Cutting-Edge Drones Headed to Ukraine in Latest US Aid

Feb. 26, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The conflict in Ukraine is emerging as a critical test bed for new weapons technology, and while efforts to provide fighter aircraft to Ukraine remain stalled, those constraints do not seem to apply to advanced unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

The latest U.S. aid package for Ukraine, announced Feb. 24, includes an array of new UASs. Valued in total at about $2 billion, the aid comes out of the U.S. Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which funds purchases directly from industry rather than taking supplies from American stocks.

Caitlin Lee, senior fellow for UAV and autonomy studies at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the UASs represent a natural evolution of new equipment for Ukraine.

“I think what you’re seeing is the U.S. building on the success of smaller drones in Ukraine and leveraging that as much as possible in the absence of the ability to send a larger aircraft, manned or unmanned, into the battle,” Lee said.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine have been able to achieve air superiority in the conflict, leading both sides to turn to drones to as a lower-risk means to attack ground targets from above. Russia has made extensive use of Iranian-made kamikaze drones to attack Ukrainian infrastructure, providing a novel and cost-effective solution to countering Ukrainian air defenses while still achieving air-to-ground hits.

Ukraine has also employed drones, including Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, and quadcopters for artillery spotting in the slugfest now taking place in the eastern part of the country. Ukraine has also used off-the-shelf drones to drop explosives, a tactic ISIS has used against U.S.-backed forces in Iraq and Syria.

The new UASs the U.S. will provide include systems either still in testing or that have only been used sparingly to date by U.S. forces. These include Switchblade 600s, Jump 20s, ALTIUS-600s, and CyberLux K8s. Only the Switchblade has been promised in past aid packages.

Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said in a press briefing Feb. 24 that unmanned systems are now “part of the modern way of warfare.”

“I think it’s become apparent to everyone in the last five to seven years, you know, especially as we saw groups like ISIS starting to use drones and now especially in this conflict, the significant impact that drones have.”

Ryder cautioned, however, that the drones would likely not arrive until late spring or later, well after the fighting is expected to pick up. He declined to specify either precise numbers or timing of deliveries.

Drones to Come

ALTIUS-600 is a small drone that can fly over 270 miles. Its manufacturer Area-I, a subsidiary of defense startup Anduril, promotes the craft as a modular system with a nose cone that can be fitted with an array of sensors or payloads. The drone is tube-launched and recoverable. The U.S. Army has tested the system in multiple forms, including launching them from the ground, from helicopters as air-launched effects (ALE), and even operating together in swarms. ALTIUS has also been tested as an electronic warfare platform. Anduril says the company has recently added a loitering munitions capability to the platform. It is unclear exactly what payloads and launchers Ukraine will receive along with the drones.

An Area-I Air-Launched, Tube-Integrated, Unmanned System, or ALTIUS, sails through the skies at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. Photo by Jose Mejia-Betancourth/CCDC AvMC Technology Development Directorate

The AeroVironment Jump 20, is a vertical take-off and landing drone that can perform surveillance missions for over 14 hours with a range of around 115 miles, according to its manufacturer. It has already been fielded for U.S. Special Operations Forces, and the U.S. Army has awarded a $8 million contract to begin to purchase Jump 20s to perform tactical missions for American troops. Its design appears conventional with fixed wings and a propeller at the front. But it also features smaller propellers that are vertically mounted, which eliminates the need for runways and is one of its selling points.

The Switchblade 600 has a longer range and bigger warhead than the tube-launched Switchblade 300 drone already used by Ukraine. Like the Jump 20, it is made by AeroVironment. The Switchblade 600 can carry a 30-pound payload around 25 miles for about 40 minutes, making it well suited for anti-armor missions.

“Patented wave-off and recommit capability allows operators to abort the mission at any time and then re-engage either the same or other targets multiple times based on operator command,” says AeroVironment.

