Air National Guard Leaders: Time is Running Short for a Space Guard

Air National Guard Leaders: Time is Running Short for a Space Guard

If Congress doesn’t act to establish a Space National Guard soon, leaders in Air National Guard units with space missions will need to start having some difficult conversations with their Airmen.

That’s the warning from multiple commanders during a virtual event hosted by the National Guard Association of the United States, in which participants ratcheted up their push for a separate Space Guard—and argued that the Space Force’s alternate proposal isn’t sufficient.

The debate over how to organize the Space Force’s reserve component began almost as soon as the new service was created in 2019, and various proposals have been bandied about with no resolution. 

But for now, the Space Force has settled on a construct called the “Space Component,” a hybrid full-time and part-time structure that would be unique in the military. Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond has told members of Congress that it is the service’s main legislative proposal this year as lawmakers begin to draft the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

Such a move on its surface would seem to be in line with Raymond’s mandate that the service remain “lean and agile”. But critics like Col. Jason Knight, commander of the 195th Operations Group in the California Air National Guard, say it would actually limit the Space Force’s flexibility and delay its development—and leave their Airmen out to dry.

“Our expectation, and the Guard Bureau’s expectation, is those individuals that are no longer in missions that support whatever they were—in my case, I’d have space electronic warfare and one satellite command and control unit that would go away—our expectation is those individuals need to be re-managed or repurposed,” Knight told reporters during a briefing May 19.

There are currently more than 1,000 members of the Air National Guard involved in space missions, spread across seven states and one territory—Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, New York, Ohio, and Guam. If the Space Component becomes a reality, many would be left behind in the Air National Guard and forced to transfer to a mission different from the one they’ve been working on throughout their careers.

Such a scenario could play out soon, depending on how the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act turns out.

“I heard they, they being the Space Force, were given direction to plan for FY 2025 when they needed to have everything converted over,” Knight said. “ … If that’s the case, then these moves will be happening probably by this summer, right? If this summer we don’t see it in the NDAA, then we’re going to have a problem. 

“The problem for me is I’m going to have to go and talk to my Airmen about, ‘Hey, I’m sorry, we don’t have a job for you here in space. We’re going to have to find something for you.’ That’s going to, obviously, result in probably a lot of folks wanting to leave and move on to something different, which is not a good thing for the nation, I would argue.”

The alternative would be to have the Guardsmen transfer into the Space Component. But the ANG commanders warned that such a move would hurt their states’ Guards and discourage service members who serve in part to support Guard missions like disaster relief or humanitarian aid.

“While supporting the federal mission of homeland defense on full-time status, on different occasions I’ve had the opportunity throughout those years to also support my state through multiple disasters—hurricanes, wildfires, pandemic response, and also travel to other states to support,” Brig. Gen. Michael A. Valle, commander of the Florida Air National Guard, said during a recent virtual Schriever Spacepower Forum event hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “That … is what space professionals in the Air National Guard do today and can continue to do so if we establish a Space National Guard: We can conduct and do the mission while being available to support our state and our country.”

In testifying to Congress, Raymond has laid out an alternative to both a Space National Guard and a Space Component—maintaining the status quo and continuing to have the Air National Guard provide support for the space mission.

But Col. Michael Bruno, chief of the Joint Staff for the Colorado National Guard, said that idea is a nonstarter.

“If we keep the status quo and the Air National Guard space mission stays in the Air Force, the problem becomes increased bureaucracy, the man hours to find the workarounds, specifically when it comes to funding,” Bruno said. “Because the U.S. Air Force is focused on [the mission of] ‘fly, fight, and win.’ … They no longer do space missions. That has already moved on to U.S. Space Force. If they have an organization underneath them that is still fighting space missions, and their mission is to fly, fight, and win, we’re not going to get the same needed funding to continue our missions and that bureaucracy of going through the Air Force to get to U.S. Space Force is just going to keep increasing, and it’s just going to cause problems at the national level.”

Air National Guard space leaders have repeatedly referred to their units being “orphaned”—left behind by the Space Force and without any corresponding unit left in the Air Force. And beyond the logistical and bureaucratic challenges that poses, there are implications for individual Airmen, said Col. Adam Rogge, commander of the 233rd Space Group in the Colorado Air National Guard.

