Officials Hope Newly Approved Novavax Vaccine Will Sway Unvaccinated Service Members

Officials Hope Newly Approved Novavax Vaccine Will Sway Unvaccinated Service Members

The Pentagon has a new tool in its push to fully vaccinate service members against COVID-19—a vaccine that medical officials hope will alleviate the concerns of those who have previously refused the shot.

The Novavax vaccine is now widely available for service members, the Department of Defense announced Aug. 29, and any locations that don’t have that particular shot can have it delivered within a few days.

Unlike previous vaccines from Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson, the Novavax vaccine was created using older, more traditional vaccine technology that contains no genetic material. 

Officials noted that the same technology is already used in other vaccines such as those for hepatitis B, HPV, and shingles, including some that have been required by the military.

“The Novavax COVID-19 vaccine uses technology that has been around since the 1980s. Not only do we have effectiveness and safety data from the Novavax clinical trials, but we also have decades of experience with this type of vaccine,” Lt. Col. David Sayers, chief of preventive medicine for the Air Force Medical Readiness Agency, said in a statement.

There are still tens of thousands of Airmen, Guardians, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines who remain unvaccinated against COVID-19 a year after Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III first announced plans to make vaccination mandatory. For the Air Force and Space Force in particular, the most recent numbers indicate that 2.6 percent of the 497,000 or so Airmen and Guardians in the total force are unvaccinated—more than 12,000 individuals.

Service members who have refused the vaccine have cited a variety of reasons. Some have religious objections to vaccines such as Johnson & Johnson’s that were developed using cell lines from aborted fetuses, while others have expressed discomfort with the first-of-its-kind mRNA technology used to create Pfizer’s and Moderna’s shots.

Medical officials hope the Novavax vaccine, which received emergency use authorization from the Food and Drug Administration on July 13, will resolve those concerns. It is a protein subunit vaccine and contains no mRNA or DNA technology, noted USAF Col. Tonya Rans, chief of the Immunization Healthcare Division at the Defense Health Agency.

However, there is skepticism that the Novavax shot will convince unvaccinated individuals to take the leap. A June survey of the general public from Morning Consult found the vast majority of those who were unvaccinated said they wouldn’t get it, and more than a month after the vaccine was approved for emergency use by the FDA, data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicates that fewer than 15,000 of the shots had been administered despite more than 625,000 already being delivered.

Meanwhile, Airmen and other service members have filed a number of lawsuits against the Pentagon’s vaccine mandates, and in July, a federal judge granted a wide-ranging preliminary injunction that temporarily prevents the Air Force from punishing or separating any Airmen who refuse the vaccine.

Remembering the Largest Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation in US History

Remembering the Largest Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation in US History

Aug. 30 marks the one-year anniversary of the end of Operation Allies Refuge (OAR), the final act in the longest war in U.S. history. Historians will long study the United States’ post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism and, in particular, the failed, two-decade effort to plant sustainable seeds of democracy in Afghanistan. Certainly as a coda to the conflict, OAR reflected the chaos, tragedy, and good-intentions-gone-awry that characterized so much of the Afghan War. 

What was accomplished a year ago under the most challenging of conditions and pressures was largely overshadowed by a horrific suicide bombing that killed more than 170 people at Hamid Karzai International Airport, including 13 U.S. service members; an errant U.S. drone strike that killed 10 Afghan civilians, including seven children; and by the dispiriting spectacle of flag-waving Taliban extremists sweeping to victory in Afghanistan 20 years after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

On this one-year anniversary, however, the fog of war that enshrouded so much of Operation Allies Refuge has largely lifted. Revealed beneath the chaos and tragedy is the largest non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) airlift in U.S. history, one that involved round-the-clock operations of nearly 800 military and civilian aircraft from more than 30 nations. In just 17 days, more than 500 U.S. Air Force Active, Reserve, and National Guard aircrews and hundreds of Air Force ground personnel helped evacuate a staggering 124,334 people, the vast majority of them Afghan nationals.

Heroism and great compassion were behind those unprecedented numbers. Airmen helped deliver three babies aboard C-17s during the operation, and dozens more were born shortly after their mothers landed safely at staging bases and temporary safe havens around the world. Air Force Aeromedical Evacuation teams and medics stood up “Operation Stork,” gathering the specialized personnel and equipment required to safely transport the roughly 20 percent of adult female evacuees who were pregnant. U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the 521st Air Mobility Operations Wing created passenger medical augmentation teams to attend to the needs of evacuees who were in many cases wounded and traumatized, and crammed shoulder-to-shoulder in flights of more than 450 passengers per sortie. Their efforts included multiple life-saving resuscitations inflight.

After the suicide bombing at HKIA, three Aeromedical Evacuation missions whisked 35 patients to care, saving the lives of the critically wounded. In all, 28 Aeromedical Evacuation missions conducted during OAR flew 177 patients to badly needed care. One of the C-17s from the 21st Airlift Squadron also carried the 13 fallen U.S. service members killed in the bombing home to Dover Air Force Base, Del.

For the one-year anniversary of Operation Allies Refuge, Air Force Magazine interviewed a number of the many Air Force participants, the better to remember their largely untold stories of bravery and compassion in the face of deadly chaos.

‘Not the Afghanistan We Knew’

Just days after the United States military had officially furled the flag on Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III issued a vocal order on July 16, 2021, instructing the U.S. Air Force to deploy a personnel recovery task force (PRTF) to Hamid Karzai International Airport. The PRTF’s mission was to provide combat search and rescue in support of a U.S. non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) for tens of thousands of Afghans who had served as interpreters, drivers, and assistants to U.S. forces and diplomats.

The Pentagon avoided such a move for many months, concerned that a mass exodus would demoralize Afghan allies. The plan at the time was still to leave behind a large U.S. diplomatic presence in Kabul to support the Afghan government and security forces. In July, however, Taliban insurgents intensified an offensive that had already seen them capture more than a third of provincial capitals around the country. A new U.S. intelligence assessment that took note of those negative trends warned that the Afghan government could fall within the next six to 12 months, as opposed to the two- or three-year window that the intelligence community assessed only months earlier. That Afghan institutions might collapse in just weeks had not yet occurred to U.S. intelligence analysts.

Operation Allies Refuge
Master Sgt. Brian Faulkner and Airman 1st Class Stephen Conklin, aerospace medical technician for the 127th Medical Group at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mich., remove stitches from an Afghan refugee, at the temporary housing facility medical clinic at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, following Operation Allies Refuge, Sept. 16, 2021. U.S. Air Force photo.

The day after Austin’s deployment order, the State Department announced Operation Allies Refuge, and the Air Force was directed to organize relocation flights for Afghan nationals and their families eligible for U.S. Special Immigrant Visas. In the classified briefing at the operations center for the 71st Rescue Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, Ga., the wing commander explained to the deploying Airmen that “the hair on the back of your necks should be standing up: This is not the Afghanistan we knew.”

Lt. Col. Brian Desautels was chosen to command the personnel recovery task force, which included combat search and rescue (CSAR) units and helicopters from Moody as well as Nellis and Davis-Monthan Air Force Bases. Along with many senior officers, Desautels had spent much of his career fighting America’s longest war, but in 20 years of operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Air Force units had become accustomed to operating out of large, secure military bases with abundant ground support such as Bagram and Kandahar airfields. At Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in Kabul, the task force would operate out of a facility wedged into the middle of a sprawling capital of nearly 5 million people, with no hardened base support or dedicated security force. The task force would thus need to carry all the food, water, equipment, and expertise it would require in the coming weeks.

The deployment amounted to an unprecedented stress test of the Air Force’s agile combat employment (ACE) concept, with pressures few could imagine at the time.

