Austin Set to Visit Belgium, Slovakia Amid Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Austin Set to Visit Belgium, Slovakia Amid Russia-Ukraine Conflict

March 11, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III is set to visit Belgium and Slovakia the week of March 13, his first visit to Europe since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the Pentagon announced March 11.

In Brussels, Belgium, Austin will take part in a meeting with NATO defense ministers as the alliance continues to track the war unfolding in Eastern Europe. Millions of Ukrainians have fled the country, many pouring into neighboring NATO states, while members of the alliance continue to ship weapons and aid into the country.

President Joe Biden has pledged to defend “every inch” of NATO territory while remaining firm in his insistence that the U.S. will not send any troops into Ukraine itself. Still, thousands of American troops have deployed to Europe.

After the ministerial in Brussels, Austin will go to Slovakia, where he will “visit with senior civilian military leaders there to again make clear our firm commitment to NATO’s eastern flank and to talk about ways to deepen the U.S.-Slovakia relationship,” Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby told reporters in a briefing.

At the moment, Slovakia, which borders Ukraine, has no permanent U.S. troop presence in Slovakia, but the two countries have increased cooperation as of late.

In early February, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Slovakia’s defense minister, Jaroslav Nad, signed an agreement for the U.S. to use two Slovak air bases for 10 years. Slovakia will receive American funds to modernize those bases, according to the Associated Press.

Then, Reuters reported that a contingent of American troops were headed to Slovakia as part of NATO’s Saber Strike exercise. Roughly 2,000 troops were scheduled to drill with Slovak soldiers in the first few weeks of March. Officials said the exercise had been long planned and was not in response to increasing Russian aggression.

Austin’s visit to Slovakia follows a previous trip he made to Eastern Europe in the fall of 2021, when he made stops in several Black Sea nations in a show of support against Russia’s influence.

Now, he will arrive in a region grappling with its largest conflict in decades—one that is growing increasingly brutal as Russia is accused of shelling civilian structures and areas and committing war crimes.

Fears are growing that Russia may use chemical or biological weapons against Ukraine. In remarks to the press March 11, President Joe Biden warned of a “severe price” if that happened.

“I’m not going to speak about the intelligence, but Russia will pay a severe price if they use chemicals,” Biden said.

Kirby likewise declined to discuss any intelligence reports but said he didn’t “have anything to report with respect to specific Russian chem-bio capabilities inside Ukraine.”

“I would only say two things. … One, this is a country that has a reputation for using those kinds of weapons on people, and we know they have a program,” Kirby added. “And two, we continue to watch for the potential—and I want to stress the word potential, potential—that they could be banging this drum with the intent of creating some sort of false flag event that they could use as an excuse to escalate the conflict even more.”

Kirby did confirm reports that Russia has conducted airstrikes on two airfields in western Ukraine, a region that has mostly been removed from the main fronts of conflict. Whether that signals a shift by Moscow to expand the scope of the war, however, Kirby wouldn’t say.

“It’s difficult to know with great certainty what the Russians are doing here. Our assessment is that they struck a couple of airfields in the west,” Kirby said. “It’s not like there hasn’t been any airstrikes in western Ukraine since the beginning of this operation 16 days ago. It’s just that we haven’t seen that as a routine matter. Now you’ve got two in one day—that’s notable.”

Congress Approves 2022 Spending Bill for Federal Government, Sends it to Biden’s Desk

Congress Approves 2022 Spending Bill for Federal Government, Sends it to Biden’s Desk

March 10, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Late on the evening of March 10, the Senate passed a massive omnibus spending bill to fund the federal government for the rest of fiscal 2022, sending it to President Joe Biden for his signature.

For the Defense Department, in particular, the bill will provide $728.5 billion in discretionary spending for defense-related activities—roughly 5 percent more than the funding in fiscal 2021 and above the $715 billion requested by the Biden administration. It also includes $13.6 billion in aid to bolster Ukraine in its response to Russia’s invasion.

The 68-31 vote in the Senate comes after months of delays, disagreements, and negotiations that led to the federal government operating under continuing resolution for more than five months—one of the longer periods in recent history. The fiscal year will end Sept. 30.

While the government never shut down, top Pentagon officials repeatedly pleaded for lawmakers to pass a full-year budget and bemoaned the effects of operating under a CR, saying it hurt readiness, hampered their ability to start new programs, and slowed modernization.

The delayed process began in May 2021, when the the Biden administration released its budget request late, as has become typical for Presidents in their first year in office.

Democrats and Republicans then took months to make progress in negotiations—a bipartisan framework for the appropriations bill wasn’t announced until Feb. 9, and the actual text of the bill wasn’t released until the early hours of March 9.

From there, however, lawmakers pushed the bill through Congress at breakneck speed. The House passed the $1.5 trillion bill the night of March 9, and the Senate followed suit the next day, avoiding the need for another short-term CR—the previous one had been scheduled to end March 11.

Now, with regular funding restored, the Air Force should be able to proceed with 16 new starts and four production increases that it previously said had been delayed by CRs. And the Space Force will be able to move forward with the transfer of satellite communications capabilities and personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The bill will fund a 2.7 percent pay raise for service members, previously authorized by the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. It will also provide funds for military families struggling with housing and food because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and it includes nearly $100 million for the DOD to implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military.

The funds in the spending bill will also buy 48 F-35s, 12 F-15EXs, and 14 KC-46s for the Air Force, all equal to its budget request. It also pays for the procurement of 20 extra C-130Js, 16 for the Air National Guard and four for the Air Force Reserve; and four MQ-9s, despite the Air Force not asking for any.

While the 2022 budgeting process has finally come to an end, the fiscal 2023 cycle is set to begin soon. Defense Department officials have said they expect their budget request for the upcoming fiscal year to be released in the coming weeks. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and continued concern over competition with China, the topline will be closely watched—Republicans are likely to push for a large increase, while Democrats may argue for smaller growth or even cuts.

Russia, China Developments Ending Debate Over Nuclear Modernization

Russia, China Developments Ending Debate Over Nuclear Modernization

March 10, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with China’s threatening moves toward Taiwan and its new campaign to build up its strategic nuclear forces, likely signal an end to debate about modernizing the full nuclear triad, according to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

“I think that sort of removes some of the arguments that maybe we should have a smaller nuclear deterrent, maybe without as many legs of the triad, Kendall said at the annual McAleese conference March 9. “I think those arguments are pretty well put to bed now, given what China’s doing.”

The Air Force, Kendall said, is likely to get the green light to move forward with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent intercontinental ballistic missile system, B-21 bomber, nuclear Long Range Stand Off missile, and command and control modernization.

“You’ve all seen … that China is modernizing its nuclear [force] and expanding it significantly,” Kendall said. “That’s a problem we have to deal with.”

Russia’s move on Ukraine was unthinkable to some in government just a few weeks before but has demonstrated that the unthinkable can happen and that the U.S. must do what’s necessary to deter them both, Kendall said:

Russia’s invasion shows that war between big nations “still happens” and that war with China in the Pacific is a “real … possibility.”

“A lot of people didn’t think that he would do it,” Kendall observed of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion. “We’ve been watching this. I’ve seen him build up his forces multiple times on the borders of Ukraine. And as we watched this one, this time was different. It was clearly not a show of force this time. He was serious about it. And a lot of people didn’t expect that.”

Now, however, “I think, for better or for worse—certainly for worse for the Ukrainian people, ultimately, for worse for the Russians—we’ve had a wake-up call. We’ve had an emotional event that says that, ‘Yes, war at scale, among great powers, among modern powers, can actually happen.’ It can also happen in the Pacific.”

Despite the Ukraine invasion, Kendall said his priority is still “China, China, China” because that country has invested for 30 years in creating a military capable of challenging the U.S. in every domain, including space. Making America’s space assets “resilient” is the top priority of Kendall’s seven “operational imperatives.” Also, “we cannot give the other side impunity to operate in space,” and other countries’ assets there must be held at risk by the U.S., Kendall asserted.

“So, we’re in a whole new world, there.”

That said, “there is a huge unfunded requirement coming in space,” Kendall warned. “When you look at what we need to have”—and some of those space architectures are being built now—“there’s a bill there, that’s coming. “We’ll start to pay it … when you see [the fiscal year 2023] budget,” but bigger bills will come later. In answer to a question, Kendall said he’s “not terribly worried” about the Space Force being able to absorb a lot of new funding, should it be appropriated. “We’re pretty good at spending money in the Pentagon,” he dryly observed.

Kendall said he is “comfortable” with the fiscal 2023 budget.

“I think we’ll be able to balance those things that we’ve talked about … and move forward. But as I look beyond that, I do see challenges ahead. We have tough choices ahead of us in the next several years as we better define the things we need and then figure out how we’re going to pay for it.”

Although he would not discuss particulars about the unreleased fiscal 2023 budget, Kendall hinted that it doesn’t have as much in it for missile defense as he would like.

“What I became alarmed about in 2010 … and what I’ve been watching progress ever since, is the purchase of ballistic and cruise missiles” by China, “targeted at our high-value assets.” The Air Force needs “good warning and tracks, particularly for ballistic missiles. So if there were one area where I think we would need much more robust capability” and funding, “that would probably be it.”

More generally, he said, if he had “extra” money, he would spend it on more analysis to make sure the programs being selected to pursue, “and modernization in general,” are optimized to USAF’s true needs.  Although in the past few years, “‘going fast’ has been emphasized … it’s really important that you go in the right direction … about where you make those investments.” His seven “imperatives” are about “making sure we get all that right.”

