AFSOC Shifts Focus to Peer Competition, Closer Collaboration With Allies and Partners

March 9, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

During a recent test, an MC-130J flew low over the Gulf of Mexico, not far from the Hurlburt Field headquarters of Air Force Special Operations Command, loaded with palletized munitions. But this was no ordinary resupply mission.

The palletized munitions were pushed out the back of the aircraft, floating toward the water in parachutes until, one by one, cruise missiles fired, adjusting mid-air and climbing to cruise altitude to travel miles away to strike a simulated oil barge.

“Why in the world would AFSOC be launching cruise missiles out of the back of a C-130?” AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. James C. Slife asked a standing-room-only crowd of Airmen, Guardians, and industry experts at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla., March 3.

“Because if our adversaries have to look at every C-130 and every C-17 and wonder what’s in the back, and whether that C-17 is in fact a long-range fire squadron, it changes their calculus,” Slife explained.

The Dec. 17, 2021, Rapid Dragon live fire test deployed from a cargo aircraft was two years in the making. The next live fire test with a C-17 is slated for the spring of 2022, he noted. The tests are part of AFSOC’s shift from the asymmetric warfare conducted in the Middle East over the past decades to a competition with a peer or near-peer adversary such as China or Russia.

“Yes, the last few decades have been laser-focused on counter-VEO [violent extremist organization] operations,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Tony D. Bauernfeind, vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, told the audience, describing a shift that began with the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

“In FY 22, over 30 percent of our operations will be against great power competitors,” he said—“to assure allies, to make sure we’re all preparing the environment to make sure we are forward, where we need to be, to have the effects to provide the options that the nation needs.”

That distribution of operations will only climb in 2023 and 2024, Bauernfeind said.

“From an operational perspective, not only is change going to happen, but change has been happening since 2018,” he added.

In a pull-aside interview after the presentation, Bauernfeind told Air Force Magazine that special operators will forward deploy for more engagements with allies and partners in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command areas of operations, with less emphasis on U.S. Central Command or U.S. Africa Command.

“We are going to show a bond with our allies and partners, both in INDOPACOM and in EUCOM,” he emphasized. “Through that combined power comes an element of deterrence to any adversary that would want to challenge [us].”

Bauernfeind said Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has “doubled down” on the great power emphasis initiated by Defense Secretary James N. Mattis, who inked the last NDS. And Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, in his earlier symposium keynote, said he expects the emphasis to remain “China, China, China,” despite Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

In addition to closer collaboration with allies and partners, Austin has also directed special operations forces to work more closely with interagency teammates, including the State Department, Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community.

“Under Secretary Austin, this is a priority, so it’s easy for us to move,” Bauernfeind added. While the organization is always planning, the crisis in Eastern Europe has led to an uptick in interest from NATO eastern flank nations.

“Anytime there is a crisis, anybody who is affected by the crisis is going to respond and be a part of planning efforts,” Bauernfeind said.

Nuclear Modernization is the ’Absolute Minimum,’ STRATCOM Commander Says

March 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Modernizing the nuclear triad and its accompanying systems isn’t just necessary for the U.S. to deter adversaries—nuclear modernization is the “absolute minimum” that has to be done, the head of U.S. Strategic Command told a Senate panel March 8.

Adm. Charles “Chas” A. Richard has been sounding the alarm on China’s nuclear progress for months, saying the Chinese experienced a “strategic breakout” after reports emerged that it had significantly expanded its nuclear infrastructure.

Now, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin’s decision to put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert, tensions are higher than ever, and modernization should be just the start, Richard told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“It is very clear that the absolute minimum that we need to do is to recapitalize the triad, the nuclear command and control, and the nuclear weapons complex,” Richard said. “But there’s two other questions we need to be asking ourselves along the way with that. The threats are changing in a way that we have not seen in 30 years. We do not know the endpoints of where either of those other two are going, either in capability or capacity. We’re just now starting to work out what three-party stability looks like, what three-party deterrence dynamics works out.

“On top of that, we are learning a number of lessons in real time on how actual crisis deterrence works. It is different from the steady-state deterrence that most of us have experience in. Those two questions, I think, need to be asked much more frequently than we have needed to in the past, followed with, what is the capability, capacity, and posture we require from our strategic forces moving forward?”

Those are questions, Richard said, that STRATCOM has been working on, along with others that many analysts are now considering, such as: How would the U.S. respond if Putin were to use a low-yield nuclear weapon in Ukraine?

“We have rewritten deterrence dynamics theory over the years. We have new analysis that we’re using,” Richard said. “We got criticized for that. We got told that it was highly improbable or somehow self-serving for us to think our way through this, but we ignored that, such that to this point, nothing has happened that we didn’t anticipate, we hadn’t thought about, and hadn’t prepared for.”

For the most part, Richard’s argument for modernization was received favorably by the Senate panel. But he did receive some pushback from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), who questioned why the Pentagon did not consult with outside experts on the feasibility of extending the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system instead of buying the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

“It appears DOD simply didn’t want to do a study that might show a massively expensive nuclear spending program wasn’t actually necessary,” Warren said, adding that she believed the role of nuclear weapons should be minimized.

“I look forward to the Nuclear Posture Review being published so you can see exactly how and what it concluded,” Richard responded. “But I will add, thank goodness we have ICBMs right now. I’ll explain more in closed testimony.”

It’s not only nuclear weapons that need to be modernized, Richard said. The bomber fleet, and the aerial refueling fleet that supports it, are also set to undergo major changes in the near future, as the B-21 Raider comes online, the B-52 receives new engines, the number of KC-46s grows, and the Air Force pursues its “bridge tanker.”

As these new changes come, they carry implications for STRATCOM. One challenge, in particular, is the threat of electromagnetic pulses. Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) asked Richard how STRATCOM’s need for EMP-hardened airframes was being met.

