens when you don’t have it?”

From an historical perspective, Kelly said, “what keeps me up at night” about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the “escalation” danger.

“Dictators, faced with a choice of either losing or using chemical weapons, choose not to lose.”

Kelly said one of his near-term priorities is providing new weapons to equip ACC’s fifth-generation aircraft.

“We’ve invested a lot of … time, effort, and money into building a low-observable force,” Kelly said. But the investment will be worthless if those aircraft have to get into “everyone’s observable range” to launch their weapons. Without longer-ranged munitions with better sensors, “we will not get a good return on investment from this low-observable fleet.”

The F-22, he said, was built “to kill Russian Flankers, period.” But it’s a “different timeframe” now, with “a different threat and geographic region, which means now I need to go further. I need to sense further. I need to engage further” than the F-22 was originally designed to do.

Kelly said he’d like to have the E-7 Wedgetail capability, or something similar, as soon as possible.

“We cannot generate sufficient sorties” with the E-3 AWACS, even when it’s operating close to its home base and with “the finest sustainment enterprise on the planet,” Kelly said. “I don’t care who makes it,” but the Air Force needs to refresh its airborne moving target indicator capability as soon as possible.

Asked whether the F-35 will be a suitable close air support platform, Kelly said the Marine Corps, which needs the aircraft almost exclusively for that purpose, has “voted” for it. The F-35 will be better than previous CAS platforms because of its ability to see through clouds and obscurants from a safe altitude, and to place ordnance exactly where it’s wanted without putting the aircraft, pilot, or ground troops in peril. Russian aircraft, he said, cannot do this, based on operations in Ukraine.

However, Kelly rejected a suggestion that Joint Tactical Air Controllers should be phased out, because “you still need … eyes on target” and the capability of Battlefield Airmen, “within arm’s reach of that battalion commander,” to assess a situation and request the right solution.

He also said that in Red Flag exercises, he’s increasingly seeing commanders choosing to keep F-35s in the battlespace, even after they’ve released all their weapons, because of the value of battlefield information they can gather with their ground- and air-sensing capabilities, and then pass that information along to the rest of the force.

Congress Unveils 2022 Spending Plan, Boosting Pentagon Funding

March 9, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

More than five months after the fiscal year began, Congress unveiled its 2022 spending bill for the Pentagon and the rest of the federal government in the early hours of March 9, with a proposed boost for defense spending.

All told, the 2022 Department of Defense Appropriations Act provides $728.5 billion in discretionary spending for the DOD and related activities—roughly 5 percent more than the funding in fiscal 2021 and above the $715 billion requested by the Biden administration.

“We invest smartly in some key areas—research and development is up by 12 percent, shipbuilding is up 15 percent,” Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.), chair of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee said in an appearance at the McAleese Conference. “We made some real investments in the battles of tomorrow: artificial intelligence, cyber, and expanding our capabilities to test the latest weapons.

The increase in spending was widely expected after the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act also added to the topline with bipartisan support. Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, pronounced himself satisfied with the increase, telling the McAleese Conference that the funding looks “relatively like a Republican defense bill.”

Tester, however, seemed to warn that sizable increases to the budget won’t necessarily be bipartisan in the years to come.

“With this year’s boost in defense spending, many wonder if we’re on the verge of another era of rapidly growing budgets,” said Tester. “But rather than tie ourselves to a particular level of defense spending, I believe what is far more important is how well those funds are spent. America also has advantages that money simply cannot buy.”

This year’s potential increase in spending was the result of months of haggling between Democrats and Republicans, which resulted in a series of continuing resolutions to stave off a government shutdown.

DOD leaders repeatedly criticized the continued use of CRs, saying it hurt readiness, hampered their ability to start new programs, and slowed modernization.

There might be still one more to go, however—the most recent CR expires after March 11, and House leadership has introduced a four-day extension to March 15. That would ensure the Senate has the time necessary to pass the legislation. The House was expected to vote on both the CR and the omnibus spending bill on March 9.

“It is clear that we do not have much time to waste, so I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in both chambers recognize the urgency and send this bill to the President’s desk as quickly as we possibly can,” Tester said. “I think the House may be voting on the bill right now. Hopefully, nobody will screw around tomorrow and the Senate will be able to pick it up and we can get it out.”

