Air Force to Make First of 13 HACM Hypersonic Tests This Fall

June 24, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force expects to fly 13 tests of the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile between October 2024 and March 2027, with a production decision to follow if the project is successful, the Government Accountability Office revealed in a new report.

GAO’s annual Weapon System Assessment report, released in mid-June, says the air-breathing hypersonic missile program is slated to undergo a critical design review in 2025 and transition from a rapid prototyping/mid-tier acquisition to a major defense program in 2027. However, the CDR will reflect an initial version of the missile, which will be refined as the test program progresses, and there will in effect be a “rolling” CDR. Production could begin as early as 2027.

Raytheon is the prime contractor for HACM, and Northrop Grumman is developing its scramjet engine.

Development of HACM will cost $1.9 billion, which will cover the 13 test missiles, associated engineering and materials, and an undisclosed number of additional all-up missiles when testing has concluded, providing a “residual operational capability.”

The arrangement is similar to that for the AGM-131 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, made by Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, which has largely concluded testing. However, the Air Force has been deliberately ambiguous about whether it has plans for further testing or production of ARRW.

Unlike ARRW, which is a boost-glide hypersonic weapon, HACM is a rocket-boosted, air-breathing system with longer range that can change course en route to target and therefore complicate defenses against it. The Air Force has long shown a preference for HACM because it’s smaller than ARRW, has a longer range, and can be carried on fighter-seized aircraft. The ARRW is limited to a large platform like the B-52 bomber, from which all its test fights were made.

Air Force budget documents for fiscal 2025 describes the two missiles as “complementary.”

HACM got its start in fiscal 2022 in a joint Air Force/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency effort called the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, or HAWC, which served as a prototype for HACM. Raytheon was chosen to develop the weapon over competitors Boeing and Lockheed in 2022.

“According to officials, the launch aircraft, booster, payload, and guidance system, along with an interstage that connects the cruiser and booster, are new to HACM and make it operationally capable,” the GAO report disclosed.

The 2027 production date depends on “what capabilities the Air Force is willing to accept and whether production facilities are ready,” the GAO report added.

The program got underway without a formal schedule risk assessment, but one was approved in June 2023, the report said. “Our prior work has shown that this type of information is important to help decision-makers make well-informed decisions about [mid-tier acquisition] program initiation. This includes whether the program is likely to meet the statute-based objective of fielding a prototype that can be demonstrated in an operational environment and provide for a residual operational capability within 5 years of program start.”

The HACM has direction from Air Force leadership “to move as quickly as possible, and schedule risk assessments would likely note that higher level of risk,” the watchdog agency noted.

Requirements, an acquisition strategy, a formal technology risk assessment, and an independent cost estimate were all completed before the program was officially launched. The Air Force approved HACM requirements in November 2021, but the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has not yet “validated” those requirements, the GAO reported. However, this is expected to happen before HACM transitions to a major defense program.

The agency said the Air Force believes the “critical technologies underpinning HACM design were either immature or nearing maturity” at the program go-ahead, but “the program expects them to be fully mature by the end of the rapid prototyping effort.”

In addition to an iterative design approach, the HACM program is using digital design tools and “fully digital design reviews,” the GAO report states. However, the program is not creating a digital twin of the missile at this stage, although there may be one in the future.

The program office told GAO officials that digital reviews are challenging because of “the sheer number of tools, licensing restrictions, limited computing power, and the logistics of doing so in a way that is accessible to the large number of program stakeholders.”

GAO officials suggested “incorporating continuous user feedback” through the design cycles, something the program apparently isn’t planning to do.

“Program officials did state that users could provide some feedback during operational testing, but this would primarily serve to facilitate users learning the system, rather than informing the design,” the GAO report noted

Because all of the Pentagon’s hypersonic projects are vying for access to a limited number of facilities and test ranges, HACM is being integrated with the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment, a joint U.S.-Australian effort. The GAO report said “several” HACM tests will take place in Australia, launched off Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18s. Air Force budget documents refer to SCIFIRE as a “prelude” to HACM.

The Air Force budget said fiscal 2025 activities on HACM will include continuing design and integration on the F-15E and F/A-18E/F aircraft, and “free flight testing of HACM prototypes.”

The research and development budget for HACM calls for $516.9 million in 2025; $448.6 million in 2026, $274.1 million in 2027, $200.8 million in 2028, and $202.6 million in 2029, at which point development is set to conclude.

USAFA Historian’s New Book Takes Fresh Look At Air Force History

June 24, 2024 | By David Roza

In just over 200 pages, a new book from the command historian at the Air Force Academy covers more than a century of airpower in a concise primer for newcomers and armchair historians.

“Fighting From Above: A Combat History of the U.S. Air Force,” by Brian Laslie organizes the 117 or so years of the Air Force and its preceding organizations into four eras defined by the changing styles of U.S. airpower, including the uncertain future presented by drones, cyber warfare, and space operations.

Laslie is one of the instructors for USAFA’s Introduction to Military History course that all Cadets must take, and he hopes the book can help them and others interested in airpower to think critically about Air Force history and prepare for whatever happens next in air warfare.

“There are things that airpower is uniquely good at, and conversely there are times when airpower might not be the best military option,” Laslie told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “There are gray areas: that not everything is right and wrong, and the situations and the conflicts that they will deal with in the future are incredibly complicated.”

While Laslie’s previous four books focused on specific Air Force history topics such as Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, airpower in the Vietnam War, and the Kosovo air campaign, “Fighting From Above” offers a broader view of Air Force history. Along the way, he sheds light on unsung heroes and offers a different point of view on some of the service’s main characters and themes.