Kendall also said there will not be as many efforts to divest aircraft, meant to free up money for new programs, in the fiscal 2023 request as there were in the fiscal 2022 budget plan.

“We made the case last year,” he said, and Congress “came through pretty well. I’m pretty happy with what they did last year. The exception was the A-10.” But “I will tell you … I don’t think you’re going to see the same scale of requested retirements in this budget as you did last year. There will still be some. Going forward, there will be some hard choices, further out.”

Kendall said his new imperatives for tactical and strategic uncrewed aircraft are priorities because the manned aircraft force now envisioned is just too expensive. He also said the F-35’s sustainment costs are not going down to where the Air Force needs them to be.

“What we’re looking at is a force in which the F-35 is the ‘low end’ of a ‘high-low mix.’ That is not going to work,” Kendall said.

“We’re not going to get the F-35 sustainment cost down to a level where that’s realistic.” While he hopes production costs will keep going down—something the program office and Lockheed Martin have said are unlikely—even at $80 million a copy, the F-35 is “not a cheap airplane. So we’ve got to figure out a way to get the capacity and quantity that we need.” He quoted the trope that “quantity has a quality all its own,” and added, “that’s very true.”

The Air Force, he said, “needs numbers, particularly in a situation where you can expect attrition. You need the ability to expand to deal with these threats. The higher-end, more expensive aircraft are not going to get you there.”

In the omnibus defense bill, the hypersonic AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) took a major cut, giving up half its funding to longer research and development. Kendall noted that “there was a lot of enthusiasm for hypersonics in the previous administration, and I think I’ve made the comment why I think China is developing hypersonic capabilities. And we have to think more carefully about what we need” in that arena, and not just “mirror what they’re doing.” Kendall said. “We need to take a look at our whole portfolio, not just hypersonics.” But with regard to ARRW, he noted a series of test failures and said he’d spoken to Lockheed Martin recently, saying, “They think they’re working their way through that” and will get back to flight testing “shortly.”

However, “ARRW still has to prove itself,” he said.  

Raymond Foresees Cislunar Space as ‘Key Terrain,’ Guardians Going to Space

Raymond Foresees Cislunar Space as ‘Key Terrain,’ Guardians Going to Space

March 10, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Force’s farthest satellites fly some 22,000 miles above Earth, with Guardians operating firmly on the ground.

But in the not-too-distant future, the head of the Space Force sees USSF satellites hundreds of thousands of miles away—and Guardians in space.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond isn’t saying this will happen in the next half-decade or so, he told audience members at the McAleese conference in Washington, D.C., on March 9. But especially when it comes to monitoring the vast reaches of cislunar space—the vast void between terrestrial orbits and the moon—Raymond said he envisions a need for the Space Force.

“First of all, I think it will become key terrain. And as … the nations of the world go further out from Earth, so is the Space Force going to have to do that,” Raymond said in response to an audience question about cislunar and lunar intelligence. “I’ve walked you through the near-term priorities: We have to be able to ensure that we can provide capabilities for our nation and for our joint coalition forces—it’s critical for the defense of all of our forces. If you were to look at the force structure of any other service, and if you took space away from it, that doesn’t close. They’re all built around having that assured access. That’s Priority 1. 

“But as nations move out, and as the economy grows between here and the lunar surface, and as you look at key terrain for the defense of our nation, I think it’s an area that will be significant as we move forward.”

Raymond’s remarks come not long after the Air Force Research Laboratory released a video touting its forthcoming Cislunar Highway Patrol System—a satellite that will fly 272,000 miles from Earth. According to multiple media reports, AFRL will look to issue a request for prototype proposals by the end of March, followed by a contract this summer.

The need for domain awareness in cislunar space is likely to grow, Raymond has noted before. NASA plans on returning astronauts to the moon as early as 2025, and companies have interest in the region as well.

As for actually putting Guardians in space, Raymond noted that there are already a few Space Force service members who have been in orbit, and they give the service a unique perspective.

“They are Guardians that are NASA astronauts: Nick Hague works for me on the Space Force staff, and Mike Hopkins just showed up to work for me on the Space Force staff,” Raymond said. “It’s really cool to have people that have actually been a satellite—that have actually been in the domain—to help us understand it.”

Raymond also acknowledged public interest in the idea of service members actually operating in space. Such a possibility isn’t imminent, but Raymond indicated he thinks it will eventually happen, and not too far down the road.

“I don’t think that that happens in the next one, two, three, four, five years type of deal,” Raymond said. “But I do see a future … as things progress in space, I do see that there may be a role for Guardians that will be in space. So I think that will happen in the .. career timeframe of the Guardians that are coming into service right now.”

Those comments echo some made by the head of Space Operations Command in July 2021. Lt. Gen. Stephen N. Whiting told Air Force Magazine at the time that his message to young Guardians was “if we think about a 20-year career arc, there’s a good chance there will be Guardians either on orbit or transiting through space for some military missions.”

Watch, Read: Leaders of US Space Command, US Northern Command Discuss Threats to the Homeland

Watch, Read: Leaders of US Space Command, US Northern Command Discuss Threats to the Homeland

March 10, 2022

Retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, moderates a panel discussion called, “The Threats Come Home,” with Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, and USAF Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, during the AFA Warfare Symposium on March 3, 2022. Watch the video or read the transcript below. This transcript is made possible through the sponsorship of JobsOhio.

Overhead Voice 

Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome back to the stage, the dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies, Lieutenant General David Deptula.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Hey everybody, if you would please grab your seat and we’ll get started for this next session. Welcome to you all, I think you will find this session particularly interesting as the scale and scope of the challenges facing our nation today are immense. I really don’t have to go into a whole lot of detail on that because anyone reading the news knows that threats hold our homeland at risk today. Peer competitors are building new long-range missiles, cyber weapons, and other means of attack that pose severe challenges to our defenses. Looking abroad, the aggressive moves by not just Russia, but China also to seize territory and destabilize our allies and partners continue to menace our collective security. Now, just like space, we used to think of our homeland as a sanctuary. Well, that’s no longer the case. It’s crucial that we look to leverage a combination of existing and emerging technologies, allied partnerships, and forward-looking operational concepts to keep our nation safe. 

So with that as context, let me introduce our two panelists for this session, who will be joining us virtually — it truly is the information age. As the commander of US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, General Glen VanHerck leads the organizations with primary responsibilities for homeland defense and aerospace warning. Prior to assuming this role, General VanHerck served in multiple leadership positions, including most recently as director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. General James Dickinson is the commander of US Space Command, the 11th and most recently established unified combatant command. General Dickinson has had a lengthy career in army artillery and air defense, and has previously served as the commanding general of the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command. So welcome, gentlemen. It’s really a pleasure to have you join us today, even though it is electronically. And what I’d like to do is start off by giving General VanHerck the floor, followed by General Dickinson, for some opening thoughts on defending our homeland in an era of renewed great power competition. So General VanHerck, you’ve got the stick.

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

Thanks, General Deptula. And give me a thumbs-up. Can you hear me OK?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Can you hear him in the audience? I think we need to raise the volume. If you can hear us in the back, raise the volume.

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

I’ll keep talking. Can you hear me better now?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Yeah, we’ve got you good now.

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

OK. Thanks, General Deptula. Let me thank the Air Force Association in general, General Wright and yourself, for all your support to all our Airmen, Guard, excuse me, Guardians around the world. I apologize I’m not there with you in person. Business got in the way, let’s just say that, and I had to stay here in DC for some meetings today. But the theme of what you’re talking about today, threats come home, couldn’t be any more timely, candidly. You know, it’s something that we’ve been talking about it NORAD and NORTHCOM for at least the 18 months, I’ve been commanding, and the predecessors as well. And both China and Russia have done us a lot of favors. And unfortunately, they’ve done some favors, starting with their January, or rather July Fractional Orbital Bombardment, delivery of the HGV. And now with what Russia is doing, it’s got everybody’s attention, especially for the threats of the homeland. And so that’s helping move that ball down the field.  So what’s really different today, when you look at the strategic environment? Well, the competitors, the strategic competitors we face today, have watched our way of projecting power for at least two decades, if not longer than that. And they understand if we’re allowed to project that force forward, that won’t turn out well. So they’ve developed capabilities below the nuclear threshold, to hold us at risk with the idea that they can delay. disrupt our force flow or destroy our will, so that we don’t project power into a regional crisis or a regional conflict.

And my concern with that, is they’re eroding our decision space and our deterrence options from the homeland especially. And it’s decreasing our senior leaders’ decision space. And what I worry about that is, the risk of strategic deterrence failure goes up dramatically. I’ll be happy to talk specifics on that. I’m not going to go into threat, I think everybody understands it. What I would just say is the threat today demands that we think differently about how we’re going to defend the homeland. And you don’t have to put a Patriot or THAAD on every corner and have batteries all over the place. It’s figuring out what we must defend that could bring us to our knees in a crisis or conflict. And that’s not my decision. That’s a policy decision that we’ve been working on for a while to get. And that’s a broad decision across the interagency, in my mind. It requires some significant analysis and linking of, what are those key critical infrastructure areas that we need to focus on? And why do we need to focus on it. Is it to protect our finance capability? Is it to protect energy and economics? Is it to protect foreign power projection? And we’re working through that now. And there’s obviously a sense of urgency to figure that out. But what it forced us to do at NORTHCOM and after I got into command was come up with a couple of different strategies, if you will. We had two strategies, actually a NORAD strategy and a NORTHCOM strategy, and General Deptula, I merged those to a single strategy, because the commands are absolutely inseparable. I, and now we, have a single strategy. And that strategy actually focuses on integrated deterrence. And so my strategy was doing integrated deterrence. And I think you’ll see the National Defense Strategy as well, we’ll focus heavily on integrated deterrence and campaigning. And that’s where we need to be. So we do need to figure out what we must defend. But also, we need to focus on that strategy that demonstrates integrated deterrence. And what is that?