Still, top officials in Congress and the Pentagon expressed optimism that the new spending bill will allow the Defense Department to move forward, especially in aiding Ukraine in its defense against the recent Russian invasion. The spending bill includes $13.6 billion in aid for Ukraine.

“That’s a very hopeful sign,” DOD comptroller Mike McCord said at the McAleese conference. “It shows strong support, very much in line with what you saw, I think, in the State of the Union address—the strong bipartisan support for the Ukrainian people. We’re seeing that in the supplemental [aid], very grateful that Congress jumped on that, and I have a feeling that it kind of helped push the thing over the edge and get it done.”

The $13.6 billion provided to Ukraine exceeds the $10 billion requested by the administration. McCord said the extra funding will go to the Pentagon’s “drawdown” authorities and help to replenish their stocks of munitions and equipment that have already been sent to Ukraine.

Elsewhere in the spending bill, funding is included for 85 F-35s, equal to the number requested across the services, along with 12 F-15EXs and 14 KC-46s, both equal to the Air Force’s budget request.

The spending bill does boost the procurement figures for C-130s and MQ-9s. That includes 20 more C-130Js, 16 of which will be for the Air National Guard and four for the Air Force Reserve. The Air Force didn’t request any MQ-9s in its budget, but the bill includes four for the USAF.

The bill also provides $70 million extra in funding for the Air Force to sustain its fleet of A-10s. This increase is intended to help the service comply with NDAA provisions blocking the Air Force from retiring any of the aging Warthogs, which it has continually sought to do in recent years.

The bill would also require the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to Congress within 30 days of submitting the fiscal 2023 budget request “on any proposed divestments of the A-10 aircraft during the future years defense plan.”

The Space Force, meanwhile, is slated to receive a boost to its overall top line, from the $17.4 billion requested to approximately $18 billion—a roughly 17 percent increase from its 2021 budget. That includes $261 million from the service’s first unfunded priority list, including $61 million to accelerate a cislunar flight experiment.

The spending bill also includes more than $500 million devoted to next-generation technologies such artificial intelligence, cyber, and microelectronics.

Finally, the bill funds a number of benefits for service members, starting with a 2.7 percent pay raise. Additionally, it appropriates $278 million for military families struggling with housing in a market upended by the COVID-19 pandemic, $119 million for food assistance, and $686.4 million to address the jet fuel spill at Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility.

AFSOC Shifts Focus to Peer Competition, Closer Collaboration With Allies and Partners

March 9, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

During a recent test, an MC-130J flew low over the Gulf of Mexico, not far from the Hurlburt Field headquarters of Air Force Special Operations Command, loaded with palletized munitions. But this was no ordinary resupply mission.

The palletized munitions were pushed out the back of the aircraft, floating toward the water in parachutes until, one by one, cruise missiles fired, adjusting mid-air and climbing to cruise altitude to travel miles away to strike a simulated oil barge.

“Why in the world would AFSOC be launching cruise missiles out of the back of a C-130?” AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. James C. Slife asked a standing-room-only crowd of Airmen, Guardians, and industry experts at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla., March 3.

“Because if our adversaries have to look at every C-130 and every C-17 and wonder what’s in the back, and whether that C-17 is in fact a long-range fire squadron, it changes their calculus,” Slife explained.

The Dec. 17, 2021, Rapid Dragon live fire test deployed from a cargo aircraft was two years in the making. The next live fire test with a C-17 is slated for the spring of 2022, he noted. The tests are part of AFSOC’s shift from the asymmetric warfare conducted in the Middle East over the past decades to a competition with a peer or near-peer adversary such as China or Russia.

“Yes, the last few decades have been laser-focused on counter-VEO [violent extremist organization] operations,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Tony D. Bauernfeind, vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, told the audience, describing a shift that began with the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

“In FY 22, over 30 percent of our operations will be against great power competitors,” he said—“to assure allies, to make sure we’re all preparing the environment to make sure we are forward, where we need to be, to have the effects to provide the options that the nation needs.”

That distribution of operations will only climb in 2023 and 2024, Bauernfeind said.

“From an operational perspective, not only is change going to happen, but change has been happening since 2018,” he added.

In a pull-aside interview after the presentation, Bauernfeind told Air Force Magazine that special operators will forward deploy for more engagements with allies and partners in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command areas of operations, with less emphasis on U.S. Central Command or U.S. Africa Command.

