US Troops Return to Somalia as Al-Shabab Threat Increases

US Troops Return to Somalia as Al-Shabab Threat Increases

President Joe Biden approved a Defense Department request to return “under 500” American forces to Somalia, where the al-Shabab terrorist group has grown in wealth and influence and increased the tempo of its attacks since American troops pulled out in January 2021.

A senior administration official told members of the press May 16 that al-Shabab posed a danger to the American homeland and to U.S. interests in East Africa.

Al-Shabab has killed a dozen Americans in East Africa, including three in a January 2020 cross-border attack on a U.S. position in Manda Bay, Kenya. In his April 14, 2021 speech announcing the U.S. withdraw from Afghanistan, President Biden said the U.S. would target growing terrorist affiliates expanding safe havens in places such as Africa.

In the 15 months since President Donald J. Trump removed 750 U.S. troops from providing a training and counterterrorism presence in Somalia, U.S. forces have commuted from nearby countries to fulfill the mission, posing increased risk and diminishing the efficacy, the official said.

“Al-Shabab, the terrorist group in Somalia that is al-Qaida’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest affiliate, has unfortunately only grown stronger,” the official said, describing the “abrupt and sudden transition to a rotational presence.”

The rotational presence has meant a heavy burden on security forces protecting U.S. special forces as they train the elite Somali Army unit known as Danab to fight al-Shabab themselves. It has also required additional airlift for movements into and out of Somalia and harmed the effectiveness of the U.S. training.

“Rotational periods of a certain number of weeks or months are consumed, in part, by transporting and unpacking equipment, then by packing it back up at the end, and then by a re-set period,” the official said.

The non-permanent nature of the presence has also increased risks to special operators.

“That rotational presence with which we were left created a very real force protection risk,” the official said. “The President made this decision to increase the safety and effectiveness of our special operators.”

American troops were ordered out of Mogadishu but continued flying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions from Baledogle Airfield northwest of the capital, a Somali Air Force official told Air Force Magazine in January.

Airstrikes against al-Shabab leaders have markedly diminished since troops withdrew. That, too, would change, according to a report from the New York Times.

The report indicates that DOD sought and received presidential authority to target about a dozen terrorist leaders.

Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby told reporters at a May 16 briefing that that the train-and-assist mission would not directly involve American soldiers in fighting on the ground in Somalia.

“Our forces are not now, nor will they be, directly engaged in combat operations,” he said. “The purpose here is to enable a more effective fight against al-Shabab by local forces.”

Kirby said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III did not believe the episodic nature of training was the most effective way to counter the “heightened threat” posed by al-Shabab.

In response to a question from Air Force Magazine, Kirby said the move may lead to a reduced need for U.S. Air Forces Africa’s airlift support.

“By having a persistent presence, it’s possible there will be a diminution, if you will, on transport back and forth,” he said. “This is not going to make a huge difference resource wise.”

U.S. Air Forces Africa did not immediately respond to an inquiry from Air Force Magazine, and U.S. Africa Command declined to comment.

The official who briefed the media May 17 said “under 500” U.S. troops will be deployed to Somalia on a “persistent” basis. The official did not describe what types of troops would be deployed, or from what service, only that the troops will relocate from other East African nations.

The U.S. maintains an East African force presence in both Kenya and Djibouti, home to the only U.S. base on the continent, Camp Lemonnier.

“It’s overall roughly the same resource and personnel commitment as we currently have in that part of Africa for counterterrorism purposes,” the official said while providing no timeline for the return of U.S. forces to Somalia.

The official likened the restoration of the training and counterterrorism mission to one conducted by the U.S. Air Force and special operators in Niger at Air Base 101 in Niamey and Air Base 201 in Agadez, where several hundred heavily protected troops train local forces to fight terrorists.

“This approach aligns with what we’re doing elsewhere on the African continent, including in Niger, where U.S. forces are training and equipping the Armed Forces of Niger to conduct effective operations to counter terrorist there such as [coalition group] JNIM and ISIS-West Africa,” the official said. “Big picture, there is much work to be done in Somalia with respect to counterterrorism.”

Somalia’s successful presidential election May 15 was a stabilizing factor ahead of the announcement, the official indicated, noting the restoration of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to the presidency, who previously served from 2012 to 2017.