Ways of War

Military historians often discuss the “ways of war” of various nations, but the Air Force way of conducting war has changed dramatically over the decades to keep up with technological developments and shifting American political goals. After several drafts, Laslie classified four “epochs” of Air Force history.

The first epoch, Period of Discovery from 1907-1941, covers the years between the U.S. Army establishing the aeronautical branch of its Signal Corps and the U.S. entering World War II. Early advocates of U.S. airpower such as Mitchell, Spaatz, and Arnold saw airplanes as a way to end future conflicts faster, without the endless, bloody slog of World War I trench warfare.

B-17 Flying Fortresses during World War II. George Letzer/American Air Museum/Imperial War Museum

Those advocates saw their vision take flight during the second epoch: Strategic Dominance from 1942-1975, which began with thousands of heavy bombers targeting Axis industrial and transportation centers in an attempt to break the enemy’s home front during World War II. While the results proved more complicated than early advocates expected, strategic bombardment “remained king” in the newly-formed U.S. Air Force, especially with the advent of nuclear weapons delivered by bomber and missile crews, Laslie wrote.

The strategic bombardment mindset continued until the end of the Vietnam War, where tangled political goals, lack of interservice coordination, and insufficient training marked the end of the Air Force’s founding belief “that strategic bombardment could win any conflict where it was applied,” Laslie contends.

Out of the Vietnam experience emerged the third epoch: Tactical Ascendancy from 1975-2019, marked by fighter pilots assuming leadership positions, new training institutions such as Red Flag, and new technologies such as precision-guided munitions that blurred the lines between tactical and strategic aircraft.

But the future Air Force way of war is uncertain. With the rise of uncrewed aircraft large and small, the launch of the Space Force in 2019, and the emergence of artificial intelligence, another fundamental shift may be on the horizon.

“What you see in the shifts of the epochs is that something breaks, something forces a change,” Laslie said. “Eventually there will be an event or a point of inflection that forces us into epoch four, and I don’t know what that is.”

The rapid pace of technology makes it hard to see the future and catch up to the present; Laslie had to rewrite the last chapter several times to stay relevant.

“Things were happening as fast as I could write them down, which is why historians typically don’t come up to present-day,” he said.

1916 photograph of American WWI aviator Victor Chapman (Wikimedia Commons)

Background Characters

Despite its short length, “Fighting From Above,” is more than a list of names and dates. It also features human anecdotes that bring Air Force history to life.

One anecdote is of Victor Chapman, the first American pilot to die in World War I. Chapman was a member of the Lafayette Escadrille, the group of American fighter pilots who flew for France before the U.S. entered World War I. The 26-year-old was flying a plane loaded with oranges to deliver to a fellow aviator in a nearby hospital when he attacked a group of five German Fokker planes who he believed had shot down his friend.

“It was, in hindsight, a particularly bad decision, as Chapman engaged in one-on-five combat,” Laslie wrote. “But Chapman’s penchant for such a fight was emblematic of the Escadrille and the willingness of the American Airmen to protect, or exact revenge for, their comrades.”

Though Chapman did not survive the engagement, his spirit lived on as generations of American Airmen after him climbed into cockpits and flew into danger. Another example is Capt. Jim Cardoso, an MH-53 helicopter pilot who helped rescue Lt. Col. Dale Zelko after the F-117 pilot was shot down over what is today part of Serbia in 1999.

“Cardoso remembers thinking, ‘A stealth just got shot down and now [they] want us to go in there?’” Laslie wrote.

A pararescueman assigned to the 38th Rescue Squadron, Moody Air Force Base, Ga., fast-ropes from an HH-60G Pave Hawk, April 25, 2019, in Eufaula, Ala. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Taryn Butler.

While such bravery often occurred in combat, Laslie also highlights the air transport crews who flew daring supply missions over the Himalayas in World War II and who turned a Soviet blockade into “a complete failure for Stalin” during the Berlin Airlift.

Though much of “Fighting From Above” may be familiar to Air Force buffs, Laslie also highlights unsung heroes and offers a nuanced take on some famous figures. Billy Mitchell, often called the father of the U.S. Air Force, was “unequivocally” an important early advocate for airpower, Laslie wrote. But in the historian’s mind, Mitchell’s focus on publicity sometimes overshadows the hard work of Benjamin Foulois, Mason Patrick, and other leaders who built the Army Air Corps.

“Foulois, Patrick, and the others wanted a functioning Air Service capable of working with but also independent of the rest of the Army,” Laslie argues. “Mitchell wanted headlines.”

Laslie also argues that World War II strategic bombardment was in some ways even more horrific than the World War I trenches it was meant to circumvent, due to the massive loss of civilian life while German factories, for the most part, “were little hindered by the American bombs raining down around them.”

Still, the threat of U.S. bombers, plus the development of long-range fighters that could protect them deep into European skies, created an unwinnable dilemma for the German Luftwaffe, which eventually ran out of pilots to fight them off, yielding air supremacy to the Allies. The effectiveness of strategic bombardment has been debated for 80 years—by academics, Air Force strategists, and even popular authors—and Laslie’s goal wading into it is to help readers gain a nuanced view of Air Force history.

“I don’t view these things as binary: win or lose, good or bad. It’s much more complicated than that,” he said. “When you study history, you look for nuances: What worked, what did not work, and what can we learn?”