“We are going to show a bond with our allies and partners, both in INDOPACOM and in EUCOM,” he emphasized. “Through that combined power comes an element of deterrence to any adversary that would want to challenge [us].”

Bauernfeind said Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has “doubled down” on the great power emphasis initiated by Defense Secretary James N. Mattis, who inked the last NDS. And Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, in his earlier symposium keynote, said he expects the emphasis to remain “China, China, China,” despite Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

In addition to closer collaboration with allies and partners, Austin has also directed special operations forces to work more closely with interagency teammates, including the State Department, Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community.

“Under Secretary Austin, this is a priority, so it’s easy for us to move,” Bauernfeind added. While the organization is always planning, the crisis in Eastern Europe has led to an uptick in interest from NATO eastern flank nations.

“Anytime there is a crisis, anybody who is affected by the crisis is going to respond and be a part of planning efforts,” Bauernfeind said.

Nuclear Modernization is the ’Absolute Minimum,’ STRATCOM Commander Says

March 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Modernizing the nuclear triad and its accompanying systems isn’t just necessary for the U.S. to deter adversaries—nuclear modernization is the “absolute minimum” that has to be done, the head of U.S. Strategic Command told a Senate panel March 8.

Adm. Charles “Chas” A. Richard has been sounding the alarm on China’s nuclear progress for months, saying the Chinese experienced a “strategic breakout” after reports emerged that it had significantly expanded its nuclear infrastructure.

Now, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin’s decision to put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert, tensions are higher than ever, and modernization should be just the start, Richard told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“It is very clear that the absolute minimum that we need to do is to recapitalize the triad, the nuclear command and control, and the nuclear weapons complex,” Richard said. “But there’s two other questions we need to be asking ourselves along the way with that. The threats are changing in a way that we have not seen in 30 years. We do not know the endpoints of where either of those other two are going, either in capability or capacity. We’re just now starting to work out what three-party stability looks like, what three-party deterrence dynamics works out.

“On top of that, we are learning a number of lessons in real time on how actual crisis deterrence works. It is different from the steady-state deterrence that most of us have experience in. Those two questions, I think, need to be asked much more frequently than we have needed to in the past, followed with, what is the capability, capacity, and posture we require from our strategic forces moving forward?”

Those are questions, Richard said, that STRATCOM has been working on, along with others that many analysts are now considering, such as: How would the U.S. respond if Putin were to use a low-yield nuclear weapon in Ukraine?

“We have rewritten deterrence dynamics theory over the years. We have new analysis that we’re using,” Richard said. “We got criticized for that. We got told that it was highly improbable or somehow self-serving for us to think our way through this, but we ignored that, such that to this point, nothing has happened that we didn’t anticipate, we hadn’t thought about, and hadn’t prepared for.”

For the most part, Richard’s argument for modernization was received favorably by the Senate panel. But he did receive some pushback from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), who questioned why the Pentagon did not consult with outside experts on the feasibility of extending the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system instead of buying the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

“It appears DOD simply didn’t want to do a study that might show a massively expensive nuclear spending program wasn’t actually necessary,” Warren said, adding that she believed the role of nuclear weapons should be minimized.

“I look forward to the Nuclear Posture Review being published so you can see exactly how and what it concluded,” Richard responded. “But I will add, thank goodness we have ICBMs right now. I’ll explain more in closed testimony.”

It’s not only nuclear weapons that need to be modernized, Richard said. The bomber fleet, and the aerial refueling fleet that supports it, are also set to undergo major changes in the near future, as the B-21 Raider comes online, the B-52 receives new engines, the number of KC-46s grows, and the Air Force pursues its “bridge tanker.”

As these new changes come, they carry implications for STRATCOM. One challenge, in particular, is the threat of electromagnetic pulses. Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) asked Richard how STRATCOM’s need for EMP-hardened airframes was being met.

“I have certain requirements, EMP protection … being one of those. So one is to clearly articulate the requirements. Two is go see what we can do in terms of employment of our force to reduce that demand signal [for tankers],” Richard said. “A great example I can point to, and I would give credit to the Air Force, is the re-engining of the B-52s. The engines on those date back to the 60s. They burn a lot of gas. [To] re-engine, less fuel [is] required, less tanker demand. And then what other efficiencies can we achieve, while still maintaining the flexibility and the signaling capability of the air leg, which is one of its prized attributes?”