“I had served in Afghanistan, so I knew what my commander was talking about in terms of the hair standing up on the back of our necks, but we are used to operating out of austere airfields and making the best of it,” Desautels said in an interview. He noted that the roughly 170 multi-mission-capable Airmen of the task force were wheels up in three C-17 “chalks” in less than 72 hours, arriving at HKIA within 96 hours of receiving the deployment order. By mid-August the PRTF had settled into a good battle rhythm, helping to evacuate on average 7,500 civilians each day. “We hit the ground running with a lot of focused energy, committed to giving 100 percent until our mission was complete.”

Then one morning in mid-August, Desautels entered the operations center at HKIA to find that Rear Adm. Peter Vasely, a Navy SEAL and the top U.S. commander in Kabul, was wearing his full “battle rattle” and carrying his M-4 rifle. There was also a new sense of urgency in the orders he barked. Taliban forces were sweeping into Kabul, and the U.S. Embassy had yet to be fully evacuated. As Desautels entered the operations center, an Army captain saluted and requested permission to abandon his post because they were taking so much sniper fire from nearby rooftops. He was given reinforcements from the PRTF team instead.

Desautels worked 27 hours straight and was grabbing a couple of hours sleep when he awoke to the sound of explosions and heavy machine-gun and automatic weapons fire. Jumping out of his rack, he grabbed two bug-eyed majors and headed for the operations center. There was screaming and multiple conversations talking over each other on the radio net. With the Taliban entering the capital virtually unopposed, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country and Afghan Security Forces had melted away.

“Then the Taliban opened fire on the airport, and suddenly word came that the whole airfield was being overrun by thousands of desperate Afghan civilians,” recalled Desautels. “The whole perimeter was collapsing around us.”

‘I Couldn’t Help But Think of My Own Daughter’

After U.S. forces abandoned Bagram Airfield in July, chief medical officer and Air Force Col. Bruce Lynch and roughly 50 members of his staff relocated to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. As the top medical adviser for Adm. Vasely, he felt acutely the tension between a U.S. military command anxious to evacuate the embassy and a U.S. ambassador and embassy staff determined to keep the faith with their allies in the Afghan government.

“At the embassy. it was in the back of everyone’s mind that things weren’t going well for the Afghan government, and by early August when two or three major provincial capitals fell to the Taliban, you could read the tea leaves, but we didn’t want to abandon our Afghan partners and exacerbate their problems by making a hasty exit,” Lynch said in an interview. Working alongside an Afghan doctor he had met at Bagram, Lynch helped treat Afghan soldiers who were wounded defending Kabul, and the two physicians became close.

When Kabul fell to the Taliban on Aug. 15, the embassy staff were finally hustled into helicopters and transported to HKIA. Given the incredible stress of the moment, Lynch was relieved to be greeted at the airport not by surly Turkish soldiers who were previously in charge, but rather by young U.S. Marines in full battle gear.

“On such a hectic day, it was quite a relief to get off the helicopter and be greeted by a bunch of U.S. Marines on the runway. That was calming to me,” said Lynch, who along with his team was ushered to the medical facility at HKIA that would serve both as their workplace and home for the next two weeks. Luckily the medical center was fairly new, with a well-equipped and modern emergency room, two operating rooms and an intensive care unit. Most important, the HKIA medical center was a hardened facility of brick and concrete with no exterior windows. Given the proximity of high-rise buildings surrounding the airport, it was a relief for the medical team not to feel they had a constant target on their backs. 

Operation Allies Refuge
Pods are established for evacuees at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Aug. 24, 2021. Military members established temporary lodging for evacuees from Afghanistan in support of Operation Allies Refuge. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Jan K. Valle.

In one of the conversations with the Afghan physician he had worked with at Bagram and the embassy, Lynch learned that the man had a 12-year-old daughter who was nearly the same age as Lynch’s own children.

“We were exchanging stories about our kids, and he told me that his daughter wanted to be a doctor like her father when she grew up,” recalled Lynch, who knew that a whole generation of young Afghan women and girls who had grown up with unprecedented freedoms in a fledgling democracy would soon be subjected to the medieval patriarchy of the Taliban. “In the back of my mind, I remember thinking that the options for his daughter’s future would be pretty grim under Taliban rule, and as a father, I couldn’t help but think of my own daughter in such a situation. It was a horrible thought.”

Later Lynch learned that neither the Afghan doctor nor his daughter were able to escape during the evacuation.

‘Rightly Concerned’

When the emergency call came in mid-August, Col. Colin McClaskey was on a mission in the Horn of Africa. As deputy commander of the Air Force’s 821st Contingency Response Group out of Travis Air Force Base, Calif., he led a unit that specialized in opening, operating, and, if necessary, closing airfields. His team included air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance personnel, military police, fuel specialists, and logisticians. And the word came that the situation in Kabul was essentially going to hell, and they were needed there yesterday.

With the rest of his team already underway from the United States, McClaskey took a C-130 transport from Djibouti, Africa, to Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany. There he hitched a ride on a C-17 transport that was ferrying U.S. Army troops to Kabul, part of an emergency deployment of some 6,000 U.S. Soldiers and Marines being rushed to HKIA to try to secure the airport. After refueling in Kuwait, the C-17 approached the Kabul airport Aug. 15. Sitting in the cockpit in the right observer seat as the aircraft circled low over HKIA, McClaskey could hardly process what he was seeing. The airport looked like a crowded soccer stadium during a riot, with thousands upon thousands of people outside trying to cram through the various gates and thousands more running onto the tarmac and taxiways like they were a football pitch.

“I was talking to the aircrew and over the radio with members of my team already on the ground at HKIA as we flew low over the airfield,” said McClaskey. “I don’t know that there was anybody in that airspace that wanted to be on the ground with their team more than me at that moment. But as we talked through the situation very frankly, we all agreed that putting the aircraft down would risk both it and those people on the ground. In the end, we had to divert back to Al Udeid, and I can tell you [as we left], my folks on the ground were rightly very concerned about their physical security.”

‘We’re Staying’

“Everyone just calm the f*** down! We’re launching the iron, but we’re not flushing the whole team! We’re staying,” Lt. Col. Desautels shouted into the radio in the operations center, referring to the two HC-130 aircraft that were designated to fly his team to safety in the event of an emergency exfiltration. With the perimeter breached and thousands of Afghan civilians swarming the tarmac, the situation at HKIA was deteriorating by the second, and many people in the operation center and around the world via television footage were unnerved by what they were witnessing.

A C-17 Globemaster that had just landed at the airport to deliver a load of equipment and security forces were swarmed by hundreds of Afghan civilians before it could even offload its cargo. Faced with possibility of losing control of their aircraft and jeopardizing all those onboard, the pilots quickly taxied and took off, with Afghan civilians clinging desperately to the fuselage and wheel wells. The sight of Afghans falling as the C-17 gained altitude would become an iconic image of OAR, recalling photos of U.S. helicopters pulling desperate Americans and South Vietnamese off the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1975.

Just minutes later, Desautels had to make a life-or-death decision. In the event that HKIA was completely overrun not only by Afghan civilians but potentially Taliban fighters, he had promised his team he would get them out or “flush” them on the two HC-130 aircraft designated “Fever 11” and “Fever 12.” Now that the moment had apparently arrived, Desautels also understood that pulling his 170-person team, many providing airport security, would leave a critical gap in the airport’s already crumbling defenses.

“We had intelligence that the Taliban had liberated a nearby prison full of al-Qaida and ISIS fighters, so my team understood how critical we were to the base defense plan. So instead of flushing the team, I got permission from the CFACC [Combined Forces Air Component Commander] to launch the HC-130s from the taxiways, which is risky. Word came back that ‘the airport is not clear, take off at your own risk,’ and within seconds Fever 11 and 12 were airborne flying just 30 feet or so above the heads of the crowd on the runway.”

With the aid of air refueling tankers, the increasingly exhausted pilots of the HC-130s circled overhead for more than 13 hours, waiting to see if the U.S. military could regain control of the airfield. The alternative was to attempt an emergency extraction of the personnel recovery task force from a contested airfield.