Well, I don’t think there’s a common lexicon or understanding of what integrated deterrence really is. So I’ll just tell you what I think it is. It’s the influence of every lever that we have, not only here in the department, but across the entire interagency. It’s with our fellow combat commanders, it’s with our fellow allies and partners, and that in every operation activity, investment and exercise, whether that be under COCOM authority, whether that be in service authority, has a deterrent value when messaged properly. Services have deterrent value as they build readiness when messaged properly and we demonstrate readiness and capability. And so I think our allies and partners are absolutely asymmetric advantages as well, as we do theater security cooperation with allies and partners just as much. Now the Western Hemisphere is crucial, it hasn’t gotten a lot of attention. But I will tell you that China and Russia are actively seeking supporters in the Western Hemisphere and campaigning. And those operations, activities and investments are crucial to us in the Western Hemisphere. So I believe, to be able to execute the National Defense Strategy, and to campaign like I’m talking about, requires us to get further left and think more about creating options in decision space, rather than reacting to threats in the homeland. We need to be able to react sooner and forward and generate a doubt in their mind about ever being successful in striking into our homeland. And that requires domain awareness. My top priority is domain awareness. It’s about having data and information from undersea to on orbit and everything in the middle and taking that data, analyzing it sooner than we do today. It’s using machines, it’s using artificial intelligence to give options to our key senior leaders in a timely manner, so that they can focus on deterrence and de-escalation if required and defeat if required.

I rely on Jim Dickinson significantly for domain awareness. SPACECOM is crucial, as is US Space Force and the United States Air Force. My missions, especially threat warning and attack assessment, Jim Dickinson provides that for me. My missile defense capabilities, SPACECOM provides much of that for me. So we’re tied together very closely to make sure that we get after the problems that I’m talking about. My ultimate goal is to focus on getting further left and campaigning and leveraging every opportunity that we can. What I would also tell you is the basics that I do, such as hurricane response, wildfire response, even COVID pandemic, every one of those, when you demonstrate readiness, resiliency, capability, responsiveness, when messaged correctly, has a deterrence value. And we need to think more about those things. The ability to react in this nation and respond is amazing. And so I’m looking forward to continuing to work with the services etc. to get more of that going. And if deterrence fails, I just tell you, my homeland defense design starts with my fellow combatant commanders forward and allies and partners, I need to generate effects forward in their AORs before they become a threat here in the homeland. And so I’m going to rely on General Wolters, I’m going to rely on Admiral Aquilino, to ensure those threats don’t actually come to the homeland. But if they do, we’ll figure out what must be defended. And so this requires culture shift. It requires everything we think about from a planning aspect to be globally integrated. There is no regional fight. They’re all global in nature. They’re all-domain in nature. It also requires us to think about homeland defense and the risk of strategic deterrence failure before we ever enter into any ladder of escalation. We’re on a ladder of escalation right now, General Deptula, and the discussion for potential escalation and de-escalation is a crucial part of where we are right now. And so I’ll pause there, and let General Dickinson go, and I look forward to any questions.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Thanks very much. Over to you, General Dickinson.

General Jim Dickinson 

Hey, good afternoon. Great to see General Deptula, and thank you for that always kind introduction and moderating the panel today. And I would be remiss if I didn’t give a shout out to Lieutenant General Wright for the invitation as well. And I think maybe today, somebody told me in my J-2 that it might be his birthday today. So happy birthday to General Wright. And then really AFA at large for again, inviting me to speak at this gathering today. So I think it was 21, September 2021, I think I was invited there. And I spent most of my time talking about how US Space Command became IOC. So I think today’s panel, though, is very appropriate with the threats come home. You know, this may seem a little bit counterintuitive, given my AOR that begins at 100 kilometers above the earth and goes out indefinitely. But everything US Space Command does every day is ultimately about national defense, defense of the homeland and defense of our allies. So for a few minutes here, I’m going to explain what I what I’m talking about in three parts. One is our role in integrated deterrence in today’s strategic environment, and mission and capability synergies between Glen and myself. So first, I think Glen did a great job with the integrated deterrence piece. I would just add to that, that integrated deterrence I feel is a whole of government approach. So unlike the Cold War, the threat is no longer clear and consistent. It’s important to leverage all levers of national power to deter. And quite frankly, it is the essence of Secretary Austin’s direction that he gave us in July of 21, which was to improve our capabilities, understand regional security and grow our partnerships. Really, the change was to widen the aperture of deterrence from simply military to the other levers of national power. And US Space Command, quite frankly, has been doing exactly that since we stood up back in August of 2019.

So how does US SPACECOM meet the SecDef’s guidance? Well, one is we counter competitor influence, we strengthen our relationship and try to attract new partners. And then we build and maintain a competitive advantage. This is all in concert with the SecDef’s vision for integrated deterrence by integrating both pre-existing and existing systems, and aiming to set requirements to field new capabilities, leveraging organic capabilities of our allies, mission partners and other combatant commands, which takes a lot of time but is a very worthwhile endeavor. We tailor to a region security landscape via our supporting role to the other combatant commanders. And I can explain a little bit later in the Q&A how we do the integration with other combatant commands. And really at the end of the day, is our supporting functions which I call the blocking and tackling functions like PNT, missile warning and satellite communications. We strengthen our relationships and attract new partners by expanding our allies and partners through agreements and campaigning.  Right now the command has about, is partnered with about 29 nations, two IGOs, and 109, yes, 109 commercial companies that benefit from technical, we both benefit from technical and regional expertise. So these efforts formed the foundation of the military space enterprise contributions, I think, to the integrated deterrence, and in particular homeland defense. So space capabilities, I think this crowd, this audience would agree, are absolutely linked to not only US military, but the US wellbeing as a society and quite frankly, the global society. So why is this so important? Well, I think the threats are indeed coming home, as the theme for this panel. And so when I look at today’s strategic environment, I think what’s important is that deterring conflict in space is critical to deterring threats to our homeland. Threats to our interest in space constitute threats to our homeland. Really our modern way of life so depends on space, that a loss of space capabilities challenges that very way of life in almost every manner. And this critical domain is becoming even more competitive, contested and congested. So space is competitive. I think people would agree with that, because it is competitive, making a powerful aspect of integrated deterrence.

It’s part of almost every aspect of modern life, from filling up your gas pump to getting money out of the ATM, to checking the weather, quite frankly, on your app as you go to work or come home for work. It’s also key in how the US and our allies conduct operations. Without satellite communications and position, navigation and timing, the ability to conduct operations is heavily degraded if not impossible. Space is becoming an ever more valuable global commodity. And we must deter a war in the domain to protect our free and open access to those capabilities. So space is congested, making norms of responsible behavior through an integrated approach very critical. And what I mean by that is ensuring that we have an established norms of behavior so that we can conduct operations in space and have open access to that. And the Secretary of Defense has charged me to do that for the Department of Defense through a memo that he gave to me, or to the department, back last July. Decreasing costs of access to the domain and the global realization of its use in commerce, I think we can agree. Science and environmental minor monitoring have spurred a massive boom, and I think in a very good way. Let me give you an example. A legacy Delta IV heavy launch is roughly anywhere between $350 and $400 million, depending on a payload, the orbit it’s going to, while a comparable today, SpaceX Falcon Heavy launch is anywhere between $130 and $150 million. So that’s a drastic reduction in cost based on a great commercial market that’s able to leverage the economies of scale from a few spacefaring nations I’ll mention. About 60 years ago, there were just a handful of them. There are now over 16 active and seven of which have actually put probes to Mars. And this has increased, as you can see, congestion.  So when I came to the US Space Command in 2019, I’ll give you a comparison, we tracked about 25,000 objects on orbit. When I assumed command a year later, that number was just about 31,000. When I was with you last year at AFA, it was about 35,000. And as I’m here today with all of you, it’s about 44,000. So that just shows you in a comparative status, how congested it has become.

Space is contested as well. Our competitors, chief among them, China and Russia, seek to challenge our very superiority in that domain. China, for example, is and we all recognize this, is our pacing challenge. China has fielded their BeiDou constellation, their own alternative GPS. That constellation is now operational. China is also rapidly advancing its space intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to compete with our information dominance in that domain. On orbit threats, China has, as has employed a dual-use capable experiment called the SJ-17 and the SJ-21, that can be used for grappling and disabling other satellites, a dual-use capability. And then from the terrestrial piece, terrestrial space weapons, both China and Russia have employed terrestrial weapons that threaten the use of that domain. So you can just see that the over the course of the last five or 10 years, they an absolute proliferation in the space domain, whether it’s contested, congested in that way. So just let me finish up real quick because I’m running out of time here, just kind of the some of the synergies between US SPACECOM and US Northern Command. So I think it’s fitting that Glen is here with me today, and I appreciate him being with me on this panel. But we really have a lot of synergies between each other. We share the imperatives to deter, detect and defeat threats to the homeland. We operated in a supporting and supported roles to one another. Missile warning and Missile Defense provide a good example of those mutually supported and supporting roles in the event of a missile threat. For example, to the homeland, US Space Command supports NORAD and NORTHCOM by providing early rapid and accurate missile warning data via our on-orbit assets as well as our radars and electro-optical sensors around the world. Glen VanHerck and his folks also support us Space Command in our global sets and roles and missions with contributing sensor data to the space domain awareness mission and to the support of the first Air Force components that support human spaceflight, spaceflight support, and quite frankly, defending the homeland, which gives us a stable base to ensure resilient modes of operation. So I’ll pause there for the Q&A. But again, thanks General Deptula for having me today.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Well thank you both for those comments and also for what your teams are doing to keep our country safe. So, let’s dig a little bit deeper into some of these subjects. The first question I have for you is for both of you. General VanHerck touched just a bit upon it. But with the emergence of new Long Range Strike weapons, like hypersonic glide vehicles, plus air- and sea-launched maneuverable weapons, what is NORAD, NORTHCOM and US SPACECOM doing to collaboratively meet this threat? Clearly, these kinds of weapons present major implications for our homeland.

