National Guard Has ‘Huge Problem’ in Addressing Sexual Assault, Lawmaker Says

Jan. 20, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Combatting sexual assault and harassment in the ranks presents a “huge problem” for the National Guard, a top lawmaker on the House Armed Services Committee warned Jan. 19.

Questioning National Guard Bureau Chief Gen. Daniel R. Hokanson during a military personnel subcommittee hearing on the topic, Rep. Jackie Speier (D-Calif.), chair of the panel, added that she had “some serious concerns” over the Guard’s ability to protect Airmen and Soldiers from harassment and assault if state officials fail to do so.

At the heart of Speier’s concerns is the process by which the Guard investigates allegations of assault and harassment. Any allegations are first referred to local law enforcement, Hokanson told lawmakers. Then, if the local authorities decline to pursue the case, the state’s adjutant general can request that the Bureau’s Office of Complex Investigations conduct an investigation.

The OCI, however, is “not a criminal investigative organization,” Brig. Gen. Charles M. Walker, director of the office, told the subcommittee. “We provide administrative investigations as a backstop so the victims and the National Guard will have an opportunity to address sexual violence against its members and to remove those within our ranks who may be perpetrators, in administrative contexts.”

OCI investigations are also complicated by the fact that different states have different military laws outside the Uniform Code of Military Justice, creating a web of different standards to consider.

“Because there are changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, each of the states that have a state code of military justice may or may not make changes as quickly as those adjust,” Hokanson said. “And so we really rely on our OCI as they go out to investigate to really look at the State Code of Military Justice and how it applies.”

What troubled Speier most, though, was the power adjutant generals hold over the investigative process.

“In many respects, what’s going on in the National Guard is what went on in the military, when it was up to the chain of command to make a determination as to whether or not to pursue a sexual assault case,” Speier said. “And we found out that for a number of reasons, they chose not to do that, and [an adjutant general] who has a number of sexual assault cases that occur under their command [may] become loath to report them, or seek assistance of OCI, for fear that it might reflect poorly on them. And sometimes they are the assaulter.”

The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act included an update of the UCMJ, taking the decision to prosecute certain crimes such as rape, sexual assault, murder, and kidnapping from the chain of command. The bill follows up on the Pentagon’s own report from its independent review commission on sexual assault in the military, which included 82 different recommendations.

Implementing these changes and recommendations across the network of 54 different states, territories, and Washington D.C., however, is taking time. Hokanson told lawmakers that more than six months after the IRC issued its recommendations, the National Guard Bureau had yet to implement any, citing a lack of resources.

Still, Hokanson expressed confidence that “I have all the authorities I need to work with the states to make sure that they follow the service guidance.”

Speier was seemingly unconvinced, noting that Hokanson seems to be limited solely to persuading and advocating, not mandating, changes.

“So I’ve got some serious concerns. It’s $26 billion that we [send] out every year to the states. And we have no control, no authority to protect those National Guard service members if the state chooses not to,” Speier said.

While Speier expressed skepticism, the OCI has seen an uptick in investigations, Walker said, in part thanks to additional resources and changes that allowed the office to add more investigators. Hokanson specified that the number of investigators has increased some 60 percent.

“With the renewed and enhanced ability to actually intake cases, we’ve seen a jump in cases particularly this fiscal year,” Walker said. “We’re running definitely ahead of what we had historically in any year already.”

While Walker expressed confidence that his office has enough investigators to handle the increase in cases, multiple lawmakers showed concern about the timeliness, or lack thereof, to those investigations. Hokanson echoed the concern while addressing the backlog of cases, calling extended timelines “really unacceptable.”

But Walker was quick to note that some of the issue of timeliness is outside of OCI’s control.

“Everyone talks of timeliness, but I want us to think about the National Guard and what we’re doing,” Walker said. “We’ve got a force that’s 75 to 80 percent part time. We are a full-time investigative capability, but we also depend on the victim’s counsel, the defense’s counsel, and the state to have the witnesses available when we do an investigation. Oftentimes, we’re limited to drill periods, which happen once a month. So for the National Guard, three days is actually 45 days equivalent, given the availability of our witnesses and the availability of us to get onsite to do investigations.”