“I want all of my enlisted Airmen to look at a chief master sergeant and say, ‘I can make it to that rank. There’s plenty of opportunity for me to do that in this service.’ I want my lieutenants to look at Mike Bruno and Jason Knight and say, ‘I can make it to colonel, I can make it to brigadier general,’” Rogge said. “If we continue to be a one off, it’s an untenable situation … if you think about, what are the opportunities for leaders?”

Help could be on the way in the form of legislation backed by a dozen Senators to establish a Space National Guard, but that proposal may face opposition from critics who point to a White House Office of Management and Budget statement of administration policy saying a Space Guard would cost up to $500 million annually.

That estimate is inaccurate, ANG leaders argued, based on the assumption that a Space Guard would require new facilities and layers of bureaucracy. In actuality, they say, the cost of a Space Guard is only several hundred thousand dollars—enough for cosmetic changes such as name tape, unit flags, and signs.

“These future space Guardians would continue to accomplish their mission in their current facilities with their current equipment,” Bruno said.

Ukraine War Shows Congress that Arming Taiwan Now Can Deter China

Ukraine War Shows Congress that Arming Taiwan Now Can Deter China

Lawmakers studying the lessons learned from the Ukraine war believe that speeding delivery of F-16s and Stingers among other kit to Taiwan, and forming a clear defensive coalition in the Pacific, could deter China from a mid-decade invasion.

“Taiwan is seeing delays right now in stingers, harpoon coastal missile defense systems, and F-16 [upgrades],” Rep. Andy Barr (R-Ky.) said May 19 at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and nonproliferation, held the day President Joe Biden began a trip to South Korea and Japan.

Barr quoted the Taiwanese Minister of Defense, who said that China will be capable of mounting a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2025 and Taiwan may not get American-made and paid-for weapons in time.

“The current timetable for deliveries to Taiwan are falling behind,” Barr said, noting that 66 F-16 fighter jets are not expected for delivery until 2026, 108 Abrams tanks in 2027, and 40 Paladin self-propelled Howitzers in 2027.

“I hope we’ve learned our lesson from Ukraine that pre-invasion arms, military assistance, is a deterrent. And failure to provide that beforehand is an invitation for aggression,” Barr added. “This is unacceptable if we are to deter the [Chinese Communist Party’s] growing aggression.”

But the Ukraine war is already taxing the U.S. industrial base. The United States has given more than a quarter of its stock of Stinger air defense weapons to Ukraine, and the industrial base does not have the capacity to quickly replace the weapon system. The Defense Department has said it intends to replace the weapon stocks “one-for-one,” but has acknowledged that could take years.

During the hearing, a panel of Indo-Pacific experts assessed the lessons China is likely taking from Russia’s invasion. In particular, they agreed that deterrence failed and warned that preventing China from invading Taiwan will require adequately arming Taiwan and a clear commitment of the United States and Pacific partners to come to Taiwan’s defense.

Chinese Assumptions

“The Chinese assumption is that what we did in Ukraine, they’re envisioning a light version of that for Taiwan,” said Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Lin also said China has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Beijing is walking a fine line to continue doing business with Russia, including the sale of semiconductors, without systematically evading sanctions.

Charles Edel, CSIS Australia chair and senior adviser, said China also announced a major food purchase with Russia before the Feb. 24 invasion and signed a deal with Russia to buy more gas, demonstrating a willingness to give Russian President Vladimir Putin a lifeline and maintain their strategic alliance.

The American Enterprise Institute’s director of Asian studies Dan Blumenthal told members of the subcommittee it was important for the United States to build a political coalition with other nations and show China that many countries would defend Taiwan if it were invaded.

“We need private diplomacy that focuses on the fact that we are going to need first and foremost to build a political coalition, political unity, around the fact that we are going to push back against Chinese aggression. That work hasn’t even begun,” he said.

In part, Blumenthal explained that confusion arises with allies because the United States has both a One China policy, which acknowledges Taiwan as part of China with no official diplomatic relations of its own, and a Taiwan Relations Act, which allows for the U.S. to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan. The resulting policy, known as “strategic ambiguity,” means China does not know if the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense.