Sacrifice

Those learning moments often don’t come without sacrifice, Laslie wrote. Billy Mitchell and the ‘Bomber Mafia’ were Army pariahs for pursuing an independent Air Force, while Col. John Warden, the mastermind of the Desert Storm air campaign, never made general.

“For every good decision made by the Air Force,” Laslie wrote, “someone had to be sacrificed on the altar of old-fashioned order and tradition and martyred to prevent upsetting the institution.”

But there is another theme throughout Air Force history: that of Airmen willing to climb into canvas biplanes, B-17 ball turrets, rocket-powered ejection seats, and countless other dangerous situations to help deliver victory with airpower.

“I don’t know where we’re going to go with space and cyber and unmanned aircraft. But there are still people willing to swear an oath and defend against enemies,” Laslie said. “The way of war may change over time, but the people are going to remain the same.”

SPACECOM Alarmed as China, Russia, Iran, and N. Korea Forge Closer Ties in Space

June 24, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are cooperating more in space, raising concerns for the head of U.S. Space Command.

“It does appear there is a growing sense of cooperation in the space sphere between these four countries, at least bilaterally within these four countries,” warned Space Command’s Gen. Stephen N. Whiting June 24 on a visit to AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “That’s something we’re keenly observing.”

Analysts and officials are worried that the interests of the four countries are increasingly aligned, with some warning the authoritarian states are forming an “axis” in opposition to the U.S. Others suggest such fears are overstated.

SPACECOM isn’t taking any chances. “We’re very interested in those relationships,” he said. “As we’ve seen Russia struggle on the battlefield in Ukraine, it appears that they’ve gone to these other countries … looking for assistance and maybe they’re willing to share or cooperate more in the space sphere. Certainly, that’s of concern to us.”

In February, a Russian rocket carried an Iranian satellite into orbit. In March, Russia and China announced plans to build a nuclear power plant on the moon in the 2030s. And most recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a defense pact after reports that Russia has already helped North Korea’s budding space program. Whiting noted that North Korea could benefit from Russian expertise in launching both ballistic missiles and spacecraft.

Russia has used Iranian and North Korean weapons in Ukraine and received support from China to up its arms production, U.S. officials have said. And while Whiting noted that the four countries are mostly cooperating on a bilateral basis, their growing ties adds a layer of complexity to a space domain that is growing more and more contested.

Russia’s Counterspace Weapon

In late May, U.S. officials announced Russia had launched a counterspace weapon into the same low-Earth orbit as a U.S. government satellite. Asked how his command had assessed the Russian launch to be a threat, Whiting cited a mix of intelligence and data from previous Russian launches.

“We’ve been tracking objects on orbit for decades and decades and decades,” said Whiting. “And so when we saw the launch in the middle of May, we can look at those orbital parameters and we can compare that launch to launches that the Russians did in 2017, 2019, 2022 that look like this class of counterspace weapon that they’ve tested previously. And now it appears that they put on orbit in an operational capacity.

“And then we look at where they launched it, and they launched it what we call co-planar to a national security satellite. And that doesn’t seem to be accidental, because they’ve done that multiple times in a row now and being coplanar gives them a short amount of operational response time to potentially hold at risk one of our satellites.”

U.S. Space Force leaders are concerned about growing space capabilities from China and Russia, such as the Russian “nesting doll” satellite that can deploy a kinetic weapon. **Mike Tsukamoto/staff; NASA; Pixabay**

Pentagon press secretary Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder noted at the time of the launch the similarities to previous 2019 and 2022 tests.

In late 2019, the Russians launched a satellite that then released a second satellite. Both satellites then followed a National Reconnaissance Office satellite. Several months later, U.S. officials said the sub-satellite had released another object, apparently firing a projectile at high speed. In the years that followed, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond compared them to Russian “nesting dolls.”

A similar test preceded that one in 2017, with a nesting satellite reportedly following a U.S. satellite and firing a projectile into space.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the Russians launched a satellite in February 2022 designed to test components for a nuclear antisatellite weapon.

Breathtaking Growth

While Russia continues to test its antisatellite capabilities, China is rapidly expanding in space too, Whiting said.

“I mean, it really is something to behold, and you can kind of bucket that into two aspects,” Whiting explained. “One is how quickly they’ve moved to field counterspace capabilities, everything from offensive cyber capabilities to jammers for GPS [and] SATCOM, high energy lasers, direct ascent ASATs, on-orbit capabilities, just across the breadth of capabilities from reversible to nonreversible, we’ve seen them move very quickly. They’ve also moved very quickly to build their own space capabilities to enable their terrestrial forces.”

Whiting has previously called China’s rise in space as “breathtakingly fast.”

Not surprisingly, Whiting’s first trip as SPACECOM boss was to the Indo-Pacific, where he visited the headquarters of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, as well as allies in Japan and South Korea.

Discussions with INDOPACOM focused on ensuring SPACECOM and the regional command were in sync. In Japan and Korea, common concern over China’s actions in space are fueling desires to work together to counter them.

How a Small Fleet of E-11A Business Jets Allow USAF to Communicate Across the Middle East

June 21, 2024 | By Chris Gordon

Amid the reduction in America’s airpower in the Middle East, one asset has proven its resilience: the E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft of the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron.

This high-demand asset remains key in maintaining communications for U.S. and coalition military operations. Despite its placement in a global hotspot, Air Forces Central (AFCENT) has only a handful of fighter squadrons and limited mobility aircraft to meet considerable demands. The same goes for the E-11As and approximately 20 aviators that remain on call 24/7.