Still, Speier, who is slated to retire from Congress in January 2023, indicated that she won’t let the issue drop for the rest of her term.

“To the National Guard: The spotlight of Congress is on you. Take care of your Soldiers. Take care of your Airmen. Stamp out sexual harassment and assault. Stop the retaliation. I am watching,” Speier said.

White House’s Cyber Plan ‘Raises the Bar’ for Securing DOD Computer Systems

Jan. 20, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

A new White House memo expands cybersecurity requirements for national security systems beyond those of civilian government systems.

The memo dated Jan. 19 “raises the bar for the cybersecurity of our most sensitive systems,” according to an accompanying fact sheet.

The memo lays out timelines for agencies to comply with security protocols and says agencies must report “cybersecurity incidents” to the National Security Agency, which is the “national manager” of the government’s classified computer systems. The NSA will write rules “requiring agencies to take specific actions against known or suspected cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.”

Building on the Biden administration’s “Executive Order on Improving America’s Cybersecurity” published in May 2021, the new memo addresses multi-factor authentication, encryption, and cloud technologies among other requirements. It says agencies must secure “cross-domain solutions,” which are “tools that transfer data between classified and unclassified systems.”

It also outlines when agency heads may make exceptions “for circumstances necessitated by unique mission needs.”

Sections of the “Memorandum on Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community Systems” call for guidance or rules addressing:

Cloud technologies: The Committee on National Security Systems will create guidance “regarding minimum security standards and controls related to cloud migration and operation.”
Zero-trust architecture: Agencies will develop plans to adopt zero-trust architecture, in which parts of systems that are walled off from each other require users to continuously authenticate themselves as they move around the system.
Quantum-resistant algorithms: The NSA will share with agencies information on its plans for using quantum-resistant security algorithms “where necessary” to defend against potential cyberattacks by quantum computers.
Framework for collaboration: The NSA will “develop a framework to coordinate and collaborate on cybersecurity and incident response activities.” The framework will loop in the heads of relevant DOD entities along with the director of national intelligence and the directors of the FBI and CIA.

Kendall: Don’t Mirror China on Hypersonics; No ‘Big Bang’ on ABMS

Jan. 19, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall warned of putting too much emphasis on hypersonics just because China is advancing in that area, saying hypersonic missiles are better suited to China’s strategy and that USAF has yet to determine the right munitions mix for the future. He also warned that the Advanced Battle Management System won’t be a “big bang” single acquisition program but instead a series of incremental steps that will network the Air Force and the other services.

The targets that China is “worried about, that we present” are well addressed with hypersonic weapons, Kendall said during a Jan. 19 virtual Center for a New American Security event. These tend to be major air bases in the Pacific and naval formations. But “I think we have to be careful about not mirror-imaging the potential threats,” he said.

There was a “rush” during the Trump administration to develop hypersonics, Kendall noted, but they may not always be the most “cost-effective … tool” for the Air Force.

“We don’t have the same targets that [China is] worried about,” he said. “We have to think about what’s most cost-effective for us … [Hypersonic systems are] very expensive compared to conventional weapons. So we’ve got to look at that very carefully and decide where we need to be in that tradeoff. I don’t think enough work has been done on that.”

Kendall didn’t elaborate on the targets most compelling for USAF or whether they are best addressed by slower, stealthy cruise missiles, air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles that would be cheaper than the boost-glide variety, or direct-attack weapons.

Broadly, he said, the U.S. goal is “having a deterrence that defeats aggression, … whether it’s in Ukraine or … Taiwan, for example.” The “core mission” of adversaries such as China, however, is “to keep us out of their part of the world, or to keep us from intervening,” he said. These are “very different operational requirements.”

The right weapons mix is “still very much an open question for me,” Kendall said. He acknowledged that hypersonic missiles have the advantage of being fast and unpredictable and “can be a valuable asset” but that the Air Force needs to better plot its path for future munitions.

“There is a role for hypersonics in that mix,” he allowed. “And I think we should continue to proceed with developing and fielding appropriate hypersonic” systems.

