PACAF Commander Highlights Strong ‘Trilateral’ Response to North Korean Missile Tests

June 10, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii—The recent barrage of ballistic missile tests by North Korea elicited a strong, “trilateral” response from the United States and Pacific allies Japan and South Korea, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach told Air Force Magazine on June 9. The show of force was necessary to retain allied unity against Chinese aggression, America’s principal concern in the theater, experts say.

“We can never look past North Korea with how unpredictable they are,” Wilsbach said during an interview at PACAF headquarters at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

“We’ve got to be ready to respond, and we are,” he added. “What was unique about that is how really trilateral it was with the Japanese as well as the Republic of Korea and the U.S.”

The North test-fired eight short-range ballistic missiles June 5, its largest test in a single day, and brought its total tests per year to 31, the largest number ever in a single year.

“They’re doing those to invoke a reaction by the United States, perhaps Japan, perhaps the Republic of Korea,” Wilsbach added.

That response came in the form of missile tests and fighter jet flights.

The United States and South Korea conducted a combined live-fire exercise June 5, firing one U.S. Army missile and seven Korean missiles into the Sea of Japan, northeast of South Korea.

The two allies also flew 20 fighter jets June 7, including South Korean F 35s, F-15s, and F-16s alongside U.S. F-16s. Separately, the United States and Japan conducted a drill with four Japanese F-15s and two American F-16s.

The most recent tests follow a string of ballistic missile launches by North Korea that began with four tests May 24 that included an intercontinental ballistic missile. In response, on May 25, the United States and South Korea test-fired Republic of Korea (ROK) Hyunmu-2 missiles using the U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile System.

Wilsbach said the continued U.S. and allied responses don’t antagonize North Korea but show unity and force.

“I’m sure that they had planned to launch those missiles well ahead of time,” Wilsbach said. “I seriously doubt that it was antagonistic from the standpoint of they saw us fly and then they launched missiles, because it takes so much planning.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) international security fellow John Schaus told Air Force Magazine in an interview that it is hard to get Pacific allies such as South Korea to see eye to eye with the United States on China as a threat. Demonstrating U.S. commitment to the ROK alliance helps.

“South Korea has a very real threat immediately across the border in North Korea,” Schaus said. “Much the same way we see NATO prioritizing Russia rather than China because it’s right next door, South Korea is prioritizing North Korea rather than China efforts.”

Schaus believes it’s an “open question” whether Pacific allies such as South Korea would assist the United States should conflict arise with China, all the more reason why the United States needs to show its commitment to South Korea’s security priorities.

“Korea is more complicated,” the analyst said, comparing South Korea to alliance partners Japan and Australia.

“I’d say that the new president in Korea is more reflexively pro-alliance than perhaps the last president was,” he added.

Wilsbach said the rapid and united show of force by the United States is a show of the U.S. commitment to the Pacific allies most threatened by North Korea’s aggression.

“That definitely is demonstrating resolve to the region,” he said.

Modular Weapons Could Improve Surge Capacity, Bunch Says in Exit Interview

June 9, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Breaking weapons up into modular segments for ease of upgrade could also improve defense industrial surge capacity, the outgoing head of Air Force Materiel Command said. Modularity could also help address the issue of intellectual property while keeping more companies in business, with more rapid turnover of weapon segment production and greater responsiveness to threat changes, he said.

Gen. Arnold W. Bunch Jr., who is retiring, told Air Force Magazine in an exit interview that modularity will be “one of the keys” to weapon production in the future.

Lt. Gen. Duke Z. Richardson succeeds Bunch during a ceremony June 13 at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force in Ohio.

Referring to the future munitions, “I see us going modular, where we have an open architecture and then we can put in different components to do different things,” Bunch said. “We’re going to need to replace parts, changing them out for what the threat drives or as the technology shifts.”

Bunch acknowledged that weapons have frequently been a budgetary “bill payer”—most recently to support a surge in research and development to confront the China threat—but said modularity would reduce the time between competitions and allow USAF to more “rapidly adapt” to threat changes. The same idea will likely apply to uncrewed aircraft, he said.