‘A Gut Punch to Everyone’

Late in the afternoon Aug. 26, Lynch stepped out of the medical facility at HKIA for a breath of fresh air. The scene that greeted him outside was almost post-Apocalyptic. The shells of abandoned cars were scattered about, and piles of discarded suitcases, bags, mattresses, and the other detritus of lives torn asunder littered the area. A stench escaped from a nearby line of latrines that had not been emptied in days.

Due to intelligence indicating a possible suicide bombing attack on the airport, leadership had put the small hospital on lockdown for much of the day. Most of the doctors and nurses were sleeping at the facility after their shifts anyway, so they really had no place else to go. Then around 6 p.m., word came that there had been a suicide bombing across the airport at Abbey Gate, which U.S. Marines guarded against a swirling mass of as many as 10,000 Afghan civilians desperately hoping to be rescued. The mass of humanity provided an inviting target for the Islamic State-Khorasan terrorist who had packed his suicide vest with ball bearings for maximum lethality.

Lynch immediately activated the mass casualty plan his team had rehearsed many times. Yet no amount of planning could prepare them for the arrival of the first trucks carrying the wounded.

“When the first truck pulled up and we saw all of the Marines injured in the back, that was a game changer. That was a big shock to me personally and a gut punch to everyone. I don’t think any of us had seen so many American casualties from a single incident, and it was clear that four or five of the Marines had passed away already,” said Lynch. “But after stepping back for a moment, we had to jump-start ourselves out of the shock because so many wounded were coming in, and we had to be on our ‘A game’ to take care of all the patients.”

Enlisting the help of a group of Air Force pararescuemen, Lynch quickly established a triage point outside the facility. He walked up and down the lines of wounded, deciding who needed to be rushed into the emergency room, which patients had less severe wounds that could be treated elsewhere in the hospital, and who lacked a pulse and was beyond help.

During one of the longest nights of his life, Lynch realized that the small hospital was in danger of being overwhelmed, doubling up in the emergency room and treating 63 U.S. and Afghan wounded in the small facility. The staff had already confirmed 10 American fatalities, some having died on the operating table. In their mass casualty plan, they had anticipated having to treat patients without dog tags or easy identification, so they created packets for them and gave each one the name of a Hollywood celebrity. They quickly ran out of celebrity names and had to think of others.

By early morning, the last of the Aeromedical Evacuation flights transporting the wounded to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany lifted off. An exhausted Lynch looked around a hospital very much the worse for wear. He knew the team would have to find the energy to clean up and reset the facility in case the airfield was attacked again. After all, they were still in the middle of Kabul; the base was still surrounded by the Taliban; and other Islamic State-Khorasan terrorists were undoubtedly still out there plotting massacres.

Soon, medical corpsmen started showing up with blood donations, and Marines arrived to help clean the hospital, mopping floors, taking out the trash, and disposing of bloody bandages and sheets. That allowed Lynch and his team to get a little rest, but not much. Lynch knew that every day until their scheduled departure Aug. 31 would be more dangerous than the previous one.

‘An Opportunity to Actually Deliver Hope’

After flying four evacuation missions out of HKIA in a matter of days, C-17 pilot Lt. Col. Austin Street was on his first extended crew rest at Al Udied Air Base in Qatar. The ramp of the air base had been expanded to accommodate more than twice the number of C-17s as normal, one of many signs that the Globemaster had become the workhorse of Operation Allies Refuge. Roughly half of the Air Force’s entire fleet of 222 C-17s had been committed to the operation, and they would evacuate more than 79,000 of the more than 124,000 total evacuees, including roughly 6,000 Americans.

Street, commander of the 21st Airlift Squadron out of Travis Air Base, Calif., was asleep when the phone call came from the operations desk at Al Udied. There had been a mass casualty suicide bombing at HKIA, and he was designated to command an Aeromedical Evacuation mission to transport the wounded to Germany. But when Street arrived at the aircraft for the high priority mission, only one maintenance person was on site prepping the aircraft. He also learned that because the heat in Qatar had the effect of expanding jet fuel, he would have to launch without a sufficient fuel load to complete the mission. To make matters worse, some of the generators at HKIA had been targeted by saboteurs, meaning he would have to land at night without runway lights.

Operation Allies Refuge
A three-day-old baby born to evacuee parents at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, receives phototherapy for a case of jaundice at 521st Air Mobility Operation Wing’s Hangar 5 prior to boarding a flight at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Sept. 2, 2021. Master Sgt. Steve Brooks shields her eyes from the sun. Brooks was a religious affairs Airman from the Alabama National Guard serving at Ramstein in support of Operation Allies Refuge. U.S. Air Force photo by Maj. Tania Bryan.

The Aeromedical Evacuation flight was so rushed that the two aeromedical transport teams and critical care air transport team onboard had to reconfigure the aircraft to accept wounded patients while underway to Kabul. No midair refueling tankers were in range. Once on the ground at HKIA, Street had to wait two hours on the tarmac with the aircraft engines running because some of the critically wounded passengers were just out of surgery and needed to be stabilized before transport.

Once again, Street took off without enough fuel to complete the mission and reach Ramstein Air Base in Germany. Initially air command-and-control could identify no tankers in range, but they finally located a KC-135 tanker on “strip alert” in the region. Street conducted a tricky midair refueling at night over the Black Sea, while in his cargo bay a critical care team performed emergency surgery on a wounded patient.

“I’ve flown the C-17 for 15 years, and that was not only the most important and significant mission I ever flew, it was also the most challenging,” Street said in an interview. At Air Mobility Command, he noted, their mission mantra is to ‘project power, and deliver hope.’ “Well, I’ve had lots of opportunities to project combat power into war zones, but I’ve rarely had the opportunity to deliver hope. That’s why I’m so proud of my crew for pushing through and overcoming the most challenging conditions I ever witnessed. This entire operation was an opportunity to actually deliver hope, not only to our own wounded, but also to all the Afghans trying to get out of Kabul. That allowed the American military to keep faith with many of those Afghans that we’ve built trust with over the past 20 years.”

‘An Eerie Feeling’

On the final day of Operation Allies Refuge, McClaskey led a skeleton crew from the 821st Contingency Response Group as they launched the final evacuation flights from HKIA. The suicide bombing days earlier had given his team a renewed sense of purpose, and they had worked around the clock to get as many Afghans out of the country as possible in what little time remained. Even in the last 24 hours of operations, they had managed to rescue 1,250 additional evacuees.

McClaskey and his team finally policed up the last remnants of equipment at HKIA, determined to leave nothing of combat usefulness for the Taliban fighters they could see all around the airport’s perimeter, their signature black-and-white flags unfurled. Everything that couldn’t fit into the rear of a C-17 was destroyed.

That evening under the cover of darkness, five C-17s would help the 82nd Airborne Division execute a joint tactical exfiltration, flying the remaining 800 U.S. personnel at HKIA, including the acting U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, to safety. The C-17s were supported by more than 20 orbiting aircraft stacked overhead, to include command-and-control, strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

When the ramp closed on his C-17 on Aug. 30, 2021, McClaskey knew his long Afghan War was over.

“At that point, I thought about the first time I flew into Afghanistan right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and how many subsequent birthdays I had spent flying to this country. I also thought about the thousands and thousands of Americans injured and killed there, some of whom I had flown out of there, and the countless lives and families changed as a result of this war,” said McClaskey. “It was an eerie feeling, and a lot to unpack. I’d spent my entire career fighting in these conflicts, and now it was all over. At that moment, I couldn’t wait to call my wife and tell her we were on our way home.”

James C. Kitfield is a contributing national security correspondent and author, and a three-time recipient of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense.

General Atomics: A Revolutionary Partnership

General Atomics: A Revolutionary Partnership

Early Vision and Sustained Support Enabled the Air Force and General Atomics to Change Warfare Forever

One extraordinary thing about the U.S. Air Force’s unmanned aircraft revolution was that it almost didn’t happen.

True believers couldn’t always make others see the vision, and had to overcome “opposition from many in the service,” as retired Gen. John Jumper, a former chief of staff, told Congress earlier this year. Once the Air Force committed in the mid-1990s to the RQ-1 Predator, there were challenges.