Bridging to ABMS

On ABMS and the joint all-domain command and control requirement, Kendall said there is no “grand solution,” noting there will be bridging solutions to the eventual system. For example, there will likely continue to be some air component of an airborne and ground moving target indicator capability like AWACS and JSTARS, even though both of those systems have become more vulnerable. The goal will be a space-based system, but it’s not yet at hand, Kendall said.

“Right now we’re proceeding with Capability Release 1, as planned,” Kendall said, which is to put a communications node on KC-46 tankers. As the system progresses, his goal will be to “focus on the places where we get the highest return” on investment in the shortest period of time.

Getting to a combined AMTI/GMTI capability will involve interim steps such as “airborne components”—manned and unmanned aircraft—toward “an overarching solution” that will have space components. Because “high-level nodes can be attacked or be potentially vulnerable, … my intuition is that we have nodes at lower levels,” Kendall said. “We need to maintain continuity through [electromagnetic pulse]-threatened environment, [or] where we’re in a contested environment.”

Developing the overall architecture for ABMS has required a “fair amount of work” over the past few years, but it’s been directed toward “the premise that we could get to a grand solution. And I don’t think that’s going to be affordable or easily achievable on a timescale that’s realistic to meet our needs.” Capability Releases 1 and 2 “can be a part of all that, but there’s not yet, in my mind, a solution to that question.” Capability 2 will involve the AMTI/GMTI and various new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Future combat operations will be more like D-Day than the 8th Air Force’s bombing campaign in Europe, Kendall analogized. It will be necessary to shift a lot of decision-making to lower levels because of the likelihood of disruption of communications, he said.

“They’re very compressed in time. They’re very high density, and a lot of decisions have to be made in the timescale which is imposed by the operation. And it’s almost impossible to imagine that being done at a very, very high level and managing the amount of data. It’s also hard to imagine it being done without a lot of automation.” Artificial intelligence tools will be necessary to aid in decision-making, he said.

Given that high-level management of a major operation “can’t be done—you’ve got to go down to lower levels,” the question becomes “what is that level? And how do you do that?” The U.S. has not had to conduct operations in a contested environment for a long time, he said, and new thinking must be applied to cope with cyberattacks and electronic warfare in a way in which the U.S. hasn’t had to operate for decades.

Kendall repeated that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) system is an “imperative” and that his top priority, in the near term, is getting a “space order of battle architecture … right.” He reiterated that he’s launching new-start programs in unmanned aircraft to escort both fighters and long-range strike aircraft, with notionally five unmanned aircraft controlled by a manned one. They will “operate as a team.” The pilot will “call the play,” and the unmanned aircraft will execute with a high degree of autonomy, he said. But “we’re not going to be able to afford this” unless the unmanned aircraft are “cheaper platforms” that are “attritable, if not expendable.” Enough work has been done—on the development of the Skyborg autonomous piloting system, for example, and other technologies—that “it’s not a crazy idea. It’s something we can achieve,” Kendall said.

The question is, “how much, at what scale, and to what extent. We’re going to have to work on that,” but Kendall said his goal is to bring it to “a real operational capability.” These new aircraft will be run in special access programs, but “we’re going to figure out how to do this as quickly as possible” and with the help of companies.

Right Concept for the Future

Kendall said the Air Force’s agile combat employment model of rapidly moving forces around to many different bases is the right concept for the future. But bringing it to fruition requires a number of steps that Kendall pledged he will not allow to be sacrificed for programmatic priorities.

“We need … a sense of urgency” about bringing ACE about, he said. That will mean air bases “have to be harder,” with hardened shelters and facilities. Additionally, “We have to create some ambiguity for the enemy. We have to use multiple locations and deception to do that. We also have to have some level of defenses so that [the enemy] has some uncertainty about how successful his attack might be.” The Air Force also has to “change the equation” about “how much leverage [an enemy could obtain by] … shutting down … a small number of air bases. That, to me, is probably the most immediate task on the list, and one of the easiest ones … when you think about what you have to do.”