U.S. Marines with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, train with a Switchblade 300 10C system as part of Service Level Training Exercise 1-22 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Sept. 24, 2021. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Alexis Moradian

Little public information is available about the CyberLux K8, produced by 23-year-old Cyberlux Corp. Among the company’s products are small quadcopters, a type of drone that Ukraine has already extensively employed.

Lee cautioned against concluding that these new systems signal a new way of waging war for the U.S., saying instead the systems could prove useful in specific situations.

“The threat environment really hasn’t driven us toward some of the smaller commercial solutions. But I think we’re starting to see the value of doing that for allies and partners,” said Lee. “The kinds of technologies that we’re seeing have some success in Ukraine are probably not the same kinds of technologies that the U.S. might need were we to engage directly in a conflict with a peer adversary like China.”

Notably missing from the new-U.S. provided drones is the MQ-9. Ukraine has asked for Reaper drones, and its manufacturer, General Atomics, has pledged to provide them from its own stocks.

“Imagine if Ukraine had access to UAVs that had an order of magnitude more payload, twelve times the range, the ability to fly across the entire county of Ukraine and stay aloft for over a day,” said retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute. “I’m talking about the MQ-1 Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Predator, of which the U.S. has dozens sitting in storage crates in the western desert not in use, or planned for use, by any U.S. agency.”

Pratt & Whitney to Resume F-35 Engine Deliveries after 2-Month Hold

Feb. 24, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Pratt & Whitney has been cleared to restart deliveries of F135 jet engines—two months after the Pentagon ordered a hold on deliveries following the crash of an F-35B in December. But the F-35 Joint Program Office has not yet allowed delivery of 21 already assembled F-35s that were put on hold after the crash.

Industry officials said F-35 jet deliveries could resume the week of Feb. 27.

Deliveries were halted due to the discovery of “a rare system phenomenon involving harmonic resonance,” the JPO said in an emailed statement, echoing word-for-word what Jen Latka, a Pratt & Whitney vice president had said on Feb. 10.

The JPO said it is working with an industry team “to ensure incorporation of mitigation measures that will fully address/resolve this rare phenomenon in impacted F135 engines.”

The government will “provide instructions to the fleet and to Lockheed Martin to enable safe resumption of flight operations of impacted aircraft and new production aircraft,” the statement said.

Pratt scheduled a press conference for Feb. 28 to explain the engine issues and its path back to a regular pace of deliveries.

A Lockheed Martin spokesperson said, “We continue to work closely with the Joint Program Office to determine next steps for resumption of F-35 flight operations and deliveries.”

F-35 field maintainers will be provided a technical order for reducing the effects of the harmonic resonance issue, and a change on the production line is warranted, the JPO indicated. It is not clear whether those changes will affect the engine or the airframe.

In the Dec. 14 mishap, an F-35B in vertical hover during an acceptance flight suddenly pitched forward and struck the runway at Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, facility. The pilot ejected at zero altitude but survived with minor injury. Deliveries of F-35s were halted shortly thereafter because acceptance flights could not be flown, and deliveries of the F135 engines were stopped on Dec. 27.

“We have developed a near-term remedy that allows the fleet to fly safely, and we expect that F135 engine deliveries could resume before the end of the month,” Latka said Feb. 10.

At that time, Lockheed had accumulated 17 completed F-35s and was waiting to deliver them; it now has 21 completed jets awaiting handover to the government. Lockheed was not able to say how long it will take to process those deliveries once they’re cleared to be “DD250’d,” the formal process of acceptance by the government. Each jet will have to undergo a series of acceptance test flights, and government sources said there is a limited number of pilots who do such testing for the Defense Contract Management Agency. Government officials could not say if the December mishap pilot has been cleared to return to flying duties.

Latka reported that a cracked fuel tube found in the wreck is not a “systemic problem” and that “after thorough review,” there were “no quality issues” with that part, she said.

The Naval Air Systems Command continues to investigate in search of an official root cause for the crash.