“Introduction into the Air Force was not easy,” Jumper said.

But the service remained committed, and so did the aerospace pioneers at General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., builder of the aircraft. Together they forged a partnership that went on to change warfare forever.

Initially, Air Force leaders focused on enhanced reconnaissance: With no human crew on board, the Predator could stay on station, orbiting areas of interest for many hours longer than conventional combat aircraft.

Commanders quickly warmed to the quantity and quality of real-time situational awareness these unmanned systems produced, more than had ever before been possible. During the air war over Kosovo in 1999, for example, officers were able to watch a Yugoslav target before, during, and after it was struck by munitions dropped from a B-52, as Air Force Magazine described. Commanders could conduct immediate bomb damage assessments from their op center.

Soon the issues shifted to new questions: How best to use a Predator’s view of a target to cue a strike aircraft quickly; how to operate the aircraft at greater distances via satellite; how to upgrade what the aircraft could do itself with its own sensors and—maybe someday—even its own weapons.

Those problems were solved.

“We were done crawling. We were walking, and we were getting ready to run,” says Dave Alexander, president of GA-ASI, who as a company aerospace engineer at the time was a central part of the process. “We knew then how much more this platform could deliver and we stayed focused in supporting the Air Force in getting it there.”

That phase of the story has passed into lore along with the names of leaders like Jumper; his predecessor as Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Ryan; retired Col. James “Snake” Clark, who later headed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance innovations as a civilian—and the team at Air Force Materiel Command’s Big Safari office, led by William Grimes. Once they and other Air Force leaders saw the Predator in action in the Balkans, they knew what unmanned systems could do in future applications.

Teeth of the Predator

The Air Force, GA-ASI and its partners began addressing the needs: the Predator got better sensors and a laser designator so that it could spotlight targets for armed aircraft to strike with precision-guided munitions. Then it got weapons of its own: a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles. All that work was well underway by Sept. 11, 2001, when the use case for armed UAS stopped being theoretical.

Suddenly American officials needed more, ever more, sustained, high-quality intelligence about activities on the ground in Afghanistan, which sheltered the al Qaeda conspirators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. And U.S. counterterrorism strategy began to rely heavily on the ability to find, pursue, and eliminate individual terrorists or small groups, knitting together all sources of intelligence available and then relying on the Predator to conclude the operation.

The aircraft, the Air Force and other U.S. government teams that operated it had their rendezvous with destiny. The Predator changed the battlefield in Afghanistan, and later Iraq and elsewhere. It became an icon, nominated as the one of the top 10 aircraft that changed the world. One important early aircraft hangs in the National Air and Space Museum and another Predator is on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

Before long, GA-ASI and the Air Force both recognized that the success of the Predator also revealed its limits. So even as GA-ASI workers were proving out and perfecting the Predator’s capabilities, they also developed a larger, more capable successor: the MQ-9A Reaper.

Enter the Reaper

Nine feet longer than the Predator and with a wingspan 11 feet greater, the Reaper’s take-off weight is 12,000 pounds, more than 4.5 times that of the earlier aircraft. Along with that, its speed, altitude, endurance, and payload are likewise greater, and its a Honeywell-built turboprop engine gives it the voice and power of a modern aircraft.

“Reaper defined what medium-altitude, long-endurance ISR could be, based on what the Air Force and the joint force needed,” Alexander says. “It still does, and it will for a long time.”

Aircraft followed for other services – including the U.S. Army’s Predator cousin, the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Friendly nations followed the trend, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy and more. The mission envelope, which began as tactical ISR, expanded into border security, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, customs enforcement, infrastructure security, wildlife monitoring and beyond.

Hardware, software and other innovations only have grown as well, company officials say. In partnership with the Air Force, GA-ASI is redrafting the very same UAS handbook they wrote together with new practices that will transform military operations and air dominance again.

The Future Force

One example is with artificial intelligence and autonomy, and a new generation of aircraft that will do much of their work on their own, without constant, real-time attention by human pilots.

“We won’t need stick-and-throttle flying anymore unless we want it, and we won’t need to have human eyeballs watching the sensor feed every minute,” says Patrick Shortsleeve, a retired Air Force colonel who served as a director of intelligence at NATO and director of ISR operations for coalition forces in Afghanistan. Shortsleeve now works as GA-ASI’s vice president for DoD strategic development.

“You’ll push a button,” he says, “the airplane will take off and fly its mission, and if it sees something interesting it’ll tap you on the shoulder and say, ‘Hey, take a look at this.’”

Shortsleeve refers to this as a form of “supervised autonomy” – humans in command, but at a layer above unmanned systems working independently or collectively to perform ISR or support other operations. The aircraft could sortie in autonomous-only flights or team with crewed aircraft. In addition to ISR roles, future uncrewed systems might be the lead element in a fighter sweep, or defend tankers, early warning platforms, or larger surveillance aircraft.

Autonomy promises to reduce personnel costs and eliminate dependence on datalinks that adversaries try to jam and hack. With resilient new networks and other novel capabilities, the aircraft can fly, work, and burst-communicate only when needed.

GA-ASI‘s combat-proven, jet-powered MQ-20A Avenger UAS regularly notches new milestones in integrated autonomous operations when flying in support of Air Force exercises at Nellis AFB, Nev. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) is supporting the Skyborg Vanguard Program, and new, bigger, more sophisticated unmanned jets are in the works, promising more endurance, higher-quality ISR, and increased lethality.

The partnership between the Air Force and GA-ASI will continue to make history, Alexander vows.

“Supporting the women and men of the U.S. Air Force is our honor,” he says. “And we’re just getting started.”

-ISR/24/7/365-

Romania Is a Model for Training Ukraine’s Pilots to Fly F-16s

Romania Is a Model for Training Ukraine’s Pilots to Fly F-16s

The Ukrainian Air Force has withstood six months of war against a much larger and more sophisticated Russian force, but U.S. lawmakers worry Russia could gain air superiority as the war grinds on unless Ukrainian pilots are equipped and trained to fly modern Western aircraft, such as the F-16.

Romania, a NATO member, offers a case study for how that could go. Its air force is completing a transition from Soviet-era MiG-21s to U.S.-built F-16s, providing a model for training pilots for the switch, according to U.S. Airmen involved with the training. The U.S. Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command even has a course for partner and ally nation pilots that could be tailored for Ukraine.

At Morris Air National Guard Base, Ariz., Eastern European pilots from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have been taking the six-month ANG International Initial Qualification Course (Advanced) for more than two decades. In fact, today’s young Romanian pilots have never flown MiGs, which are being phased out of Romania’s Air Force as it seeks to expand its fleet of F-16s and eventually to buy F-35s.

The United States and some 50 international partners are already helping Ukraine to modernize its military force with Western, NATO-standard weaponry. But while Ukraine has repeatedly asked for Western fixed-wing fighter aircraft, that request has thus far gone unheeded.

U.S. lawmakers, including Air Force veteran Rep. Chrissy Houlahan (D-Pa.) have called for the Defense Department to begin training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16s, anticipating that airplanes will eventually be offered. A bill now stalled in Congress would provide $100 million for the training.

Col. Brant A. Putnam, vice commander of the 162nd Wing at Morris, has seen generations of Eastern European fighter pilots such as those from Romania graduate from U.S. training programs, and he believes Ukrainians would excel in the program.

“Based on what I’ve heard, I think that they’d fit right in with what we do here,” he told Air Force Magazine in a July interview.

After two decades of this kind of training, the students from former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland and Romania have changed. “These young guys … haven’t flown any Russian airplanes,” said Putnam. “Typically, their English is better, and we run them through to the basic course, and they are, for all intents and purposes, just like the U.S. guys who train alongside them.”