“I have certain requirements, EMP protection … being one of those. So one is to clearly articulate the requirements. Two is go see what we can do in terms of employment of our force to reduce that demand signal [for tankers],” Richard said. “A great example I can point to, and I would give credit to the Air Force, is the re-engining of the B-52s. The engines on those date back to the 60s. They burn a lot of gas. [To] re-engine, less fuel [is] required, less tanker demand. And then what other efficiencies can we achieve, while still maintaining the flexibility and the signaling capability of the air leg, which is one of its prized attributes?”

Threats from China and Russia Extend to Western Hemisphere, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Bosses Say

March 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

While China remains the long-term pacing threat, and immediate concerns focus on Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, the U.S. cannot afford to neglect its own back yard and allow its two near-peer adversaries to gain a foothold, the leaders of U.S. Northern and Southern Commands told Congress on March 8.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put Europe back in the security spotlight, and some observers have drawn parallels with China and a potential invasion of Taiwan. But as the Defense Department looks to center its strategy around the concept of “integrated deterrence”—working across domains, theaters, spectrums, and government agencies—it has to make progress in the Americas, NORTHCOM boss Gen. Glen D. VanHerck told the House Armed Services Committee.

“From a theater security cooperation perspective, I think there’ll still be work to be done,” VanHerck said. “A little goes a long way in the Western Hemisphere, and to compete as part of integrated deterrence, I think we can do more. China and Russia are both global problems. Instead of running to the South China Sea, or to the EUCOM [area of responsibility], we need to factor in that they’re here in the Western Hemisphere and ensure adequate funding for integrated deterrence.”

VanHerck and SOUTHCOM commander Army Gen. Laura J. Richardson said they haven’t seen the fiscal 2023 budget request that’s yet to be released by President Joe Biden’s administration. But they both seemed to indicate that they weren’t expecting massive increases in funding.

“I aspire that it will give us modest investments in the AOR,” Richardson said of the budget. “I think [we need] a comprehensive strategy in the SOUTHCOM region. As we look east and west quite a bit, we don’t look south so much. This is a very important AOR, and so I’m hopeful that we’ll get what we need. When we don’t, … we look for other ways of low-cost, high-yield investments.”

Meanwhile, both Russia and China are seeking to increase their influence in the region. Richardson highlighted China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s disinformation campaigns as particularly concerning.

The Belt and Road Initiative, whereby China has invested tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure projects globally, has already impacted U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command. Now, it’s coming for South and Central America, Richardson said.

“As we know, it starts with the infrastructure [and] economic projects and then furthers into exploitation. A lot of those are state-owned enterprises by China. … I think that the Chinese are using the same playbook that they did in Africa 10 to 15 years ago, and they’re using that in the SOUTHCOM AOR now,” Richardson said.

Specifically, the Chinese spent $72 billion in the region from 2017 to 2021, Richardson said, highlighting projects near the Panama Canal as particularly concerning. By comparison, SOUTHCOM received $250 million for infrastructure projects conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers.

“This region is rich in resources, and the Chinese don’t go there to invest—they go there to extract,” Richardson said.

But it’s not just infrastructure that China has been leveraging to build its influence in SOUTHCOM.

“China doesn’t have partners, but they are using our playbook in our region. So, for example, with professional military education, they’re offering one-year, two-year, all-expenses-paid [trips] to Beijing for professional military education with individuals,” Richardson said. “But they don’t have exercises, and they don’t have partners. So I’ve got to be able to keep up the security cooperation and the exercises that we do in this region to show the strength of the partnerships.”

Meanwhile, Russia has leveraged its strengths in spreading misinformation to interfere in elections and to prop up authoritarian leaders, Richardson said. The approach is particularly dangerous, she added, because of the state of many democracies in the region—more than two dozen are “fragile,” she said.

“Fragile democracies [are] trying to make it, trying to deliver for their people. COVID has really rolled back the advances that some of these countries have made by 10 to even 20 years, due to the economic impacts of COVID, and depending on what area of the region,” Richardson said. “And so they’re trying to deliver for their people, and quite honestly these disinformation campaigns are very prevalent, and we work very closely with the partner nations to try to help them counter it and advise them.”

Risk to the Homeland

It’s not just China’s and Russia’s abilities to influence Latin America that should concern the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, VanHerck said. With the rise of hypersonic missiles and modernized nuclear weapons, the U.S. homeland is under continuous threat, he warned, and that will only increase in the years to come.

“Russia will be a persistent, proximate threat to the homeland in the maritime domain within the next five years,” VanHerck said. “China is about a decade behind, but they will do the same thing. And so 24/7 in the near future, we’ll have both persistent, proximate threats from a submarine perspective, but also surface-level as well.”

In order to deal with that threat, the Pentagon must invest more in domain awareness and missile warning, VanHerck said. It’s an issue he has harped on before, and he added March 8 that the DOD should assign an office of primary responsibility to deal with cruise missile defense of the homeland.

When it comes to the 2023 budget, meanwhile, VanHerck said he is “confident that we’re going to move the ball, if you will, down the field on domain awareness, both in the air domain, space domain, and undersea domain.

“We do need to work more on NORAD modernization on the way forward, which would include infrastructure in the Arctic to get after that problem, which also allows me to position forces for the cruise missile problem … as well as having organized, trained, and ready forces to operate out throughout my AOR.”

Poland Offers MiG-29s in Exchange for Used US Fighters, but Pentagon Shoots Down the Idea

March 8, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Poland has volunteered to give its 23 MiG-29s to the U.S. immediately, presumably for transfer to Ukraine, in exchange for an opportunity to buy used American aircraft, the Polish minister of foreign affairs said March 8. But the Department of Defense said it doesn’t see good reason to do the deal, and doesn’t consider it “tenable.”

“The authorities of the Republic of Poland,” after consultations between the government and President Andrzej Duda, “are ready to deploy—immediately and free of charge—all their MiG-29 jets to the Ramstein Air Base and place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America,” according to a statement posted on the Polish government’s official website.

“At the same time, Poland requests the United States to provide us with used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities. Poland is ready to immediately establish the conditions of purchase of the planes.”

The Polish government also urged other NATO allies that operate MiG-29s “to act in the same vein.”