No timeline was given for the movement of U.S. forces back to Somalia, but Kirby said the restoration of Somalia rotations will not constitute a deployment.

“It’s not a deployment,” he said. “This is a change in the posture. It’s about putting troops back into Somalia on a persistent basis. It’s not a deployment with an end date.”

Space Force to Add Three Intelligence Squadrons—‘Billets Are Already in Place’

Space Force to Add Three Intelligence Squadrons—‘Billets Are Already in Place’

The Space Force plans to add three new intelligence squadrons in the next two years, said Lt. Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, commander of the service’s Space Operations Command. 

The additions would double the number of squadrons in Space Delta 7, whose intel Guardians already work on missile warning and defense, electronic warfare, and research and development. 

In an online discussion hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Whiting described the advances the Space Force has made in intelligence since becoming the sixth military service.

Organizationally like a major command in the Air Force, the Colorado-based Space Operations Command, a field command, sits “at the nexus” of the Space Force and the newly re-created U.S. Space Command, Whiting explained. 

Possessing “all the the operational capability in the Space Force,” SpOC, as it’s known for short, also serves as the Space Force’s component within U.S. Space Command—the combatant command’s largest component assigned there from any of the military services.

Describing SpOC’s work, Whiting said, “Think of missions like space domain awareness, electromagnetic warfare, missile warning, operational-level command and control, defensive cyber capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, satellite communications, precision, navigation, and timing, orbital warfare—and then we also run the bases from which we operate.” 

Adding more intelligence activities would contribute to the command’s priority of being “ISR-led and cyber secure,” Whiting said. 

Governments such as China’s and Russia’s can attack satellites in orbit, but they and others such as North Korea or Iran could also mount cyberattacks—considered the “soft underbelly” of the U.S. satellite infrastructure—because of the “lower bar to entry,” Whiting said.

Citing Russia’s 1,500 pieces of “long-lived debris” that it created in a demonstration of a ground-launched anti-satellite weapon in November 2021, “we have to do everything in SpOC relative to the threat now,” Whiting said. “We have to be informed about that threat so that our operations can continue to be sustained in the face of those threats.”

Intelligence is the area in which Whiting said he believes the Space Force has made the most progress since its creation in December 2019. 

“When we stood up the Space Force, we went all around the U.S. Air Force to find all the places that intelligence was being done, either for space or from space, and we brought all of that in, in partnership with the Air Force, and it all transferred over to the Space Force,” Whiting said. 

That formed Space Delta 7, the command’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance delta, which has detachments that embed within each of the command’s other numbered deltas.

“So if you’re the Delta 4 commander at Buckley [Space Force Base] outside of Denver and you have the global missile warning responsibility, your S-2 function—your intel function—is actually a detachment of that Delta 7. And that major who runs that detachment … they take their day-to-day direction from Delta 4,” Whiting said.

He said the plan to add three more intelligence squadrons is “all fully funded—all the billets are already in place.”

The new squadrons will include a threat analysis squadron, a targeting squadron, and a PED squadron, short for processing, exploitation, and dissemination.

“So we are really getting after the intel requirements that our space warfighters need, and those intel Guardians are just leading the way for us, and we’re very, very proud of what they’ve done.”

Mitchell Institute’s New UAV Study Center Looks at Drones in a China Fight

Mitchell Institute’s New UAV Study Center Looks at Drones in a China Fight

Unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous aircraft may provide a solution to operating in heavily contested domains such as the Taiwan Straits, according to a panel of expert who suggested operationalizing artificial intelligence for such purposes sooner rather than later. The group gathered virtually May 12 to help launch the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies’ new Center for UAV and Autonomy Studies (MI-UAS). The Mitchell Institute is part of AFA.

“China, in particular, has developed networks of very long-range missiles, electronic warfare systems, and other power projection capabilities that could severely limit or even prevent the ability of the U.S. to defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific,” said Caitlin Lee, Mitchell Institute senior fellow for UAV and Autonomy Studies and head of the new center.

“UAVs may have an important role to play in this fight,” Lee added.

Experts gather virtually, May 12, 2022, to help launch the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies’ new Center for UAV and Autonomy Studies (MI-UAS). The Mitchell Institute is part of AFA.