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

Thanks for the question, General Deptula. We talked, as you said, a little bit about it. It goes back to domain awareness for me. And General Dickinson provides that domain awareness for the threats that you’re really talking about. And we have to go to space much sooner than we are today. For me to be able to detect hypersonics whether they come from space, or whether they come from a cruise missile that’s a hypersonic cruise missile, and the capabilities we have, we’re gonna have to go into space to provide my threat warning and attack assessment much sooner. General Dickinson has embedded teams in all the combatant commands, JIST teams, I forget what the exact acronym stands for, to be part of each combatant command and their requirements. I worked closely with General Raymond as we were developing the budget and where they’re going for space. And I will tell you that I work the same with General Dickinson, I support where Space Force is going, we need to accept some risk near term to get to space sooner to get after the threats that you described. Other things we’re doing, over the horizon radar capabilities. Over the horizon radar capabilities just don’t benefit me from a domain awareness from maritime domain, from air domain; they also benefit the space domain awareness for tracking and backup and give additional capability to detect those threats that you just talked about. And so I’m encouraged when the budget comes out with where we’re going, I think you’ll see us advance our domain awareness capabilities quite a bit. The final thing I’ll say is, we’re sharing data and information back and forth from sensor capabilities, as we do through our global information dominance experiments, to give us an all-domain global picture, and partnering with SPACECOM to do that is crucial. So folks around the globe can have an integrated all-domain picture. I’ll pause there.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

General Dickinson?

General Jim Dickinson 

Hey, absolutely. So it’s joint integrated space team. So that’s the JIST. And we have one at every one of the other 10 combatant commands that serves as our liaison integration plug, if you will, into each of the combat commands. And that’s what we have with Glen right now. From a sensor manager perspective, you know, that is one of my UCP responsibilities. And what we do with that, and we’ve been doing it over the last couple years is, how do we take the existing sensor network that we had back in 2019 — which was, quite frankly, you know, some of those geographic sensors that we have around the world plus the ones that we’ve, we have on orbit — and how do we add to that? How do we self-admit that. And so we’ve been looking at sensors that haven’t traditionally been used for space domain awareness, for example, in a role of space domain awareness. So we’ve taken some missile defense sensors that have typically, as I said, not been part of our integrated approach. And we are starting to integrate them into a sensor network that provides us a common operating picture that gives us much more fidelity. So sensors like TPY-2s, BMD ships, those types of sensors, we’re looking to how do we bring those together, put them into an architecture, integrate them to increase battlespace awareness. That is my number one priority within the command, is how do I increase my battlespace awareness? In particular, how do I look at the space domain. Part of that, I’ve got a responsibility to give that to the other combatant commands, in particular Glen VanHerck, in terms of a missile warning missile defense capability. So these sensors that we’re bringing on, we’re making the best use of the sensors we currently have in the Department of Defense around the world. And then we’re looking at the future of that. So what requirements do we need to put in addition on those sensors that we have today? And then what sensors do we need in the future to increase our battlespace awareness, space domain awareness, missile warning and missile defense?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Well, very good. Thank you both. Now, when thinking about Homeland Defense, the mental image that people tend to have is a ICBM or bombers racing over the North Pole. But another increasingly common threat today in our information age are cyber attacks. General VanHerck, I’ve heard you talk about the Colonial Pipeline cyber attack as an example of the need to expand our definition of what constitutes homeland defense. And General Dickinson, you’ve pointed out that there’s no operating in space without cyber. How are you both addressing the increasing threats in the cyber domain? And how are you partnering with US Cyber Command in this area?

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

You want me to go first? OK. That’s a great question. And it’s really on everybody’s mind, the secretary, the chairman, right now. You know, once we started getting intel, back last fall on what was ongoing, we started building partnerships and relationships. One of the first things I did, by the way, when I took the command was the need for a joint operation center. Believe it or not, I was the only combatant commander who didn’t have a joint operation center. And so I’ve stood up a joint operation center. The reason we didn’t is because nobody would believe you’d fight in and from the homeland. Well, the bottom line is that joint operations center is stood up now. And we’re building relationships. We’re building those relationships with CYBERCOM. But probably more importantly, from a broader homeland defense perspective is, we’re building those relationships with CISA. Under DHS and director Easterly, we’ve connected all those ops centers together, we’ve gone through the processes for, how do you identify a cyber attack in the homeland. That’s evolved in conference; General Nakasone, as the commander of CYBERCOM, has a responsibility for declaring an attack in the cyber domain. And I have the responsibility which would be done through a [inaudible] conference for a domestic attack and attack on our homeland. I think it’s crucial to point out who’s responsible for truly defending the homeland in the cyber domain. And General Nakasone is responsible for the DODIN only. General or Director Easterly is responsible for federal networks outside of the DODIN. Everybody else is kind of a volunteer play if you want to play. That’s where my most concern is. And what I’m doing is, we’re working through what’s called a unified command or coordination group right now, to define what are those key critical infrastructure pieces that must be defended, and apply resources? Now I tell you, we don’t have the authorities in DOD to do those kinds of things outside of there. So there’s some policy things we have to go look at. In addition to that, Dave, I would tell you, that we may not go look at law. So for example, one of my challenges is domain awareness in the homeland, in the cyber domain, to understand. But the laws don’t allow you to collect intelligence within your own homeland to know what pieces of key and infrastructure might be vulnerable. And so we’re building those relationships not only through Congress, the National Security Council, but with CISA and Cyber Command. I’ll stop there. General Dickinson?

General Jim Dickinson 

Hey, great. So great question. And I would just say we we have the advantage that when we stood up two years ago, August 2019, we put a lot of thought in how we were going to grow and incorporate integrate cyber into the command from the very beginning. And I’ll give you a couple of examples. One is, we’ve just recently stood up our joint cyber center. And we made a deliberate decision to put that in order under our director of operations, or J-3. And that has worked out very well with us in terms of integrating ops and cyber defense, right within the headquarters, right within that JADO directorate, that also has a plug from General Nakasone, from the US CYBERCOM IP, or integrated planning element, that’s baked into that organization as well. The other advantage that the command has had is, as we have received our service components from each of the respective services, two of those service components are dual-hatted. So my MARFORCYBER is my MARFORSPACE. So Major General Ryan Heritage is dual-hatted as both component to Paul Nakasone, as well as the component to me. As well as Vice Admiral Ross Myers, who’s the NAVCYBER and NAVSPACE commander. And so he also has a dual hat to Paul Nakasone and myself. Those relationships there just breed, if you will, a good synchronization of space and cyber, really in a hand in glove type of relationship. So that I think that gives us the greatest synergy, if you will, in terms of bringing that together. There has been some good work within my Space Operations Command or my SPOC, which is my space service component in terms of standing up CSPs and making sure that we have good defense of our critical space infrastructure, space architecture. So I think in the command right now, we’re moving towards having that as a very synchronized effort within the command. And we’ve got some other things going on, but for for sake of time, I’ll pause there.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Well, thank you both. Now, this one’s for General VanHerck. We’ve consistently heard from our senior leaders, including this morning, that China is the department’s pacing threat. But if nothing else, the situation in Ukraine is a reminder that the threat posed by Russia isn’t going away anytime soon. To that point, General VanHerck, you’ve repeatedly said that Russia is the primary military threat to the US homeland today. So how do we simultaneously address the threats posed by both Russia and China, from a homeland defense mission vantage?

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

Thanks, General Deptula. And you’re exactly right. You almost paraphrase my words exactly. But I want to make sure everybody understands that I’m on board: China is the pacing threat. China is the long-term existential threat there, they’re a then threat. Russia is a now threat in the military dimension to the homeland, because of the conventional capabilities that hold our homeland at risk, so we have to deal with both of them. The first thing I would tell you is, we must fund and upgrade the nuclear triad. The foundation of homeland defense is our strategic deterrent. And we cannot let that. When you talk about nuclear nuclear powers, you must have a command and control for the nuclear capability, nuclear capabilities across the triad ready to go. We must also maintain credible deterrence options below the nuclear threshold, so they won’t exploit those. That’s where I go back to the need to campaign and have options that create doubt that they could ever be successful by striking our homeland, whether that be kinetic or non kinetic, and the capabilities, that’s the integrated deterrence piece that is crucial. I would also tell you, General Deptula, we’ve got to get out of a regional perspective and focusing on China or Russia from a regional perspective. And I believe our plans and strategies must start with global end states where we will accept or not accept global risk, and apply that across the entire force and joint force. Instead, we plan from a regional perspective backwards, and we end up with old plans and campaign plans that consume 100% of the joint force. And so there’s a different model on how we utilize and plan for joint force. And General Brown and I have talked about that, as well. I think that there’s opportunities for GFM reform, and to be when I say GFM, I’m talking global force management, to best utilize the entire joint force to get after two strategic competitors. We can’t impact the force generation models of the services, but during the force generation, I think there’s opportunities to utilize the campaigning or the force generation for campaigning purposes. I’ll pause there and let you move on.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

No, it’s very good. Thank you. General Dickinson, the administration’s space priorities framework was released in December 2021. And it highlighted the need to protect our space-related critical infrastructure. Just what’s the significance of this designation? And what steps are you taking to actively protect space-based critical infrastructure?