Being limited to single suppliers for key weapons has contributed to munitions shortages in recent years and most recently has been raised as a problem as the U.S. has provided Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles with no swift means of restocking them. The Air Force relies on individual companies for certain staple weapons—such as Boeing for the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Lockheed Martin for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)—and some munitions companies have said they have “maxed out” their production capacity.

As for intellectual property rights, that’s “part of the challenge,” Bunch said, but USAF is now “[putting] those things on contract,” such that the Air Force will own the technical baseline and be more agile in competing and integrating new capabilities.

“You could very easily” hold competitions for a plug-and-play seeker or booster segment of a weapon, he said, noting that the armament directorate is pursuing that idea now.

Creating a completely digital enterprise will open up such options, Bunch said, such as in the Golden Horde Vanguard program in which the Air Force demonstrated Small Diameter Bombs receiving and interpreting new instructions mid-flight and collaborating with each other to strike designated targets.

For Golden Horde, “We created a digital environment so that we can bring in different ideas. And we can look at those to determine how [and] … what do we want want to go out and buy, and what gives us the most return on investment,” Bunch said. This approach will “give us more flexibility than what we’ve had.”

Would the Air Force be the integrator for these systems?

“There are a couple different ways you could do that,” Bunch said. “You could hire an integrator, or you can do it yourself,” but it’s an area where the Air Force would have some flexibility. “You may not need to play that role,” he said.

However, “We want our teams to be more involved” in setting the technical baseline, such as “knowing what the interface is,” he added. That way, “you know the system better and you can make better choices.”

The Air Force is taking an integrator/modular supplier approach to the new Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW), which will merge the capabilities of weapons such as JDAM and the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).

Bunch said his crystal ball was murky on whether the return to a Cold War-like security environment would drive a return to multiple competitors vying for a lion’s share of annual production of an entire system, as in the so-called “Great Engine War” of the 1980s.

“If you’ve managed one program … you’ve managed one program,” Bunch said, making the point that every acquisition is unique and that “in every case, we’re going to have to weigh all this out.”

“We’ve got to start with the end in mind,” he said. “We’ve got to understand: What do we really want this system to be, and how are we going to manage it long term, and what are we going to put on contract? Do we need two people producing these? Do I only need one that serves as an integrator? Do I want to serve as the integrator?” Competitions may shift to having an integrator and holding competitions to show that a supplier can surge-produce a certain quantity of qualified items, he said.

“Those are all things that our future program managers are going to need to look at as we build our acquisition strategy.”

Lawmakers Suggest the Space Force Start to Coordinate Space Launches Among Providers

June 9, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

For years, Congress has pushed the Air Force, and the Space Force after it, to increase competition within its space launch enterprise, to move beyond the one or two companies the military has long relied on to send its satellites into orbit.

And now that Space Force leaders have said they’re interested in opening things up in future contracts, lawmakers are recommending that the service bring a partner onboard to help coordinate.

As part of its 2023 National Defense Authorization Act markup, the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee included a provision encouraging the use of a so-called “common launch integrator” and directing the Space Force to prepare a briefing on the idea in the months ahead.

While commending the Department of the Air Force for promoting “robust competition” through the National Security Space Launch program, the committee noted in its markup that it “remains concerned regarding overall efforts to drive down cost, reduce risk, and ensure launch reliability and performance, particularly as the U.S. Space Force, including efforts of the Space Development Agency, plans to increase the total number of projected launches over the Future Years Defense Program.”

Indeed, the Space Force and SDA are planning to launch hundreds of satellites in the coming years, many of which will form a constellation in low-Earth orbit called the National Defense Space Architecture. Already, SDA has awarded contracts for more than 150 satellites in that constellation.

As part of that effort, SDA, which is due to move organizationally from the Office of the Secretary of Defense into the Space Force this year, has purposefully sought to drive competition, splitting contracts between multiple vendors and encouraging losing bidders to try again.

And just a few weeks ago, the agency awarded a deal to General Dynamics Mission Systems to develop the ground operations and integration segment for the NDSA—a contract that an SDA official called the “most critical element” of the effort because General Dynamics will have to build a system capable of taking satellite and ground segments from different vendors and meshing them together.

In a similar way, the congressional panel wants the Space Force to identify a common launch integrator “that works across Department customers, satellite manufacturers, and launch providers, [and] can provide tested space vehicle interaction processes,” according to its markup.

Such an approach would lower costs, reduce launch timelines, and increase competition, the committee argues, presumably by providing a baseline set of standards and reducing logistical challenges.

By Feb. 1, 2023, the committee wants the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing “on the benefits, including cost and schedule, of using one consistent launch integration solution across all types of space and launch vehicles,” including any plans the Space Force has to do so.

Commercial Capabilities

In addition to a common launch integrator, the strategic forces subcommittee also wants the Space Force to turn to industry to take advantage of the rapidly developing commercial market in space.

”We must continue to buy the best off-the-shelf technology and partner with the best firms to invent new technology,” said chairman Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.). “We must also demand that the U.S. have capabilities that vastly exceed anything in the private sector.”

Cooper has not been shy in the past about his desire for the Space Force and the broader DOD to rapidly develop and deploy new capabilities, and his committee’s markup includes several provisions meant to aid that.

For one, the committee’s mark notes that commercial satellite radio frequency remote sensing has “the potential to support a variety of Department of Defense missions” and directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the combatant commanders, to provide a briefing by Dec. 1 on how the Pentagon plans to use the technology.

For another, the mark encourages the expanded use of commercial synthetic aperture radar, especially for the National Reconnaissance Office, and also asks for a report on any plans to use more commercial SAR.

GPS Backup?

In addition to the strategic forces panel, the subcommittee on cyber, innovative technologies, and information systems also has some concerns touching on the Space Force’s portfolio.

In particular, the committee included a requirement in its 2023 NDAA mark that would require the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to lawmakers by Feb. 1, 2023, on the Pentagon’s research into position, navigation, and timing.

PNT has generated some renewed interest in recent years, as observers in and outside the Pentagon have grown concerned about the possibility of a kinetic or non-kinetic attack on the Global Positioning System satellites that form the basis for almost all PNT nowadays.

“While GPS is the world standard, it is perhaps fair to say that we’ve come to rely on it solely and exclusively and too heavily,” Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson acknowledged during a Congressional hearing in May.

The cyber subcommittee agreed, writing in its mark that there is “a need for assured positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities in the event that the Global Positioning System (GPS) is denied or disrupted.”

Pacific Allies Worry About Taiwan Invasion, Call for Closer US Cooperation

June 9, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

America’s Pacific allies Japan and Australia want deeper cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as long-range weapons and military space activities with the goal of deterring a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan and to prepare in the event of one.

“We need more conversation over our region,” said Japanese defense and air attache Maj. Gen. Hiroyuki Sugai on the sidelines of the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) conference in Washington, D.C.

Japan’s geostrategic position as part of the so-called “first island chain,” bordering the East and South China Seas, means U.S. forces in Japan are close to Taiwan should an event arise. At the same time, hosting American bases would draw Japan into the conflict.

“Japan serves as the power projection platform for the U.S.,” Japanese Col. Kimitoshi Sugiyama, director of the Tokyo Center for Air and Space Power Strategic Studies, said in a CASI panel discussion May 17 on allies and partners. “Our interoperability is high, and we use the same effects and also conduct preparedness exercises.”

Sugiyama said Japan is deepening multilateral military operations with like-minded countries such as the United States and Australia in order to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. That includes closer space cooperation with the United States, he said.

Sugai said the U.S.-Japan alliance is a “challenge for China” in the event of a Taiwan invasion. But he warned that the Russia-Ukraine war highlights the need for further integration between the U.S. and Japanese air forces.

“Thinking about modern warfare, Ukraine is very important to understand what’s going on in case of the Taiwan Strait crisis,” Sugai explained, pointing to the use of unmanned aerial systems. “China is also studying the war in Ukraine because they use a similar weapon system as Ukraine is using on Russia, so they might see the advantage or disadvantage of their weapons.”

The situation in Ukraine might influence China’s thinking about an invasion of Taiwan, requiring attentive allied study and conversation.

“The Japanese air forces [are] studying how to use unmanned aircraft,” Sugai added.

The role of unmanned systems is vital to a Taiwan Strait scenario just as in Ukraine, where unmanned ISR aircraft are targeting Russian communication and other assets.

In many other areas, the U.S. and Japan are exercising together and sharing lessons learned, but UAS reviews are being done by the United States and Japan separately, highlighting an area that can be shared.

“We exchange our lessons learned,” Sugai said, hinting at deeper collaboration to come. “We regionally exercise in joint training with the U.S. Air Force, but in the near future we will discuss in more detailed conversations.”

Australian Calls to Share B-21 Technology

In September 2021, President Joe Biden announced the “AUKUS” arrangement made by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to share nuclear-powered submarine technology and deepen military cooperation in other areas.

Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute praised the agreement but on a CASI panel repeatedly asked when it will include sharing of B-21 bomber and other new technologies, especially given Australia’s likely willingness to aid the United States in Taiwan’s defense.

“Australia is facing a much more serious challenge from China,” Davis said, citing the 2020 Australia Defence Strategic Update, the country’s version of the National Defense Strategy, updated every four years.

“The chances of major power war, including U.S.-China conflict, are considerably higher than previously,” Davis said, citing the report. “As a result, the traditional assumption that we would have 10 years’ warning time for such a conflict is no longer an appropriate basis for defense planning.”

CASI experts assumed China could be prepared for a Taiwan invasion as soon as 2025. Davis said strategists in Australia think about Taiwan as the “key scenario” to prepare for with the sophisticated military assets to defend its homeland and aid allies before then.

AUKUS, he said, gives Australia the opportunity, alongside the United Kingdom and the United States, “to play a much more forward and focused role in the Indo-Pacific as a frontline state, rather than being in a strategic backwater.”

The potential for conflict with China will require Australia to reconsider its force posture on the continent and requires domestic capabilities such as missile production and improved strike technology, he said.

China’s ongoing negotiations with the Solomon Islands for basing access is a “game changer” for Australia, he said.

“Australia’s eastern seaboard is now potentially under threat of direct attack from a hostile military power in a way that could hold at risk our key urban areas and many of our key military bases,” he said. “The key concern, obviously, is China’s intentions regarding Taiwan.”

Davis said that in 2021, Australia granted the U.S. military increased basing access, and he predicted that access and positioning of American troops and assets will grow in coming years. However, to defend the bases where U.S. troops might be stationed, Australia will need to develop anti-access/aerial denial capabilities, long-range missile defense systems, cyber warfare capabilities, and ways to defend its space architecture.

The long-range strike capability being debated in Australia of late, Davis said, is the B-21.

“There is a debate in Australia about what is the best approach to defending our continent as far forward as possible,” he said. “If the Americans are prepared to offer us [surface to surface missiles], surely we should be able to talk to them about [the] B-21.”

Davis called for more burden-sharing with allies and joint development of capabilities to deter China instead of matching China “tank for tank” and “ship for ship.”

“What we need to be able to do is to build asymmetric counters that ultimately weaken and erode China’s ability to project power against us, against our allies, or to deter them from threatening Taiwan in the future,” he said.

Davis said Australian defense policy analysts are evaluating now how to deter China, and if deterrence fails, how to respond. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan will allow China to project power north to Japan, south to the Philippines, and deep into the Central Pacific, to Guam, he said.

“I would fully expect Australia to stand by America. At the same time, I fully expect [Chinese President] Xi to push forward and try to take Taiwan,” he said, describing what Australia believes would be a “protracted conflict” if China were to invade Taiwan.

“Losing Taiwan, I think, would be catastrophic,” he added. “That means talking to the Americans about things like B-21, NGAD, space … But there also has to be a defense diplomacy angle where we work together and strengthen those relationships.”

Concerned Lawmakers Want to Know: How Soon Will the Air Force Replace Old ‘Doomsday’ Planes?

June 9, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

With several House Armed Services subcommittees set to allow the Air Force to make cuts to some of its oldest aircraft fleets as part of their 2023 National Defense Authorization Act markups, one airframe in particular—and its delayed successor—is worrying lawmakers.

The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, sometimes called the “Doomsday” plane because it is meant to withstand a nuclear attack and keep the government running from the air during a crisis, has been flying since the 1970s. The Air Force has been contemplating a replacement since 2019.

However, the search for the replacement, dubbed the Survivable Airborne Operations Center, has been delayed several times, and the Air Force said in early 2022 that the program is still “in the very early stages of development.”

In its 2023 budget request, the Air Force asked for some $203 million in research, development, testing, and evaluation for the SAOC, up from roughly $95 million in 2022 and $50 million in 2021. And in the years ahead, funding is expected to grow, projected in the Future Years Defense Program to swell to nearly $610 million in 2024 and $856 million in 2025.

The HASC subpanel on strategic forces, however, is “concerned” by what it sees as slow progress and by the E-4’s “availability and capability,” it wrote in its mark of the 2023 NDAA.

To do something about it, the subcommittee is proposes requiring report from the Air Force on its plan to sustain the NAOC and field the SAOC.

“This is a continuing concern based off of how long it’s taken to get a replacement program on record. So, at this point, we’re concerned about how long the NAOC is going to be able to hold on and when the SAOC is actually going to be up and in place,” a committee aide told reporters in a background briefing June 7. “So that is just kind of continuing to want to get more information from the Air Force about when that capability is, what its characteristics are for the SAOC, and also what the transition plan is and how we’re going to sustain the NAOC as long as we need it.”

Another aide noted bipartisan interest in getting more information on the issue.

Air Force Safety Command

Another area of bipartisan interest is safety. Congress included a number of safety provisions in the 2022 NDAA, including the creation of a DOD-wide safety council.

Accidents involving military vehicles, especially in training, have accounted for thousands of military deaths in the past several decades, research has found, leading to Congressional hearings on the topic.

Now, the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee is looking to expand its safety efforts in the 2023 NDAA, including a mandate in its markup that would require the Air Force to establish an Air Force Safety Command, led by at least a two-star general.

Air Force Safety Command would be responsible for “the formulation of safety policy, the development of risk management strategies, the monitoring of risk adjudication processes, [and] the provision of safety-related training,” according to the bill’s language. It does not, however, clarify whether the Safety Command would be equivalent to the Air Force’s major commands.

At the moment, the Department of the Air Force has the Air Force Safety Center, which “develops, implements, executes and evaluates Department of the Air Force aviation, occupational, weapons, space and system mishap prevention and nuclear surety programs and policy.” The center is commanded by a two-star—currently, it is Maj. Gen. Jeannie M. Leavitt. Included in the NDAA markup is a provision that elements such as the Safety Center be transferred to the new Safety Command.

The Naval Safety Center has already transitioned to become the Naval Safety Command, providing it with increased authorities.

New F-35 Sustainability Review Ordered by HASC Readiness Panel

June 8, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

The U.S. comptroller general, who oversees the Government Accountability Office, would assess sustainability challenges of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and report back to Congress by March 2023 under a House Armed Services subcommittee markup of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

The readiness subcommittee tasked the comptroller general, Gene L. Dodaro, with what amounts to a lessons-learned evaluation of how well F-35s have fared when deployed—as well as how the left-behind aircraft in their units do during those deployments—to assess the adequacy of spare parts and other elements of the F-35 support enterprise.

The subcommittee has been vocal about its displeasure with F-35 sustainment costs and availability rates. Panel chair John Garamendi (D-Calif.) has pledged to fight hard to block his colleagues from adding more F-35s than the Pentagon asks for, noting that adding aircraft before the support enterprise is ready for them only worsens the readiness problem. Congress has added a dozen aircraft to the Air Force’s F-35 request for several years running.

The committee noted “sustainment challenges” with the F-35, “including problems associated with the global supply chain and the F-35 logistics software,” which is transitioning from the Autonomic Logistics Information system (ALIS) to the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN).

It’s essential that lessons be captured from Air Force F-35A deployments to the Middle East and Navy/Marine Corps cruises with the F-35B/C on amphibious ships and carriers, and longer-term Marine operations with the F-35B in Japan, the panel said, and it wants the comptroller to conduct a “comprehensive” review of “operational capabilities and challenges” of the F-35.

Specifically, the comptroller would examine:

whether the F-35 met expectations when deployed.
whether the F-35 experienced sustainment challenges when deployed.
whether current stocks of spare parts and consumables were adequate to unit needs when deployed.
challenges of “operating and maintaining F-35s that remain at the air bases or stations from which F-35s are deployed” and
“any other topics” relative to operating the fighter that the comptroller thinks are relevant.

The comptroller would brief the committee on these matters by March 1, 2023, and the committee would decide at that point how it wanted a report structured to capture the findings.

The military services requested fewer F-35s in the fiscal 2023 budget than they have in recent years. The Air Force has said it prefers to reduce the buy in the near term and accelerate it once the F-35 Block 4 model—which will have numerous improvements—is in production, in the 2024-2025 timeframe.

The services’ reduction in the planned buy is one reason cited for a long delay in striking a deal for Lots 15-17 of the F-35, the Joint Program Office said. A handshake deal was expected as early as October 2021 but is now more than seven months late as the JPO and F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin negotiate over higher costs also having to do with unprecedented inflation and supply chain issues.

Both Lockheed Martin and the JPO have warned over the last year that unit prices for Lot 15-17 will be higher than the $79.2 million per copy price in the last lot; and that a nearly 10-year pattern of year-over-year F-35 unit cost reductions has come to an end.

USAF’s Plan to Cut Most of Its JSTARS Fleet Gets Support in Congress

June 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force’s plan to retire most of its E-8C JSTARS fleet took another step toward reality with help from a congressional panel. The House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee unveiled its markup of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act on June 8.

A provision included in the markup amends the 2019 NDAA by removing a section, which included several requirements meant to protect the JSTARS, or Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, fleet from a quick retirement.

One such requirement was that the Air Force maintain at least six E-8s “for allocation to the geographical combatant commanders through the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Global Force Management Allocation Process” until the fleet is entirely retired.

Keeping the requirement would block the divestments the Air Force asked to make as part of its 2023 budget request. The service wants to retire eight of 16 remaining E-8s by the end of fiscal 2023 and another four by the end of 2024, leaving just four planes, short of the six required by law.

The HASC subcommittee’s proposal is to eliminate that requirement completely, seemingly clearing the way for the Air Force to proceed with its divestitures.

The reduction of the JSTARS fleet is necessary, Air Force officials have said, because the aging airframe is not survivable in a high-end conflict—”they’d be gone in a minute,” Maj. Gen. James D. Peccia III, deputy assistant secretary for budget, told reporters in March.

However, some observers have expressed concern that in looking to retire most of the fleet before replacement systems such as space-based ISR are ready, the Air Force will create a gap in capabilities. Air Force leaders say they should be able to manage that gap.

The E-8C isn’t the only Air Force fleet poised to take a cut in the 2023 NDAA. The HASC subcommittee on seapower and projection forces included provisions in its markup that would let the Air Force cut its tanker fleet down to 466 aircraft and its C-130 fleet down to 271.

Reviews and Reports

In addition to the eliminated requirement, the tactical air and land forces subcommittee included a number of reviews and reports that it wants the Air Force to conduct in the coming months.

Among them:

A study “on the requirements for the Air Force combat search and rescue mission to meet the objectives of the most recent National Defense Strategy.”
A report “on the required timelines to achieve a fieldable and relevant unmanned autonomous system to team with and augment the current and future piloted aviation force.”
A report “on any plans to include autonomy software in [the] … next generation air dominance family of systems initiatives.”
A report “regarding the planned reduction of advanced training aircraft capacity.”

Pairing unmanned autonomous systems with manned platforms has been a high priority for Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, who has endorsed the idea of such aircraft for both fighters and bombers.

In its markup, however, the committee expressed concerns “with the current pace of efforts and the cost goals recently announced” by Kendall, noting that previous efforts in autonomous aircraft have shown progress but never progressed to actually fielding new capabilities; and registering doubt that such platforms could reach Kendall’s goal of costing at least half of other manned platforms.

The committee also raised doubts about the Air Force’s plans to transition to a smaller training fleet as it switches from T-38s to T-7s, saying it needs more details “to understand the underpinning analysis that justifies replacing 422 T-38C aircraft with just 350 T-7 aircraft.” As part of the report, the committee is asking whether the planned reduction would have a negative effect on pilot training and its effect on operational or training safety.

Cotton Nominated to Lead US Strategic Command, Two New Leaders Tapped for MAJCOMS

June 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Less than a year after he was nominated to head Air Force Global Strike Command, Gen. Anthony J. Cotton is in line for another promotion, as President Joe Biden has nominated him to be the next leader of U.S. Strategic Command, the Pentagon announced June 8.

If confirmed, Cotton would succeed Adm. Charles “Chas” A. Richard in commanding STRATCOM, which is responsible for strategic deterrence, nuclear operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and missile defense, among other mission areas.

Cotton’s confirmation would also cap a whirlwind period for the trained missileer. In June 2021, he was deputy commander of AFGSC, second to Gen. Timothy M. Ray, when he was tapped to take over the major command. He was quickly confirmed to that post and took over from Ray in August, pledging to guide AFGSC through a critical moment as both of its legs of the nuclear triad undergo modernization efforts.

At the same time, Cotton has had to contend with China’s aggressive development of its nuclear arsenal. Richard, who he is set to replace, referred to that growth as “breathtaking” and a “strategic breakout.”

Most recently, Russia has engaged in nuclear saber-rattling over its invasion of Ukraine, raising fears that it could be setting the stage for actually using a nuclear weapon.

Cotton will have to confront both of those challenges if he is confirmed to lead STRATCOM. He has a long history in the realm of strategic deterrence and nuclear operations. In addition to his time as deputy commander and commander of AFGSC, he has also previously commanded the 20th Air Force, which oversees the Air Force’s intercontinental ballistic missile operations; and the 341st Missile Wing, responsible for the Minuteman III ICBMs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.

Other previous assignments for Cotton include serving as commander of the 45th Space Wing and as commander and president of Air University.

If confirmed, Cotton would become the second Black commander of STRATCOM ever and the only Black combatant commander currently serving. He would also join Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, head of U.S. Northern Command; and Gen. Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, head of U.S. Transportation Command, as Air Force generals currently leading combatant commands. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, head of U.S. European Command, is set to retire in the coming months.

Other Nominations

In addition to Cotton, the Pentagon also announced June 8 that Biden has nominated two new leaders for Air Force major commands.

The first, Lt. Gen. James B. Hecker, is set to get a fourth star and become the next head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa.

Hecker, the current commander and president of Air University, would succeed Gen. Jeffrey L. Harrigian, who has held the post since 2019. A pilot with experience on the F-15, F-22, MQ-1, HH-60, and T-38, Hecker has previously worked as vice director of operations for the Joint Staff, commander of NATO Air Command-Afghanistan, commander of the 19th Air Force, and commander of the 18th Wing.

Hecker’s nomination comes just a few weeks after the Senate confirmed a new deputy commander for USAFE. Maj. Gen. John D. Lamontagne is set to advance.

The second, Lt. Gen. Tony D. Bauernfeind, would remain at his current rank and take over Air Force Special Operations Command, succeeding Lt. Gen. James C. Slife. Bauernfeind currently serves as vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and has an extensive history in special operations. Prior to his stint as vice commander, he was chief of staff for SOCOM, and before that, he spent time as deputy commanding general and commanding general of Special Operations Command Korea.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on June 9 to correctly identify Lt. Gen. Tony D. Bauernfeind’s current position as vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Austin’s Participation in Shangri-La Dialogue Suits PACAF’s Purposes

June 8, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie

JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii—Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III’s fourth visit to the Indo-Pacific region comes at a critical time for Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) as the major command seeks to maintain and deepen partnerships and China competes to win basing access that could undermine U.S. security.