Making the transition from Russian to Western aircraft, however, requires a mind shift. “It’s not easy,” he said. “It depends a lot on how long they’ve been trained in the MiGs, because a lot of what comes along with their training is their mindset,” he said. “They’re into the Soviet system that goes along with those aircraft, which is typically a lot of close control. They don’t make a lot of decisions. They’re not used to being super flexible.”

But in the U.S. Air Force program, pilots must learn to be decision makers. “They can’t sit up in the airplane and just drive and wait to be told what to do,” Putnam said. “They have to actively direct their aircraft and think about what it is they’re trying to accomplish.”

Pilots’ Experience

Romanian Air Force pilot Capt. Alexandru Beraczko, 28, is one of two Romanians now in basic combat flight training in Arizona. He previously participated in U.S. Air Force programs at Lackland and Randolph Air Force Bases, Texas, Columbus Air Force Base, Miss., and Vance Air Force Base, Okla.

“I’ve been trained in the mindset to fly the MiG-21 before,” said Beraczko of his Romanian Alpha Jet training, which has the same avionics as the MiG-21. He’s also familiar with the MiG-29 flown by Ukraine.

“Getting [to] the F-16 from the MiG-29—it’s a way different airframe,” Beraczko told Air Force Magazine by phone from Tucson. “The heads-up display, even the missiles they are running, they have different cool times, different intelligence. Bear in mind they need to apply different tactics. Air tactics are different.”

Romania joined the NATO Partnership for Peace in 1994 shortly after independence and became a full NATO member 10 years later. Each step was a shift to the Western way of warfare.

From trained pilots and maintainers to required infrastructure to a boneyard of spare aircraft, Romania has been working on its transition to the F-16 for nearly a decade.

“Even we struggle at this point, and we started enhancing and getting the F-16 like seven or eight years ago, and we’re still not yet there,” Beraczko said. “We are so close; we are wanting and willing to be there as personnel, as maintenance, as even a force.”

A U.S. Air Force spokesperson said foreign countries seeking to train fighter pilots in the United States would typically begin with a few weeks in the T-6 trainer aircraft before spending a few months flying the faster T-38. Once the training is complete, the pilot can enroll in the basic course for combat pilots.

The majority of the course uses the F-16C model, since most pilots will be flying single-seat aircraft when they return home.

Graduating students reach a wingman level and are expected to continue flying with close supervision for 500 hours.

“It still takes what it takes to create an experienced pilot who can go out and employ aircraft, make tactical decisions, and survive,” Putnam said. Graduates, he said, “will be combat ready, in a sense. [But] they will not have the experience to make tactical decisions in the scenarios that they might see.”

In Tucson, Putnam said AETC has created tailored courses to meet the needs of specific countries. 

Congress Backs Training Ukrainian Pilots

In June, Rep. Houlahan and fellow Air Force veteran Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.) introduced legislation to finance the training of the Ukrainian fighter pilots on the types of American aircraft that could be given to Ukraine.

Support for the bill has not waned, Houlahan told Air Force Magazine, but the administration has refrained from taking a decisive first step on a path that could take many months or years.

“Russia could turn the tide of the war at any moment, which means time is one of our most valuable assets and we must use it wisely to ensure the people of Ukraine are victorious,” she said.

In an Aug. 24 Pentagon press briefing, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin H. Kahl said Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has directed a team from his office, the Joint Staff, and U.S. European Command to work with Ukraine to help design a future Ukrainian Air Force, but he expressed reservations that such a force can be assembled in the short-term.

Still, Houlahan and other lawmakers believe defense officials need to be having conversations about pilot training now.

“I’m frustrated by the lack of progress here on seriously considering this viable option,” she said.

Pentagon’s Plan to Reduce Civilian Harm May Not Work in Future Conflicts, Experts Say

Pentagon’s Plan to Reduce Civilian Harm May Not Work in Future Conflicts, Experts Say

The Pentagon’s Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan released Aug. 25 details nearly a dozen objectives creating institutions and processes to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. 

But critics say the plan’s objectives may do more harm than good, creating extra layers of bureaucracy for planners and operators to navigate, and that it won’t work in a large-scale conflict.

In a memo accompanying the release of the action plan, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III called its objectives “ambitious but necessary,” and press secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder told reporters that the plan will “enable DOD to move forward on this important initiative.”

Austin first ordered the drafting of an action plan in January, not long after a series of reports from the New York Times in late 2021 detailed the impact of airstrikes that led to hundreds of civilian casualties in the Middle East. Those reports followed the high-profile deaths of 10 civilians in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August 2021, caused by an erroneous strike during the U.S. withdrawal.

Among the action plan’s objectives is the establishment of a civilian protection center of excellence; the incorporation of guidance for addressing civilian harm across the full spectrum of armed conflict into doctrine and operation plans; improved knowledge of the civilian environment and civilian harm mitigation capabilities and processes throughout the joint targeting process; and the creation of a steering committee to oversee the action plan’s implementation.

More practically, what that will entail for operators in the field is “having somebody or probably a group of people who are experts in this civilian environment, that are sitting next to the operators, the threat-focused intel folks, the lawyers, as they’re really developing whether it’s an individual operation or a campaign and building in this component of civilian harm throughout the overall process,” a senior defense official told reporters in a background briefing. 

Among those who could be included in those plans are forward deployed experts from the new center of excellence, the official added.

Austin, Ryder, and the defense official all emphasized in their statements that the action plan is meant to be forward-facing—Austin called the reforms “scalable and relevant to counterterrorism operations and large-scale conflicts against peer adversaries.”

But retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, disagreed.

“I believe that this report and the recommendations that it contains are really backward-looking toward an era of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations,” Deptula said. “Conditions will be very much different in operations in a major regional conflict. That doesn’t mean that avoidance of, planning for, and having the understanding of how to execute operations while minimizing or avoiding civilian casualties changes in importance. It just means that the intensity of conflict is not going to allow for exquisite, centralized analysis for the prosecution of each and every target.”

Instead, the Pentagon should work to ensure that its operators and planners know and abide by the laws of armed conflict, particularly the principle of proportionality, Deptula said—in an attack for a military objective, any anticipated civilian harm should not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”

Trying to create uniform processes and institutions that oversee all civilian harm reduction efforts also runs contrary to the Pentagon’s and Air Force’s philosophy of distributed control, added Deptula—Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. and others have said they want to fundamentally shift their approach to war by embracing “decentralized execution … It’s the aspect of being able to work small teams and trusting our Airmen to be able to do things.”

Using such an approach in a major conflict will mean “you’re going to be operating in environments where … connectivity between the leading edge of the combatant forces and the highest levels of command will be interrupted,” Deptula. “So you can’t stop the execution of operations. This is why it’s so important for the individual combatants to fully understand the laws of armed conflict.”

Conversely, adding more layers of approval to the targeting process will increase the amount of time it takes to make a decision and execute a strike, retired Col. Mark Gunzinger, the Mitchell Institute’s director of future concepts and capability assessments, said.

“That can lead to lost opportunities. That can lead to suboptimal operational results,” Gunzinger said. “And that could lead to actually more casualties, and not fewer.”

Beyond that, prioritizing the prevention of civilian harm over the accomplishment of military objectives could lead to a dynamic in which “the commanders and their staffs that do the planning for next day’s operations—they’ll be self constraining, in that the most important thing in the planning would be no collateral damage, rather than what effects do we need to make to achieve a battlespace objective, to get this over with,” said retired Maj. Gen. Larry Stutzriem, the Mitchell Institute’s director of research.

Such a dynamic would extend conflicts, Stutzriem warned, with the potential for more civilian casualties as a result.

Report: How Norms of Behavior Could Save Space Companies From Becoming Targets in War

Report: How Norms of Behavior Could Save Space Companies From Becoming Targets in War

The rapid proliferation of commercial satellites is revealing increased potential for counter-satellite military operations and collateral damage.

SpaceX reported that its Starlink satellite internet service was jammed in Ukraine after the start of the war, and Viasat reported hackers attacking its satellite internet service there around the same time. In the wake of Russia’s debris-generating test of a ground-launched anti-satellite weapon in November 2021, operators with satellites in low Earth orbit saw risks increase as more than 1,500 new pieces of debris were scattered in that region.

The Russian act intensified calls to establish norms of acceptable behavior in space, and the U.S. government pledged not to perform any future debris-generating tests in space. 

To help inform efforts to establish norms, the not-for-profit Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy studied other areas where civil and military activities converge. The study, “Commercial Normentum: Space Security Challenges, Commercial Actors, and Norms of Behavior,” published Aug. 23, notes that commercial satellites could make attractive targets in a space war and suggests that commercial operators should be involved in the issues raised as a result. The paper lists factors for companies to weigh when deciding whether to take an active role in establishing norms and ideas for how they might do so.

Aerospace’s Robin Dickey, the report’s author, writes that commercial participation in establishing security norms could be more important in space than in other domains because “the physics of debris propagation in space make it much harder to limit the effects of any single accident or conflict.”

Adding to the complexity and risk is the emerging intermingling of civil and military uses of satellite assets. The Space Force is increasingly interested in incorporating commercial constellations and data into its activities, both as a means to extend situational awareness and to ensure resilience in space in the future. Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond has called America’s and allied space industries a “great advantage” and said the Space Force must harness and leverage the “explosion of business that’s going on.” Commander of U.S. Space Command Army Gen. James H. Dickinson has said he is most interested in how commercial space firms can improve space domain awareness.

The risk, both to commercial entities and the U.S. military, is how military uses for those systems could turn them into legitimate military targets. “Were conflict to significantly escalate in space, the potential lack of distinction between military and commercial satellites could result in targeting of even commercial satellites that do not provide military services,” Dickey writes. Because they’re uncrewed, commercial satellites could also be seen as lower-threshold targets, making their destruction “less escalatory” than attacking crewed assets in other domains.

Dickey draws comparisons with past instances in which militaries targeted civilian property, organizing them into three categories:

  • Collateral damage from attacks on military objectives. Landmines roughly equate to how ASATs scatter destructive debris. The International Space Station provides an example of how the debris affects satellites: NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel reported in July that out of 681 conjunction notifications the ISS crew had received in 2022, to warn of closely approaching objects, 505 traced back to the Russian ASAT test.
  • Attacks due to misidentification or misinterpretation of a commercial activity. At least six commercial airliners were shot down before clear norms were established for mitigating against such commercial targets in the midst of combat. 
  • Deliberate targeting in war. Historically, commercial maritime shipping has been targeted during military conflict, justified because such ships either carried legitimately targeted supplies or helped support military activity economically. In space, deliberate jamming, cyberattacks, or the “disruption of sensors” with directed energy could similarly apply pressure to commercial activities.

Dickey makes the case, in part, that because companies have a stake in space security, they should also get a say in establishing the security-related norms that might otherwise seem like the purview of governments.

But because norms will only work to deter bad behavior according to the extent that they’re accepted around the world, Dickey concedes that they may prove most useful in justifying a response—“providing a legal of political point around which other space actors can rally if a state goes rogue.”

Practices such as establishing minimum cybersecurity standards for satellites; transparently sharing mission data between the commercial sector and governments—even competing ones; and implementing formal lines of communication in case of problems all could help protect satellites and avert disaster.

Dickey’s paper proposes three styles of approaches to consider:

  • Protect all civilian/commercial assets. In this circumstance, any attack on commercial assets would be ruled out, regardless of the satellite’s purpose. Determining what constitutes an attack would also be necessary. “Are commercial satellites that sell services to militaries viable objectives?”
  • Protect all essential space services. In this approach, only certain kinds of services would be protected. The risk is that this plan would “exclude numerous commercial satellites from the highest degree of normative protection.” But it could get closer to legal and political common ground.
  • Protect only those commercial satellites that do not provide military services. This could be done by conveying to other countries “intentions and activities to de-escalate misunderstandings.”

Establishing normative behavior does not assure that satellites will never fall prey to military attack or collateral damage, Dickey notes. Norms “should not be the only approach to mitigating potential threats. However, they can be an important piece of the larger puzzle.”

Chiefs, Part 1: Discordant Visionary

Chiefs, Part 1: Discordant Visionary

In its 75-year history, 22 Airmen have led the Air Force as Chief of Staff. Each came to the post shaped by the experiences—and sometimes scar tissue—developed over three decades of service. Each inherited an Air Force formed by the decisions of those who came before, who bequeathed to posterity the results of decisions and compromises made over the course of their time in office. Each left his own unique stamp on the institution. As part of Air Force Magazine’s commemoration of the Air Force’s 75th anniversary, Sept. 18, 2022, we set out to interview all of the living former Chiefs of Staff, ultimately interviewing Chiefs from 1990 to the present. In this first in the series, we share the story of the first of those Chiefs: No. 14 Gen. Merrill A. McPeak (1990-1994). This period begins the pinnacle of American air power, the planning and execution of 1991’s Operation Desert Storm, in which the fruits of a decade of modernization were put on display to devastating effect: This was the first time the world saw how stealth could evade enemy air defenses and how the dream of precision bombing that motivated the Bomber Mafia in the interwar period leading up to World War II was actualized five decades hence. 

Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, CSAF No. 14 (1990-’94)

Every Chief is unique, shaped by his time and the world as he rose through the ranks and the events and personalities defining the national security landscape when he takes office. To these circumstances each Chief adds his unique personality, style, and attributes. 

When Gen. Merrill “Tony” McPeak arrived as Chief in October 1990, Iraq had, only months before, invaded and occupied Kuwait. The United States was assembling an enormous coalition against Iraq, and the Air Force would soon demonstrate a new era of American air power: Stealth aircraft that could evade enemy detection; precision weapons that could strike with pinpoint accuracy; and dominance like no air force had ever demonstrated before.  

Yet McPeak’s job was not to fight that war, but to organize, train, and equip the Air Force for what would follow. By the time he became Chief, the Cold War that had defined his entire adult life was over. Born in 1936 in the midst of the Great Depression, McPeak had reached adulthood in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The Soviet Union was suddenly no longer America’s archrival. In fact, the Soviet Union no longer existed. 

“Desert Storm began a couple of months after my swearing in,” McPeak recalled in July. We’re on a video call and he’s in workout gear from his home in Oregon. A photo taken in the Oval Office in December 1990 of the Joint Chiefs meeting with President George H.W. Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney rests on the credenza behind him. McPeak wears a beard, and sounds very much like he did as Chief, still ramrod straight, still intense, still able to laugh at and with himself. “You would think that I spent a lot of time worrying about how to support [Gen.] Chuck Horner out in the sandbox, and I did. But I was also talking to the Secretary [of the Air Force] from Day One about how we were going to reorganize the Air Force. …  [Secretary] Don Rice and I had agreed before the end of January ’91 on  how we wanted to reconfigure the Air Force.” 

The Air Force had 535,233 Airmen on Active duty when McPeak came to Washington. It had 426,327 when he left four years later. The drawdown was a dramatic reworking of a force that had been locked in a strategic competition for more than four decades and was anticipating President Bush’s “New World Order,” a unipolar world in which the U.S. was the sole superpower remaining. McPeak thought the entire military was ready to be reset at a much smaller scale than what the nation had been used to.  

“My idea was to simplify the structure of the Air Force,” McPeak recalls. “Complexity is the enemy of success in combat. You’ve got to keep it simple. And that starts with a simple organization.” As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Army Gen. Colin Powell had already developed the “Base Force,” defining the scale of the coming drawdown. The aim was to avoid creating a hollow force that would retain structure devoid of capacity, but instead outline a force that could fight two wars on the scale of Operation Desert Storm simultaneously.  

McPeak did away with Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command. Instead of three of these Major Commands, the Air Force would have two: Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. The change in acronyms was intended to help drive home the changes, which were driven by the notion that the distinction between tactical and strategic forces was anachronistic.  