The move is not technically a reversal from Poland’s position the day before, when Duda’s office tweeted that Poland “won’t send its fighter jets to Ukraine” or allow that country to use its airfields. The new March 8 message did not specify that the jets would go to Ukraine, but to the U.S. That cautious phrasing may have been meant to avoid provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin to move militarily against Poland, which has so far absorbed nearly a million Ukrainian refugees from Putin’s invasion.

But Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said the way Poland presented the offer “shows just some of the complexities this issue presents.”

The prospect of fighter jets “at the disposal of the U.S. government” operating from a U.S./NATO air base in Germany, flying into airspace contested by Russia over Ukraine, “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance,” Kirby said.

“It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it,” he added, saying the U.S. will continue to consult with Poland and other NATO allies “about this issue, and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland’s proposal is a tenable one.”

Kirby added, “the decision about whether to transfer Polish-owned planes to Ukraine is ultimately one for the Polish government.”

Neither the Air Force nor the State Department would comment.

In recent days, there has been speculation that European countries that operate Russian-made combat aircraft would transfer them to Ukraine in exchange for American types. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said over the weekend that Poland has a “green light” from the U.S. to take such action, and a number of members of Congress have pledged that they would provide funds to make such a transfer happen.

The only U.S. fighter that Poland employs that could easily be absorbed into its air force is the F-16. Since Poland seemed to rule out new-purchase aircraft—which could take several years to be delivered—the jets would either have to come from USAF Active, Guard, or Reserve units, from storage at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., “Boneyard,” or from a third party willing to sell its used F-16s back to the U.S.

The USAF Total Force operates 936 F-16C/D aircraft, and their average age is just under 31 years. The Air National Guard alone operates 288 F-16C and 45 F-16D aircraft.

A Davis-Monthan spokesperson could not immediately say how many F-16s parked at the facility are in “recallable” condition, meaning that they have not been harvested for parts and could be regenerated.

Poland did not specify how many jets it wants in return for its 23 MiG-29s. Commercially-available, used MiG-29s have recently fetched between $5 million and $8 million, depending on their age and condition. Israel recently sold 29 of its early-model F-16s to adversary air company Top Aces, but the price of the jets was not disclosed.

According to Polish government accounts, that country’s MiG-29s are flyable but need a lot of maintenance, the engines being particularly unreliable. Poland’s statement did not mention spare engines nor whether any compatible ordnance for the jets would be provided.

The U.S. is known to operate an undisclosed number of MiG-29s that it flies to familiarize fighter pilots with the capabilities of the jet. It bought 21 MiG-29s from Moldova in 1997 for a reported $40 million in cash, other assistance, and non-lethal military equipment, such as trucks. Some of those aircraft have been dismantled for analysis; others are in threat “petting zoos”; and some number are flown for dissimilar air combat training, along with other Russian-made fighters.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated at 7 p.m. on March 8 with additional information from the Defense Department.

Watch, Read: In Keynote, Kendall Warns ‘Putin Made a Very Serious Miscalculation’

March 8, 2022

Watch the video or read the transcript of Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s March 3, 2022, keynote address during the AFA Warfare Symposium: “One Team, One Fight.” This transcript is made possible through the sponsorship of JobsOhio.

Good morning. I’d like to first thank AFA for their patience and their cooperation as we worked through the process of having another major AFA conference during the COVID pandemic. Last fall we were hopeful that COVID was receding as people became vaccinated. Unfortunately, the Omicron variant had other plans, and too many Americans, for whatever reasons, made decisions not to be vaccinated. I’m hopeful once again that we’re on a good trajectory, and I appreciate the vast majority of Airmen, Guardians, and DAF civilians who have become fully vaccinated. Yesterday we stopped wearing masks in the Pentagon. It was truly great to see all those smiling faces; in fact it was great just to see those faces, but they were smiling. The DC area met the CDC’s new low-risk criteria; unfortunately Orlando does not. We’re definitely making progress – at least for now. Let’s keep it up. I don’t want to sound like a nag up here. I emphasize what the chief just said a moment ago. We do not want to be the super source or a super-spreader for a new variant that sets us all the way back so let’s please follow the rules while we’re here. I’d really appreciate that; all our Airmen and Guardians here appreciate that as well.

I want to especially highlight the resiliency of our Airmen and Guardians and their families. The last two years have upended everything that we might consider our normal routines, across the board. These men and women, from every imaginable background, have never stopped working to ensure that the United States Air Force and Space Force remain the best the world has ever seen, and their families have borne this burden right along with them. I also appreciate all that industry has done to continue supporting our nation during this crisis. My hat’s off to every one of you.

I’ve been part of our “one team” for over six months now, and what I’d like to do this morning is to give you some feedback about what I think I’ve learned so far about our Department, what I’ve tried to accomplish in my first few months, and where I think we need to go. Before I do all that though, I’d like to say a few words about current events and our historical context.

Somewhere during my education, I recall being instructed that it’s dangerous to draw major conclusions from contemporary historical events. Understanding and interpreting the broad, lasting impact of highly-disruptive events requires some distance in time, and a clear-eyed, objective perspective that is simply impossible in the moment. I think that observation was wise, but here we are. The threat of a major land war in Europe was something that until a few days ago most of us believed was extremely remote. So much for that.

Two Fridays ago I spent the day at CYBERCOM. As I was leaving, I mentioned to General Nakasone that based on what I’d seen that day, most of the world was about to have a major emotional event; something that would shock people into a new understanding of reality, something which has now unfortunately come to pass. A few weeks ago, well before the invasion of Ukraine, I told those present at the weekly Department of the Air Force staff meeting that they should put one of those little yellow sticky notes up on their workstation to remind themselves that great power conflicts could happen, and could do so at any time.

I was trying to create a stronger sense of urgency about the importance of our work. I don’t think there is much doubt about the possibility of major power acts of aggression at this point. If war between major powers does happen, it will most likely be the result of a miscalculation by an authoritarian head of state.

In my view President Putin made a very, very, serious miscalculation. He severely underestimated the global reaction the invasion of Ukraine would provoke, he severely underestimated the will and courage of the Ukrainian people, and he overestimated the capability of his own military.