Air & Space Forces Magazine had a rare opportunity to talk to the Airmen who fly critical missions in the Middle East as pilots on the E-11A BACN, commonly pronounced “bacon.”

The E-11As help the Air Force, other American services, and a myriad of coalition partners communicate via radio and share data. During the U.S.’s years in Afghanistan, the aircraft also extended the range of communications links to mountainous terrain, which led to the aircraft’s ability to be likened to “Wi-Fi in the sky.”

“It’s catchy, but it doesn’t thoroughly represent really the nature of the BACN mission,” Lt. Col. R. Clayton McCart, the squadron commander, said of the nickname. Instead of merely extending range, McCart said, the E-11 takes different types of information and ensures that it is compatible with a wide variety of platforms.

“The big thing is that’s between dissimilar platforms with varying electronic capabilities,” McCart explained. “Modern warfare requires communications … or conveying data, and in a joint and interoperable way. Those data sources are often dissimilar. So we’re really [applicable] to many different mission sets.”

McCart and pilots under his command in the 430th EECS declined to discuss where they were based or operational details of most missions, as a condition of offering a rare glimpse at the E-11’s role in the Air Force’s most active combat zone.

But the Airmen did discuss the E-11’s role in one mission that has put Airmen and aircraft to the test: the humanitarian aid airdrops over Gaza that AFCENT has been conducting since March. The U.S. coordinates its missions with its Jordanian-based planning cell, often drops alongside the Royal Jordanian Air Force, and must deconflict airspace with Israel and other nations. E-11s have supported a total 33 U.S. airdrops into Gaza, AFCENT said, fulfilling the mission each time.

“I think we do a really good job with the U.S. Air Force as far as our communication goes. But when coalition forces are speaking a different language, not literally, but figuratively, then we’re able to take that, regardless of whatever systems they are running, and integrate that,” said Capt. Britton Ellington, an E-11 pilot, who has flown missions to support humanitarian aid airdrops. “We have a considerable stand-off range where we’re able to link up a lot of those players, kind of translate all those languages, and convert those into something that everyone can understand and see.”

USAF aircraft have been involved in defending U.S. troops from aerial threats in Iraq and Syria, conducting airstrikes against Iranian-aligned militia targets, supporting efforts to fend off Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in Yemen, and flying missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, the campaign against the Islamic State group. So the life of an E-11 crew can be a busy one.

“We’re not constrained to just the airdrops, this is multifaceted and directional, and so we’re on call by the Combined Air Operations Center,” McCart said. “We’re at their beck and call and the ATO [air tasking order] that comes out of the CAOC.”

Despite the lack of aerial refueling, the Bombardier business jet’s range—6,000 miles in the latest models—allows it to conduct multiple missions in one flight with a crew of just two pilots. The BACN payload is made by Northrop Grumman.

“What makes us beneficial in CENTCOM is sortie duration,” Ellington said. “We’re able to stay airborne through multiple vul times [vulnerability windows], if you will. We’re able to accomplish the airdrop and still have plenty of loiter time to accomplish other ATO tasks in the same day.”

McCart rattled off some of the capabilities that could be used in an ATO, including “cross-COCOM strike support” throughout CENTCOM.

One mission the BACN is no longer called upon to perform regularly is helping combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations, which is, in no small part, why the E-11 exists in the first place.

“That harkens all the way back to the early 2000s … the mountains and comm limitations of Afghanistan drove the need for beyond-line-of-sight communications,” McCart. “That’s where we were. And here’s where we are.”

The E-11 has proved its worth to the Air Force beyond the Middle East.

Though BACN has had a mission since 2008, the E-11 will have a permanent home at Robins Air Force Base, Ga., with the standup of the 18th Airborne Command and Control Squadron to form a more traditional home station and deployment model. Robins received another new E-11 in November. The Air Force wants a fleet of nine by the end of fiscal 2027, as the USAF takes delivery of roughly one new aircraft per year. The service had five aircraft in its inventory at the end of fiscal 2023.

A U.S. Air Force E-11A BACN displayed at the World Defense Show outside Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in February 2024. Photo by Chris Gordon/Air & Space Forces Magazine

AFCENT declined to say how many E-11s are forward deployed. One E-11—a fourth of the fleet at the time—was lost and its two pilots were killed in a 2020 crash in Afghanistan.

Though the terrain of Afghanistan is not what the BACN crews confront these days, the basic mission of ensuring data and information reach the right place remains.

“I think what makes the E-11 so dynamic is it’s not just about mountains; it’s about any place where we have assets spread out, and the coalition aspect of this mission, where we have people coming from all over the world for a specific mission,” E-11 pilot Capt. Joseph Viteri said. “And so we position ourselves somewhere where we can actually be that glue. We can be that transfer of communication between one coalition member and get them closer to our other coalition members and get the mission completed. So that can happen over land, sea, mountains, desert, whatever, because of just the distances involved.”

Can More Be Done to Respond to Russia’s Space-Based Nuke?

June 21, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

Four months after issuing a public warning that was revealed to be about Russia developing a nuclear anti-satellite program, leading lawmaker Rep. Mike Turner still thinks the White House needs to do more to reveal details about the threat and subsequently deter Moscow from deploying it.

Yet at least one expert believes such actions must be approached cautiously.

Turner, the head of the House Intelligence committee, renewed his warnings about the Russian space nuke at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event on June 20, saying President Joe Biden’s administration is “sleepwalking” into “Day Zero,” a term Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman has used to describe the launch date of such a nuclear anti-satellite weapon.