Threats from China and Russia Extend to Western Hemisphere, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Bosses Say

March 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

While China remains the long-term pacing threat, and immediate concerns focus on Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, the U.S. cannot afford to neglect its own back yard and allow its two near-peer adversaries to gain a foothold, the leaders of U.S. Northern and Southern Commands told Congress on March 8.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put Europe back in the security spotlight, and some observers have drawn parallels with China and a potential invasion of Taiwan. But as the Defense Department looks to center its strategy around the concept of “integrated deterrence”—working across domains, theaters, spectrums, and government agencies—it has to make progress in the Americas, NORTHCOM boss Gen. Glen D. VanHerck told the House Armed Services Committee.

“From a theater security cooperation perspective, I think there’ll still be work to be done,” VanHerck said. “A little goes a long way in the Western Hemisphere, and to compete as part of integrated deterrence, I think we can do more. China and Russia are both global problems. Instead of running to the South China Sea, or to the EUCOM [area of responsibility], we need to factor in that they’re here in the Western Hemisphere and ensure adequate funding for integrated deterrence.”

VanHerck and SOUTHCOM commander Army Gen. Laura J. Richardson said they haven’t seen the fiscal 2023 budget request that’s yet to be released by President Joe Biden’s administration. But they both seemed to indicate that they weren’t expecting massive increases in funding.

“I aspire that it will give us modest investments in the AOR,” Richardson said of the budget. “I think [we need] a comprehensive strategy in the SOUTHCOM region. As we look east and west quite a bit, we don’t look south so much. This is a very important AOR, and so I’m hopeful that we’ll get what we need. When we don’t, … we look for other ways of low-cost, high-yield investments.”

Meanwhile, both Russia and China are seeking to increase their influence in the region. Richardson highlighted China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s disinformation campaigns as particularly concerning.

The Belt and Road Initiative, whereby China has invested tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure projects globally, has already impacted U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command. Now, it’s coming for South and Central America, Richardson said.

“As we know, it starts with the infrastructure [and] economic projects and then furthers into exploitation. A lot of those are state-owned enterprises by China. … I think that the Chinese are using the same playbook that they did in Africa 10 to 15 years ago, and they’re using that in the SOUTHCOM AOR now,” Richardson said.

Specifically, the Chinese spent $72 billion in the region from 2017 to 2021, Richardson said, highlighting projects near the Panama Canal as particularly concerning. By comparison, SOUTHCOM received $250 million for infrastructure projects conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers.

“This region is rich in resources, and the Chinese don’t go there to invest—they go there to extract,” Richardson said.

But it’s not just infrastructure that China has been leveraging to build its influence in SOUTHCOM.

“China doesn’t have partners, but they are using our playbook in our region. So, for example, with professional military education, they’re offering one-year, two-year, all-expenses-paid [trips] to Beijing for professional military education with individuals,” Richardson said. “But they don’t have exercises, and they don’t have partners. So I’ve got to be able to keep up the security cooperation and the exercises that we do in this region to show the strength of the partnerships.”

Meanwhile, Russia has leveraged its strengths in spreading misinformation to interfere in elections and to prop up authoritarian leaders, Richardson said. The approach is particularly dangerous, she added, because of the state of many democracies in the region—more than two dozen are “fragile,” she said.

“Fragile democracies [are] trying to make it, trying to deliver for their people. COVID has really rolled back the advances that some of these countries have made by 10 to even 20 years, due to the economic impacts of COVID, and depending on what area of the region,” Richardson said. “And so they’re trying to deliver for their people, and quite honestly these disinformation campaigns are very prevalent, and we work very closely with the partner nations to try to help them counter it and advise them.”

Risk to the Homeland

It’s not just China’s and Russia’s abilities to influence Latin America that should concern the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, VanHerck said. With the rise of hypersonic missiles and modernized nuclear weapons, the U.S. homeland is under continuous threat, he warned, and that will only increase in the years to come.

“Russia will be a persistent, proximate threat to the homeland in the maritime domain within the next five years,” VanHerck said. “China is about a decade behind, but they will do the same thing. And so 24/7 in the near future, we’ll have both persistent, proximate threats from a submarine perspective, but also surface-level as well.”