General Jim Dickinson 

Well, I think this designation is very significant, and that it underlines the importance that our national level leadership is placing on the space domain and our partners in industry. Other than the steps we are taking in the cyber realm to protect the link portion of our systems, we are improving our protection of our critical ground segments as well. Many of our ground assets, as many know here, especially our early warning radars, are really quite frankly, of the Cold War vintage, and in remote locations all around the world. And so while it’s a challenge, US Space Command partners with its service-side teammates to ensure that these assets are frankly resilient through firmware and supporting infrastructure upgrades. And we are taking increased steps towards protecting and defending those assets on orbit by enhancing SDA through increased collaboration with the intel community industry, and in a very good way through our allies and partners. So let me let me stop there.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Thank you for that. General VanHerck, there’s an increasing emphasis on the Arctic area of responsibility. And to that end, each of the services, as well as the Department writ large, has released an Arctic strategy. However, you also testified that the FY 22 budget did relatively little for the Arctic in terms of providing necessary resources. I guess I’d add, what what else is new? What are some of the key investments and capabilities necessary to maintain a credible defense of the Arctic?

Gen. Glen VanHerck 

Well, the first thing I’d tell you is, I need access to force are ready, trained, equipped to operate in that environment. I’m the only combatant commander who doesn’t have a threshold force and a dedicated capability to operate the environment. Now a lot of people are gonna say, Well, you’ve got 100 5th-Gen fighters in Alaska. No, Admiral Aquilino, has 100 5th-Gen fighters in Alaska, they just happen to be in my AOR. So we’ve got some common-rail challenges that we can sort through there and those fighters are likely to go elsewhere. And so having access to ready and trained forces would help. That’s something I’m working on with the secretary and the chairman. The Arctic, there’s going to be opportunities and vulnerabilities that environmental change is going to create. And so domain awareness, like I talked about is crucial. And that’s the over the horizon radar, it’s undersea surveillance capabilities as well. But do we need infrastructure. Infrastructure to operate in and out of from the Arctic. So as part of NORAD modernization, and … I worked for the Chief of the Defence Staff in Canada, and Canada has to be supportive of the solution as well, to enable us to operate out of locations not only in Canada, but I would say we have to work with the EUCOM AOR to operate out of Thule, Greenland. Why this is important as part of that campaigning plan that I’ve talked about part of integrated deterrence. To be, you know, persistent in the Arctic, you’ve got to have infrastructure and capability, which means comms, you’ve got to be able to communicate really tough north of 65, you got to have fuel. The Navy needs fuel, as does the Coast Guard, we need fuel north of Dutch Harbor to maintain that persistence, those are some of the capabilities that I need, General Deptula.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

OK. General Dickinson, commercial space companies are all the rage nowadays. And they can provide capabilities to the government for a range of national security missions. As commercial entities play an increasingly prominent role in US Space Operations writ large, how do you envision that they could contribute to homeland defense?

General Jim Dickinson 

Well, we really rely on the innovation of the American industrial base, certainly, to answer some of our most pressing concerns. I mean, there are numerous opportunities, but I think from an industry perspective, we really need their help in training our warfighters through modeling and simulation tools and space training and exercise ranges, both physical and virtual. You know, we’ve had a great outpouring, if you will, of commercial companies wanting to integrate be part of the Space Command enterprise, if you will. And we’ve seen such a bow wave of folks come into the CSPOC out in California, they’re at Vandenberg Space Force Base, as well as here in Colorado Springs, and really those two entities, 1, Vandenberg is the satellite communications mission in the partnership that we want to realize through that. And then here in Colorado Springs, quite frankly, through an element we call the JCO here, we’ve got a lot of companies coming … that want to provide and participate in space domain awareness. So it’s really just an overwhelming, you know, outpouring, if you will, of commercial companies wanting to be part of the enterprise. And so what we’re doing right now, so much so that we’ve had to step back for a second and create a new commercial integration framework and a new commercial strategy within the command to address the commercial interest in being part of the part of the team here. So we’re very excited about that. We look forward to it, and we’ll continue to work it.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, U.S. Air Force Retired 

Well, gentlemen, we’ve come to the end of this session of our aerospace warfare symposium. Thanks to both of you for your comments on these critical issues. And from the discussion today, it’s clear that SPACECOM and NORTHCOM are very fortunate to have you both leading these critical commands today. So on behalf of all of us at AFA, we wish you the very best as you continue to deal with the challenges that affect our homeland. And from those of us at Mitchell Institute, we hope that you have a great aerospace power kind of day.

Between Retiring Old Aircraft and Modernizing, Guard and Reserve Watch for Readiness Gaps

Between Retiring Old Aircraft and Modernizing, Guard and Reserve Watch for Readiness Gaps

March 10, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Aging aircraft, limited sustainment funds, and still in-progress modernization are combining to cause concerns about readiness gaps in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, leaders said during the AFA Warfare Symposium.

The Air Force has continually sought to retire old aircraft in recent years, saying the moves are necessary to free up funds for modernization efforts such as the F-35 and KC-46. These potential retirements would likely have an outsized impact on the Guard and Reserve—their fleets have higher percentages of legacy aircraft such as the F-15C/D, A-10, KC-135, and C-130H.

“As [Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall] said, the average age of the Active-duty fleet is 30 years,” Maj. Gen. John P. Healy, deputy to the chief of Air Force Reserve, told Air Force Magazine. “Ours is a touch more mature, at 33 for the average. But 44 percent of that fleet is beyond its expected service life.”

Reserve leaders are in “lockstep” with their Active-duty counterparts in encouraging the Air Force to modernize, Healy added, a sentiment echoed by Air National Guard chief Lt. Gen. Michael A. Loh. 

But as those modernization efforts unfold, some are concerned about gaps developing between old systems going away and new ones coming online. In September 2021, Healy’s boss, Air Force Reserve commander Lt. Gen. Richard W. Scobee said, “in a perfect world, it would be heel to toe—you would have one butting up against the other”; before adding that, “on a regular basis, I am reminded we do not live in a perfect world.”

At the time, Scobee said he felt confident about the Reserve’s ability to work through any gap shorter than a year by sharing aircraft among units. Healy added in March that the three components of the total Air Force are all working together to align transitions “heel to toe.”

“There was discussion, and the great thing about the discussions as they go on in terms of how are we going to manage this from an Air Force perspective, … the fantastic partnership between the Active duty and the Reserve, and the Guard, for that matter, allowed the conversation to go on, to ensure that if there is a case where we might be talking about a cut or divestiture in any certain aircraft, that they understand that the base of mission needs to be covered,” Healy said. “And that’s the terminology we’re using. We’re not going to have any bases uncovered.”

Such transitions are currently happening at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., where the Reserve’s 916th Air Refueling Wing is swapping out KC-135s for KC-46s. 

And there are plans for more. Healy pointed to the recent decision to base Reserve KC-46s at March Air Reserve Base, Calif., and Loh referred to the plan to integrate F-15EXs and F-35s at five different Guard locations in the coming years. 

“Right now we have a couple EXs that are running through tests,” Loh said. “The performance that the pilots have relayed to me, because I’ve talked to them—it’s exceptional. Great airplane. So we’re going to bring it on as fast as we can get it from under contract, and the contracting piece is going through right now.”

But even as the Guard looks to move fast in acquiring new fighters, its current fleet is showing its age badly—Loh remarked to reporters that 22 Guard F-15s are “grounded right now because of just service life.” This follows comments he made in September 2021 that 20 of the aircraft were grounded because of cracked backbones.

Repairs aren’t simple fixes, either, due to a limited budget.

“We do have some gaps in readiness, and here’s where I need your help in advocacy, and I’ll just put it to you that way,” Loh said during a symposium panel discussion. “Our weapon systems sustainment accounts continually come under pressure. Last year in 2021, we were funded at 87 percent. In [2022], right now, it’s down to 79 percent, and we’re still sitting on a [continuing resolution].”

Flying hours are also down, Loh noted, to the point that some Guard pilots have had to stop flying before the end of the fiscal year. Taken together, all these factors form a challenge to readiness that he admitted “keeps me up at night.

“That bow wave is hitting right now, and all of those are challenges that require resources,” Loh said. “And we’re gonna get after those gaps: modernization, recapitalization, weapon system sustainment, and flying hours. All of them require resources.”

Russian ASAT Demo Tested US Space Command’s Nascent Domain Awareness

Russian ASAT Demo Tested US Space Command’s Nascent Domain Awareness

March 10, 2022 | By Shaun Waterman

The Russian test of an anti-satellite weapon system in 2021 gave the newly relaunched U.S. Space Command the chance to showcase its growing ability to perceive and understand the space domain, its commander Army Gen. James H. Dickinson said.

When the Russians launched a maneuverable kill vehicle atop a Nudol missile Nov. 15 and destroyed one of their own defunct spy satellites, “I was very pleased with how the command responded,” Dickinson told an audience online and in person at the Atlantic Council.

He highlighted the exercise of “space domain awareness”—the ability to perceive, locate, track, and interpret the intentions of moving objects in space. “We were able to detect and characterize and decide what had happened in a very, very short amount of time [and] … provide that type of information to our national-level leadership,” Dickinson said.

He credited “two years of hard work,” since U.S. Space Command stood up again in 2019 after a 17-year hiatus. He added that the time had been spent “developing processes [and] bringing talent into the command.”

Space Command is a combatant command, with its own area of responsibility, or AOR, that starts just above the atmosphere and extends outwards in all directions. 

“Enhanced space domain awareness is my top mission priority,” Dickinson said, adding: “We spend an incredible amount of time trying to understand what we’re seeing in the space domain in terms of battle space awareness.”

Part of what made it so hard, he explained, was that the sensors the command was using were mostly not designed for space domain awareness but rather for missile defense or Earth observation. He said they had “exquisite” capabilities “that allow us to look into the space domain … And while they may not have been originally designed or invented for space domain awareness, that additional capability that they have has really been something we’ve been trying to leverage. And bringing that into an integrated architecture is a big challenge,” he said.

One issue was that missile defense and other traditional surveillance sensors were positioned to detect things launching from the surface rather than approaching from deep space, Dickinson said. But as NASA and commercial enterprises started to think about returning to the moon and even crewed voyages to Mars, it became clear that U.S. Space Command needs space domain awareness in deep space.

“That’s the challenge we have, is having the ability to look outward like that. Because, quite frankly, you know, if you look at our architecture, right now, we’re pretty good at looking down and in towards the Earth. We have to look at how we turn around and start looking outward,” he said.

One way to do that is by leveraging private sector capabilities, he said, which Space Command was doing through its commercial integration cell in Colorado Springs, Colo. “Space domain awareness from looking up terrestrially is all about location, location, location, right? So you have to have sensors in certain parts of the world where you can look up and see what we’re … interested in. And so being able to leverage the commercial market has been very powerful,” he said.

Engaging multiple commercial partners could augment U.S. Space Command’s own capabilities or allow it to focus on something else. “They’re looking at something that we don’t necessarily have to look at or decide on. And so we can look at something else instead.”

Watch, Read: Nuclear Deterrence and Global Stability

Watch, Read: Nuclear Deterrence and Global Stability

March 10, 2022

Retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, moderates a panel discussion with Gen. Anthony J. Cotton, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command; and Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command, on “Nuclear Deterrence and Global Stability” during the AFA Warfare Symposium on March 3, 2022. Watch the video or read the transcript below. This transcript is made possible through the sponsorship of JobsOhio.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies: “Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to this session of the 2022 AFA Aerospace Warfare Symposium. As you can see, to my right, we’re privileged here to have some very distinguished leaders with us to discuss nuclear deterrence and global stability. Let me just take a couple of sentences to set the scene for you. It should go without saying, but it needs to be said that America’s nuclear forces are the bedrock of our nation’s security and key to preserving global stability. But let’s face it, our nuclear enterprise is old, and it’s in need of modernization. That’s why programs like the B-21, GBSD, long-range standoff weapon, and nuclear command, control and communications modernization are so important.

“As all of you know, we’re working extra to execute these modernization efforts at the same time that Russia is developing and deploying next-generation nuclear weapon systems. And China’s in a breakout. I just read about that this morning. They’ve actually sort of triggered some internal lever that sees them perhaps doubling their nuclear stockpile over the next few years. So while these developments might serve as an obvious warning to many about the need for the U.S. to remain committed to its own nuclear modernization efforts, there are also some who are quite vocal in arguing that we should be building down our nuclear forces, not recapitalizing.

“So bottom line, we’re here today in interesting times. And that’s why I’m so very pleased to be joined by two of our nation’s key leaders in this realm, Gen. Anthony Cotton, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, and Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, who’s deputy commander of the United States Strategic Command. So welcome, gentlemen. Thank you both for taking the time to be here. And not only that but what you’re doing in your respective commands. You both command a lot of respect, and it’s well-deserved. So what I’d like to do to kick this off is to give you both the opportunity and make a couple of opening comments, and Gen. Cotton over to you.”

Gen. Anthony J. Cotton, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command: “Thanks, Dave. Well, first of all, I’d like to say thank you to AFA. Orville, thanks for the invite. But more so thanks for the invite of all the men and women that are sitting in the audience that got a good opportunity to kind of hear senior leaders and describe what’s going on in the world today and hear from that vantage point and that point of view. So thanks for being able to do this for the years and years that you guys have been doing this. It’s exceptional.

“So to my right, though, I have to kind of give a shout out to Tom Bussiere. So Tom and I kind of go way back. We actually survived the numbered Air Force commanders and Global Strike Command together. And it was awesome. I had 20th, and he had eighth. And we’ve been friends even before then. And we continue to be incredible friends today. So thanks, Tom, for everything that you’re doing as deputy commander out of STRATCOM.

“You know, you highlighted it, right? The world has changed. I think that’s an understatement. I don’t like to be the guy that says I told you so. And I won’t, because I think all of us kind of knew that the underpinnings of what could happen was always there. But you know, we shifted our posture within within Global Strike Command. When you say ‘nuclear enterprise’ for us, I’d like to say that I’m not necessarily the nuclear deterrent force. I’m actually the strategic deterrent force, the strategic arm, lon-grange strike capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, that represents the United States Air Force in the department, and as the JFACC to the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, being able to present those forces. So being able to do that in a conventional and nuclear, if required, sense, is what we’re all about. And that’s what makes up Air Force Global Strike Command.

“You know, I think we must maintain our nuclear capabilities. You said it, David, right? I mean, we kind of are where we are. You know, everyone keeps saying, ‘Well, you know, well, how quickly are you going to be able to modernize?’ And we can talk about that in some of the questions and answer sessions. The fact of the matter is, I wish I was already 15 years into it. But we’re not. That being said, I’m comfortable of where we’re going and the developments that we’re taking. But yes, it would have been a nice, a nicer opportunity to say, ‘Hey, we’re at the end of our nuclear modernization right now.’

“You talked about it. Back when I was the 20th Air Force commander, I would tell you that I don’t know that we in 2015, that we really were thinking that … by 2035, or by 2030, that the Chinese would have 200, you know, not mobile 200 land-based ICBMs. We weren’t thinking that, right? 2018: Well, maybe 2035; 2021 and 2022, we’re sitting here talking about in … by 2030, they might have an arsenal of over 1,000 weapons. That’s how quick they’re advancing in their capabilities — at an incredible pace. And you’ve heard that all through the day. I think everyone in the audience knows this, but I think it’s worth relaying. Global Strike Command is, I repeat, is the long-range strike capability of the United States Air Force. We are all of the strategic bombers in the free world. We are all the land-based ICBMs in the free world. We are responsible for two legs of the triad. So I think everyone needs to kind of take a step back as Airmen, and Guardians because Guardians as well support us, to understand that fact — that the Department of the Air Force is responsible for two legs of the triad, which is fundamentally foundational to the national security of this nation. And we need to understand that.

“And the world notices us, whether on the conventional side,[garbled] bomber task forces that support all the COCOMS. I think there’s nothing nicer than seeing our allies and partners fly up on the wings of Andy’s bombers when they’re doing bomber task force missions throughout the globe. Because our AOR is the globe. And we’re able to prove that day in and day out. On the ICBM side, being able to have 24/7, 365-day umbrella coverage to not only the United States but to allies and partners, being able to describe or show our capabilities through tests when we launch out of Vandenberg Space Force Base. Those are things that are noticed, to be frank, more by the international press than even by our own U.S. press. So it shows that we’re making a difference. We’ll talk more about modernization. I was going to talk about that. But I’ll pause there and then we can talk about the modernization of the weapons systems in the in the Q&A. But I’m incredibly proud to be here and representing the strikers of Global Strike Command.

Deptula: “Tom?”

Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command: “Thank you, sir. I’m gonna kind of categorize my opening comments in kind of three big buckets. First, some thanks. And then a little bit on the threat and then a little bit on the need for modernization. So, first of all, thanks. You know, before I do that, I think the first time I met Gen. Cotton, I was the IG doing a nuke surety inspection on his wing. So that was our first meeting. That was kind of fun for me.”

Cotton: “Nothing like a nuke surety inspection.”

Bussiere: “So thanks. I want to echo Gen. Cotton’s thanks to AFA from a slightly different angle. So bringing together Airmen, Guardians and their leadership teams and coupling that with the experts in industry is really a recipe for success. So I know it’s the standard, but to the Airmen and Guardians in this room and the leadership teams, take advantage of networking with each other, between the two services as well as with our industry partners, because when the chief says innovate or lose, that innovation resides in this room and with our industry partners. So that’s kind of point No. 1.

“Second, to Gen. Cotton and the Air Force, obviously, as the air component to U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. Cotton’s responsible for two-thirds of the triad. And the strikers do that in a multitude of ways, whether it’s the ICBM force or the bomber force, sustainment and oversight of our NC3 systems. But probably just as important, if not more important, the stewardship and oversight of the, I would purport to be, the most important acquisition programs in the Department of Defense. So all that coupled together is right here in this forum in Orlando.

“The next thing I’d like to, for a moment if you’ll indulge me, is this second, this minute, 150,000 soldiers, sailors, Airmen, Marines and Guardians are standing the watch, providing that bedrock of national security for our nation and our allies every day. And they’ve been doing that for decades. We tend to forget about that. We don’t necessarily forget about the importance of the mission. But I’d like you all to sometime today take a few seconds and silently thank and think about those warriors that do this every day, and many of them are in this room.