“In order to avoid Day Zero, the Biden administration must immediately declassify all known information concerning the status of Russia’s nuclear anti-satellite weapons program,” Turner argued.

Turner’s warning in February prompted media reports and eventually a statement from the National Security Council that the danger involved an anti-satellite weapon the Russians have been developing that would violate an international treaty that bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb confirmed last month that Russia was developing an “indiscriminate” nuclear weapon designed for deployment in space, emphasizing its potential devastating impacts on communications, commerce, and national security. He added that while the threat isn’t “imminent,” the Pentagon is concerned about it.

However, disclosing all information about the threat to the public, as Turner suggests, could come with risks, said Charles Galbreath, senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

“It is a question of what do we divulge, and to whom, and for what reasons,” Galbreath told Air & Space Forces Magazine, highlighting the different needs and understanding of political leadership, the military, and the public. “What are we gaining from making something public? Because once we reveal how we know, that would potentially burn the source, and any additional information that we could have received from that source is then lost.”

Beyond more disclosure, Turner also called for the White House and Pentagon to crank up actions and suggested that every option— including economic sanctions and military measures—should be on the table.

“You do not hear the administration saying, ‘That red line is so great that we are going to implement an additional regime of financial restrictions, sanctions,’ and even look what we are going to do with our allies and NATO to make a strong statement to Russia, to understand that this is not something that is going to be accepted,” said Turner.

Galbreath noted that economic sanctions have thus far been ineffective in deterring Russia from aggressive actions, such as in Ukraine.

“An option would be to persuade Russia that the international community, including nations like China, would all be adversely affected by the detonation of a nuclear weapon in orbit,” said Galbreath. “We would view any nation that committed such an act as a terrorist state rather than a legitimate government. The entire globe would take action to prevent them from ever having that capability again in the future.”

Space Development Agency director Derek M. Tournear has also suggested a global response would be needed to respond to a nuclear weapon in space, calling its potential use an “attack on the world.”

If Russia were to detonate such a weapon system in space, the ramifications could quickly spill over into everyday life. During the Cold War-era “Starfish Prime” test in 1962, the U.S. detonated a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit, disabling eight out of 24 satellites and causing a power blackout in Hawaii.

To prepare for Russia’s weapon, Galbreath said the U.S. should enhance the resilience of its satellite systems by proliferating them and making them less susceptible to nuclear events.

“A few of our satellites today have radiation shielding and multiple redundancies, ensuring that if one subsystem fails, another can back it up,” said Galbreath. “With less expensive satellites, they lack the levels of redundancy or shielding, but cheaper satellites can be replenished by launching new ones, as their design life is typically only a couple of years. So, through a combination of shielding some assets and reconstituting lost assets rapidly, any effect from a nuclear detonation space could be minimized.”

After Turner’s criticism, White House national security spokesperson John Kirby said the administration has been “working hard” to persuade other nations to join the U.S. in clearly outlining the dangers posed by an anti-satellite weapon designed to carry a nuclear payload.

“We’ve been working this particular problem set from every possible angle, including through intense diplomacy with countries around the world and, obviously, through direct conversations with Russia.” Kirby told reporters on June 20.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far denied any intention to deploy nuclear weapons in space. Washington affirmed that such developments would breach international treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in space.

Flying Hours: USAF Seeks Stability Before Seeking Growth

June 21, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force is trying to stabilize its flying hours program, after years of declines that alarmed observers and lawmakers. Using up the flying hours available is the first step to buying back more hours in the future, the Air Force operations boss said this week.

The flying hours budget declined from 1.45 million flying hours in 2019 to 1.07 million in 2024, a total decline of 26 percent. USAF is seeking 1.09 million for 2025, but Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Lt. Gen. Adrian L. Spain said the 2024 figure will likely be the standard for the time being.

“We’ve come to what we are calling a reasonably executable number at about 1.07, 1.06 million flying hours,” Spain said at an AFA Warfighters in Action event. “Regardless of the cost, that’s what we’re going to ask for each year.”

Less than two decades ago the Air Force had about 1.6 million flying hours, enabling pilots, navigators, and weapons systems officers more cockpit time to hone their skills. Now, after years of cuts, the program “is short of the true readiness requirement for the forces that we have and the operators we have,” Spain said.

But even if more hours were available, the Air Force probably couldn’t use them all.

“We haven’t executed [much] over 1.1 million hours in a very long time,” Spain said.” And so part of this is on us to actually go execute the hours. But the ask and the position we’re in now is that we are going to stabilize at this number each year, and it’s my job to work with the MAJCOMs of today to execute above that number so that we can go ask for more flying hours because we’re able to actually execute. Until we do, then this is the number we’re at for the next few years.”

In 2023, the latest year for which budget documents included the data, the Air Force flew only 1.03 million of its 1.13 million budgeted flying hours. That left more than 9 percent of flying hours unused.

Year	Requested	Executed	Percentage
2025	1.093 million	N/A	N/A
2024	1.066 million	N/A	N/A
2023	1.126 million	1.028 million	91.30%
2022	1.151 million	1.149 million	99.83%
2021	1.238 million	1.156 million	93.38%
2020	1.325 million	0.909 million	68.60%
2019	1.454 million	1.099 million	75.58%

Source: Air Force budget documents

There are multiple reasons for the shortfall, Spain said: growing sustainment costs, declining aircraft availability, a shortage of skilled maintainers, and a shortage of pilots have all contributed to the challenge. When Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James C. “Jim” Slife had Spain’s job last year, he noted in March 2023 that: “If you gave more Flying Hour program funding, we wouldn’t be able to generate the sorties because we don’t have the flight line maintainers to generate them …. These things are all interconnected.”