An Air Force spokesperson said in mid-February that while there have been “no operational impacts” on USAF’s F-35 fleet, a problem with “the F-35 main fuel throttle valve has only impacted production aircraft and a very small number of fielded F-35s with low-time engines.” At that time, the Air Force was to receive “about a dozen” of the aircraft being held back at Lockheed, and these were headed toward operational bases at Lakenheath in the U.K., Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., and Hill Air Force Base, Utah.

The timing of an engine defect is problematic for Pratt, as the Air Force is expected to decide in its fiscal 2024 budget request whether to accept Pratt’s proposal of an Engine Core Upgrade for the F135 to meet power requirements of the F-35 Block 4, or whether to open a competition for Block 4 propulsion between Pratt and GE Aerospace. Both companies have developed advanced adaptive engines created with an F-35 powerplant upgrade in mind, but which would require significant investment to develop and integrate with the F-35 fleet. Congress has said it would like to see Adaptive Engine Technology Program (AETP) engines in the F-35 as soon as 2027.

Pratt & Whitney is a division of Raytheon Technologies.

Air and Missile Defenses Must Be ‘Integrated By Design,’ Urges Former USAFE Chief

Feb. 24, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

With the Ukraine invasion anniversary as a backdrop and a NATO summit coming up this July in Lithuania, the former commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe argued for integrating air defense and missile defense systems and network and enhancing the responsiveness of U.S., NATO, and partner defenses.

Speaking at a roundtable discussion of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a non-profit organization in Alexandria, Va., retired Air Force Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian said Russia’s war in Ukraine offers important lessons for thinking ahead about integrated missile and air defenses.

“This idea of integrating [these] by design was fundamental to being able to posture ourselves appropriately when the Russians finally invaded,” Harrigian said, recalling the leadup to the start of the war a year ago. “That same type of mentality is what we need to keep driving on as we go from, not just air defense from the air domain perspective … [and] the basics of missile defense to integrated air and missile defense.”

Harrigian said integrating those systems requires modernizing legacy infrastructure and ensuring critical components are upgraded and ready to operate when needed. Integration also depends on different entities agreeing to share information and access.

“I think we need to start with the fundamentals, get those right, and then … you bring in the right commercial entities that are able to work through the NATO process,” he said. “Because as you do this, one of the key challenges is going to be the policy piece of what the nations are willing to share.”

Events like the invasion can act as a “forcing function to drive some of this change,” he said, accelerating with urgent needs.

“It’s challenging,” Harrigian said. “You get a little bit into the bureaucracy of NATO. But my belief is the time to do that is now, and we can’t keep admiring this problem.”

Once partner nations are in general agreement on the need, it’s time to conceptualize the “operational design,” he said. That’s where the players commit to their responsibilities and an organization in which leaders and contributors are clearly defined.

“Some of the northern tier nations have spent a lot of time thinking about this,” Harrigian added. Implementation is largely a policy discussion, which must be implemented through software to enable rapid data sharing with appropriate, pre-defined rules.

Harrigian was joined by retired Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, former Deputy Director for Plans, Policy, and Strategy at U.S. European Command, who agreed that leaders must draw the right lessons from the Ukraine conflict, including takeaways from how Russia has prosecuted its attack.

“When Russia got in trouble in their ground offensive—when Russia’s ability to conduct large-scale ruble warfare faltered, when their cyberattacks weren’t properly synchronized to have the effect they needed—they turned to the old trusty cruise and ballistic missile [attacks],” Montgomery said. “They’ve stayed on that tune for nine months now. We’ve absolutely got to understand … their heavy reliance on cruise, ballistic, hypersonic missiles and drones is something we have to prepare for—we being NATO and the United States.”

Riki Ellison, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance’s founder and chairman and the moderator of the discussion picked up on that point: “Because Russia didn’t get air superiority over Ukraine, it drove their missile attacks, it drove their motivation,” he said. “And if you assume that Russia will never get air superiority over NATO, their effective way to come at NATO is going to be missile movements.”

Montgomery agreed, saying that NATO members must prioritize their integration strategy, because policy hang-ups among and allies can slow things down. To succeed, members must commit to “a belief of ‘integrated and interoperable now.’”

Among allies, a diversity of equipment makes that harder, imposing interoperability requirements that add complexity to the challenge. Germany’s supply of Gepard guns to Ukraine, Montgomery said, has proven effective against Russian drones. But when more ammunition was needed last in April, the Swiss supplier was blocked by Switzerland from delivering it. The lesson, Montgomery said: “Make sure your munitions … are being built in NATO countries that are going to contribute them.”

That same theory applies to the weapon systems themselves once allies define a policy and architecture to follow, Montgomery said: “Make sure that when you buy a weapon system it meets that architecture that supports the policy.”

Northrop Grumman Touts New Multimode Sensor As Quicker, Cheaper Upgrade

Feb. 23, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Northrop is moving into test and integration with a new software-controlled, multimode, “ultra-wideband” sensor that it said can simultaneously conduct radar operations, communications, and electronic warfare.

The new technology leverages the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s efforts to accelerate sensor upgrades, and could be intended for use on Air Force Collaborative Combat Aircraft or the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems.

Called EMRIS, for Electronically-scanned Multifunction Reconfigurable Integrated Sensor, the new device was designed to be “easily scaled and reconfigurable” across a variety of platforms, said Krys Moen, Northrop vice president for advanced mission capabilities. It employs an open architecture, she said, so “we can rapidly add new or improved capabilities to increase performance while avoiding redesign.”

EMRIS builds on DARPA’s Arrays at Commercial Timescales (ACT) program, which set out to break existing patterns in which sensor upgrades to 10 years to develop and remained in use for 20-30 lifespans, requiring costly service life extension programs. DARPA wanted to bring sensor array upgrades more in line with commercial upgrade cycles and narrow the widening performance gap “between the radio frequency (RF) capabilities of military systems and the continuously improving digital electronics surrounding those systems.”

Northrop did not identify any specific platforms for EMRIS, but the technology is compact enough to fit in a small drone. Rather than targeting “any particular program capture,” Moen wrote in an email response to questions, the EMRIS investment is intended “to enable earlier insertion into a variety of future programs.”

The architectures “are easily scaled and reconfigurable for a wide applicability across platforms and domains,” she said, and the sensor can be “either mounted in the nose of an aircraft or integrated within the skin of a platform.”

EMRIS could be retrofitted to existing platforms or designed into future ones, the company said.

An image of the hardware under test in an anechoic chamber indicates a flat, trapezoidal aperture, suggesting the sensor could be flush-mounted on a flat surface or inside an aircraft’s nosecone.

The new technology consolidates “multiple functions into a single sensor, decreasing both the number of apertures needed and the size, weight and power requirements for the advanced capabilities,” Moen said. Those advantages also would lend themselves to reduced cost and complexity in an aircraft and improved stealth.

EMRIS was designed using common building blocks, Northrop said, which was among DARPA’s objectives in its ACT program.

ACT sought to create “a digitally-influenced common module comprising 80-90 percent of an array’s core functionality” that could be used in a “wide range of applications,” DARPA said at the time. Building blocks included “reconfigurable and tunable RF apertures for spanning S-band to X-band frequencies.”

Moen said EMRIS is flexible technology that will have numerous applications.

“We can scale the frequency range based on what a specific customer requires,” she said. “The multiple degrees of freedom allow EMRIS to respond to a wide range of threat systems through software updates.”

As threats evolve, she said, “so too does the software-enabled capabilities in the system.”

Air Force CIO Knausenberger Will Depart in June

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The Department of Air Force’s chief information officer Lauren Knausenberger will depart the Air Force in June, the Air Force said Feb. 23. Knausenberger joined the Air Force as Chief Transformation Officer in 2017, and had been CIO since August 2020.

The Air Force aims to identify a successor before Knausenberger leaves, said Air Force spokeswoman Ann Stefanek.

Knausenberger’s departure signals a clean sweep of departing military department CIOs: In January, Army CIO Raj Iyer said he was departing after more than two years, and the Department of the Navy’s CIO Aaron Weis is leaving his post after more than three years next month.

As CIO, Knausenberger oversaw an information technology portfolio valued at around $17 billion.

Since arriving in the department from industry, Knausenberger has been an agent of change and modernization, pushing to update the Department of the Air Force’s IT infrastructure by accelerating a push into the cloud, upgrading cybersecurity, and expanding the use of artificial intelligence. Those efforts mirrored trends throughout the Department of Defense and align with Operational Imperatives like the Advanced Battle Management System, part of a military-wide drive to shortening the “sensor to shooter” loop and gain decision advantage over adversaries through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

The rising use of cyber as a disruptive force to counter U.S. advantages in communications and intelligence raise the stakes for the kind of work Knausenberger pursued for the Air Force.

“I think that most nations want to avoid the attrition that comes from the kinetic in favor of a more quiet cyber war,” Knausenberger said during an event hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in November 2022.

Knausenberger did not say what she plans on doing next. Her Air Force roles were her first in government. Before that, she founded Accellint Inc., a consulting firm, and was a Venture Partner with NextGen Angels, investing in commercial technologies that could be applied to government applications. She also held jobs at American Management Systems and CACI, where she oversaw much of the company’s Intelligence Community portfolio.

Heritage: Here’s How to Answer South Korean Worries Over Nuclear Threats

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

With North Korea increasingly testing long-range missiles and South Korea agitating for its own nuclear deterrent, a new Heritage Foundation report recommends the U.S. work with Seoul to ease its concerns and recommit to the peninsula’s defense.

Bruce Klingner, a Heritage senior research fellow, said in his Feb. 23 report that the South Korean government needs a reassurance. “Seoul is pushing for more tangible signs of U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, greater involvement in U.S. planning for potential use of nuclear weapons in Korean contingencies, and a role in nuclear decision-making during a crisis,” Klingner wrote. “Washington seems willing to be more forthcoming in revising the highly sensitive nuclear relationship but retains clear red lines.”

Klingner said Washington and Seoul should establish a “bilateral nuclear planning group,” which might later be expanded to include Australia and Japan in order to more comprehensively address threats in the Indo-Pacific region. He also advocated for joint training parameters and discussions on potential future strategic weapons deployment, including dual-use aircraft and aircraft carrier battle groups.

“It seems that South Korea would perceive anything less than creating a new body … as insufficient,” Klingner wrote. “Increasing South Korean involvement would be consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which pledged ‘stronger extended deterrence consultation emphasizing a cooperative approach between the United States and Allies in decision making related to deterrence policy, strategic messaging, and activities that reinforce collective regional security.’”

If South Korea were to pursue its own nuclear program, it could be highly disruptive, Klingner said. South Korea would have to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that could upset a host of other dependencies that could destabilize the region, including denuclearization policies that underlie 11 U.N. resolutions that enable sanctions against North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear arms.

“Either action would require the [Nuclear Suppliers Group] to curtail supply of fissile material to South Korea’s civilian nuclear energy program, which accounts for 30 percent of the country’s electricity,” he wrote. “The NSG could also request the return of all previously provided fissile material.”

In addition, the report notes that such a program would violate the Atomic Energy Act and the “nuclear cooperation agreement” between the U.S. and South Korea. And it wouldn’t stop there.

“South Korea developing nuclear weapons could lead to calls in Washington for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, either due to anxiety of being drawn into South Korean escalatory actions of perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone since it no longer trusted the American commitment,” Klingner noted.

The subsequent reaction of China, he adds, would be more devastating than the sanctions China imposed after the deployment of South Korea’s THAAD system in 2016.

Klingner’s report said “deft management” is crucial for the U.S. and South Korea, with the U.S. fostering trust to alleviate South Korea’s concerns and for Seoul to “manage public expectations” at the same time.