“We have to be working now just to go around the world and say, ‘Look, if China attacks Taiwan, here are the foundational principles of international law, international relations that it is violating.’ And we need to come up with that foundation, and we need to sell it,” Blumenthal said.

If not, he argued: “It’s going to affect our military operations, because political unity is going to be the number one ingredient to success in military operations.”

Strategic Impacts

Blumenthal explained that if China took Taiwan, Japan would no longer be defendable, and China’s strategic position in the Pacific with Taiwan under its control would be a threat to the United States.

“With an attack on Japan, you begin the unraveling of the alliance system in the Asia Pacific. The alliance system in the Asia Pacific is what has kept us safe since World War II,” he said. “A forward defense of Taiwan is essentially a forward defense of the American homeland.”

Subcommittee ranking member Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) concluded that it’s time the United States did away with the policy of strategic ambiguity, better arm Taiwan, and clearly state—along with coalition partners—that it would defend Taiwan if it were invaded by China.

“Military confrontation, the chance of that goes up, as China thinks that Taiwan is weak, and they could take them or they think the United States is not committed,” said Chabot.

“I think rather than strategic ambiguity, we ought to have strategic clarity,” he said. “Where they know we would be there; they know Taiwan is strong. So, they decide military action makes no sense. Then we have peace. We avoid war.”

New Air Force One Will be 2-3 Years Late; Battle Brewing Over KC-Y

New Air Force One Will be 2-3 Years Late; Battle Brewing Over KC-Y

The VC-25B, or “Air Force One,” replacement will be as late as 36 months, and members of the House Armed Services Committee warned USAF that they plan to push for competition on the KC-Y stage of aerial tanker recapitalization, which Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said the service may skip.  

Air Force acquisition executive Andrew P. Hunter, testifying before the HASC power projection panel, said the VC-25B is “anticipating a delay to the previously approved schedule on the order of 24-36 months …[or] two to three years.” The previous estimate had been 17 months late.

 It’s “quite a significant delay,” he said.

Boeing is the sole-source contractor for the VC-25B and is converting two 747-8s for the job. Hunter said Boeing’s subcontractor to do the interior finishing couldn’t do the work, a problem that’s “been known for some time,” but it’s taken further effort to assess the full effect of that setback on the schedule.

Boeing “had to bring in someone else to do that work” and take some of it in-house, Hunter said.

The two- to three-year delay in initial operational capability “means we will have to sustain the existing aircraft longer,” Hunter said, warning the committee that it will see changes in the fiscal 2024 budget submission to that effect as well as a request for “further resources to cover the gap.” The existing VC-25A fleet is more than 30 years old and suffers from “vanishing vendor” parts issues and general obsolescence, and has already been extended in service.

He added that “I believe we can take care of it within the resources within the program.”

An Air Force spokesperson said the delay “is due to a combination of factors,” including “impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic,” the change of vendors for the interior work, “wiring design timelines and test execution rates.” She said the Air Force “currently expects a 24-month delay” in the program.

The Air Force “recommends” that the “objective”—or goal delivery time—should be set at 24 months, while the “threshold,” or must-have, be set at 36 months, the spokesperson said. The Pentagon’s acquisition and sustainment chief, William LaPlante, will decide on the timing after “an update to the acquisition program baseline,” she said.

“Based on how the contract was written, as the expected completion date moves to the right, the threshold date also moves to the right,” she noted. “The new schedule baseline will contain the updated completion timeline.”

Hunter was warned by several members of the committee that they are unhappy with Kendall’s recent comments that the KC-Y phase of tanker recapitalization may simply be a sole-source to Boeing, and that they will push hard for a competition on that phase.

Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.) noted that Kendall has called competition an important tool for driving both quality and lower costs and asked Hunter why the Air Force is “walking away” from that idea on the tanker.

Rep. Jerry Carl (R-Ala.) said the HASC would “go ballistic” in the absence of a competition. Lockheed Martin has said that if it wins the KC-Y contest with its LMXT tanker—based on the Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport—it would build the jet in Alabama.

Kendall told reporters on the eve of the fiscal 2023 budget rollout in March that “I want to be very transparent about this. I think that there’s still a possibility of competition out there, but as we’ve looked at our requirements, the likelihood of competition has come down.” Near-term, the requirements for KC-Y “start to look like a modified KC-46 more than they do a completely new design.” The service had previously said it views the KC-Y as a “bridge tanker” to a next-generation aircraft.

Hunter said the Air Force is still “gathering data” on what the KC-Y requirements should be and that the process will be completed in the fall, when a decision will be made as to whether to compete the KC-Y, which will replace both KC-135s and KC-10s.

“We are awaiting inputs from the requirements community,” Hunter said.

There could be “some difference” in the near-term versus long-term requirements for new tankers, Hunter said.

The three-stage KC-X, KC-Y, and KC-Z plan for tanker recapitalization “was formulated probably a decade ago, and the environment has evolved substantially since then,” Hunter said.

The need for “something like KC-Z”—which has notionally been described as a potentially stealthy, next-generation type of aircraft—“is growing more urgent over time, and that’s definitely part of our calculus,” Hunter noted.  

However, “we want to deliver capability the warfighter needs in the 2020s timeframe.” That would likely mean sticking with the KC-46 for the next tranche of tanker replacement.

Carl pointed out that Boeing has had severe problems with the KC-46 and claimed that “it only works 85 percent of the time,” conflating mission capability with the fact that the Pegasus is now certified for 85 percent of the planned list of aircraft it’s supposed to be able to refuel. He also pointed to delays on Boeing’s T-7 trainer, a new cost increase on the B-52 re-engining, and the Air Force One delay and said “I’m extremely concerned” about the Air Force “putting all its eggs in one basket” with the tanker.

“Somehow … we still feel comfortable putting all this business in their lap,” he said, adding, “that’s dangerous.”

Carl said the KC-46 “can’t compete” with the “Airbus/Lockheed plane” and insisted that the tanker program be “re-bid.”

Lockheed Martin announced this week that it would build the automated boom for the LMXT in Arkansas.

Rep. Donald Norcross (D-N.J.), whose district includes Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, said buying more KC-46s would get the Air Force more tankers to deal with Pacific theater threats “in the 2027” timeframe.

Space Force Prepares for Decision on Indo-Pacific Command Service Component

Space Force Prepares for Decision on Indo-Pacific Command Service Component

The Space Force is nearing a Secretary of Defense decision that would create a component command at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, a move that would strengthen space integration in the combatant command responsible for defending the U.S. against threats from China, said Space Force Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, deputy chief for operations, cyber, and nuclear.

“We just think space is so critical now that we need a seat at that table,” Saltzman said at a May 19 meeting of the Defense Writers Group.

“With China being the pacing threat, it was essential that we stand up the service component at INDOPACOM,” Saltzman said. “The biggest change is going to be the combatant commander will have a subordinate commander that they can task to effectively integrate space capabilities.”

Adding “senior personnel at strength, with numbers” will help the combatant commander address space concerns such as space integration with exercises or wargames, including regional programs that involve allies and partners.

Today, Guardians at combatant commands reside within Air Force components under the legacy “director of space forces” construct, a Space Force spokesperson explained to Air Force Magazine.

“By moving from Air Components to Space Components, Guardians in theater will be better aligned to execute their Space Force missions, roles and responsibilities,” the spokesperson said. “Presenting forces is an essential element of Joint Force and service business, and when activated, these component commands will help normalize the presentation of space forces.”

Saltzman said standup of component commands is a normal function of the services and that Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III will ultimately make the decisions on when and where Space Force component commands are established.

“Space is important enough now that it warrants that service-level attention,” Saltzman underscored.

Saltzman added that while the Space Force is still small and growing, it will seek to establish component commands first at those combatant commands where the threat to the U.S. homeland is most acute, namely INDOPACOM, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central command. U.S. Cyber Command would follow.

The Space Force’s only component command to a combatant command, Space Operations Command (SpOC), stood up in October 2020 at U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs.

“Each of those combatant commands have different thoughts when it comes to space integration, scope, and responsibilities associated with space in operations,” Saltzman said. “With the ongoing operations that were in U.S. Central Command, it was important that we stood up there. And with Russia as an acute threat, if you will, EUCOM is right there.”

The Defense Department’s fiscal 2023 budget request calls for a $2.8 billion investment in the Next Generation Interceptor with clear implications for INDOPACOM’s defense against Chinese ballistic “carrier killer” missiles and hypersonic weapons.

“The next generation of on-orbit, [infrared] abilities will be better against faster, lower-maneuvering threats,” Saltzman said in response to a question about hypersonics defense from Air Force Magazine.

The missile warning, missile tracking in this budget was like the first one that really pivoted to put serious dollars against the proliferated constellations,” he added. “We are moving rapidly, as rapidly as the system really allows us to get it right.”

Saltzman said the Space Force plans to launch the satellites in the next three to five years.

As far as standing up the INDOPACOM service component, Saltzman said there’s “buy-in across the community that this is a good idea.” Discussions are now taking place at the Pentagon regarding resourcing, manpower, and the budget, he said.

“We don’t want to go so fast that we hang this organization out and it can’t be effective when it’s put in place,” Saltzman said. “We need to deliver planning to make sure it’s successful from Day 1, because it’s so critical.”

Congress Approves $40B in Ukraine Aid, Just as Previous Funding Runs Out

Congress Approves $40B in Ukraine Aid, Just as Previous Funding Runs Out

The Defense Department authorized another $100 million in security assistance for Ukraine on May 19, reaching the limit of President Joe Biden’s existing drawdown authorities just as the Senate passed a massive $40 billion aid package to extend them.

In a press release, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby specified that the latest $100 million will go toward more artillery, support systems, and counter-artillery radars for Ukraine in its fight against Russia, reflecting the conflict’s increased focus on artillery.

In a later briefing with reporters, Kirby confirmed that the aid package “brings to a close the pre-existing authorities that we had,” adding that the equipment will “start to flow very, very soon” into Ukraine.

All told, Kirby added, the DOD has now given Ukraine $4.6 billion in security assistance since President Joe Biden was inaugurated, the vast majority—$3.9 billion—coming after Russia launched its invasion Feb. 24.

That number, however, is set to nearly quadruple in the coming months, thanks to the new package passed by the Senate in a bipartisan 86-11 vote.

Initially, Biden had asked Congress to approve $33 billion in funds, including $16 billion for the Defense Department—$6 billion more for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which procures weapons and systems for Ukraine; $5 billion for additional presidential drawdown authority, which allows for the transfer of material from U.S. stocks; and $5 billion to help pay for security on the NATO eastern flank.

That was on top of the $13.6 billion the House and Senate previously authorized in March.

Congress, however, added to Biden’s new request, boosting the top line from $33 billion to $40 billion. For the Pentagon, the new package keeps the funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative level but boosts the drawdown authorities to $11 billion, along with another $9 billion to replenish the equipment stockpiles sent to Ukraine.

It also includes $3.9 billion to support U.S. European Command operations, $600 million to bolster the defense industrial base’s production of missiles such as Javelins and Stingers, and $500 million “to procure critical munitions to increase the stocks of the Department of Defense.”

The House approved the aid package May 10 by a 368 to 57 vote. Passage in the Senate was delayed a week due to objections from Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), leading Kirby to warn that a delay could create “a bubble, a period of time in which there’s just nothing moving.”

Once Biden signs the new package into law, the DOD will have enough drawdown authorities to transfer an unprecedented total of $14.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. But this latest $11 billion won’t be doled out all at once, Kirby said.

“We now have some longer runway,” Kirby said. “And so we’re going to meter these out appropriately, so that Ukraine’s getting what it needs in the fight that they’re in. And that fight could change over time.”

Cost of B-52 Re-Engining Jumps By Half in New Estimate of Refit

Cost of B-52 Re-Engining Jumps By Half in New Estimate of Refit

The cost of the B-52 re-engining program has increased 50 percent because of integration issues, according to revelations in a House Armed Services panel hearing.

Air Force acquisition executive Andrew P. Hunter acknowledged the B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) price hike as voiced in a question from Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.) in testimony on service modernization.

“We currently believe there is cost growth from our design work that we did originally through the middle-tier acquisition program to what we anticipate we’ll be looking at [in] Milestone B,” which evaluates readiness for entry into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, Hunter said.

The B-52 CERP has been conducted as a middle-tier acquisition program to get underway rapidly and develop a prototype system but is now moving to a “traditional” program, and the Air Force is firming up the costs it expects to pay, Hunter said. The cost increases have more to do with integrating the engines on the B-52, which is a Boeing effort, and has less to do with the engines themselves, which will be built by Rolls-Royce, he added.

“I want to emphasize that a lot of that engineering work is actually inside the airplane, on the support struts, to which the engines attach, versus the engine itself, which is largely a commercial engine that already exists,” Hunter said. The engine needs only “a modest number of modifications,” he said.

“So it’s really about re-engineering 1960s aircraft to perform all the way through” to the end of the B-52’s lifetime, now envisioned as circa 2050.

The Air Force told Congress a year ago that the CERP effort had increased in cost by nine percent because of pandemic-related supply issues, to about $11 billion. Hunter did not speculate on a new cost estimate.

The end of the risk reduction and prototyping phase is rapidly approaching, Hunter said, and when it’s done, “we’ll have an effective design … [that will] allow us to go into an acquisition program to allow us to do that re-engining.”

At Milestone B, “we will … have in our hands the real, full cost of what it will take to do it, and we’ll set the original baseline for the full program … at that point,” Hunter said.

The Air Force will “assess” at that milestone whether “it still make sense to move forward with that program,” Hunter said, adding, however, that “we will need a new engine for the B-52 to get it out to its full lifetime.”

In an email response to a query from Air Force magazine, Boeing said the “50 percent differential in the CERP cost comes from an original, 2017 government estimate produced by the Air Force program office, compared to the latest 2022 estimate.”

The company said it “is our understanding that the government’s estimate has been adjusted over the years from the initial business case analysis, developed at a very early phase of the acquisition, to incorporate additional complexity” as well as “further historical fidelity on similar programs, as well as additional understanding of technical scope and complexity of the design.”

Rolls-Royce North America said through a spokesperson that the company “has been collaborating closely with the Air Force and program integrator Boeing on the CERP program.” There have been “no changes in engine pricing since the contract was awarded.”

The Air Force was not able to comment on the B-52 CERP cost increase by press time.

The CERP seeks to integrate eight new Rolls-Royce F130 engines per aircraft to replace the Pratt & Whitney TF33s, which are original equipment on the B-52Hs, built in 1962. The engines will be digitally controlled, requiring new pylons, new twin-engine nacelles, and wiring to connect the powerplants to the B-52 cockpit. The project is part of an overall modernization of the B-52 fleet that includes digital wiring, new communications, and a new radar, among other improvements.

Biden Supports Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO Bids—Wolters Highlights ‘Exciting Attributes’

Biden Supports Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO Bids—Wolters Highlights ‘Exciting Attributes’

President Joe Biden stood alongside the leaders of Sweden and Finland at the White House on May 19 to declare his “strong support” for their countries’ NATO bids, while Supreme Allied Commander Europe U.S. Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters highlighted the specialized deterrent capabilities the High North partners would bring to the alliance, if the concerns of Turkey are first assuaged.

“This is, in my view and the view of my team, a momentous day,” Biden said in a Rose Garden ceremony.

The president offered “the strong support of the United States” for the applications of the two Nordic democracies that are currently NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partners, the closest cooperative framework for non-members.

Sweden and Finland have for years participated in joint exercises and training and have fought alongside NATO troops in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Since Feb. 25, the day after Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland and Sweden also began enhanced intelligence sharing with NATO. On May 18, the nations formally applied to the alliance, which requires approval from all 30 current members.

Until then, Finland and Sweden are not protected by NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause, but Biden said the U.S. would “deter and confront any aggression while Finland and Sweden are in this accession process.”

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson also recently already voiced a willingness to help Finland and Sweden defend themselves during a NATO accession process.

At the White House, Biden highlighted the benefits Finland and Sweden would bring to the alliance.

“They meet every NATO requirement and then some,” Biden said. “And having two new NATO members in the High North will enhance the security of our alliance and deepen our security cooperation across the board.”

Both nations have Arctic territory and broad training ground for multi-lateral exercises that have increased in recent years, as Russia has heightened its military presence in the Arctic and China has claimed that it is a “near-Arctic state,” with security implications.

Wolters, speaking after a meeting of the military chiefs of defense in Brussels on May 19, highlighted the special capabilities that Sweden and Finland would bring to the alliance as large, forested countries in a cold region that borders the Arctic. Finland, for its part, has a 900-mile border with Russia and is forced to operate within Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) bubble.