“I think how we organize to fight is the most important thing a leader can do,” McPeak says. “Then of course you’ve got to turn them loose to fight. And if they’re well trained, they’ll do well. But first, it’s how you organize to go to battle. That had been very important in my thinking for a long time, certainly before I became Chief. … And remember: the way you organize something is, first, you organize it, and then, second, you’re reorganizing.”  

Gen. Merrill McPeak. USAF via National Archives.

First moves aren’t always right, and McPeak is quick to own his mistakes (at least where he sees decisions as wrong). “I put the ICBM force into Combat Command—that was a mistake,” he says. He changed his mind, altering people’s lives in the process, and moved it to Space Command. Later, it would be moved again, combined with bombers into Air Force Global Strike Command. McPeak was passionate about getting organization right, and achieving a viable structure that made logical sense. “When, I took over the Air Force it had 200 things called ‘wings,’” he says. “When I left, we had 100 things called wings. They were real wings.”  

Organizational upheaval created turmoil. “Any organization that wants to stay at a high level of performance is in virtual reorganization all the time,” McPeak says. For example, there were two wings at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., south of Washington, D.C., and when asked why, McPeak was told it was too much for one colonel to manage. “I said, ’Well, let’s make it a one-star and put the whole wing under him and get rid of a headquarters and a staff car and a secretary.’ Man, if one person can’t run Andrews then what am I doing trying to run the whole Air Force?” 

McPeak’s structural remaking of the force was, he recalls, about one-third drawdown and Base Force, “but two-thirds of it was closing superfluous wings.” 

Cutting the force was an opportunity, if it meant the service could be more efficient. But getting the message across was difficult. McPeak saw the Base Force not as an objective floor below which the Air Force and other services would not go, but as a ceiling: the biggest it could possibly be when the cutting was finally done. That proved prescient. Service budgets that peaked before the end of President Reagan’s eight years in office continued to decline through most of the 1990s. At the same time, demand for Air Force operations remained constant. While the services returned to a massive homecoming celebration in Washington, D.C., in 1991, the Air Force found itself adapting to a new way of life, rotating forces and aircraft through the Middle East to enforce no-fly zones in the south and north of Iraq, protecting Iraqis from their own military.  

None of that was clear when McPeak was still in charge. He was remaking the Air Force in his own image, and he was a different kind of Airman. He remains today a different sort of former Chief, still marching to the beat of his own drummer, still intimately familiar with the Air Force but from a greater level of remove than other former Chiefs. He is a Chief who sweated details others would ignore. He had the Air Force Band create a string quartet to play chamber music because he felt the Strolling Strings were outsized for his quarters at the Air House. He took part personally in the auditions.  

He introduced a new uniform. If there’s anything most Chiefs won’t do, it’s work on uniforms. Everyone has an opinion, and everyone is an expert. The uniform McPeak introduced was derided both for being cut for McPeak’s wiry physique and for looking too much like a commercial airline pilot’s uniform. Yet while the decorations on that uniform would change, the basic suit remains the same.   

“No guts, no glory,” he says of Chiefs who shy away from uniform controversy. “If you don’t want to take on big challenges, then you shouldn’t be in the Chief’s office. [The uniform] didn’t take up much of my time.  It was easy. And by the way, that uniform is being worn today. That’s my uniform, except it’s been glitzed up. … My idea that simplicity is what works in combat? Well, it also works in uniforms. The blue suit with three Arnold patch buttons on the front is …. the uniform I helped to redesign.”  

Others knocked McPeak as symbolizing the “fighter mafia” and favoring combat aviators. A former Thunderbird, McPeak had flown more than 200 sorties in Vietnam and 199 as a Thunderbird, surviving the team’s first-ever crash in front of a public audience when the wings of his F-100 sheared off on a maneuver in Del Rio, Texas, in October 1967. Pulling his jet heavenward at 6.5 Gs, he heard a loud bang as the wings came off, releasing fuel that turned into a fireball. That he survived the accident is a testament as much to skill as luck.  

McPeak questions the fairness of the fighter mafia label. “I made Billy Boles a four star and sent him to run Training and Education Command. Not only was he not a fighter pilot, he wasn’t any kind of pilot. He wasn’t a navigator. He had a slick uniform right here where here you put your wings. First guy ever sent to Air Education and Training Command who was nonrated. I sent up to the Air Force Academy Paul Stein. First Air Force Academy Superintendent who was not a rated officer, not a pilot. I brought in a guy to be Vice Chief who was a space guy, he wasn’t a pilot. But he was a warrior. Billy Boles was a warrior. Paul Stein—go find me a warrior better than Paul Stein. I wasn’t so much interested in who’s a fighter pilot as I was in who’s a warrior. Turns out a lot of fighter pilots are in that category. Thank goodness!”  

 McPeak was no dictator when it came to selling his vision of the force. “I spent about one-third of my time in front of audiences, working on consensus,” he recalls. “No organization that I know of goes anywhere based on what Mussolini tells them to do. We all operate on consensus. And that’s true in the military.  I never thought I could just come in and turn on the light switch and expect everybody to have all the lamps in the building go on. So I worked hard to build consensus, [but] I was only about 51 percent successful. Change is hard to do. It’s hard to lead.”  

The reason it was so hard, he says, is that he wanted to do more than incremental change. “Look, you know how to create the best dictionary in the world?” he asks, pausing for effect. “Start with the existing best dictionary and then fix one mistake, one word. That’s what some people have as an idea of leadership. But that wasn’t my idea. I wanted to start building a new dictionary. That’s pretty ambitious.” 

That would not work if every Chief wanted to do that, he acknowledges. “We can’t have an Air Force that every four years gets turned on its head and shaken hard. But every once in a while, it’s not a bad idea.”  

McPeak blew up thousands of pages of regulations, calling in his functional Chiefs and asking them to boil down those regulations to four or five pages, double-spaced. He recalls it took multiple iterations to boil these down to their essence. “The idea was we should have instructions that say what is important to us. And if 100 things are important, it’s like saying nothing’s important.”  

By going to the functional Chiefs—“the head cop, the head chaplain, the surgeon general”—McPeak sought to build consensus around a singular idea: “What is it that we’re in business to do here? What is the Air Force all about? With the central idea being that it’s about excellence,” he says. That vision is too often lost, he said, in other pursuits. “I hear way too much today about diversity. It is not the mission of the Air Force to solve society’s diversity problems. I’m not against diversity, but I am for winning in aerial combat. That comes first.”  

When McPeak took office he had a four-by-six card in his desk on which he had written five simple, declarative sentences, five things he wanted to accomplish in that office. “Every day I was inundated by other things that other people wanted me to do,” he said. “People would come in and say, “Hey, boss, I’ve got a horrible problem. You’ve got to help me. I’d listen to them and say, go fix it. Come back and tell me how you fixed it. Then I’d open that top drawer and look at the little card to tell me about the things I wanted to do. …. Never got them done, by the way. Never accomplished those five things.”  

What were they? McPeak won’t say. “Because I failed,” he says. “I’m not in the confession mode here, and you’re not my priest. I’m not willing to admit the depth and breadth of my failure.” But was it failure to be ambitious, to strive for things that remained out of reach? For an 85-year-old former Chief, the frustration is not that, but the reality of the constraints of time, which, like the constraints of gravity, limit most people to live life inside the lines. McPeak spent his life trying to break free of those constraints.  

“You only have four years,” he continues. “To do the things that I had in mind would have required eight or maybe 10 years. Therefore I was too ambitious. You have to decide what mistakes you want to make in life. You don’t ever get it right. So the mistake I want to make is to be too much of X and too little of Y. … My five things were things I couldn’t get done in four years. And, so part of my problem as Chief was I tried to get them done in four years.” 

Nuclear Advances by China Raise Questions on Command and Control, Structure

Nuclear Advances by China Raise Questions on Command and Control, Structure

Pentagon and Air Force officials have repeatedly warned in recent months that China is making rapid progress in building up its arsenal of nuclear weapons. But as that growth continues, key questions are still unanswered about how the Chinese will structure their strategic forces, according to a new report.