One year later, Spain suggested little has changed. “it’s really about aircraft availability at the end of the day, and mission capable rate,” he said.

Mission capable rates measure the percentage of time an aircraft is able to perform at least one of its core missions. Rates have been particularly poor for older workhorse fleets like the B-1 and F-15C.

Spain said the Air Force has also had a harder time adjusting to “unplanned events,” like severe weather or unexpected maintenance.

Another issue is the trade-off between time in the cockpit and time in simulators, which can be particularly critical for fifth-generation aircraft which can’t exercise all their capabilities in open-air exercises, lest adversaries gain insights that could be used to counter them. The increasing fidelity of simulators has also brought into question how the USAF should measure true, open-air flying hours.

Simulators “can’t replace flying,” Spain said. “It is a thing that allows us to stress our operators in a way that they can’t execute on our open-air ranges. But they still need to go fly and they need to fly in tactical environments to simulate both the stressors and the fog and friction of weather, night, actual ground that you can hit … and those elements of airmanship and proficiency that you can only get while flying.”

The Pentagon is investing heavily in efforts like the Joint Simulation Environment that will allow pilots to train in advanced environments like never before. And simulators can also play a role in helping the Air Force address its pilot shortage, Spain added, potentially changing the speed with which new pilots can be trained.

But the pilot shortage could get worse before it gets better, as its roots are planted deep in decisions made a decade ago.

“We made some decisions in the mid-2010s to [add] fewer people and to produce fewer pilots in those year groups,” Spain said. Now those smaller year groups are coming up on the end of their active duty obligations. “Despite the fact that we might have pretty decent retention, Spain said, “if a year group is too small, 45 percent of 500 is different than 45 percent of 800.” That could leave the Air Force short by hundreds of experienced pilots for critical staff jobs where flying experience is typically required.

“We have to work a little harder to talk to those folks who are up for an elongated commitment or restructuring of the contract, if you will, and let them know we need them,” Spain said.

Air & Space Warfighters in Action series presented featured speaker Lt. Gen. Adrian Spain, the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, during a June 18, 2024, event moderated by Air & Space Forces Association President and CEO Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.) at AFA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Photo by Mike Tsukamoto/Air & Space Forces Magazine

Airmen Face Inspections as ACC Boss Calls Out ‘Discernible Decline’ in Standards

June 21, 2024 | By Greg Hadley and David Roza

Air Combat Command boss Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach has ordered tens of thousands of Airmen to face inspections in the next few weeks to make sure they’re meeting Air Force standards for dress and personal appearance.

Wilsbach’s directive, which will cover nearly 80,000 Airmen assigned to ACC, came in a June 10 memo that was circulated on social media. An ACC spokesperson confirmed its veracity to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

In the memo, Wilsbach noted that “while the majority of Airmen maintain professional standards, there is a discernable decline in the commitment to, and enforcement of, military standards in the Air Force.” As a result, he is giving commanders until July 17 to conduct unit-level “standards and compliance inspections.”

Those inspections will include open ranks inspections, in which flights of Airmen are formally inspected together, to review service members’ uniforms, customs, and courtesies. There will also be records inspections, in which commanders will review personnel files to determine if Airmen are up to date on their medical exemptions or religious accommodations, and if their religious accommodations need to be reevaluated due to new circumstances.

Finally, the ACC surgeon general will develop a shaving education course “to help Airmen understand the proper medical protocols to reduce irritation caused by shaving,” according to the memo. All Airmen will have to attend the shaving course before they are granted or can renew a medical exemption from the Air Force’s shaving standards.

The ACC spokesperson cited the Air Force’s February update to its dress and appearance standards document, DAFI 36-2903, as the impetus for the command’s inspections, calling them a “natural progression” to make sure all Airmen are in line with the update.

The spokesperson also noted ACC’s renewed focus on readiness as part of the Air Force’s “re-optimization for great power competition.” Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin has said ACC is “transitioning into a different type of command” as part of the effort, focusing on readiness for the entire service and ceding control of Numbered Air Forces that present forces to combatant commands.

ACC’s memo noted that “readiness begins with the enforcement of high standards” and “enforcing standards goes beyond simply maintaining order and discipline; it is a foundational mission imperative.”

Former Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass also highlighted the importance of standards to readiness and a perceived slip last June, writing at the time that “history shows that when standards erode, military capabilities and readiness decline.”

The reaction among Airmen on social media has been mixed—something ACC projected in its memo—with some arguing the inspections will take time away from mission and others arguing it is a necessary and needed part of being in the military.

“Most Air Force members want to do fulfilling work like deter conflict or crush our adversaries in aerial combat. Grooming standards are a pretty basic expectation in the U.S. military; it’s disappointing that we have to waste time on enforcing them,” an Air Force officer with experience in ACC told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The focus on shaving waivers, in particular, has sparked debate—many Airmen have advocated for years for the service to allow beards without a waiver. Currently, Airmen are allowed to grow beards if they receive a religious exemption or a medical waiver for conditions such as pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), also known as razor bumps, a skin condition caused by ingrown hairs that makes shaving painful and can lead to scarring if skin is not given a chance to heal.