UAVs such as the Reaper and Predator have already reduced risks to aircrews and operate at a lower cost than manned aircraft, she said.

But operationalizing UAVs for great power competition—and achieving Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s operational imperatives of uncrewed aircraft being part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter and the B-21 bomber platforms—will require a change in the way the Defense Department thinks about the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

“Everybody knows the extensive anti-access/area denial capabilities that China has deployed over the last 20-plus years are going to be brought to bear,” said David Ochmanek, a defense researcher at RAND Corp.

Ochmanek described a hypothetical U.S. defense of Taiwan that would face intense attacks by China on U.S. bases with accurate ballistic and cruise missiles; world-class integrated air defense; increasingly capable fighters and fighter aircrews; and attacks on American space-based sensors and command-and-control.

But the Obama-era deputy assistant secretary of defense for force development saw a way to counter such an offensive.

“Imagine 1,000 unmanned UAVs over Taiwan and over the Taiwan Strait,” Ochmanek posed.

The small aircraft would fly at a high, sub-sonic speed, with a radar signature indistinguishable from an F-35’s. The UAVs would fly in front performing a sensing mission while manned aircraft flew in the rear.

“Imagine now being an SA-21 [missile defense system] operator on the mainland of China, or on one of the surface action groups trying to predict [what will happen],” he said, noting that the UAVs would also gather and share target data, while others could be equipped with jamming devices.

“Your scopes are flooded with these things that you’ve got to kill,” Ochmanek said. “If you don’t kill those sensors, we’re going to find you, and if we find you, we’re going to kill you.”

Tim Grayson, special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, said getting to that point will require diversifying the missions on which UAVs are employed.

“If we start looking at really diversifying the types of missions, you could get to the point where as the price goes down, I can afford to take more risk with it,” he said.

The Air Force could then use the platforms to attack manned aircraft, expensive surface-to-air missile systems, and jammers.

“At that point in time, I can start thinking about missions entirely differently, … prioritizing mission effectiveness over survivability,” Grayson said.

He argued that with Global Hawk, the Air Force already operates an autonomous UAV conducting an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission.

Getting to that envisioned point in time within years, rather than decades, means operationalizing autonomous UAVs today, Ochmanek said, asking rhetorically how 10,000 Uber drivers are managed on the island of Manhattan.

“It’s not Mildred sitting in a switchboard saying, ‘Joe, you go to the corner of 42nd and Broadway.’ No, it’s the AI,” he said, referring to artificial intelligence. “It’s not that hard, given the state of current computing, to imagine a system where the targeting grid is commanding and controlling itself.”

While the discussion participants agreed that human oversight is still required, they argued that AI is ready for some missions today, but that certification and doctrine will need to catch up.

“We know there are some missions where the autonomy and the AI is mature enough to be able to use now,” Grayson said.

“What we’re missing is what I’ll generically call the DOTMLPF,” he added—the acronym for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. The Air Force will need to develop testing, certification, and ways for Airmen to train with UAVs and to adjust techniques, tactics, procedures, and doctrine.

“We cannot wait until we’ve solved all of those problems to move out and do some of this,” Grayson said. “We’ve got to start working the operationalization and fielding of this today.”

On NATO’s Eastern Flank, Navy Growlers Highlight Air Force’s Electronic Warfare Gap

On NATO’s Eastern Flank, Navy Growlers Highlight Air Force’s Electronic Warfare Gap

Navy E/A-18 Growlers are conducting NATO enhanced air policing in Eastern Europe near Ukraine to show Russia that the U.S. stands ready with electronic warfare capabilities. But what the Navy is doing also highlights what the Air Force can’t.

Pilots from Navy Electronic Attack Squadron 134, or VAQ-134—nicknamed “Garudas”—who spoke to Air Force Magazine at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, said they were practicing integration with Air Force F-16s and flying NATO missions with EW pods turned off.

But soon, Navy divestment will eliminate that joint force capability before the Air Force replaces it.

“We can employ air to air, but we can also collect [electronic support measures] data and employ in the electromagnetic spectrum, both offensively and defensively,” said Navy Lt. Cmdr. Andrew Mays while showing off an E/A-18 Growler deployed to Spangdahlem from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.