All these initiatives will require resources, which the Air Force hopes to find by retiring irrelevant systems, Kendall said. He expressed gratitude to Congress for allowing some of the divestitures USAF sought in the fiscal 2022 budget—though “not the A-10”—but insisted that Congress not hold on to obsolete capabilities just to preserve constituent jobs.

“Change can be painful, but it is necessary,” he said.

Space Force Foresees Need for Cislunar Space Domain Awareness Within Decade

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

The Space Force’s top officer thinks the U.S. needs to be able to surveil cislunar space as soon as five years from now to defend U.S. interests on and around the moon.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond explained his estimate—the need for cislunar space domain awareness in the next five to 10 years—during a webinar Jan. 19 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

NASA, with its mission of exploration and science, has said it plans to go back to the moon “hopefully here in the not-too-distant-future,” Raymond said. “I think for them to do their job, they have to have a domain that’s safe, and secure, and stable.”

NASA hopes to land astronauts on the moon’s surface by 2025 but will first send its vehicles on two test-flights to cislunar space and back—the first of those flights uncrewed, the second crewed but without a landing. Meanwhile, NASA and companies are planning a number of robotic missions.

Raymond said he views the Space Force’s role as “providing capabilities for our country’s way of life, and our way of war, and making sure that [space] is safe and stable so all can operate in it.” He said the Space Force already has the job, through the monitoring of objects in orbit, of protecting astronauts on the International Space Station. He alluded to dangers such as debris like that caused by Russia’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in November.

“So as the nation goes further away, as the world goes further away, from the Earth, I think there’s going to be a requirement to have, at least—at a minimum—some domain awareness on that environment,” Raymond said. “I would say in … the next five to 10 years, we’re going to have to have some capability to be able to support those operations.”

On the military side, he also acknowledged “utility” in keeping pace with advancements being made by China, “our pacing challenger,” to make sure “that we compete in all areas of the domain, not just in low Earth orbit, or medium Earth orbit, or geosynchronous orbit.”

The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Cislunar Highway Patrol System is an example of the military’s research into how objects move in cislunar space and new ways to track them.

The commander of U.S. Space Command, Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, described space domain awareness in an interview with reporters in August. He differentiated space domain awareness from the well established practice of space situational awareness.

“One is different that the other,” Richardson said. Space situational awareness is more simply “reporting on where something is in space—characterizing it that way,” he explained. Space domain awareness “is a little bit more complicated,” requiring observers to try to understand and assign motive—“the ‘why’—the intent—behind having something in space and where it is.”

What Can Congress, Pentagon Do to Help With Military Spouses’ Unemployment?

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Dozens of programs already provide career assistance to military families. But Congress and the Pentagon can do more to study just how well those programs work and to understand other challenges facing military spouses seeking employment, advocates from the National Military Spouse Network argued Jan. 19.

More than 20 percent of military spouses were unemployed before the COVID-19 pandemic, NMSN President Sue Hoppin noted during the virtual rollout of the organization’s 2022 white paper, “The Military Spouse Employment Dilemma.” That percentage has stayed relatively steady for years now.

At the same time, the number of career-related resources available to military spouses has grown significantly. The paper notes that a 2020 Government Accountability Report identified 45 such programs for military and veteran families across the federal government.

“If you dig deeper and look at some of the military spouse employment pieces, holy cow, the number of resources are just tremendous,” said Sharene Brown, wife of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. “How they include career development, hiring assistance programs, entrepreneurial exploration, federal jobs—you name it, there’s just so much more … The opportunity to be able to help military spouses thrive in the employment world starts from just how to begin and then carries you through. There’s even coaching opportunities along the way.”

That wasn’t always the case, said Mollie Raymond, wife of Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond. When she first became a military spouse, she noted, the biggest adjustment was dealing with employment, or lack thereof.

“I was so excited to have graduated. I have a master’s in business administration. But I couldn’t find a job. I couldn’t find a network to connect with or any of the resources. [They] just weren’t like they are today,” Raymond said. “So I have seen, in these 34 years, so many wonderful resources available to spouses, and I couldn’t be more pleased or excited.”

Though resources are available, obstacles remain. Given the frequent moves that come with being part of a military family, spouses often struggle to find jobs, even compared to similarly educated individuals. There are also other challenges, said Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska).