“If North Korea continues its provocative actions, [South Korean] President [Suk Yeol] Yoon will face greater pressure to build an independent nuclear deterrent,” he writes. “Dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to strengthen extended deterrence or any perceived wavering in America’s commitment to defend South Korea would intensify South Korean advocates’ calls for indigenous nuclear options.”

USAF Launches New Study of Cancer Risk in ICBM Crews

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Air Force Global Strike Command is launching a new study of cancer risks among Airmen and Guardians who worked near intercontinental ballistic missiles and is developing new resources for current and former service members and their families.

“Air Force Global Strike Command and our Air Force takes the responsibility to protect Airman and Guardians incredibly seriously, and their safety and health continues to be my priority,” said AFGSC Commander Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere in a statement.

The “Missile Community Cancer Study” will examine all intercontinental ballistic missile wings and all personnel who support the Air Force’s ICBM mission, according to AFGSC.

Bussiere commissioned study, to be led by the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, asking for an examination of cases of non-Hodgkin lymphoma and other cancers. It is unclear how long the study will take, but the Air Force said it will run in multiple parts and phases, with the results from the initial phase determining subsequent work.

In January, a presentation detailing cancers among missileers who served at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., was posted on Facebook, triggering concern across the missile community and others who have served at Malmstrom, Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and Minot Air Force Base, N.D. The presentation indicated that at least nine service members from Malmstrom had been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

Lt. Col. Daniel Sebeck, himself a former missileer and now a Space Force Guardian, created the presentation; it is unclear who posted it on the unofficial Air Force amn/nco/snco Facebook page Jan. 21.

“There are indications of a possible association between cancer and missile combat crew service at Malmstrom AFB,” Sebeck said. Missileers have long worried about the health risks posed by their service, which places them in aging, underground bunkers among a variety of equipment. The Air Force has studied the matter previously, in 2001 and again in 2005. Neither study concluded the community faced serious health risks.

“However,” wrote Seback in his presentation, “21 years later, the study’s conclusion is challenged by the current NHL incidence rate and deserves further attention.”

Sebeck cited “known hazards,” such as chemicals, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, lead, and other materials in ICBM silos and bases which might be potential causes of health issues.

When his comments and findings went public, Bussiere organized a team to try to address the concerns, and held two townhalls to ease concerns in late January. He told Airmen then that he was working with Air Force senior leaders and medical professionals to ensure their worries got the attention they deserved.

“I want a deep understanding of any potential risk there is or could be to our Airmen and Guardians and to the force,” Bussiere said at the time. “This is not about one base, one AFSC, or one rank. It’s about all Airmen of all AFSCs that support our mission and about all of our locations and operating environments.”

AFGSC later released the questions and answers Bussiere, AFGSC Chief Master Sgt. Melvina A. Smith, and AFGSC Surgeon General Col. Lee D. Williams provided during the town halls and encouraged past and present Airmen, Guardians, and family members to come forward with concerns.

The command is now formalizing its response to the issue with a new website that offers detailed questions and answers. Officials promised the site will be continuously updated. The command said it wants missileers to come forward with any concerns and/or to talk with their doctors. The website provides information about non-Hodgkin lymphoma, the two previous Air Force reports on the issue, and a statement from Bussiere assuring Airmen of his commitment to finding any links between work around missile silos and cancer.

Meanwhile, the formal health study will begin to “conduct a formal assessment that addresses specific cancer concerns raised by missile community members across related career fields and also examines the possibility of clusters of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma at intercontinental ballistic missile bases,” according to AFGSC.

“The study will have two study teams and be divided into multiple pieces allowing for a better focus on specific needs, prioritization of the study focuses, and enables the best use of resources and time,” AFGSC added.

The study will draw on active-duty medical data, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ cancer and mortality data, and public cancer registers, according to Williams.

“It is my personal pledge to all Strikers, Airmen, Guardians and family members–past and present–to remain transparent throughout this process and we will continue to maintain an open dialogue,” Bussiere said. “This is my priority.”

Wargame Report: China’s Nuclear Arsenal More Survivable in Taiwan Conflict

Feb. 22, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

China’s diverse nuclear arsenal makes it more survivable and would provide China with more coercive options in a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. The findings were the result of two summer 2022 tabletop wargame exercises conducted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that each pitted China (Red) against the U.S. (Blue).

“A larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal not only increased the survivability of China’s second-strike capability but also gave the Red teams the ability to threaten or employ nuclear weapons in a limited fashion,” according to “Avoiding the Brink,” a CNAS report released in February. “In short, the Red teams felt that they had a secure second-strike capability and were better positioned to brandish nuclear weapons coercively and employ them if necessary.”

The report also indicated that China has no need to match the U.S. quantitatively when it comes to nuclear capability to be a bigger nuclear threat.

The findings show what China could do in some scenarios and the teams estimated some specific actions on the part of combatants.

“By the Red players’ estimation, the notional 700-warhead nuclear arsenal of the first [exercise] was sufficient to provide a secure second-strike capability and options for limited theater nuclear strikes, allowing them to brandish their nuclear weapons coercively and employ them, if necessary,” the report stated, noting that the same was true in the second exercise with an arsenal of 1,000 warheads. “The size of both arsenals and the diversity of delivery systems and warhead sizes (5 to 300kt) expanded the types of attacks Red could threaten and the set of targets that Red could credibly hold at risk.”

The wargame also revealed that neither team felt early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict was necessary, although both Red teams threatened their use early in each conflict hoping to stop U.S. involvement. Arriving at a conclusion similar to a CNAS wargame scenario in the spring of 2022, the report noted that a fait accompli for China is unlikely. A U.S. defeat of an initial invasion, according to the report, is also unlikely.

Though neither team thought the other would actually use nuclear weapons, a Red team employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam after attacks on the Chinese mainland. The report emphasizes that the battle to disable conventional capabilities could trigger such escalation.

“From China’s perspective, Guam is such a critical American power projection node that it needs to be disabled early in the conflict to give the Chinese invasion a chance of succeeding,” the report states. “The problem is that attacking Guam or the Chinese mainland crosses Blue or Red lines and thus comes with significant risk of setting off a tit-for-tat escalation spiral.”

Preconceived notions on the part of participants were noted as well. For example, the report stated that Blue players were “stuck in a Cold War mindset” assuming limited nuclear use could be countered by strategic superiority. Red players, on the other hand, hesitated to stray from China’s current known nuclear posture.

“Blue players had trouble believing that Red would cross the nuclear threshold, given its current and past doctrine and posture, and underappreciated the fact that China did not need nuclear parity to consider limited nuclear use,” the report noted. “The Red teams were willing to consider limited nuclear use because they did not believe that Blue would respond with a nuclear weapon in kind and thus they could keep the conflict from unduly escalating.”

Still, the results of both wargames indicated that pressure to use nuclear weapons was low, and China’s current posture is to use nuclear weapons only as a retaliatory measure.

Recommendations from the exercises include continuing to explore ways China might employ nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict and ensuring national security personnel understand China’s increasing nuclear capabilities. As a short war appears increasingly unlikely, the report also emphasizes further examining protracted war scenarios. In addition, the report suggests building up research on China’s nuclear capabilities in a similar manner to the research conducted for decades on Russia’s nuclear program.

Air Force Has to ‘Get Our House in Order’ on Pilot Retention Red Tape, Slife Says

Feb. 22, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force wants its pilots comfortable shifting between Active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve to accommodate life events. But to do this, the USAF must “get our house in order,” deputy chief of staff Lt. Gen. James C. Slife said during a webinar hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on Feb. 21. He also said the service is building metrics to better determine how budgetary issues can affect readiness—particularly flying hours.

Slife said USAF must do all it can to retain pilots in the face of a years-long pilot shortage and is willing to let pilots move between components, but the red tape of such moves is formidable.