“We have a unique set of skills that mix fourth-gen fighters with an [EW] platform,” added Mays, wearing the Garudas’ characteristic maroon-accented green flight suit. “We maintain that capability, but we’re not using those currently.”

Lt. Cmdr. James Corrin, also a Growler pilot deployed to Spangdahlem, explained that the aircraft are postured defensively in a transparent way meant to demonstrate to adversaries the U.S. joint force capabilities positioned on NATO’s eastern flank.

“There’s no confusion about what we’re doing here,” he said. “Those all have capabilities that could be used. But at this point, we’re just maintaining our air policing and that defensive posture.”

The Navy pilots are, however, preparing for local flights and discussing with local F-16 squadrons how to better integrate their capabilities into the joint force. They also stand ready to use EW, if needed.

“We’re just giving more options to NATO,” Corrin said.

VAQ-134 is an expeditionary squadron divided evenly between carriers and joint force support. The Growler is a modified F/A-18 with foldable wings for use on a carrier, and it carries EW pods in place of most munitions. For the NATO mission, the platform is armed with AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles.

The unit had been readying for deployment to Japan on a regular force rotation when they were directed in March to support the Russia deterrence effort on NATO’s borders.

When the Growlers’ deployment was announced, a senior defense official insisted that the aircraft would not assist Ukraine by suppression of enemy air defenses or jamming Russian cruise missiles within their range.

“They are not there to engage Russian assets. That is not the goal,” the official told journalists in a March 28 telephone briefing. “They are there, as all of the other aircraft that we have devoted to this mission, … to reinforce our deterrence posture on the eastern flank.”

The USS Harry S. Truman‘s carrier air wing, including squadrons of Marine Corps F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and Navy EA-18 Growlers, also included electronic warfare capabilities, the defense official said. The Air Force does not have assets with dedicated electronic warfare capabilities on the eastern flank.

An Air Force Capability Gap

Retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the deployments highlight a gap in Air Force capabilities ever since the retirement of the F-4G Phantom in 1996 and the EF-111 Raven in 1998.

“Part of the impact of decommissioning the EF-111 force was that a very experienced electronic warfare crew force or personnel were scattered to the four winds,” said Deptula, who as commander of Operation Northern Watch in Iraq in 1998-99 regularly employed the Growler’s predecessor, the EA-6B Prowler, to jam Iraqi acquisition radars of its surface-to-air missile systems.

“The Air Force tried to make the case that stealth was a form of electronic warfare, and it really is not,” Deptula explained.

“A key characteristic of electronic warfare is to be able to move and counter move,” he added. “There are other elements of electronic warfare that we want to be able to conduct from platforms designed solely to do that.”

In recent years, Air Combat Command head Gen. Mark D. Kelly has said China’s and Russia’s EW gains keep him up at night. Air Force leaders have also voiced concerns that development of new electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations are moving too slowly. In June 2021, ACC stood up the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., to pursue dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Fifth-generation F-22 and F-35 fighters have inherent electronic warfare capabilities. In February, the Air Force said that it had achieved initial operating capability of the Legion Pod, an infrared search-and-track sensor designed for integration with the F-15C Eagle. All F-16s can carry self-defense jamming pods, while F-16CJs have upgraded EW sensors for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) with AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM).

A Department of the Air Force spokesperson told Air Force Magazine that the Air Force relies on a memorandum with the Navy to maintain five expeditionary VAQ squadrons for use in joint missions that require offensive EW operations.

“Air Force EW efforts are still primarily focused on maintaining and updating platform-specific self-protection capabilities,” the spokesperson said in a statement.

Deptula said that’s not enough.

“Less than 25 percent of our combat force are made up of those advanced technology platforms,” he said. “You don’t have sufficient electronic warfare capability.”

L3 Technologies is helping the Air Force to develop the EC-37B Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft to provide improved electronic attack capabilities, but ACC does not plan to field the first five platforms until 2023. Still, the Air Force described the EC-37B attack capability as “limited.”

“The Air Force’s Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) focus is primarily centered on defensive capabilities to limit detection and increase aircraft survivability with an effort to conduct limited Electromagnetic Attack (EA) via the EC-130H/EC-37B,” the Air Force said in a statement.