Waivers have become easier to obtain in recent years, but advocates say there is still a cultural stigma around facial hair that can hold back Airmen’s careers. Lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee voted last month to create a three-year Air Force test program studying the effects of beards on safety, discipline, morale, and inclusivity, but that legislation is still pending.

Watchdog: Air Force Plan to Divest Old F-22s Has Too Many Holes

June 20, 2024 | By David Roza

A government watchdog said the Air Force’s proposal to divest 32 of its oldest F-22 fighter jets leaves too many questions unanswered for Congress to make a well-informed decision.

Specifically, the service needs to provide better information about what toll the divestments would take on the F-22 program’s ability to train pilots, test new capabilities, and meet mission requirements, the Government Accountability Office wrote in a June 18 report. The service also needs more analysis on the costs of maintaining the current fleet and of possibly upgrading the 32 jets in question.

“We respect the Air Force’s need to make difficult budget decisions in the face of limited resources and having to provide the necessary tools to the warfighter,” GAO officials wrote. “This does not, however, alleviate it of the responsibility to document the process and data it uses to make these decisions.”

The Air Force currently has 185 F-22s—150 in the Block 30/35 configuration, 33 in the Block 20 configuration. Block 30/35 includes upgraded radar, weapons, and communication, enhanced GPS systems, and improved cockpit and heads-up displays. The Block 30/35 jets also have better air-to-ground attack capability and can fire modern AIM-9X and AIM-120D missiles.

Lagging farther behind are the Block 20 jets, which are used primarily for training new pilots. Air Combat Command officials said new F-22 pilots spend 90 percent of their initial flight training on Block 20s, but the Air Force thinks the Block 20s are not worth the cost of maintenance as the service looks to modernize.

The F-22 Raptor Demonstration Team performs in Alaska, July 12, 2020. (Air Force photo by 1st Lt. Sam Eckholm)

Wear and Tear

One modernization effort is the Next-Generation Air Dominance program, a family of systems that are supposed to replace the F-22 as America’s ace-in-the-hole for air-to-air combat. The Air Force thinks it would save about $1.8 billion for programs like NGAD between fiscal years 2024 and 2028 by divesting the Block 20 F-22s, but GAO says the service has not done its homework checking those calculations.

Small as it is, the F-22 fleet did not meet its mission capability or aircraft availability goals in any fiscal year from 2011 to 2021. In fact, most F-22 combat squadrons have 24 Block 30/35 jets to make sure there are 12 mission capable aircraft at any time. If the Air Force transferred 32 Block 30/35 jets to training squadrons, it would leave just 18 total aircraft at each combat unit, the report noted.

“This would increase the wear and tear on these aircraft since, according to Air Combat Command officials, new pilots often have hard landings and make other mistakes that are tough on aircraft,” the watchdog agency explained.

It is also unclear how long the F-22 fleet would have to sustain that tempo, since there is no publicly available date for when NGAD could take the Raptor’s place. Indeed, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin said last week that NGAD faces an uncertain future amid the service’s competing modernization priorities.

Even if the Air Force published a date tomorrow, there could still be years of delays similar to the ones that have befallen the F-35 fighter and T-7A trainer, GAO noted. Divesting the Block 20s could also cramp F-22 developmental and operational testing programs, which are already under-resourced, the report added. The watchdog argued that Congress could make a more-informed decision if the Air Force’s calculations were sound, but those are not publicly available.

“Materials supporting the Air Force’s divestment decision stated that these issues, along with their associated risks, required further analysis,” GAO noted. “We were not provided documentation that these issues were analyzed.”

Some of that may be due to current Air Force budget guidance, which “does not require the Air Force to provide key information to Congress regarding divestment decisions,” the GAO found.

Airman 1st Class Nicholas Hull, 94th Aircraft Maintenance Unit crew chief, marshalls in a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor aircraft at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, May 13, 2020. (U.S. Air Force photo by Nicholas J. De La Pena)

Upgrades?

The Air Force argues that the Block 20s are too outdated to fight a war against China, but GAO noted that the service did not adequately explore the idea of upgrading the jets to the Block 30/35 configuration. Prime contractor Lockheed Martin estimated it would cost at least $3.3 billion and at least 15 years, largely due to the time and cost of restarting parts production lines. The price tag would work out to at least $100 million per tail, more than the cost of a brand-new F-35.

Lockheed Martin told GAO the upgrade cost estimates were not submitted in response to a formal request for proposal by the Air Force and should be considered notional. Neither the Air Force or contractor looked into upgrading the Block 20s with other parts from active production lines or achieving some other configuration besides Block 20 and Block 30/35.

“Because the Air Force did not fully assess its options to upgrade, the Air Force and congressional decision makers have limited insight about the potential consequences of Block 20 upgrades and are not well-positioned to make informed determinations about the future of these aircraft,” the watchdog wrote.

After the Air Force proposed divesting Block 20 F-22s in its fiscal year 2023 budget proposal, Congress included language in that year’s defense bill prohibiting the service from divesting the jets until fiscal year 2028 so that more information could be gathered, including GAO’s report.

Earlier this year, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees blocked the Air Force’s proposal to retire 32 F-22s in their markups of the fiscal 2025 National Defense Authorization bill.

The Senate also directed the Air Force to provide “an annual report on the Air Force tactical fighter force structure” and work with the Navy to develop a plan for air superiority in the 2030s and ‘40s.

The pause could give the Air Force more time to explore the costs of upgrading or divesting its Block 20 F-22s. The GAO said the service did not agree with its recommendations to fully document the options for divesting and upgrading, but it encouraged Congress to consider requiring the Air Force provide such data before making divestment decisions.