“So Gen. Deptula talked about the threat a little bit. I don’t think you have to go too far back in the last couple of weeks to realize that the world is a unique and dangerous place. Whether we’re talking about the Soviet Union’s, now Russians’, arsenal and the recapitalization of their strategic forces, which last year, the president of Russia articulated in the high 80%. And … those are those systems accountable under the New START Treaty. What we have to maintain cognizant over is the fact that there are a multitude of nontreaty-accountable nuclear weapons being developed and proliferated in the Russian arsenal. And that’s growing every day and every week. And that doesn’t account also for the exotic systems that the president of Russia highlighted in public in the last few years, which if you don’t know about those, then I invite you to ask Mr. Google about them. For China, I would say that 10 years ago, their public narrative and their rhetoric match their force posture and their nuke enterprise. I’d say that fast-forward to the 2020s, where we see them today and in the future, as Gen. Deptula mentioned, it’s no longer congruent with their public statement of why they have that arsenal, and we’re seeing a rapid diversification and expansion of their nuclear capabilities.

“And we can discuss at length the differences between our treaty obligations and mechanisms of security with Russia and the fact that we don’t have those with China. And then last, to be the master of the obvious, if you believe that the bedrock of our national security is the strategic deterrence forces, which I do. If you believe that the world as we see it today is a dangerous and an ever-expanding threat base, which I do, then you can agree with me that the recapitalisation of the nuke enterprise is absolutely essential in all three legs. And hopefully, we’ll have an opportunity to discuss that during our comments today. So thank you.”

Deptula: “Well, thanks very much, Gen. Cotton. It might be pretty basic for some people, but I think it’s pretty important and useful to ground folks in the core arguments regarding why we have a triad. So could you just kind of hit on those basics? For not just the audience here but those who might be watching this and we can help educate? You know, the naysayers and others.”

Cotton: “Yeah, thanks, Dave. So when we talk about the ‘triad’ in this conversation and the rhetoric that’s going back and forth on whether or not you need one or not, I think presenting forces to the commander of STRATCOM for all three legs and being able to provide options for him to be able to provide options to the president is key and fundamental. So when we talk about the land-based ICBM leg, we’re talking about the responsive leg. When we talk about the bomber leg, we’re talking about that leg that can be seen, that can be a generated force. What people don’t really talk about is how each one of the legs — and of course, the third leg being the SLBMs in the subs that is the donor leg that the United States Air Force doesn’t own — but what we don’t talk about a lot is how each leg of the triad complements each other, how each leg of the triad, actually, or can be hedges for the other leg … to ensure that we’re maximizing what Adm. Richard as the commander of STRATCOM can present to the president. Right?

“So when you — and oh, by the way, it must work because our adversaries are doing exactly the same thing. Right? … The Chinese has announced that, you know, that they have, not a fledgling triad, that they have a triad. Right? The Russians have a triad for the exact same reasons on being able to complement each of the other legs. So this argument that if you — which I don’t agree with; I want to maximize the options that we can provide as the provider of the force and present the force to STRATCOM, who then presents it to POTUS. I want to be able to maximize those effects to be able to do that. And I don’t, you know, it’s really hard to kind of figure out how you can do that when it is not a triad. And when you say, ‘Well, will a diad work?’ I’ll say to that, for me, I think the answer is no.”

Deptula: “No, it’s very good. Gen. Bussiere has often said that we’re talking about the triad, but NC3, your nuclear command, control and communications, is the fourth leg of that triad. That would be a quad, I guess, but whatever.”

Cotton: “A quadad.”

Deptula: “Yeah, it clearly is a crucial part of the modernization plan. And obviously, nuclear command and control, if there’s anything that ought to be secret, really secret, it’s that, but can you talk a little bit about a broad scheme of modernization for NC3?”

Bussiere: “Yeah, absolutely. I guess I’ll just expand upon your comment about the fourth leg of the triad. You know, the credibility of our strategic deterrence forces is in the three legs of the triad. The credibility of our ability to deter is in our ability to command and control it. So over many, many decades, we have developed and fielded, both in the Air Force and in the Navy, 204 systems that account for NC3 that are currently on the books. And over the last [garbled] years, the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Navy has gone to great strides to acknowledge and account for those systems and make sure that their readiness and operational utility is extended into the future. It was so important to then Secretary Mattis that he directed the stand-up of the NEC, the NC3 Enterprise Center in Omaha, so the commander of STRATCOM, Adm. Richard, is also the commander of the NC3 Enterprise Center, which accounts for that connective tissue between the Air Force systems and the Navy systems both for today and the future. I’d offer to you the expertise in this room and then the industry partners are going to be the future for what we call NC3 Next.

“So not only do we have an obligation to maintain the current 204 systems today at full operational capability, but there has to be a graceful transition into the future. So you can think about, I think it was the chief that said this morning, when he came in the Air Force, he was a captain before he had email. So think about how we’ve developed our NC3 systems to do command and control decades ago, and then think about the technology we have today. And so how we’re going to transition and take advantage of the technologies and the innovation that industry and the Air Force and the Navy have both from operational perspective and a technical perspective and merge that into what we’re calling NC3 Next, and couple it with JADC2 that the Department of Defense is doing with the services, is absolutely essential.

“But we can’t lose sight of the fact that we have to maintain our current full operational capability today as we gracefully transition to those systems. All that I’ll offer is if the ‘NC3 Enterprise Center,’ ‘the NEC,’ is a new term for you, we’d invite you out to get educated on that, both from a component perspective and then from a joint perspective.”

Deptula: “Thank you. And Gen. Cotton, as the strategic deterance landscape is changing markedly given proliferation issues, actions by Russia and China and the increasing role of technology, could you walk us through a bit about what other actors are doing when it comes to building their own nuclear weapons capabilities?”

Cotton: “Yeah, let’s start with China. I mean, you alluded to it in your opening comments, so, you know, and I spoke of it as well, so think about where we thought the minimal deterrence rhetoric that was being articulated in the mid-2010s. Right? Minimum deterrence; 2015, from where I alluded to being a commander of the 20th Air Force, where you know, the talk was, ‘We don’t need to worry about that until about 2035-2040s.’ Then I become the deputy commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, and that moves to 2035. I’m the commander of Global Strike Command, and now it’s 2030. They are building their arsenal at a rapid pace.

“So from that perspective, seeing the H6N, for example, as their nuclear-capable bomber, saying that it has extended legs, seeing that they’re actually now doing air refueling. Where if that was a regional notion in the past, why now train your crews on air refueling capability and etc. Seeing hypersonics being introduced for China. Let’s move to Russia. So, Russia: 80 to 85% complete on their nuclear modernization. And we’re just beginning.

“So that’s just two of our, you know, what I call our near-peer adversaries that we’re dealing with, with capabilities that are actually, you know, quite dire if you really think about some of the capabilities that they have presented. And you heard Tom talk a little bit about some of those capabilities as well. So 85%, 80 to 85% complete, and their modernization over the past 20 years, when we were in the desert, they were still modernizing their force. A China that is a true triad nuclear-capable, probably no longer a minimal deterrent, China. Then we look at Iran. I think Iran is sitting at about, I think they just announced that they have kept capacity and capability for 60% in uranium enrichment. North Korea, who is thinking the month of January launch seven ICBMs, or I’m sorry, ‘space venture tests.’ And you know, and even recently, in the month of February, you can add to that number.

“So, it’s real. Right? So that’s why it is imperative, it’s very important for us to continue with the rigor that we are right now and modernizing our force.”

Deptula: “It’s a real challenge. You heard the NORTHCOM commander earlier in the prior session talk about while China may be the pacing threat, Russia right now has the preponderance of nuclear weapons. But now we see China getting to the point with accelerating, just like you talked about, that we’re facing some serious challenges. Gen. Bussiere, in that regard, my sense is that the Cold War paradigms are in need of some major update. This may be especially true given that past understandings we had with our adversaries just might not translate to the current climate. I’ll toss out a concern that we might not fully understand what China’s going on and thinking about their no first-use policy, for an example. Everything Gen. Cotton just said, given what he said, what does that mean for the U.S. as we seek to ensure that we’ve got a modern relevant strategic deterrence strategy?”

Bussiere: “So I think we’ve had this conversation a few times in the past year. I’ll kind of reverse the order there a little bit. So I would offer that any discussion of how we’re going to approach the threats that we see today and in the future has to start with a recapitalized, modernized triad that’s underpinned with our ability to command and control it. So that’s a given in this discussion. Because if you don’t have that as a premise, then the discussion of how we’re going to deter two near-peer adversaries plus the regional actors gets somewhat skewed and gets derailed pretty quickly. So I’ll offer that as the first thought.

“The second piece I’d like to intellectually challenge everyone is if you go back into the ’60s and ’70s, whether it was, you know, at the time the RAND Corp. or other think tanks or other industry or academic partners, there was an unbelievable effort of intellectual energy looking at how we are going to develop the theories of deterrence, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, now Russia. Well understood, a lot of documentation, a lot of literature, even though we may not necessarily have that conversation as much as we should now, I think it’s being rebirthed. And I’ll offer to you that it’s being rebirthed in Gen. Hecker’s organization both, at SAS and SANS, and I think there’s some school of advanced nuclear deterrence studies students here at AFA this year.