Perhaps most of all, he severely underestimated the reaction from both the United States and from our friends and allies. A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to have dinner at the home of the Ambassador to the United States from Finland. His comment to me was that the actions the Biden Administration was taking to prepare and unite the free world to counter Russia might not stop Putin from invading—he’s likely to have already made the decision to do so—but, they are preparing the world for like-minded nations to work together if he does invade. As I often say: One team, one fight.

Where this will lead, I honestly don’t know, but if President Putin thought he could divide NATO, divide Europe, and even divide the United States, he was wrong. Now it’s up to all of us to ensure that something like this does not happen again. Our role, the role of the Department of the Air Force, is clear: to provide the Air and Space Forces that will deter aggression, and if necessary, defeat it. As my former boss Secretary Leon Panetta said in every speech I ever heard him give, there is no more sacred obligation than the duty to protect our nation and our values.

How will we meet this obligation? The Biden Administration is about to release the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. I don’t want to get ahead of that process, but you can be confident that despite current events the pacing challenge remains China.

You can also be confident that alliances and partnerships will be emphasized under the “integrated deterrence” rubric. Russia and other threats will not be discounted, but China, with both regional and global ambitions, the resources to pursue them, and a repressive authoritarian system of government, will be our greatest strategic national security challenge. Some of you will recall my three priorities from last September when I spoke at that AFA conference – China, China, China.

Since then I’ve had several months on the job. What have I learned? Firstly, I’ve gotten to meet a lot of Airmen and Guardians. Nothing is more inspiring to me than to have informal conversations with the men and women who wear the Air or Space Force uniform. The dedication, commitment, professionalism, and passion these people bring to their service and to the nation is simply awesome. Thank you, all.

As I’ve traveled to places like Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, and Thule Greenland, the positive attitudes, drive, and commitment I’ve seen from our men and women serving far from home and sometimes in challenging circumstances is just exceptional. I am going to talk to my staff about some warmer travel options, however. Diego Garcia, Niger, and Djibouti are on the list for this year and I’m telling my staff that we’ll average out to a very moderate temperature.

My remarks today are about warfighting and operational capability, the subject of this conference, so I won’t be focusing on people today, but our Airmen and Guardians are the heart and soul of who we are, what we stand for, and what we are sworn to protect. I have enormous respect for our Airmen and Guardians. They are always foremost in my mind, and I know I can say the same on behalf of the entire Department of the Air Force leadership team.

But I’ve also learned about the problems our institution faces. We’re stretched thin as we meet Combatant Commanders’ needs around the globe. We have an aging and costly-to-maintain capital structure with average aircraft ages of approximately 30 years and operational availability rates that are lower than we desire.

While I applaud the assistance the Congress has provided this year, we’re still limited in our ability to shift resources away from legacy platforms that we need to retire to free up funds for modernization.

We’re not flying and training as much as we would like to be, sacrificing in part a significant historical advantage of superior flying experience for our pilots and our aircrews. We’re carrying the costs of a roughly 20 percent excess capacity of real estate. We have a significant number of programs in the Air Force that are not fully-funded beyond the budget year. We have a Space Force that inherited a set of systems designed for an era when we could operate in space with impunity.

Moreover, our entire military was designed for an era in which our potential adversaries did not possess space systems of their own that actively threaten our terrestrial joint forces. We’ve only begun to define, and have not yet fully resourced, the space systems that we will need to secure the nation.

Overall, we do start more programs than we can afford, and we don’t prioritize the most promising ones early so that we can ensure they cross the value of death to production and fielding. As General Brown has noted in his recent orders, we still have too much bureaucracy.

Finally, we know that despite the progress we’ve made, we have more work to do to ensure every Airman and Guardian has the opportunity to reach their full potential and to serve in an environment where they will always be treated with respect.

The Department of the Air Force’s senior leadership team, myself and the Under Secretary, the Service Chiefs, their Vices, and our Senior Enlisted Leaders, are all focused on addressing these issues. While I’m involved in getting after every one of them, my highest personal goal as Secretary has been to instill a sense of urgency about our efforts to modernize and to ensure that we improve our operational posture relative to our pacing challenge; China, China, China. The most important thing we owe our Airmen and Guardians are the resources they need, and the systems and equipment they need, to perform their missions.

To achieve this goal, I’ve commissioned work on seven operational imperatives. These imperatives are just that; if we don’t get them right, we will have unacceptable operational risk. For those here from industry please pay attention; this is what the Department of the Air Force will be investing in and this is where we need your expertise, intellectual capacity, and creativity.

Before I walk you through them, let me give you a little historical context to set the stage. I’ve been around a few decades and I’ve always loved history. Keep in mind that China started its efforts to defeat U.S. power projection forces about 30 years ago, after the First Gulf War. What does that mean – 30 years? Let’s take a quick look at four 30-year-long periods in modern history and the history of warfare.

In 1901, there was no significant military air arm, there was no military air arm. The Wright Brothers were refining the design of the 1903 Wright Flyer, but at this time there had never been a manned, powered, heavier-than-air aircraft flight.

Thirty years later, in 1931, we had fought World War I and airpower, machine guns, tanks and radios had become a major element of modern militaries. By 1931 Billy Mitchell had demonstrated the obsolescence of the battleship, even if some were still not convinced. By 1931 there was an Army Air Corps with about 17 hundred aircraft.

Another 30 years later in 1961 we had fought World War II and the Korean War, demonstrated the criticality of airpower to tactical and strategic operational success, transitioned from propellers to the jet engine and from guns to air-to-air missiles. We had introduced intercontinental bombers, ICBMs, satellites, and of course nuclear weapons.

By 1991, the beginning of the 30 years in which China has been investing in ways to defeat U.S. power projection, we had fought the war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and we demonstrated unprecedented conventional warfare dominance in the First Gulf War. The entire world had begun its reliance on GPS. Airborne surveillance systems—AWACS and prototype JSTARS—provided air and ground situation awareness and C3 battle management. The first stealth fighter, the F-117, was used in combat. Thirty years ago the B-2 had flown and the F-22 was in development.