The Air Force is planning a range of new systems, including the F-15’s Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS), but most are defensive.

Deptula believes the Air Force decision not to develop EW comes from an empty promise from the other services.

“Part of what drove the elimination of the EF-111, and the reduction in focus on electronic warfare, was the belief that joint warfare, our joint brothers and sisters, would pick up the load,” Deptula said. “The other services have not.”

And the Navy Growlers now integrating with the Air Force on the eastern flank will soon go away.

The fiscal 2023 defense budget plans for the Navy to divest all of its non-carrier-based Growlers by fiscal 2025. The Air Force did not say how its memorandum with the Navy would be honored if the joint force Growlers are divested.

Ukraine does not have EW aircraft of its own, and nearby U.S. Growlers lack the authority to engage their pods in support of Ukraine.  DOD has, however, included in recent aid packages to Ukraine nondescript “electronic jamming equipment.”

Deptula said the war waged by Russia in Ukraine highlights the need for aircraft with SEAD capabilities “across a spectrum of conflict” to fight peer adversaries.

“This is the kind of capability that we need to be able to prepare for the future contingencies that we might have to face,” he said.

“[Are] all you need … these new modern fighters? No, you need more than that,” he said. “Even though these aircraft are not survivable in the highest demanding fight, they can be used in other contingencies where electronic warfare is so important.”

Kendall Sees Room to Change Space Force FYDP—But Not F-35 Plan

Kendall Sees Room to Change Space Force FYDP—But Not F-35 Plan

The Space Force’s budget got a big bump in the Pentagon’s 2023 budget request, with a topline of $24.5 billion—36 percent more than fiscal 2022’s enacted level.

And even more money in the years ahead is likely, according to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

“I do not anticipate the future budgets will remain flat or go down for the Space Force—quite the opposite,” Kendall told the House Appropriations defense subcommittee May 13.

If Kendall’s prediction is accurate, it would contradict the numbers laid out in the Pentagon’s Future Years Defense Plan, which projects spending five years in advance. Rep. Betty McCollum (D-Minn.), chair of the panel, noted in questioning Kendall that the overall FYDP for the Space Force is “basically flat, rising a bit in 2024 before falling below the 2023 proposed budget level.”

While McCollum expressed concern that the FYDP projections don’t “reflect what it will actually take to deliver successful acquisitions and programs,” Kendall indicated that the numbers are subject to change as the Space Force matures and leaders get a better sense of what they need.

“We still have to define our requirements. We have to make sure that the programs we put in place … are structured for success so that we don’t have massive schedule and cost overruns. We all want to avoid that,” Kendall said. “There are opportunities through emerging technologies and commercial best practices that I think will make that possible. But we’re going to still have to be disciplined, and we’re going to have to be smart about how we invest in space. I think that’s the picture that we see coming. At this point, I think the [2023] budget is a good start toward those types of architectures and gives us the resources we need to decide what next steps we need to take.”

The FYDP is primarily a “planning tool,” according to the Congressional Research Service, that “allows DOD and the military services to plan for anticipated changes to programs or priorities.” But it can be changed, and former Pentagon and Air Force comptroller Robert F. Hale, in a report on the DOD budgeting process for Brookings, found that FYDPs “do not always capture changes beyond the budget year, especially increases associated with newer and more sophisticated weapons.”

The Space Force, meanwhile, is in the process of absorbing the Space Development Agency, a move that accounts for a sizable chunk of the increase in the 2023 budget. There are also one-time costs associated with interservice transfers expected to come onboard in the next year or so.

Even still, the service and SDA are dedicated to building out a constellation of hundreds of satellites in low-Earth orbit, called the National Defense Space Architecture, ​for missile warning, communications, data coverage and sharing, and other capabilities. While these spacecraft will be smaller and less expensive than previous military satellites, there will be far more to create a distributed, resilient architecture.

The SDA is also planning to follow a two-year cycle in rolling out new capabilities, a rapid pace that will require steady funding as well.

But while the Space Force’s budget is likely to change from the FYDP, one aspect of the future plan that likely won’t, Kendall told lawmakers, is the Air Force’s reduced buy of F-35s in 2024.

The Air Force surprised some when it cut its requested purchase of F-35s in 2023 from 48 planes in previous years all the way down to 33. In 2024, though, the FYDP shows that request going even lower, to 29, before rising again.

As he has done before, Kendall insisted that these reductions don’t mean the Air Force is backing away from the F-35, predicting that the service will be buying the fifth-generation fighter for 15 years to come.

But he also indicated that the FYDP is unlikely to change.

“The reduction we took this year, and we will probably extend that to next year, was based on a number of factors,” Kendall said. “There were a number of things we need to do in the TacAir portfolio. One of them was to buy out the remaining number of inventory of F-15EXs that we need, for the capabilities that the F-15EX will provide. We want to increase the funding for the Next Generation Air Dominance [platform] which will be the follow on to the F-22. We’ve got some other programs we need to move forward as well. 

“We also are very interested—we’re insistent on getting the Block 4 capabilities for F-35, and the contractor has been late in delivering them so far. So we want to see evidence that they will be able to accomplish that before we increase the production, so that was a major factor as well.”

The Block 4 update to the F-35, which would include the latest hardware and software modernizations, needs the Technical Refresh 3 upgrade to “unlock” its updates. However, that has taken Lockheed Martin longer than expected to develop.

Early on in his tenure, Kendall noted that he had dealt with issues in the Joint Strike Fighter program before, when he was undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. His solution then was to cap purchases for several years to put pressure on Lockheed Martin and to avoid buying jets that would later need to be modernized.

Three Vanguards to Become Programs of Record in 2023, Air Force S&T Boss Says

Three Vanguards to Become Programs of Record in 2023, Air Force S&T Boss Says

Three of the Air Force’s four Vanguard programs—high-profile ventures chosen for extra investment and accelerated development—are slated to become programs of record by the end of 2023, the deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for science, technology, and engineering told Congress on May 12. The statement seemed to affirm the department’s approach to rapidly turning key technologies into acquisition programs.

The Vanguard programs “have succeeded in representing a new model for accelerating the pace of transitioning solutions,” Kristen J. Baldwin said in her written testimony to the House Armed Services subcommittee on cyber, innovative technologies, and information systems. 

Golden Horde, Skyborg, and National Technology Satellite-3 were all selected as initial Vanguard programs in September 2020, with the Air Force seeking some $157.6 million for them in fiscal 2021. Then, in June 2021, the service announced it was adding Rocket Cargo as a fourth line of effort.

The first three programs are all set to transition to acquisition in 2023, Baldwin told lawmakers. She did not offer a timeline for Rocket Cargo, instead stating that a “small [science and technology] investment today influences early commercial design efforts and leverages $5-10 billion ongoing industry and NASA investments.”

Still, the transition of the initial three in 2023 would ensure those programs remain mostly on time from their initial estimates.

NTS-3, an experimental satellite meant to complement GPS and increase the resilience of satellite navigation for the military, was initially scheduled for launch in late 2022, but the Air Force Research Laboratory had said in April 2021 that that date had slipped to 2023.

In August 2021, Brig. Gen. Dale R. White, the program executive officer for Skyborg, an artificial intelligence-enabled system to control unmanned aircraft in a future manned/unmanned aircraft teaming concept, hedged his bets on transitioning in 2023, saying, “I won’t say it is not achievable” but warning that budgetary pressures could change that.

Golden Horde, meanwhile, is intended to develop “networked, collaborative, and autonomous,” or NCA, weapons—munitions that can set up their own network, change their targets in flight, and synchronize their strikes. Officials had not previously assigned a timeline to that program but had transitioned it to a new phase of development in September 2021 called “Colosseum,” with virtual environments, digital engineering, and “surrogate UAVs” to allow scientists and engineers to rapidly try out new ideas and innovations.

Speaking to lawmakers, Baldwin seemed to endorse using the “Colosseum” approach for other programs.

“We’re all looking at digital technology, digital modeling, simulation, agile software practices,” Baldwin said. “So the continued interest in allowing us to utilize advanced technologies in transforming our processes through digital tools is also going to have a significant benefit, because … the knowledge gaining and learning process, the recovery, can be quicker when we are training things in models and simulations versus expensive hardware prototyping.”