“We will be able to show tactics, techniques, and procedures with Finland and Sweden. They will be able to share with us their unique regional aspects that they have more expertise on than we’ve seen in the past,” Wolters said, noting that the new TTPs will “enhance the overall deterrence capability of NATO.”

“We look at those attributes … as tremendous opportunities to improve our ability to comprehensively deter,” Wolters said. “Those are exciting attributes that Sweden and Finland are going to teach us a lot about.”

Wolters was less effusive about news that Turkish President Recep Erdogan had blocked the start of talks about Finland and Sweden’s NATO entry.

Turkey reportedly wants the opposition Kurdistan workers party, or PKK, declared a terrorist organization by NATO allies, and he wants Turkey to be admitted into the F-35 program, from which Turkey was removed when it adopted Russia’s S-400 missile defense system.

“What we all want the most is for diplomacy to come to the forefront,” said Wolters. “And if that conversation took place, it is my hope as a result of that conversation, we get one step closer to achieving a diplomatic solution.”

Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said DOD is discussing with Finland and Sweden the security guarantees they may require during the accession period. Russian President Vladimir Putin has in the past warned of consequences should Finland and Sweden join NATO.

“We are actively now talking to them about what kind of security assurances they might need or welcome,” Kirby said.

In Brussels, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark A. Milley met with both his Finnish and Swedish counterparts, and the DOD said Milley held his first call with his Russian counterpart, Chief of Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov, since before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“The military leaders discussed several security-related issues of concern and agreed to keep the lines of communication open,” Joint Chiefs spokesperson Col. Dave Butler said in a statement.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III also met with his Swedish counterpart at the Pentagon on May 18.

“Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a free, sovereign, and democratic neighbor, clearly demonstrates the threat posed by Mr. Putin to European security,” Austin said in welcoming remarks. “Our two militaries routinely exercise together. Your capabilities are modern, relevant, and significant, and your addition to the alliance will make us all better at defending ourselves.”

Eielson Celebrates Completion of F-35 Beddown, More Progress to Come

Eielson Celebrates Completion of F-35 Beddown, More Progress to Come

Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, celebrated the beddown of its full complement of F-35s on May 13, with a ceremony just weeks after the base received the last of its 54 fighters.

The arrival of those F-35s in mid-April gave Eielson the Air Force’s second fully equipped, combat-coded F-35 wing, comprising two fighter squadrons.

The celebration marking the official end of a two-year beddown process featured Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, commander of Pacific Air Forces, and Col. David J. Berkland, commander of the 354th Fighter Wing, as well as officials from Lockheed Martin.

“The task of standing up two new F-35 squadrons was not small,” Wilsbach said during the ceremony, according to an Air Force release. “You made it look easy, but we know it was not. That’s because of the professionalism of the Airmen who work here at Eielson. The Icemen did a fabulous job of standing up this capability here, and the community around Eielson has also been incredibly supportive not only of our Icemen and our mission but this aircraft as well. We’re grateful in so many ways this mission has been so welcomed here.”

The Air Force selected Eielson to be home to the first operational overseas F-35s in 2016, and the 354th Fighter Wing accepted the first two aircraft in April 2020. At Eielson, fighter jets are able to reach anywhere in the northern hemisphere in one sortie and have access to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, which features more than 75,000 square miles of airspace for training.

While the final jets have arrived, the work of fully integrating and settling the F-35 onto the base is still ongoing.

Berkland previously told Air Force Magazine that the 354th FW maintains a high operations tempo as it looks to build its experience and comfort level with the new fighter—some 44 F-35 training sorties a day. As that training continues, the 354th hasn’t declared initial operational capability yet.

It’s not just pilots that have to adapt to harsh Arctic conditions though—the challenge of maintaining the F-35s when temperatures are frequently sub-zero is one the Air Force has tried to address by spending some $600 million on 39 military construction projects.

Lt. Gen. Warren D. Berry, deputy chief of staff for logistics, engineering, and force protection, detailed some of those projects while testifying to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee May 19, explaining how Eielson has created the space necessary, if needed, to ensure that no F-35 has to be parked outside.