The final 30 years take us to last year, 2021. In this period space was militarized to provide targeting support to long-range ground, sea, and air-based missiles; ground-based anti-satellite weapons were fielded and a range of counter-space weapons entered development to threaten satellites in all orbits. Highly accurate land and maritime attack Medium Range Ballistic Missiles and advanced land attack cruise missiles were fielded.

Beyond visual range air-to-air missiles were fielded, and a variety of hypersonic weapons, including intercontinental-range systems were tested or fielded. Military services devoted to long-range precision rocket forces and strategic support forces for space and cyber warfare were created, transforming military structures. Unlike the 30 year periods that I discussed before this one, these items on the list I just gave all occurred in China.

The point is that for the last 120 years, technology and warfare have changed dramatically in each 30 year increment. During the last 30 years, the US has not stood still, but we have not moved fast enough. We must accelerate change or, as General Brown noted, we will in fact lose.

A few months ago, the senior Department of the Air Force leadership team agreed to focus on a list of seven operational priorities, imperatives to help guide our investment decisions. These imperatives are all things we must accomplish in order to provide forces that can deter or defeat conventional military aggression by a peer or near-peer competitor. The two stressing cases we’ll analyze are a possible invasion of Taiwan and land assault on a NATO member. We have very visible evidence now that at least one of those is quite possible; so is the other one. Both are characterized by high operational tempos with large numbers of combatants on each side.

These are not the types of problems the Department of the Air Force has been focused on since the Cold War ended and especially not since 9/11. But as current events show, they are the types of problems we must be organized, equipped, and ready for. Not some time in the future, but now.

Fortunately we’re not starting from zero, but in each case we do need to improve our capability with a sense of urgency. I’m not at liberty to discuss the FY23 budget yet, but you’ll see alignment between the Department of the Air Force’s budget and the National Security and Defense Strategies on one hand, and these imperatives on the other. That said, there is still a great deal of work to be done in finalizing the best long-term modernization program for each of these imperatives.

Some of that work will, by necessity, have to inform our FY24 submission next year. The way we’ve organized the work is to put a team of operational and technical or acquisition experts in leadership roles for each of the seven imperatives. The overall effort is led from the operational perspective by Lt Gen Hinote for the Air Force and Lt Gen Liquori for the Space Force. Darlene Costello is the overall lead for acquisition and technology.

None of the operational imperatives exists in isolation. Space considerations transcend each and every one of them, and many are tightly coupled. For that reason, we’ve brought on board Dr. Tim Grayson, who has joined the Department of the Air Force as a highly qualified expert — small letters — responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the work on the seven imperatives.

Analysis efforts across the imperatives are being conducted by the Department of the Air Force Studies and Analysis organization led by Rowayne Schatz and the Space Warfare Analysis Center led by Andrew Cox. This will not just be an internal Department of the Air Force effort. For the industry, laboratory, and FFRDC people here, we need and welcome your help in addressing each of these imperatives successfully, and we’re actively soliciting your inputs.

The first imperative is Defining Resilient and Effective Space Order of Battle. The U.S. and its allies depend on space for a range of military services; communications, intelligence, targeting, navigation, and missile warning included. Our potential adversaries have fielded their own versions of these services and are also fielding a variety of ways to attack U.S. systems.

The simple fact is that the U.S. cannot project power successfully unless our space-based services are resilient enough to endure while under attack. Equally true, our terrestrial forces, Joint and Combined, cannot survive and perform their missions if our adversary’s space-based operational support systems, especially targeting systems, are allowed to operate with impunity.

This imperative will build on the excellent work already completed by Gen Raymond and his team, including that conducted by the Space Warfare Analysis Center, the Space Development Agency, and others. We’re also working closely with the Intelligence Community, especially the National Reconnaissance Office led by Chris Scolese.

As a critical input to this effort, the Vice Chief of Space Operations, Gen D.T. Thompson, is leading the effort with the other Services to define the totality of Joint operational requirements for support from space. We’re also grateful for the pioneering work done by General John Hyten, who recently retired, when he defined the vision for future military space. One team, one fight.

Of all the imperatives, this is perhaps the broadest and the one with the most potential impact.

The second imperative is Achieving Operationally-Optimized Advanced Battle Management Systems (or ABMS). This imperative is the Department of the Air Force component of Joint All Domain Command and Control. It is intended to better define and focus our efforts to improve how we collect, analyze, and share information and make operational decisions more effectively than our potential adversaries.

Our existing battle management platforms such as JSTARS and AWACS are aging and difficult to defend against modern threats. Our C3 battle management centers, Air Operations Centers especially, are in great need of modernization and are also vulnerable to attack. The theory of ABMS, and more broadly JADC2, has been that by using modern networking and communications capabilities in tandem with artificial intelligence for battle management and data collection from numerous sources, we can effectively process information to support superior operational decision-making, substantially improving the performance of our forces.

That’s a reasonable working hypothesis, but we can’t invest in everything and we shouldn’t invest in improvements that don’t have clear operational benefit. We must be more focused on specific improvements with measurable value and operational impact.

Also, as I’ve learned more about our current “legacy” C3 battle management systems, it’s also become apparent to me that the Department of the Air Force needs more than just ABMS appliques that add specific capability and connectivity, and more automated decision making. We also need a program to modernize C3 battle management more generally. This imperative will finish the job of defining that program.

The next imperative is Achieving Air and Ground Moving Target Identification at Scale. The scenarios of concern present target-rich environments in which densely spaced, many-on-many engagements, in a compressed timeframe are the norm. ABMS and JADC2 won’t be of any value without efficient, timely target acquisition. The targets of interest are air, ground and maritime mobile targets associated with an act of violent aggression, such as the one we just saw in Europe or an invasion of Taiwan.

This imperative is about identifying, tracking, and enabling the engagement of numerous targets—such as mobile missile launchers, ships, aircraft, etc—nearly simultaneously. The scenarios of interest are likely to be more like D-Day and decided in a few hours, rather than the long term strategic bombing campaign carried out by the Eighth Air Force.