In order to deal with that threat, the Pentagon must invest more in domain awareness and missile warning, VanHerck said. It’s an issue he has harped on before, and he added March 8 that the DOD should assign an office of primary responsibility to deal with cruise missile defense of the homeland.

When it comes to the 2023 budget, meanwhile, VanHerck said he is “confident that we’re going to move the ball, if you will, down the field on domain awareness, both in the air domain, space domain, and undersea domain.

“We do need to work more on NORAD modernization on the way forward, which would include infrastructure in the Arctic to get after that problem, which also allows me to position forces for the cruise missile problem … as well as having organized, trained, and ready forces to operate out throughout my AOR.”

Poland Offers MiG-29s in Exchange for Used US Fighters, but Pentagon Shoots Down the Idea

March 8, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Poland has volunteered to give its 23 MiG-29s to the U.S. immediately, presumably for transfer to Ukraine, in exchange for an opportunity to buy used American aircraft, the Polish minister of foreign affairs said March 8. But the Department of Defense said it doesn’t see good reason to do the deal, and doesn’t consider it “tenable.”

“The authorities of the Republic of Poland,” after consultations between the government and President Andrzej Duda, “are ready to deploy—immediately and free of charge—all their MiG-29 jets to the Ramstein Air Base and place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America,” according to a statement posted on the Polish government’s official website.

“At the same time, Poland requests the United States to provide us with used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities. Poland is ready to immediately establish the conditions of purchase of the planes.”

The Polish government also urged other NATO allies that operate MiG-29s “to act in the same vein.”

The move is not technically a reversal from Poland’s position the day before, when Duda’s office tweeted that Poland “won’t send its fighter jets to Ukraine” or allow that country to use its airfields. The new March 8 message did not specify that the jets would go to Ukraine, but to the U.S. That cautious phrasing may have been meant to avoid provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin to move militarily against Poland, which has so far absorbed nearly a million Ukrainian refugees from Putin’s invasion.

But Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said the way Poland presented the offer “shows just some of the complexities this issue presents.”

The prospect of fighter jets “at the disposal of the U.S. government” operating from a U.S./NATO air base in Germany, flying into airspace contested by Russia over Ukraine, “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance,” Kirby said.

“It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it,” he added, saying the U.S. will continue to consult with Poland and other NATO allies “about this issue, and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland’s proposal is a tenable one.”

Kirby added, “the decision about whether to transfer Polish-owned planes to Ukraine is ultimately one for the Polish government.”

Neither the Air Force nor the State Department would comment.

In recent days, there has been speculation that European countries that operate Russian-made combat aircraft would transfer them to Ukraine in exchange for American types. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said over the weekend that Poland has a “green light” from the U.S. to take such action, and a number of members of Congress have pledged that they would provide funds to make such a transfer happen.

The only U.S. fighter that Poland employs that could easily be absorbed into its air force is the F-16. Since Poland seemed to rule out new-purchase aircraft—which could take several years to be delivered—the jets would either have to come from USAF Active, Guard, or Reserve units, from storage at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., “Boneyard,” or from a third party willing to sell its used F-16s back to the U.S.

The USAF Total Force operates 936 F-16C/D aircraft, and their average age is just under 31 years. The Air National Guard alone operates 288 F-16C and 45 F-16D aircraft.

A Davis-Monthan spokesperson could not immediately say how many F-16s parked at the facility are in “recallable” condition, meaning that they have not been harvested for parts and could be regenerated.

Poland did not specify how many jets it wants in return for its 23 MiG-29s. Commercially-available, used MiG-29s have recently fetched between $5 million and $8 million, depending on their age and condition. Israel recently sold 29 of its early-model F-16s to adversary air company Top Aces, but the price of the jets was not disclosed.

According to Polish government accounts, that country’s MiG-29s are flyable but need a lot of maintenance, the engines being particularly unreliable. Poland’s statement did not mention spare engines nor whether any compatible ordnance for the jets would be provided.

The U.S. is known to operate an undisclosed number of MiG-29s that it flies to familiarize fighter pilots with the capabilities of the jet. It bought 21 MiG-29s from Moldova in 1997 for a reported $40 million in cash, other assistance, and non-lethal military equipment, such as trucks. Some of those aircraft have been dismantled for analysis; others are in threat “petting zoos”; and some number are flown for dissimilar air combat training, along with other Russian-made fighters.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated at 7 p.m. on March 8 with additional information from the Defense Department.