The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) at Air University issued the third edition of its PLA Aerospace Power Primer on Aug. 19, three years after its previous update. And in that time, the People’s Liberation Army’s nuclear capabilities have changed dramatically.

Then-commander of Air Force Global Strike Command Gen. Timothy M. Ray called the growth “breathtaking.” U.S. Strategic Command boss Adm. Charles “Chas” A. Richard termed it a “strategic breakout.” And the Pentagon had to revise its estimates of how many nuclear warheads the Chinese will possess by the end of the decade.

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, which controls China’s nuclear and conventional missiles, “has evolved from a small, unsophisticated force of short-ranged and vulnerable ballistic missiles to an increasingly large, modern, and formidable force with a wide array of both nuclear and conventional weapons platforms,” notes the new CASI primer.

But while much has been made about the increase in silos and warheads, the grand totals still lag far behind the U.S. and Russia, noted Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney, director of CASI and one of the primer’s authors. China’s new nuclear triad, however, deserves more attention, he said.

“You can say, ‘Oh, my God, they’re tripling their force. It’s a 300 percent increase,’ which is absolutely true,” Mulvaney told Air Force Magazine. “But it’s always been in the Rocket Force, so as you create a submarine force and an air force that are now nuclear capable, of course you’re going to have to increase the number of warheads. 

“… But it is very telling that they’re spending that much time and effort in the nuclear forces, and diversifying, right? That’s the part that really makes people, or should make people, pay some attention to that.”

In particular, the beginning stages of China’s nuclear triad raise all sorts of questions for the PLA Air Force and Navy, the report suggests, as neither branch has dealt much with nuclear weapons.

“The open question, which China doesn’t talk much about, is as you build a triad, what are the roles and capabilities that you’re going to have in the air arm?” Mulvaney said. “Because for them, the PLARF have all the ICBMs, right. So traditionally, the PLARF has had control over essentially all the weapons in China for these last couple of decades, for a long time. And so as that changes, what role does the air force … play?”

For now, the report states, the “current role of the PLAAF … is nascent at best due to technical limitations and the relatively small size of its nuclear capable bomber fleet.”

But that may change in the future, particularly if the PLAAF develops its own nuclear command and control procedures and infrastructure, separate from the PLARF, Mulvaney said.

The Chinese could “simply cordon off within the air force and within the navy the nuclear [weapons]-capable portions … and have them create their own direct links, like the PLARF has, but just duplicating one for each service,” Mulvaney said. “So that’s possible, and all that would feed up to the Joint Operations Command Center for the Central Military Commision.”

Such an arrangement would create redundancy and flexibility but might also raise the possibility of poor communication and misunderstandings.

Alternatively, “it’s conceivable that they would come up with something akin to our Strategic Command, in which case, they would start to lump all the nuclear weapons or the nuclear release authorities,” Mulvaney said. 

Such an arrangement wouldn’t be perfectly analogous to STRATCOM—“they’re organized differently, their command and control is different, so it’s not a one-to-one ratio,” Mulvaney said—but it would fit with a broader trend he noted in how the Chinese have reformed their military over time.

“Because China doesn’t have any real-world experience, they do a lot of studying other militaries, specifically the United States and our allies and partners,” Mulvaney said. “ … A lot of the changes that they made in 2015 and 2016 were basically to craft a new model kind of like the United States.”

While those questions remain unanswered, Mulvaney said the goal of the primer is to give personnel across the Air Force a basic understanding of China’s military aerospace capabilities, in line with Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr.’s Action Order C, which pushes for Airmen “to understand their role in the long-term strategic competitions between the U.S., Russia, and China.”

A digital copy of the primer is available online, and hard copies will be distributed at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College, Mulvaney said.

DOD Denies Escalation With Iran-Backed Militants After Volley of Attacks

DOD Denies Escalation With Iran-Backed Militants After Volley of Attacks

The Pentagon said Aug. 25 that a battle with Iran-affiliated militants in northeastern Syria was over and that U.S. Central Command had taken measures to avoid escalation.

One U.S. service member was treated for a minor injury and returned to duty, and two others were under evaluation for minor injuries after a coordinated attack Aug. 24 in which several rockets landed inside the perimeter of Mission Support Site Conoco and in the vicinity of Mission Support Site Green Village, both in northeastern Syria.

U.S. Central Command reported Aug. 25 that it retaliated against that latest attack with AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, AC-130 gunships, and M777 artillery, killing four militants and destroying rocket launchers.

The exchange of attacks began when militants attempted to attack U.S. facilities in Syria on Aug. 15 with unmanned aerial vehicles possibly supplied by Iran.

The United States responded Aug. 23 when four F-15Es and four F-16s launched from bases in the region to fire at nine militant bunkers, avoiding militant casualties. Two additional strikes were removed from the target list when human movement was detected.

DOD denied that it had waited nearly 10 days to respond to the attack while the United States and Iran hashed out final details for Iran to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Instead, some 400 hours of intelligence was collected at the target sites.

“Separate from the JCPOA, we will defend our people no matter where they’re attacked or when they’re attacked,” said DOD Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder.

“The two really are not interrelated in that regard,” Ryder said. “Our forces were threatened. We took appropriate and proportionate response and will do so anywhere and anytime that we receive that threat.”

The battle with Iranian-backed and supplied forces came as the United States and Iran are close to bringing Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA and lifting U.S. sanctions that were reimposed when President Donald J. Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018. The JCPOA is intended to limit Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Since breaking away from the agreement, Iran has enriched uranium to levels consistent with the construction of a nuclear weapon.

Ryder declined to discuss the operational planning that led to the delay that occurred while JCPOA negotiations were ongoing. Ryder said Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and radar assets helped assure no militants were killed as a result of those American strikes.

“In terms of our objectives and the message we were trying to send, which was a proportional response to the [UAV] attacks against U.S. forces, none of our forces were killed,” Ryder said in response to a question from Air Force Magazine.

Ryder also drew a distinction between the decision not to target militants and the Pentagon’s Aug. 25 release of its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, a wide-ranging effort to reform military doctrine and operational planning to mitigate civilian casualties.

“In this context, no, I wouldn’t conflate the two,” Ryder said. “This was a concerted decision not to strike individuals, suspected militants, because, again, we were aiming to do a proportional strike.”

UAVs Traced to Tehran

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin H. Kahl said at an Aug. 24 Pentagon briefing that UAV pieces collected at the Aug. 15 attack sites were “traced directly back to Tehran.”

“We don’t want Iran to draw the wrong conclusion that they can continue just doing this and get away with it,” Kahl said at the briefing. “Our concern was that this might be an indication that Iran intends to do more of this, and we wanted to disabuse them of any sense that that was a good idea.”

The DOD policy chief said the United States has communicated through multiple channels with Iran against supporting the militants.

After the Aug. 24 rocket attacks and deadly retaliation by the U.S., Army Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, said the U.S. “will respond appropriately and proportionally to attacks on our servicemembers,” according to a press release. “No group will strike at our troops with impunity. We will take all necessary measures to defend our people.”

Ryder said the aerial response did not indicate that the battle with Iranian-backed forces was heating up.

“That does not necessarily indicate that things are escalating,” he said. “We maintain a variety of platforms in the region to provide whatever types of support we may need, and, of course, the AC-130 gunship is one of those capabilities.”

National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said at an Aug. 24 press briefing that Iran has made concessions and that a deal to bring Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA is close.

“We are closer now than we were just even a couple of weeks ago because Iran made the decision to make some concessions,” Kirby said. “So that’s a positive step forward, but I would add very quickly … gaps remain. We’re not there.”

Drawing a distinction between the ongoing JCPOA negotiations, Ryder said the message of deterrence was conveyed in Syria.

“In terms of the strikes in Syria, again what I would say was our focus was on sending a message loud and clear to these Iran-backed militants in terms of what is not acceptable behavior, and that’s targeting U.S. forces,” he said.