Currently, the Department of the Air Force uses aging and vulnerable legacy systems, JSTARS and AWACS principally, to provide Air and Ground Moving Target Indication radar-based “pictures” if you will of the battlefield or airspace, and targeting-quality tracks for handoff to other platforms and engagement systems. What enables our aforementioned ABMS investments to be successful starts with the ability to acquire targets using sensors and systems in a way that allows targeting data to be passed to an operator for engagement.

The efficiencies from ABMS and JADC2 come from the ability to see the battlefield and to then make smart decisions about which of those targets to engage and what weapons to employ. But for the scenarios of interest it all starts with those sensors. They must be both effective against the targets of interest and they must be survivable.

Ideally we’d prefer to do these functions from space, which should be more cost effective if adequate resiliency could be provided, but that isn’t the only possibility. And technical limitations, as well as the urgent need to replace some of our aging legacy systems, may limit near-term options for some of this functionality. This imperative will identify, analyze, and select for investment the most promising approaches to acquire and analyze AMTI and GMTI data. The Department of the Air Force is working closely with the intelligence community as we explore this trade-space.

The next imperative is Defining the Next Generation Air Dominance (or NGAD) System of Systems. On its current trajectory the tactical air force is not affordable. The crewed fighters we plan to acquire; F-35, F-15 EX, and the NGAD platform, are all too costly to fill-out our needed force structure as legacy aircraft retire. In effect the F-35 becomes the low end of our high-low mix.

NGAD must be more than just the next crewed fighter jet. It’s a program that will include a crewed platform teamed with much less expensive autonomous un-crewed combat aircraft, employing a distributed, tailorable mix of sensors, weapons, and other mission equipment operating as a team or formation.

The program that became the NGAD experimental technology demonstrator program started with a DARPA study that I commissioned several years ago that concluded we needed a system-of-systems approach for next generation, air-to-air combat. I believe this is a valid concept, even more so than seven years ago when the study was conducted.

This imperative envisions nominally one to five un-crewed combat aircraft controlled by a single, modern, crewed aircraft – principally the NGAD platform but also potentially the F-35. The idea is for the crewed aircraft to be essentially calling plays and employing the un-crewed combat aircraft as wingmen in tactically-optimized ways. Introducing these un-crewed autonomous and attritable aircraft to the tactical air dominance equation opens up a world of fascinating tactical opportunities.

The exact mix of crewed and un-crewed teaming, what is carried on those un-crewed aircraft individually, and what kinds of plays could be available for the operator to select, these are all being analyzed and defined as part of this imperative.

This imperative builds on work already done under programs like Skyborg in the Air Force, ACES at DARPA, and the Australian loyal wingman program, and others. The intent is to cross the valley of death and move forward with the fielding of the first instantiation of a program of record that integrates crewed and un-crewed platforms operationally. The assessment we have made is that the technology programs I have discussed—and others—have done enough to build confidence that this goal is achievable.

With this program the DAF will have a platform, in quotes, a platform in the sense that the IT industry uses platform – not in the sense that we all use it – in a commercial technology sense of the word, platform, from which to continuously extend technology applications and functionality as that technology matures. Initial fielding will be followed by a program of continuous development and incremental fielding of both hardware and software.

The next imperative is defining optimized resilient basing. One of the dependencies that our competitors have come to understand and design forces to attack is our reliance on well-established forward tactical air bases. The NGAD tactical family of systems that I just described won’t be viable without resilient forward basing.

The Department of the Air Force has a long-standing dependency on a handful of forward air bases in the Western Pacific and in Europe. In all cases these air bases are at fixed locations that are very well known. With precision munitions, it’s possible for an adversary to send a great deal of weapons against each of these assets.

China, in particular, has acquired a large number of precision conventional rockets and is working on fielding large numbers of hypersonic weapons which are even harder to defend against. We must find a way to keep these bases open if attacked, or to take away that easy targeting opportunity that we’ve provided.

The concept that the Department of the Air Force is pursuing to address this problem today is called Agile Combat Employment or ACE. It’s the idea that one doesn’t just operate from an individual fixed base. Satellite bases dispersed in a hub-and-spoke concept provide numerous locations and make forces less easily targetable because of their disbursement.

The ACE concept is absolutely an important step in the right direction, but it must be fully defined and adequately resourced to be successful. This imperative builds on prior work to define the optimal mix of dispersion, hardening, deception, and active defenses to ensure the resilience and operational effectiveness of our tactical air assets. Most of our forward basing is in allied nations that we are trying to protect and defend, so it is an absolute requirement to work with our many allies around the globe to implement and succeed in this great imperative.

The next imperative is defining the B-21 Long Range Strike Family of Systems. This initiative, similar to NGAD, identifies all of the components of the B-21 family of systems, including the potential use of more affordable un-crewed autonomous combat aircraft.

The technologies are there now to introduce un-crewed platforms in this system-of-systems context, but the most cost effective approach and the operational concepts for this complement to crewed global strike capabilities have to be analyzed and defined. One of the things that people often miss about un-crewed systems is that if you’re going to use an autonomous platform with a crewed system, it has to have range capability to go as far as the crewed system goes and support that system with a reasonable payload when it gets there.

We’re looking for systems that cost nominally on the order of at least half as much as the manned systems that we’re talking about for both NGAD and for B-21. Together, with the B-21 and NGAD platforms, un-crewed systems would provide enhanced mission-tailorable levels of capability. They could deliver a range of sensors, other mission payloads, and weapons, or other mission equipment and they can also be attritable or even sacrificed if doing so conferred a major operational advantage – something we would never do with a crewed platform.

Finally, the seventh imperative is overall readiness of the Department of the Air Force to transition to a wartime posture against a peer competitor. This imperative is about assessing the ability of our Department to quickly and effectively deploy and support Air and Space forces deployed to defeat aggression thousands of miles from the United States.