Baldwin also noted that the Department of the Air Force remains committed to dedicating 20 percent of its science and technology budget to “transformational technologies.” And as the Vanguards are set to transition to acquisition programs, she offered a small hint as to where her next priorities would lie.

“You may … be familiar with the Secretary of the Air Force’s operational imperatives in order to keep pace with the China threat,” Baldwin said. “We are actively identifying what capabilities are needed and using this transformational S&T component to align with those capability gaps.”

Four USAF Generals Tapped for Third Star, and Guillot to CENTCOM, in New Nominations

Four USAF Generals Tapped for Third Star, and Guillot to CENTCOM, in New Nominations

An Air Force three-star general has been tapped to become deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, and the Air Force would get four more lieutenant generals, in a slate of nominations announced May 13.

Lt. Gen. Gregory M. Guillot has been nominated to the CENTCOM post at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. He currently commands U.S. Air Forces Central Command (Ninth Air Force) and Air Combat Command’s Ninth Air Expeditionary Task Force, and is CENTCOM’s combined forces air component commander at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. 

If confirmed, Guillot would serve as the deputy to Army Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, who assumed command of CENTCOM in April.

The following major generals have been nominated to the rank of lieutenant general:

  • Maj. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, assigned to replace Guillot as commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command; commander, Ninth Air Expeditionary Task Force, Air Combat Command; and combined forces air component commander, U.S. Central Command. 
  • Maj. Gen. Richard G. Moore Jr., assigned as the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff, Plans and Programs, replacing Lt. Gen. David S. Nahom, who has been nominated to take command of U.S. Northern Command’s Alaskan Command and the Eleventh Air Force.
  • Maj. Gen. Charles L. Plummer, assigned as the judge advocate general of the Air Force. 
  • Maj. Gen. Michael J. Schmidt, assigned as director, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, replacing Lt. Gen. Eric T. Fick.
Guard F-16 Skids Off Runway in South Dakota, Pilot Safe

Guard F-16 Skids Off Runway in South Dakota, Pilot Safe

An F-16 from the South Dakota Air National Guard’s 114th Fighter Wing slid off the runway in Sioux Falls, S.D., on May 11. Images appeared to show the jet’s landing gear collapsed and its nose damaged.

The pilot, however, is safe, the wing said in a statement posted to social media.

The incident occurred at approximately 2:43 p.m. local time as the fighter was returning from a routine training mission at Joe Foss Field, located at the Sioux Falls Regional Airport, the press release says. The cause of the accident was still being investigated.

However, local media outlets including the Argus Leader and Dakota News Now posted images of the F-16 after the crash, with the landing gear crushed and the plane resting on its nose. The canopy is raised.

This marks the second safety incident involving an Air National Guard F-16 in the past three months. On March 23, an Oklahoma Air National Guard fighter crashed in a woodland area near the Louisiana-Texas border. The pilot in that incident was able to eject.

A day prior, an F-22 from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., had its landing gear collapse on the runway.

From fiscal year 2015 to 2021, there were 42 Class A or Class B mishaps involving Air Force F-16s, including 20 aircraft destroyed. Class A mishaps result in a death or permanent disability, cause more than $2.5 million in damage, or result in the destruction of an aircraft. Class B mishaps cause permanent partial disability; causes damage valued at between $600,000 and just under $2.5 million; or hospitalize three people, not counting those admitted for observation or administrative purposes who are treated and released. 

The F-16’s five-year rate of 3.38 Class A and B mishaps every 100,000 flight hours exceeds the A-10 but is lower than the F-15, F-22, and F-35, according to data from the Air Force Safety Center.

A Dozen Senators Introduce Legislation to Establish a Space National Guard

A Dozen Senators Introduce Legislation to Establish a Space National Guard

Twelve senators have backed legislation that would create a Space National Guard, reigniting a debate over how the Space Force will organize its part-time components.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced the Space National Guard Establishment Act on May 10, with four Democrats and six Republicans joining them in co-sponsoring the legislation.

“Without a National Guard component for Space Force, we risk losing many talented individuals who want to keep serving their country and their states after they leave active duty, and that is simply unacceptable,” Feinstein said in a statement. “Creating a Space Force National Guard would also save money and ensure a smoother process in the event we need to activate personnel. Not establishing a Space National Guard was a mistake when Space Force was created, and this bill will remedy that.”