“We want to make it as easy as possible for pilots to be able to spend time in the Active Duty, spend time in the Guard, spend time in the Reserve, and move back and forth, based on where they are in life,” Slife said, noting increased mobility between components is key to the Air Force’s retention strategy. “We all have life events and it might be easier for somebody to manage their life events not by leaving the Air Force but by just associating with a different component.”

But he added that it will take a determined effort to navigate the bureaucracy.

“We’re looking at where are all the policy shortfalls are,” he said. “Maybe it’s harder than it needs to be.”

While the issue is more difficult for the Guard, as they utilize state assets, Slife said for the Air Force Reserve, it’s a matter of working through policy issues.

If necessary, the service will go to Capitol Hill and seek legislative changes to make mobility easier, “but we’ve got to get our own bureaucratic house in order, smooth that out,” he said. Still, he noted some pilots have successfully navigated those bureaucratic hurdles.

Slife also said it’s crucial for the Air Force to persuade pilots to stay when their commitments expire, and those who elect to leave—even when offered significant bonuses—often cite quality of life and flexibility to accommodate family illnesses, the birth of a child, or other life events as a big part of their calculus. The Air Force has experienced a shortage of between 1,800 and 2,100 pilots annually over the past seven years.

Slife said there is no magic bullet to convince pilots to stay with the service, and there is no way to grow a “ten-year fighter pilot” in less than 10 years.

The problem is not simply an inadequate number of pilots or potential pilots but “how we manage the inventory across year groups” so the Air Force can have pilots “be squadron commanders one day and operations officers one day, and those types of things,” he said.

He also said the junior ranks must maintain sufficient numbers as well.

Absorption—the number of pilots the Air Force can comfortably merge into units—is the challenge, Slife said.

“If I produce 100 brand new wingmen in any given platform, it doesn’t necessarily help a squadron to dump 100 inexperienced wingmen on that squadron commander,” he said. “We have to be able to experience them.”

The Air Force is looking to put some of those pilots into “our operational test and training infrastructure,” Slife added. “That can help with the absorption challenge we have.”

The service is also looking at other ways to maximize its throughput of pilots, but “some of it [is] we’re just limited by flat capacity,” Slife said.

“There’s only so many takeoffs and landings that you can do at a pilot training base in a day,” Slife said, just one of many variables the Air Force is working on.

Insufficient flying hours is also a factor in some pilots separating, and Slife said that funding for flying hours is an increasingly complex calculation. Some of the capabilities of fifth-generation aircraft, for
example, can’t be exposed in open-air exercises, lest adversaries develop insights into capabilities and tactics.

Flying hours are also affected by legacy aircraft spending more time in the depot, or an insufficient number of spare parts, he said. The increasing fidelity of simulators has also brought into question how the USAF should measure true, open-air flying hours.

“This is one of the key metrics that [Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr.] is paying attention to … and something that I’m spending a lot of time on,” Slife said.

The upshot is that the variables that affect flying hours—depots to parts to exercises—are “well known.” Still, the USAF lacks a clear understanding of the effect of changes on “the ultimate output of aircrew flying hours per month.”

Slife said there’s more good than bad, but he couldn’t say how flying hours will be affected by reducing funding for some of those contributing factors.

The Air Force has “undertaken a fairly involved data analytic effort to map all of those inputs to the outputs that we want to inform the budgeting decisions that our Secretary needs to make every year,” Slife said.

“What’s going to be the impact of cutting funding by this amount? I can tell him exactly what it is. And I can also tell him where to cut it in order to do the least damage to our readiness,” Slife said.

While the Air Force has “a number of models built” to answer those questions, “every platform is different,” according to Slife, and the service is working on a model that will provide a complete picture of the service.

According to figures provided last year to Air & Space Forces Magazine, pilot flying hours across all types of aircraft in the Active-duty force averaged just 10.1 hours per month in fiscal 2021, down from 10.9 hours in 2020.