“But our ability vis of the service, whether it’s the Air Force, the Navy, Army, Marines, or our Guardians, or it’s the joint force or OSD, it has to start, I think, in the Air Force and the Navy, with the operational experts that can come up with theories of how we’re going to develop a model to deter two near-peer adversaries that have the capability. They have their own rheostat now. You know, we’ve had the luxury of, for decades now, of having our ability to dial the rheostat up on primarily the conflicts we’ve been fighting in the Middle East. We’re now facing two near-peer adversaries there that have their own rheostat of escalation that is not only nuclear but multiple domains involved in that. And so how do you approach that from a peer-to-peer perspective, and now couple that with two near-peer adversaries, potential adversaries, that we have to deter, and I’d offer to you, that we have to deter in different ways. So innovation is not just operations, not just new weapon systems, innovation is intellectual power that we need in the Enterprise also.”

Cotton: “Dave, can add?”

Deptula: “Absolutely.”

Cotton: “One of the things I think is going to be important for us as Airmen and Guardians, because whether or not you’re in the Enterprise or not, you are in the Enterprise as Airmen and Guardians. You, as members of the Department of the Air Force, are going to have to be able to articulate what it means to own two legs of the nuclear triad. Because every one of you in this room own two legs of the nuclear triad. Right? And if we can’t get there as a service to have, because I remember what Gen. Goldfein used to say. He says when you’re in a room as an Airman, and now Guardian, folks are going to look at your tape that says United States Air Force. They’re not actually looking at all of this that’s sitting up here. Right? You have to be able to articulate who we are as a department. And as a department, we own two legs of the nuclear triad and the majority of the NC3 systems by the way.”

Deptula: “Very good. Gen. Cotton. What were the key drivers pushing DOD to develop a new generation of triad capabilities? I mean, let’s face it: Minuteman 3, B-52, command and control—all of these are decades old. But, so are we talking about sustainment challenges, a diminishing pool of support vendors or the basic viability of the systems?”

Cotton: “Well, so the systems are viable. What we want to do is ensure that we never reach the expiration date. So let’s talk about the weapons systems a little bit. So for the Minuteman 3, for example, the sustainment challenges, they’re real. It was a system that just celebrated its 50th anniversary not too long ago, on the backs of young Airmen, by the way. The maintainers out in the missile fields are incredible. The ICBM operators who operate them are incredible. The defenders who defend them are incredible. But it’s on their backs. It was a system that was, I mean, it’s an incredible weapon system. The Minuteman 3 is an incredible weapon system. It was designed for a 10-year lifespan. Right? So it was designed using 1960s technology; 1970s technology, then, is modernization.

“So if you think about that, it’s really, really hard to take what we would see as what we do in a 21st century, in an open architecture system, to be able to just do basic maintenance and things of that nature to support that weapon system. It was never even designed in. But like I said, those incredible Airmen in the northern tier that are monitoring them each and every day are keeping them viable. So that’s one.

“And you’re right. You know, I was joking in the audience here earlier. I said that I might need a component that’s the size of what’s holding that rail, and there’s no one out there that makes it anymore. And the supply line no longer has it. So you reverse engineer it. Right? So … how do you get a vendor … in the audience to say, hey, I need 500 components of this piece of aluminum. They said sure, I’ll make it 10,000. I don’t need 10,000 of them; I need 500 of them. Well, OK, that’s great, I’ll charge you, you know, imagine what that cost will be in just building that one piece of equipment. … So that’s why modernization of the Minuteman 3 absolutely has to happen. … No, we’re past that. We’re past that. What I find that’s interesting in the conversation about GBSD: We’re five years into the program of record of GBSD, of the replacement of the Minuteman weapon system. So let’s stop talking about it like we’re trying to figure out if we’re going to turn it into a program of record. It is a program of record. It is the system that we need to replace the Minuteman weapon system. And the team, many are in the audience, are doing an incredible job to do just that.

“For the B-52, as we talk about the B-52 and its CERP program in replacing and modernizing its radars, modernizing its avionics. We just recently announced the engine contract on putting new engines on that airplane. You know, people pick on the B-52 and its age all the time. You know, it’s funny, I was just telling someone, so we’re getting ready to celebrate its 70th birthday. So for all but five years of the United States Air Force’s life as a service, there’s always been a B-52, except for five years of its life. And guess what? There will be until 2050. So the modernization efforts that are going into the B-52 is incredibly important for strategic deterrence.

“The B-21, the B-21, is a penetrating and daily flyer that we have to have, and it will be the preponderance of the bomber force moving forward. As we drive down to a two-tail force, that will be a B-52 updated version of the H model, as well as the B-21. That’s what the United States of America is going to have as a bomber force, the two-bomber force. Incredibly important for the conventional role as well as the nuclear role that it will play. LRSO to replace the ALCM, the long-range strategic weapon that will replace the ALCM. Incredibly important, as Gen. Bussiere has mentioned, in the modernization of the nuclear force. Let’s see what else, I think I’ve captured all of them. … So when we talk about, I have to do that, because every weapon system that I own is getting modernized. That’s great. I wish we could have done it earlier. But I’m happy that it’s happening now.”

Deptula: “Very good. Thanks for that. Now, Gen. Bussiere, could you give us kind of a system-by-system breakdown of when this modernization is going to be complete?”

Bussiere: “So I’d like to dovetail off what Gen. Cotton just said and kind of approach your question, Gen. Deptula. So what Gen. Cotton just said about the air and land leg of the triad also is true for the maritime leg. So we’ve seen the ICBM Minuteman 3 fielded potentially for 10 years, now at 50. We talked about B-52. And we can’t forget the Ohio class has been extended to 42 years of service, and that’s a different dynamic when we’re talking about haul pressure on the boomer fleet. So if you look at the B-21, the GBSD or the Columbia class that’s underpinned by our ability to command and control it. You know, it has served our nation well. Our current triad and our current NC3 equipment has served our nation well. And it has underpinned our national security and that of our allies and partners. It was built in a different world. It was fielded in a different world.

“So as we look at the world as we see it today, the threats we see it today and going into the future, this one, underscore underline and bold text, the fact that we need to recapitalize the triad and keep it on schedule to not only keep it operationally relevant to account for the vanishing vendors, the increase, the sustainment cost, but to meet the threats of the future. So it’s not just a mechanical, operational or vanishing vendor challenge. We always step back from that which is real and look at the operational requirement within our nation’s triad and what the threat is presenting, and … we don’t have any more operational margin to continue to life extend these programs.

“So I’m sure I don’t see Gen. Bunch out here, but I’m sure he would not want me to go program by program and challenge his acquisition programs. But I can tell you right now, both from the Air Force side and Navy side within the department writ large, we are happy and pleased to see the emphasis both from the Air Force and Navy perspective, as well as in the department’s perspective to make sure we field these capabilities on time.”

Deptula: “Well, thanks very much. Unfortunately, we’ve come to the end of this Aerospace Warfare Symposium event. And I think the audience will agree with me that we’re blessed to have both of you serving in the positions that you are. We thank you for what you have done, what you continue to do and what you will do in the future. So please join me in thanking our two guests this afternoon.

“And just as a reminder, we’re gonna have our final event of the day with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt on accelerating artificial intelligence, and that’s coming up here at 4:40. So we’ll see you then.”

Training Could Help Build Trust in Autonomous Systems, Industry Panel Says

Training Could Help Build Trust in Autonomous Systems, Industry Panel Says

March 10, 2022 | By Nick Adde

Autonomous systems will emerge as critical in future fights, according to industry and military representatives who spoke at the AFA Warfare Symposium. They said they’re convinced of the fact.

But before this happens, they believe, Airmen, Guardians and other troops must know they can trust these machines to work without distracting humans from their missions. 

“We know that autonomous systems can lead to cost savings [and] better use of our workforce across our air forces and services across the joint force,” said Air Commodore John Haly, the Royal Australian Air Force’s air and space attache in Washington. “But there clearly are implications in what and how we do things,” said Haly, who moderated the discussion.

Unmanned systems might someday assume integral roles in the daily operations tempo, said Chris Pehrson, vice president for special programs at General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.

“It’s going to be a disaggregated network, and they’re all going to be feeding data with precision timing and precision communications and … really bringing all that together for a shared situational awareness,” Pehrson said. “Again, trust is the foundation. We have to build that trust—that it’s not going to put our own crews in danger.”

An approach that allows for rapid training may help foster that trust, said Tony Bacarella, vice president of advanced programs at Elbit America. “That allows you to go into a synthetic environment to get the training on these multiple missions and environments,” Bacarella said.

Synthetic environments can also help in improving AI algorithms and human-machine teaming, Bacarella said. “We [at Elbit America] have done that. And we think it’s important … to have the AI [artificial intelligence] trainable.”

While such synthetic testing can streamline the engineering process and thus improve cost effectiveness, Krystle J. Carr, senior director of autonomous aviation and technology at Boeing Defense, Space, and Security said real-time testing is also essential. 

“That doesn’t mean you don’t ever bend metal, that you don’t fly and test your prototypes to make sure that what you’re seeing in the digital environment is real,” Carr said. “But you can do a lot digitally at first.”

The panel agreed there would likely be no one-size-fits-all approach to full integration of human-operated and autonomous systems. The machines and their human counterparts must be able to communicate clearly, just as the nations partnering with the U.S. should as well. 

“We think the future really comes down to, there’s going to be a bunch of different solutions and a bunch of different areas that are going to need tools from every company to make a successful route forward,” Bacarella said. 

“As an Australian, with the United States [and] all of our friends and partners around the world, we will always sound like we have an accent when we talk to each other,” Haly said. “But if we can build systems that don’t have a digital accent when they talk to each other, we give ourselves the preconditions for the interoperability and interchangeability that fundamentally we need if we’re going to meet the challenge of the day.”