“I think it’s critical that we should always look for ways to lessen the obstacles for military spouses to be able to get good jobs,” Sullivan said. “And look, that’s a win-win. It’s, of course, a win to the military families. But it’s a win to the communities that those families are in. Too often there are burdensome state or local regulations or federal regulations that inhibit military spouses from being able to fully contribute in their communities.”

And when spouses can’t find jobs, a whole host of other issues are likely to arise, said Heba Abdelaal, an NMSN leader and former congressional aide.

“There’s a reason why, when we talk about food insecurity, child care challenges, housing challenges, it’s always followed up by the fact that a military spouse may or may not be unemployed or underemployed,” Abdelaal said.

Over the long term, spouses are often unable to take advantage of benefits such as retirement plans because employers require them to spend a certain amount of time with the company before investing in those programs, Abdelaal said.

In order to address the employment and career development issues, NMSN offered five recommendations in its paper:

The Defense Department should establish “a standard set of metrics” to evaluate career assistance programs across federal, state, and local levels; and should make the findings of those metrics publicly available.
Congress should study “the inability of military spouses to benefit from financial vesting programs.”
The federal government should expand its use of the Domestic Employee Teleworking Overseas program, which allows federal employees to keep their jobs while temporarily working remotely overseas.
The Small Business Administration should create a Military Spouse SBA Small-Business Concern classification to provide support to military spouse entrepreneurs.
Congress should “consider authorizing the development of a military spouse experience map through the lens of employment, and what employment benefits/resources are accessible to a military spouse through each phase of the military life cycle.”

There has already been some Congressional action. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision, co-sponsored by Sullivan, mandating that the Defense Department conduct a study on military spouse employment. And the Military Spouse Hiring Act, introduced by Rep. Antonio Delgado (D-N.Y.), is currently pending.

Speaking Jan. 19, Delgado urged military spouses to advocate for the bill and to direct their energy to the proper officials, noting that the bill doesn’t fall under the purview of the House Armed Services Committee. Because it authorizes a tax credit to businesses who hire a military spouse, the legislation instead falls under the House Ways and Means Committee, “which handles tax policy,” he said.

“It’s understanding that dynamic that gives you the best chance to get the outcome you desire,” Delgado said.

While advocates continue to push for sweeping change, Raymond urged military spouses to take advantage of resources in their local communities.

“I just want to reiterate that local communities, whether you have a military spouse career coalition or not, they want to help spouses. They want to help the military in their communities. So don’t hesitate to reach out,” Raymond said. “And to spouses who might just be starting out, please look for resources. They’re out there. And we want you to follow your dreams professionally and financially, and we want you not to give up, so don’t give up. Look for resources. And know that you’re not alone and that your talents, your adaptability, your resilience, your hard work, your loyalty are valued.”

NATO Publishes ‘Overarching’ Space Policy, Outlines 4 Roles It Could Play

Jan. 19, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

NATO isn’t looking to develop any space capabilities of its own, but it does want to bolster its space support for operations and missions. Any space-based attack on an ally could trigger the alliance’s collective defense policy, it said in its first public space policy document released Jan. 17.

NATO’s newly released “overarching” space policy follows the alliance’s adoption of a previous space policy in 2019, but details of that policy weren’t released publicly.

The new document pledges that NATO “is not aiming to become an autonomous space actor.” But given the increasingly crowded and contested nature of the domain, the alliance “will seek to complement and add value to the work of Allies and to engage with other relevant international organizations, as appropriate, avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.”

In particular, the policy outlines four key roles for NATO to play in the space domain:

Integrating space and space-related considerations into the delivery of NATO’s core tasks;
Serving as a forum for political-military consultations and information-sharing on relevant deterrence and defense-related space developments;
Ensuring effective provision of space support and effects to the Alliance’s operations, missions, and other activities;
Facilitating the development of compatibility and interoperability between Allies’ space services, products, and capabilities.

Those key roles will be supported by nine “lines of effort,” ranging from space support to space domain awareness to training and exercises.

The issue of space support is particularly important, the policy states, as it is needed for everything from space situational awareness to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications to weather monitoring; and missile warning to position, navigation, and timing. In order to fulfill those missions, NATO will identify and develop mechanisms to define its space support needs, the policy states.

“Allies’ capabilities, and, if necessary, trusted commercial service providers should be leveraged to meet these requirements in the most secure, efficient, effective, and transparent manner,” the policy adds.

Other lines of effort are centered around a push that the U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly endorsed—the adoption of an international set of rules or norms for operating in space. Even more fundamentally, the policy calls for NATO to “develop a common understanding of concepts, such as the role of space in crisis or conflict.”

But even while the policy states that free access, exploration, and peaceful use of space are “in the common interest of all nations,” it acknowledges that potential adversaries are developing capabilities to attack space assets, such as anti-satellite missiles and in-orbit weapons.

Such attacks would “present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance … and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack,” the policy states, adding that those attacks could lead to the invocation of NATO’s Article 5, under which members of the alliance commit to collectively defend each other and to respond to armed attacks.

The policy does not, however, definitively say what attacks in space will trigger Article 5, instead stating that those decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s principal political decision-making body.

The council will also be tasked with considering “a range of potential options … across the conflict spectrum to deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Allies’ space systems.”

Interoperability and cooperation are recurring themes throughout the policy as well, with NATO calling on member nations to share best practices with each other, coordinate their capabilities and information-sharing, and include space considerations in their military exercises.

DOD Condemns Iranian-Backed Houthi Attack on Partner UAE

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthi rebels attacked U.S. partner the United Arab Emirates on Jan. 17 with a combination of drone and missile strikes targeting two of the country’s airports and an oil refinery, killing three and setting off multiple explosions in the capital of Abu Dhabi.

Houthis have primarily targeted Saudi Arabia and its oil fields in the past with Iranian-made drone attacks. In a first, the terrorist attack against the UAE injured several foreign nationals in an attempt to discourage support for the Yemeni government, which has been in conflict with the Houthis since 2014.

The Defense Department condemned the attack on the regional partner and promised to seek ways to help the UAE better defend itself.

“The Department of Defense joins me in strongly condemning yesterday’s terrorist attack in Abu Dhabi,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said in a statement Jan. 18.

“We remain committed to the UAE’s security and ability to defend itself and stand united with our Emirati partners in defending against all threats to their territory,” the Secretary added.

In a briefing Jan. 18, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby went further, underscoring the foreign military sales relationship with the UAE and noting that the U.S. would seek ways to strengthen the partnership.

“We take these attacks on the Emirati seriously,” Kirby said. “We’re going to continue, again, to look for ways to make that defense partnership and their ability to defend themselves stronger and better.”

U.S. foreign military sales to the UAE total $29.3 billion and include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9B remotely piloted aircraft.

The Air Force relies on the UAE’s Al Dhafra Air Base, where 3,500 U.S. personnel are stationed for regional operations including over-the-horizon efforts in Afghanistan. Al Dhafra also served as a staging point in the August 2021 Afghanistan noncombatant evacuation operation, hosting thousands of Afghan refugees before onward movement to Europe and the United States.

The UAE attacks, dubbed “Operation Hurricane Yemen,” targeted Dubai and Abu Dhabi civilian airports, the Musaffah oil refinery, and other sensitive sites, according to press reports quoting Houthi spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree.

The statements, reportedly made on the Houthi-owned Al Masirah TV channel, claims that five ballistic missiles and a large number of drones were used in the operation.

Kirby said the DOD was still assessing the attack and could not rule out whether American personnel were at risk, noting that the “evolving” drone threat has been persistently used by Iranian-backed groups throughout the region to attack Americans.

“Even the best of systems isn’t necessarily going to get every single individual threat,” Kirby said. “In this case, it was the Houthis supported by Iran, but we continue to see in Iraq and Syria, militia groups supported by Iran sort of choose this tactic, this way of conducting attacks using UAVs.”

Air Force’s Major Accidents Trending Down Slightly

Jan. 18, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Numbers of major accidents involving Air Force aircraft are down slightly over the past five years, the service reported Jan. 18. There were fewer Class A accidents in fiscal 2021 but a slight increase in Class B mishaps during the year, the third year Class B accidents have increased.