The race is on to secure friends and allies in the Pacific. China is reaching out to Pacific island nations with promises of big investments in exchange for basing access while the United States looks for like-minded nations to partner to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Austin departed June 8 for a trip that will take him to Colorado then to Singapore June from 10 to 12 for the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 19th Shangri-La Dialogue with Indo-Pacific leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

“Singapore is a key player not only in the region—they’re also key player within ASEAN,” Maj. Joseph S. Buckman-Ellis, deputy chief of the Southeast Asia branch of the international affairs division of PACAF, told Air Force Magazine.

The United States is Singapore’s No. 1 security cooperation and defense partner with $8.5 billion in sales. The wealthy city state sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia has operated fighter jet detachments in the United States for 27 years, flying F-15s and F-16s.

In turn, Pacific Air Forces has a facilities agreement to use Paya Lebar Air Base in central Singapore.

“It’s a great place for us to have interoperability with Singapore,” Buckman-Ellis said. “Having a partner in the region that we can fly with and conduct those missions with is great training for both of our forces.”

Paya Lebar has a small U.S. Air Force unit consisting of an air mobility squadron and combat training flight. The air base also hosts exercise Commando Sling annually, allowing air crews and maintainers to work side by side similarly to the interaction at the combat training exercise Red Flag.

“There’s a lot of like-mindedness,” explained Buckman-Ellis, who attended Singapore’s command staff college for a year.

“Singapore’s philosophy on that region is a really balanced Indo-Pacific,” he added. “That aligns with the United States in terms of we want—a free and open Indo-Pacific. They want to make sure that that kind of harmony, coexistence stays that way.”

The Singapore partnership also offers an example of the type of relationships that can be forged in the region. Austin will visit Thailand after Shangri-la.

“We can be a role model to other relationships as we start to look at the other ASEAN partners,” Buckman-Ellis said.

PACAF is hoping Austin’s meetings can advance Air Force partnerships and overcome myriad challenges in the vast Pacific theater, such as refueling and executing agile combat employment (ACE) or landing at and operating from austere bases.

Austin’s planned engagement follows President Joe Biden’s special summit May 12-13 with ASEAN nations in Washington, D.C., but it also comes as China approaches the Pacific islands with investment promises.

China is reportedly negotiating with 10 Pacific island nations to sign a pact that would include economic incentives but possibly limit those countries’ ability to cooperate with the U.S. military. In April, China signed a five-year security pact with the Solomon Islands, situated northeast of Australia and near Sydney, and its important military installations.

Austin will have to show ASEAN attendees that despite billions of dollars flowing to Ukraine to defend itself and to prevent Russia from encroaching on NATO territory, the United States really is focused on China as a pacing challenge. Many nations of the Pacific have faced economic and military aggression from China in the past.

Singapore, like many of those nations, depends on China economically.

“The Singaporeans are invested heavily, No. 1, by the United States. And the No. 2 is by China,” said Buckman-Ellis.

China’s investments include the banking and digital sectors. While Singapore’s economy is a free market, more than 70 percent of Singaporeans are ethnically Chinese.

“The rules-based order is very important; the international order is very important,” Buckman-Ellis said in evaluating Singapore’s likely priorities at the coming meeting. “In their viewpoint, having the United States and China find a way to coexist and work together that maintains the region’s stability would be their No. 1 strategic goal.”

Austin’s continued engagement with Singapore is also vital to continuing PACAF’s basing access on the island, which will change in coming years as the country breaks ground on the new Changi Air Base (East) with the intention of building out a section that would be used by the U.S. Air Force.

“From a PACAF perspective of what we would want from that type of engagement with Secretary Austin is the continued support from those high-level conversations,” Buckman-Ellis said. “Singapore has a pretty dominant voice within ASEAN, and I think maintaining that relation within the Shangri-La dialogue is the key input.”