The bill has been referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, where it will face an uncertain future. As part of its 2022 National Defense Authorization Act markup last summer, the committee proposed simply changing the name of the Air National Guard to the Air and Space National Guard, instead of establishing a separate entity.

That approach left advocates for a Space National Guard unsatisfied—they argue that a new entity is needed because members of those Air National Guard units don’t have a direct connection with the Space Force and have essentially been “orphaned” by the Air Force with no corresponding Active-duty units left in the service.

The SASC proposal was “a new idea,” Brig. Gen. Steven J. Butow, commander of the California Air National Guard, said during a recent virtual Schriever Spacepower Forum event hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “But what it does is it fails to recognize the way that we operate. We are creatures of doctrine. And doctrine comes from lessons learned in the battlespace. … Unity of command, unity of effort—these are very important concepts. … If you don’t own it, you don’t control it. How can you rely on it? And somebody else is going to have a higher priority for that capability. It is unfair to create the Space Force and then tie the arm behind the Chief of Space Operations’ back because you gave him a less than full complement of capability.”

However, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget also came out against a separate Space Guard, releasing a statement of administration policy saying it “strongly opposes” such a move as it would create unnecessary bureaucracy and increase costs by up to $500 million annually.

Brig. Gen. Michael A. Valle, commander of the Florida Air National Guard, argued that such cost estimates are based off flawed assumptions, such as the need for new infrastructure and the establishment of space units in every state and territory. In actuality, he said during the Mitchell Institute event, the costs would be limited to cosmetic changes such as name tape, unit flags, and signs.

The House Armed Services Committee backed a Space Guard as part of its NDAA markup. But when it came time for the two committees to draft a compromise bill, they pushed the decision off, instead requiring a study and a report on how the Space Force should structure its reserve components, including a look at how much a Space National Guard would cost.

Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee May 11 that the service hoped to complete that study in time for the 2024 budgeting cycle, starting next year.

At the same time, the Space Force itself has proposed combining its Active-duty and reserve forces into one combined “Space Component.” In an April hearing before the HASC, Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond listed three options for Air National Guard units with space missions—leave them as is, create a separate Space Guard, or fold them into the Space Component.

Feinstein and Rubio’s bill would keep those units separate from the Space Component and establish them as the reserves for the Space Force.

Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) isn’t one of the cosponsors of the bill. But in questioning Thompson during the May 11 hearing, he laid out several arguments for why a Space Guard might be preferable to a single component.

“Many folks who joined the Air National Guard, they did so because of geographic stability that it offers the members of their families, as well as the opportunity sometimes to serve their state,” Kelly said, pointing out that Air National Guard members might choose not to transfer over to the Space Component if that structure is put in place.

Valle, speaking during the Mitchell Institute event, echoed that line of thinking, saying surveys had shown that up to 90 percent of Air National Guard members in space units said they wouldn’t want to transfer over.

“While supporting the federal mission of homeland defense on full-time status, on different occasions I’ve had the opportunity throughout those years to also support my state through multiple disasters—hurricanes, wildfires, pandemic response, and also travel to other states to support,” said Valle. “That … is what space professionals in the Air National Guard do today and can continue to do so if we establish a Space National Guard: We can conduct and do the mission while being available to support our state and our country.”

Thompson, for his part, noted that while estimates vary on how many ANG service members will transfer, the Space Force’s study on the issue is not making any assumptions that “a large number of Guard members would transition.” 

Instead, the study is looking at “determining what would be required to replace those members by Space Force members, the numbers it would take, the training time it would take, the training resources that would take, and the corresponding degradation in mission as we bring those units back up to full status.”

Given the pressing threats posed by China and Russia and the increasingly contested nature of space, Valle and Butow said, the Space Force can’t afford any delay caused by the need to train new Guardians. At the same time, they pointed out that adding Guard members to the Space Component could present manning challenges, as the Space Force’s end strength is supposed to stay low, at 8,600 in 2023. 

Currently more than 1,000 members of the Air National Guard are involved in space missions, spread across seven states and one territory—Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, New York, Ohio, and Guam. Senators from Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, and Ohio are all cosponsors of Feinstein and Rubio’s bill.