“In the 2017 appropriations [bill], we had $161 million to build two 16-bay weather shelter facilities for the F-35s. Those are in place. There are another 18 parking locations indoors for F-35s, and when necessary, the wing can clear out some more space to make room for four, which handles all 54 of the F-35s,” Berry said. “So from what we see, we don’t see a shortfall of storage locations for housing F-35s indoors.”

Still, Berry indicated that more facilities are being worked on to support the F-35 mission.

“We also had in FY20 a project to build storage facilities for the support equipment that goes with the F-35s as well. So that project is underway to provide some indoor storage for those support equipment requirements for the F-35,” Berry said.

Air Force Lt. Col. Samuel Chipman, 356th Fighter Squadron commander (right), briefs visitors to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, May 13, 2022. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Jose Miguel T. Tamondong.
Dependence on Russian Aircraft Engines Could Prompt China to ‘Fix Their … Problem’

Dependence on Russian Aircraft Engines Could Prompt China to ‘Fix Their … Problem’

China’s dependence on Russian fighter aircraft engines may soon affect the People’s Liberation Army Air Force fleet if Russia can’t service or provide engines or parts for up to 40 percent of the Chinese fighters, experts at the China Aerospace Studies Institute conference said May 17.

China has yet to wean itself off Russian engines by mastering the technology, experts explained during a panel discussion on military cooperation between China and Russia. If Russia must resupply its own military over the course of a protracted war, that competing demand for parts could prompt China to focus more intently on building up internal expertise.

“China is still quite dependent on Russian components and probably will be for the foreseeable future,” said David R. Markov of the Institute for Defense Analysis.

Russia delivered nearly 4,000 engines for Chinese helicopters and other military aircraft between 1992 and 2019. China has also received Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.

“I think they’re going to continue to buy engines from the Russians, though it’ll be interesting to see whether Russia can now supply these engines in light of the international sanctions,” Markov said, referring to economic blocks imposed by U.S. and European countries that limited Russia’s acquisition of technologies such as semiconductors, used by the Russian defense industry.

The situation gives China a much greater incentive to apply national resources to “fix the engine problem that they have,” he added.

Markov discussed China-Russia aerospace cooperation, tracing the history of Russia’s dual-use and military sales to China, including its technology transfer over the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union.

While China has made significant gains in acquiring key military technologies that helped develop its stealthy J-20 and J-31 fighters, Markov argues that, in the area of fighter engine production, China is still lagging because Russia withheld advanced secrets. China’s struggle in this area isn’t due to a lack of resources devoted to the effort but a lack of domestic expertise, he said.

Many of China’s scientists, engineers, designers, and production managers are in their late 20s and early 30s, and they lack the know-how that comes from apprenticeship programs and decades of specialized experience. To make up for that, China has contracted Russian specialists to work inside Chinese factories.

However, “This isn’t a ‘throw money at the problem’ solution,” he said.

“What they still have yet to understand is, modern aviation engines, particularly supercruise fighter engines, are more art than science,” Markov explained.

Engine workers at producers such as Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, and General Electric have “tacit knowledge” that the Chinese are still lacking, he added.

“There’s a lot of phenomenology that takes place in an engine that we still do not … understand … with our qualitative computing technology,” Markov explained. “But there’s a guy named Joe who works at Cincinnati Milacron, who’s been working that thing for 30 years, [who] just knows, through experimentation, time, and experience, that you do this thing to make the engine get this outcome. And that’s the part where China just doesn’t have that capability yet.”

Markov believes China’s purchase of Su-35 aircraft from Russia was meant at least in part to get access to the type’s advanced engine and ancillary support and digital control system.

China has made strides, however, developing the WS-10 engine that powers its J-20 stealth fighter.

“The big game changer in much of this was the J-20,” Markov said. “It was the wake-up call to a lot of people following China: of how far they had come, and particularly with Russian talent.”

But China has struggled to develop its WS-15 engine that would give the J-20 supercruise capability, a defense analyst told Air Force Magazine during a sideline interview.

Russia still provides engines for up to 40 percent of China’s air force fleet, the analyst noted, posing the question: “Are they going to be able to sustain current readiness and flying operational capabilities in light of potential spare parts disruptions with this engine manufacturer?”