In fiscal 2021, the Air Force saw 21 Class A aviation accidents, down from 30 in fiscal 2020 and “well below the five-year average” of 27.2, the service said. Class A mishaps result in a death or permanent disability, cause more than $2.5 million in damage, or result in the destruction of an aircraft.

Class B mishaps, however, increased from 41 in fiscal 2020 to 42 in 2021, which USAF said was “consistent” with a five-year average of 42.5 such accidents. A Class B mishap causes permanent partial disability; causes damage valued at between $600,000 and just under $2.5 million; or hospitalizes three people, not counting those admitted for observation or administrative purposes who are treated and released.

The Class A accidents in fiscal 2021 resulted in four deaths, including one contractor pilot, compared with seven who died in Class A events during fiscal 2020. Eight aircraft were destroyed—versus 14 the year before—of which two were Air Force-owned manned airplanes, five were USAF-owned unmanned aircraft, and one was a manned contractor airplane. Six unmanned aircraft were involved in Class A accidents in fiscal 2020.

The data provided were as of Dec. 15, 2021.

Mishap data — The most serious Air Force accidents—Class A mishaps—were down in fiscal 2021, but the number of less-serious Class B mishaps was on a three-year rising trend, although still below the peak of fiscal 2018. Source: Air Force Safety Center

Of the 2021 “flight mishaps,” 19 were Class A and 30 were Class B, for a total of 49. “Ground operations” accidents tallied two Class A and 10 Class B, for a total of 12, and there were two Class B accidents under “flight-related mishaps,” for a grand total of 63 Class A and B mishaps combined in fiscal 2021.

Although the trend line for Class A accidents is down with 2021, the number has risen and fallen over the past five years. The number was 29 in fiscal 2017; rose to 30 in 2018; fell to 26 in 2019; then surged again to 30 in 2020; before falling sharply to 21 in 2021.

Class B accidents are actually on a rising trend line over the past three years. In fiscal 2017, there were 44 Class B accidents, but in fiscal 2018, there were 47—a five-year high. Class B accidents fell sharply to 36 in fiscal 2019 but jumped to 41 in 2020 and rose again to 42 in 2021.

The Air Force did not provide data on Class C accidents, which cause damage valued at up to $600,000 or result in injuries causing loss of workdays.

The total combined Class A and B accidents—63 in fiscal 2021—is meaningfully less than the 72 in fiscal 2020 and 2019. The recent peak was fiscal 2018, with a combined 74; following 70 in fiscal 2017.

The Air Force Safety Center has noted that statistics “fluctuate from year to year,” so it looks at trends in the data in search of significant changes or common issues.

Raymond: Yearlong CR Would Cause ‘Ripple Effect,’ Could Push Back 2 Space Launches

Jan. 18, 2022 | By Amanda Miller

Going the full fiscal year funded by a continuing resolution would cost the Defense Department the ability to procure two space launches and cause a “ripple effect for years to come.”

Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond addressed the effects of a continuing resolution on the National Security Space Launch program Jan. 18 online interview hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

SpaceX and United Launch Alliance are the NSSL providers.

President Joe Biden signed the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act in December, authorizing the procurement of five launches under the program.

But until Congress appropriates money to be spent, the government has to operate at fiscal 2021 levels. The current continuing resolution funding the government expires Feb. 18.

“The way we do launches [is], we procure launches two years in advance,” Raymond explained. “So the launches that would slip would be those launches we procure in ’23 for launch in ’24.”

If Congress passes the full budget in February, the Space Force will move ahead with procuring the five launches, Raymond said. But “a long-term CR” would delay two of those.

Pushing off the two launches would then bump two more, setting off the ripple effect, Raymond said: “It’s more than just a one-year impact.”

Without specifying, Raymond said the Space Force knows which two launches it would delay—“and they’re really important launches to us as we compete to turn and win against Russia and China, our pacing challenge.”

He pointed out that the payloads planned for launch will already have been built.

“I cannot stress enough the importance of getting a budget passed,” Raymond said.