To go from a standstill to mobilizing forces, moving them into theater, and then supporting them takes the collective success of a large number of information systems and supporting logistical and industrial facilities and infrastructure. We have never had to mobilize forces against the cyber, or even the kinetic, threats we might face in a conflict with a modern peer competitor.

This imperative will analyze the entire mobilization and support ecosystem to ensure it is adequately hardened against the threats we would expect a peer adversary to present. It will identify and prioritize the investments we need to ensure success. To mobilize our Airmen and Guardians, track them, and get them into the field, we must have secure networks. Beyond that it includes our transportation systems, our logistics systems, physical security, and everything we depend upon to go to war.

There’s a strong allies and partners aspect to this imperative as well. It’s logistics nodes that we’re going to have to use, considerations like fuel and power that are going to require in order to support our forces. A range of things.

Alright, I’ve given you a lot to think about. At the end of the day all of this is about making good decisions and then moving out quickly to field real capability. You may have heard me say it many times, but we need to get meaningful operational capability in the hands of operators as quickly as possible…and that entails risk acceptance and some commitment.

Languishing in never-ending, small-scale experimentation does not get the warfighters what they need, but neither does wasting time and money on dead ends that won’t produce cost-effective and affordable solutions for our warfighters. We have to get our choices right about these imperatives, and we have to do so quickly.

Clearly we have some hard work ahead of us and we need your help, all of your help. Change is hard; change is hard, but losing is unacceptable. One team, one fight.

Six Space Technologies the USSF Needs in Order to Maintain the US Advantage

March 8, 2022 | By Nick Adde

As challenges to the U.S. military’s advantage in space continue to mount, the need to foster innovations and develop technologies to meet them rises accordingly.

A panel of experts addressed the technologies necessary to maintain superiority during a March 4 discussion at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla.

“The United States has worked for decades to keep space peaceful,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, who moderated the discussion. “Given adversary actions, we’ve got to respond. We need to present senior leaders with a range of effective options, and that means pursuing both defensive and offensive capabilities.”

The Space Force’s chief technology and innovation officer, Lisa Costa, outlined the critical space-security activities underway now:

Securing freedom of action in space—through artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and advanced analytics.
Improving survivability and resilient architectures.
Digital engineering throughout the processes of acquisition, training, and operations.
Adopting responsible AI and ML that Guardians can trust.
Improving space access, mobility, and logistics.
Enhancing current services, including search and rescue; space commerce; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The panel’s industry representatives—Nicholas Bucci of General Atomics and Frank DeMauro of Northrop Grumman—offered their views on how partnerships between businesses and the government could support the efforts of Costa’s team.

space technologies — The Space Force’s chief technology and innovation officer, Lisa Costa, from left, and Nicholas Bucci of General Atomics and Frank DeMauro of Northrop Grumman take part in the AFA Warfare Symposium, March 4, 2022. Staff photo by Mike Tsukamoto.

“This is about what is driving … innovation. It’s all about size, weight, and power improvements in terms of capabilities,” said Bucci, vice president of defense systems and technologies at General Atomics.

Bucci would like to see a 500-kilogram satellite do the work now performed by a 5,000-pound satellite; to advance technology that can deliver better access to space; and to get talented people who can foster innovation hired in the space community.

DeMauro, Northrop Grumman’s vice president and general manager of strategic deterrent systems, described how the company developed a way to dock onto and refuel existing commercial satellites—thus extending their lives—and how such technology could support the military mission as well.

In order to continue such support enterprises and activities, DeMauro said companies must plan the designs of their factories accordingly.

“[When] figuring out the flexibility we need to have in our systems, we also need to have the flexibility in our factories and in our systems to be able to pivot quickly, to be agile in what we’re delivering to the customers,” DeMauro said. “We’re going to have to figure out how to make sure that it’s meeting the needs of the warfighter.”

Service Cyber Leaders Discuss Challenges of Joint Operations

March 8, 2022 | By Shaun Waterman

Divergent ways of thinking about time were among the more unexpected challenges to joint cyber operations highlighted by commanders from three different services in a panel discussion at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla., on March 4.

Combatant commanders tend to focus on current engagements in the continuum of competition with adversaries employing hybrid tactics below the level of armed conflict, said Lt. Gen. Timothy D. Haugh, commander of the 16th Air Force and Air Force Cyber Command. “How do they use our overall [cyber] force to be able to engage an adversary today in the information environment or in cyberspace [in a way] that creates advantage?”

For leaders of the geographic combatant commands, the question is: “How do we engage the gray zone elements of our adversaries that are trying to create advantage for their nation? And how do we create opportunities for [the U.S.] interagency [policy and planning process] and our allies to be able to slow that advance?”

Air component commanders, by contrast, Haugh said, tend to focus on a longer time horizon—working out how information operations and cyber forces could assist their efforts to surge forces and work with allies in response to crises like the current one in Europe.

For air component commanders, Haugh said, “It’s about how do they enable their dynamic force employment? How do they amplify their exercises with allies and partners to strengthen resolve as part of the areas that could be enabling for agile combat employment? As we think about our partners and how we will work together in an area of crisis or conflict.”

Time, in the form of time at sea, was also on the mind of the Navy’s top cyber warrior, 10th Fleet and U.S. Fleet Cyber Commander Vice Adm. Ross Myers. The Navy faced a tougher challenge in recruitment and retention than the other services, he said. In the Navy, in addition to the same wage gap with the lucrative jobs that top cyber warriors could land in the private sector, “we do go to sea. And not everybody that’s inclined in cyber is necessarily inclined to spend months at sea.”

Combine that with the nationwide shortage of cyber talent, Myers added, and “We’re in a constant battle to acquire and retain a combat ready [cyber] force.”

Like in all the services, Myers said, a generation of Navy leaders who came into a service without email are challenged to relate to the digital natives they now command.

“It’s hard for me to relate to a 20-year-old that lives with an iPhone in their hand. That’s their means of communication … and they live and breathe with that thing. They sleep with it. That is foreign to me,” he said. “But it does not diminish the fact: Leadership is leadership. Whether it’s electronic, or whether it’s physical, it still demands and requires all of us to be good leaders.”

“In truth and reality, the Navy [had] some of the last units to go … into the electronic age,” said Myers, who entered the service in 1986. “When I came in the Navy, we were still doing letter mail. Email addresses didn’t exist,” he recalled, noting that he now leads a fleet “where I guarantee you there are sailors that have never received a letter at sea. The only thing they’ve received are emails.”

Like other digital natives, young Navy service members took connectivity for granted, added Myers. “If you want to come close to a mutiny, cut off the internet connection … for more than a few hours, and offer no explanation for it,” he said.

Army Maj. Gen. William “Joe” Hartman, commander of Cyber Command’s National Mission Forces, admitted that he, too, entered the service in the pre-email era. But he said he learned the basics of cybersecurity from the legendary “Ranger Handbook: Five Principles of Patrolling,” one of which was security.

“Until you had security, you couldn’t do anything else. And that’s the environment that we’re still in. And for a network operation, it starts with security,” Hartman said. “Once your network is secure, you can then communicate those important things you need to, and you can make those decisions that as a senior leader you need to make. But if you’re unclear on the security of your network, you shouldn’t make any decisions. You shouldn’t take any actions, until your network is secure. And that’s a little bit blunt. But that just is the way that we’ve always operated in the Department [of the Army].”

Even leaders from the pre-email era had families who tended to take connectivity for granted, said Lt. Gen. Mary F. O’Brien, Air Force deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber effects operations, who moderated the discussion.

“When I was deployed to Afghanistan,” she recalled, “my son said, ‘Mom, are you going to have WiFi in Kabul, so you can order my saxophone reeds and schedule my lacrosse camp?’ And I said, ‘Yes, I will,’ and he goes, ‘OK, we’ll be fine.’”

Full-Spectrum Employment Is an Industry Priority for EMS Warfare

March 8, 2022 | By Hope Hodge Seck

With peer adversaries gaining ground in electromagnetic spectrum warfare, the U.S. military must employ the entire spectrum to protect warfighters and press the advantage, a panel of industry experts said. Speaking at the AFA Warfare Symposium on March 4, the experts in EMS warfare also urged agile development to keep pace with the threat.

Complicating the strategic picture is greater signal density from commercial as well as military use, said Lisa Aucoin, vice president of F-35 Solutions at BAE Systems.

“Relying on stealth as we have in the past is no longer a sole option,” Aucoin said. “I think one of the key pieces here is employing the entire spectrum, not only [radio frequency], but [infrared], to kind of branch that range of frequencies, to enable us to detect more threats in real time.”

Aucoin was joined on the panel by Paul K. Turner, principal product development engineer at AT&T Public Sector, and Andy Lowery, chief product officer at Epirus. Col. William “Dollar” Young, commander of the Air Force’s newly created 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing, moderated the discussion.

After Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. declared in January 2021 that the service had been “asleep at the wheel” for the past three decades in EMS warfare, the Air Force has intensified its pursuit for dominance in that space. It released an Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy in April and has made big shifts, including the creation of the 350th, to prioritize spectrum warfare.

The Air Force also announced in February that it had achieved initial operating capability of the Legion pod, an infrared search-and-track sensor designed for integration with the F-15C Eagle.

Aucoin listed key developments that must take place to fully employ the electromagnetic spectrum for EW countermeasures: hardware and software innovations to provide improved instantaneous bandwidth; better emitter identification; high-speed scanning; and greater radar sensitivity.

“These new techniques will evolve as the threat evolves, and we have to go faster than our adversaries,” she said.

Lowery, who previously worked as chief engineer for the Navy’s Next-Gen Jammer program, said solutions dependent on software rather than hardware can help the Defense Department become more agile and available to adapt at the speed of enemy threats. Epirus’ flagship product is an open-architecture system that uses high-power microwave technology to neutralize enemy drones.

“A warfighter has a threat they haven’t seen before. We identify it. We study it. We send out to the field real-time, over-the-air updates,” he said. “And now that threat can be taken care of.”

Further investment in research and development, Aucoin said, could help the Defense Department to extract more signal information from the spectrum it can access. Also, she said, it’s important to begin thinking about and employing the spectrum in a holistic, collaborative way.

“We tend to think of RF by itself; we tend to think of IR by itself, laser by itself,” she said. “We need to make all of those things work together to do what we need them to do.”

KC-135s, Air Support Ops Team Deploying to Europe

March 7, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The Pentagon is sending KC-135s and roughly 150 Airmen to Europe to support troops already deployed there in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, press secretary John F. Kirby announced March 7.

The tankers will come from Fairchild Air Force Base, Wash., and are planned to go to Souda Bay, Greece, “to provide additional aerial refueling support to the commander of U.S. European Command,” Kirby said in a press briefing.

Fairchild is home to the 92nd Air Refueling Wing, the Air Force’s lone “super” tanker wing. The 92nd boasts 63 aircraft in its inventory and is often called upon for refueling needs. Kirby did not specify how many tankers would deploy.

The move is one of several ordered by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III over the weekend, Kirby said. Approximately 40 members of an air support operations center also will deploy to Poland and Romania from Fort Stewart, Ga., where the 15th Air Operations Support Squadron is based.

On top of that, roughly 300 personnel from a modular ammunition ordnance company out of Fort Bragg, N.C., and a support maintenance company out of Fort Stewart will deploy to support the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, in Germany.

All told, roughly 500 service members are being deployed in support of the 7,000 U.S. troops who recently deployed to Germany.

“Specifically, the ones we’re talking about today are enablers,” Kirby said. “And we said before when we deployed the additional 7,000 that there would be associated enablers with them. This is part of that support.”

Over the past few weeks, the DOD has shifted troops and resources several times in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, seeking to bolster allies along NATO’s eastern front. On top of the 7,000 service members announced in late February, F-35s, F-16s, and F-15s have all taken part in joint training and enhanced air policing missions, and an infantry battalion, attack aviation battalion, and attack aviation task force totaling 32 Apache helicopters, multiple Stryker units, and 4,700 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division deployed as well.