The Navy already has a similar program requiring the Navy Secretary to submit a detailed rationale and exploration of options to Congress in order to decommission or inactivate a battle force ship before the end of its expected service life, GAO pointed out.

“Without guidance, the Air Force may continue to make budget proposals to Congress that include divesting assets without documenting the impact of these decisions on its entire fleet,” the watchdog added.

New Report: USSF’s Missile Warning Satellites in All Orbits Face Challenges

June 20, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Force is working on dozens of new missile warning and tracking satellites that will go across every orbit in space—geosynchronous, polar, medium-Earth, and low-Earth. But a new report from a government watchdog noted issues in those programs which could lead to delays and other challenges.

As part of its annual weapons assessment report released this month, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) looked at five different missile warning/missile tracking programs within the Space Force, all of which are expected to start delivery in the next few years and comprise a massive portion of the service’s budget plans: $24.77 billion in the next five years.

Next-Gen OPIR

The longest in development, the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent (OPIR) Infrared program is meant to succeed the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program and actually consists of three segments:

Next-Gen OPIR GEO: Two satellites that will go into geosynchronous orbit.

Next-Gen OPIR Polar: Two satellites that will go into polar orbit.

FORGE: The ground segment that is meant to provide command and control and data processing for the satellites.

Originally, the Space Force planned to buy three GEO satellites, but the service’s other efforts in low- and medium-Earth orbit led it to cut one in its 2024 budget. Congress approved that cut, though some lawmakers expressed concerns about it and requested more information on the issue.

Even with the cut, the first GEO satellite appears likely to miss its 2025 launch date, the GAO found.

“The program continues to face schedule challenges, driven largely by the mission payload,” the agency’s report states. “According to the program office, flight hardware production and integration challenges already delayed payload delivery by roughly 11 months until July 2024. As a result, payload and space vehicle integration delays will likely result in launch delays and program cost increases. Our work in this area indicates that a launch delay of at least a year is likely for the first GEO satellite.”

The report, which is based on data up until January 2024, did note that program officials said they were “resolute” in trying to solve scheduling problems and meet their original launch date. But GAO is not the only one sounding the alarm about that not happening. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acqusition and Integration Frank Calvelli told lawmakers in written testimony this spring that Next-Gen OPIR GEO was a program he was “watching closely.”

“The payload is in test, but over a year late,” he wrote. “We cannot afford delays, and I am engaging with this program frequently to mitigate further slips.”

That mission payload will be modified to go on the Next-Gen OPIR Polar satellites, which have more time before their first launch in 2028. However, the GAO report noted that program officials are “tracking risks associated with the integration of the main mission payload onto the space vehicle.” Should the satellite have to be modified, it could cause integration issues leading to delays or extra costs.

An artist illustration depicts a Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR) system in GEO orbit. Next-Gen OPIR is intended to replace the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), beginning with its first launch in 2025. **Lockheed Martin illustration**

Yet perhaps the bigger risk to the Polar satellites is FORGE, which officials say has made incremental progress but still has a ways to go.

“Numerous development, integration, and testing steps are needed before the FORGE command and control functions will achieve readiness for system-level testing,” the GAO report states. “If FORGE command and control functions are still immature by the end of fiscal year 2026, the first polar satellite launch is likely to be delayed and program costs are likely to increase.”

The Space Force has selected four companies to work on a FORGE C2 prototype and plans to pick one to move forward later this year, the GAO noted, but the prototype would have to be completed by late 2028 to support the first Polar satellite launch.

In the interim, the service is working on what it calls Next-Gen Interim Operations (NIO) as a placeholder for FORGE. Considering the delays with FORGE’s C2 development, the interim “will be the only system available to command and control the space vehicles for several years,” the report notes.

Tracking Layer

The first eight demonstration satellites of the Space Development Agency’s (SDA’s) Tracking Layer are in low-Earth orbit after launches last year, and the agency’s focus has now turned to the 28 satellites that will make “Tranche 1” of that layer.

Expected costs on the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer have dipped 6 percent compared to last year, the GAO report noted, which did not note any schedule risks. SDA officials have said speed is their top priority, above cost and performance.

Yet performance in Tranche 1 may suffer, the GAO report warns. Specifically, since SDA developed an optical communications terminal (OCT) standard to encourage competition and interoperability.

‘However, it has a challenge of ensuring interoperability among multiple vendors because, per testing officials, the SDA OCT standard is different from commercial OCT standards, and vendors can have different interpretations of it,” the report states.

As a result, SDA officials said they may need to process the Tracking satellites’ data on the ground, then send it back up to the agency’s Transport Layer satellites for distribution. Such an arrangement could lead to delays in missile warning.

MEO

In between geosynchronous and low-Earth orbit, Space Systems Command has been working on a constellation of medium-Earth orbit satellites, slated to start launching in late 2026, early 2027.

The GAO report noted two critical technologies for these satellites that will not be mature until September 2026, according to program officials: optical sensors that will allow the satellites to pass data to each other directly, and “large format focal plane arrays, which are sensors that can capture images with high resolution and sensitivity.”

Officials also noted problems with shared access to the modeling and engineering tool being used to design the satellites and their payloads. Work on the report was completed before the Space Force announced it was canceling its contract with RTX to produce three of the nine satellites meant to go in the first batch.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated June 21 to correct the current estimate for the number of satellites in the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer.