New Mitchell Institute Paper Argues Space Force Must Take Lead Role in JADC2

New Mitchell Institute Paper Argues Space Force Must Take Lead Role in JADC2

The Space Force must be given leadership over disparate elements of the U.S. military’s joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) effort, according to a new policy paper from AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

JADC2 is an effort by the Department of Defense to improve command and control by collecting more data and sharing that information across the services down to the tactical level. This joint effort, however, is being developed separately by the individual services, each coming up with its own concept of how JADC2 could work. What JADC2 will become in practice is still somewhat amorphous.

In the paper, the Mitchell Institute’s Senior Fellow for Spacepower Studies Tim Ryan suggests these efforts be consolidated under the Chief of Space Operations, with the power to define key authorities and standards of JADC2 efforts. In Ryan’s view, the CSO should be given “the primary responsibility of overseeing the integration of the entire JADC2 system.” Without better coordination among the services’ efforts, JADC2 programs risk being neither joint nor all-domain.

Because the Space Force’s satellites will be part of the “transport layer” of JADC2 that the U.S. military says will underpin its future operations, the service needs more precise strategic guidance about its mission, more responsibility, better training, and increased funding, according to Ryan. The goal would be to empower the Space Force to help make JADC2 a reality and to fulfill its vital role as a facilitator of U.S. operations by giving it the means to protect its assets.

“This sounds very expensive,” Ryan said during a roundtable with reporters to preview the paper. “It sounds very complex. I understand that. And I agree that it is.”

America’s adversaries, primarily China, have their own military space components. The People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force wants to be able to disrupt an enemy’s command and control networks in space.

“It is much, much cheaper to do it right the first time because, quite frankly, I don’t think we’re going to get a second chance on this,” said Ryan. “The second chance is we lose.”

U.S. military leaders, inside and outside of the Space Force, have begun voicing concern that America’s space assets, which include capabilities as fundamental as GPS, could be disrupted by an attack. The Biden administration is pursuing improved global norms in space, such as a ban on testing most anti-satellite weapons and stricter rules requiring operators to deorbit their defunct satellites. States such as China, however, often ignore international agreements, even if they are enacted, especially the current non-binding efforts the U.S. is pursuing.

Ryan’s paper argues that the DOD must articulate the need for, and Congress must approve, funding for the defense of space assets critical to JADC2. American military and civilian officials publicly acknowledge that space will become contested in future conflicts. Senior Space Force leaders have begun to float concept of “space superiority.”

“What that really means is the ability to take a punch and to continue to fight,” said Lt. Gen. Nina M. Armagno, the director of staff of the Space Force, at AFA’s Air, Space, & Cyber Conference in September.

Missing from that statement is an explicit ability for America to fight back directly when it is attacked in space, as it does in other domains.

Ryan, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel who served in a variety of space roles and also worked as a civilian on the Space Force staff at the Pentagon, recommends in his paper that the Space Force receive authorization and funding to “develop space-based weapons systems that are specifically designed to defend the JADC2 space transport layer against kinetic and non-kinetic acts of aggression.”

While the Biden administration’s efforts to improve the safety of space operations through international norms are laudable, the U.S. still needs a clear space deterrent as America’s adversaries may be willing to ignore international norms, according to Mitchell Institute experts.

“Where’s the hard power in the current construct? It really doesn’t exist,” said Douglas A. Birkey, the executive director of the think tank. “Otherwise, we’re actually risking an increased likelihood of conflict in space because there are no real consequences they’re going to care about.”

Established in 2019, the Space Force is mainly made up of systems and personnel from other services. The President’s budget request for fiscal 2023, which Congress has not yet passed, allocates $24.5 billion for the Space Force, a $7 billion increase over 2022. These budget increases, however, do not necessarily reflect new capabilities, as other services have shifted the burden and the cost of space assets to the Space Force.

According to Ryan, a larger budget is required. However, he acknowledged that putting that into legislation would be challenging.

“Any current increase in the current Space Force budget [has] been primarily done through stand-up actions and being able to integrate the other services’ capabilities into the Space Force,” Ryan said. “At the end of the day, quite frankly, the money has not been equal to the demands that are being placed on the Space Force and the increased demands that it will have with JADC2.”

In the view of Birkey, space cannot be seen as devoid of consequences on Earth if U.S. space assets are attacked and systems go down.

“We have got to get real because everything else is going to fall offline fast and lives will be on the line,” he said.

Air Force Acquisition Report Shows Savings on Space Launch, Cost Increase for F-15 EPAWSS

Air Force Acquisition Report Shows Savings on Space Launch, Cost Increase for F-15 EPAWSS

The Department of the Air Force’s biggest acquisition accounts generally kept costs down in fiscal 2021 compared to the year before, even as the programs’ projected timelines continued to lengthen, a new DAF report found.

The department’s annual acquisition report, released Oct. 14, showed how current and future estimated costs and schedules for major programs have changed from both original projections and more recent estimates. In particular, the report showed significant cost savings in the National Security Space Launch and GPS III Follow-on programs while not cutting quantities. NSSL cut its long-term estimate for the program by $1.6 billion, 29 percent below its original baseline; while GPS IIIF saw a decrease of $612 million, roughly 9 percent less than its estimate in last year’s acquisition report.

“These two programs were more than enough to offset other program cost increases,” the report states, noting that the DAF’s overall portfolio of DOD Acquisition Category I, or ACAT I, programs—each of which involve at least $480 million in research, development, testing, and evaluation or $2.79 billion in procurement—decreased costs about $920 million, or 0.3 percent.

Of 35 ACAT I programs, 11 increased their estimates over their original baselines.

Leading the way, the F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, or EPAWSS, remained significantly over cost and behind its original schedule, though the schedule baseline was recently reset.

Compared to its original baselines, EPAWSS—an electronic warfare system designed to significantly upgrade the fourth-generation fighter’s capabilities—is 24 percent over budget by unit cost. That marks a nearly six percent increase over the prior cost estimate.

For schedule, last year’s acquisition report recorded EPAWSS as being 33 months behind. That baseline was reset in fiscal 2021.

EPAWSS’s acquisition troubles have been documented before—the program was originally to cover all F-15Cs and F-15Es, but the Air Force cut the F-15C from the planned upgrade in 2017. The program was also on hold for several years as the Air Force wrestled with how long to keep the F-15.

That has led to major program cost and schedule fluctuations—as have shifting requirements for the program, changing its scope.

Eventually, the Air Force split some decision points for the program, hoping for fewer reviews looking at more manageable chunks. The program reached Low-Rate Initial-Production phase in December 2020, and the first units were installed on operational fighters in September 2022. The acquisition report estimates that the program will complete its Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase in fiscal 2024.

The service won’t say much about the capabilities of EPAWSS, but the system will likely give F-15 pilots the means to detect, locate, and jam enemy radar while also deceiving the adversary about the fighter’s exact position and heading. 

The only other ACAT I program now projected to cost more than 10 percent over its original baseline is the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Fuze Modernization program, which actually cut its cost estimate from 2020 to 2021, from 16 percent growth to 15 percent.

The only program that saw its cost increase by more than 10 percent from last year was the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) program, which actually went from being under cost a year ago to six percent over cost as of September 2021. The program also rebaselined its schedule in 2021.

A number of other programs also reset their current schedule baselines, as their timelines continue to slip from original estimates.

“The aggregate schedule grew by 2.2 percent in FY21, which is a bit better than the 3 percent average rate of growth over the last five years,” the report states. “Scheduled growth in FY21 was driven primarily by nine programs experiencing schedule growth. … No programs shortened their overall schedule length.”

One of the primary drivers of that schedule growth was the VC-25B, the planned replacement for the Air Force One aircraft. The program has been plagued by delays for some time now, with the most recent estimates being that aircraft will not be delivered until September 2026 at least, a delay of two years.

All in all, however, DAF Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Andrew Hunter framed the 2021 report as showing a “tremendous” year for the Air Force acquisition enterprise.

“This report provides data showing we are executing and meeting requirements, while increasing our focus on meeting the pacing challenges and persistent and acute threats,” Hunter said in a statement.

Service Member Suicides Drop in 2021; Air Force Posts Significant Decline

Service Member Suicides Drop in 2021; Air Force Posts Significant Decline

The total number and rate of suicides among service members, particularly among Active-duty troops, declined from 2020 to 2021, the Pentagon announced in its annual suicide report released Oct. 20—a small sign of progress amid a general upward trend over the past decade.

In particular, the Air Force—including the Space Force—recorded a sizable drop, going from 82 suicides among Active-duty Airmen and Guardians in 2020 to 51 this past year; and posting the lowest rate among the services.

Still, officials pledged to move forward with a “comprehensive and integrated” suicide prevention strategy, as more than 500 troops died by suicide for the fifth consecutive year.

“While we are cautiously encouraged by the drop in these numbers, one year is not enough time to assess real change,” Beth Foster, the executive director of the Pentagon’s office for force resiliency, told reporters in a briefing accompanying the report’s release. “The year-to-year trend provides helpful preliminary insight, but there is still a gradual increasing trend for suicide in the military over a 10-year period. And we need to see a sustained long-term reduction in suicide rates to know if we are making progress.”

All told, 519 service members died by suicide in 2021 compared to 582 reported a year ago. Similarly, the rate of suicides per 100,000 individuals declined across all three components—Active, Guard, and Reserve. Most strikingly, the Active-duty component rate fell from 28.7 in 2020 to 24.3 in 2021.

However, those declines didn’t change the overall trend of increasing rates dating back to 2011, which the report found to be statistically significant.

Both the general trend upward over time and the decline in the past year were largely driven by the rate of suicides among Active-duty troops, officials said—the Guard and Reserve components have fluctuated over time but shown no statistically significant trend.

Every service showed an increase in the suicide rate among Active-duty troops from 2011 to 2021, but only the Air Force had a statistically significant drop from 2020 to 2021, going from 24.6 suicides per 100,000 individuals to 15.3. 

The Navy and Marine Corps had declines as well, though they were not deemed statistically significant, meaning “we have a low confidence that it is a true change and could be due to chance or natural variation in the data year-to-year,” Dr. Liz Clark, director of the Defense Suicide Prevention Office, told reporters.

Across all branches, the report continued to find a few common trends. Young, enlisted men remain most at risk, and firearms, usually personally owned, are still the most common method.

The report also studied suicides among military families, albeit from 2020 due to lags in data from the CDC’s National Death Index.

In 2020, 202 military dependents died by suicide, including 133 spouses and 69 other dependents. That’s the same figure as in 2019, and more than 2018 and 2017, the first years when military families were included in the report.

Initiatives

In a statement accompanying the release of the report, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III pledged that “we will not stop working to address the root causes of this issue. We also continue efforts to improve the quality of life for service members and their families, address stigma as a barrier to seeking help, and expand our safety efforts for our service members and their families.”

In particular, officials said their efforts over the past year have focused on creating supportive environments.

“Historically, we’ve really taken a one-to-one approach to suicide prevention,” Foster said. “So we focus on an individual’s particular risk factors and reducing those factors, and that’s still a critical part of suicide prevention, to be clear, but what we’re also focused on and what we’re moving towards in this space is focusing on common community risks and protective factors.” 

As part of that focus, DOD is looking to hire 2,000 “prevention personnel” to station around the globe, Foster noted. The hope is to have the first 400 hired within the next few months.

Those personnel will be tasked with “building healthy climates that lead to a reduction in these behaviors,” Foster said, adding that personnel will also try to get “to the left of this—so how do we reach those service members before they get to that point of crisis?”

Some of those efforts can be broad. “How do we make life worth living for the service members?” Clark said. As an example, Foster pointed to recent policies implemented by Austin across the DOD aimed at ensuring economic security for troops.

“We really want to emphasize that quality of life is a critical part of suicide prevention and it’s really important that we consider this in our approach. … These are really critical elements to building an environment where service members and families can thrive,” Foster said.

Leaders are also working on a communications push to both destigmatize getting help for mental health and to highlight the resources available. Clark noted that there are many “misperceptions and misconceptions” about how seeking mental health treatment will affect service members’ career opportunities.

That push will include a review of DOD policies, both to get rid of what officials called “stigmatizing” language and to ensure that getting help for mental health won’t have adverse effects on someone’s career.

“We are in the process of reviewing all DOD policies, regulations, and procedures, but language that would be stigmatized and could be—such  as ‘commit suicide’ would be one, ‘mental retardation’—and taking some stigmatizing language out of the policy and really being able to look at, if you were to have a mental health appointment, if you were to have suicide ideation or suicide-related behavior, what is then that limitation of any type of waiver or a denial of a position or assignment; and having an opportunity to examine each one of those,” Foster said.

Service members and veterans who are in crisis or having thoughts of suicide, and those who know a service member or veteran in crisis, can call the Veterans/Military Crisis Line for confidential support available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. Call 988 and press 1; text 988; or chat online at VeteransCrisisLine.net/Chat

First B-21 Bomber to Roll Out of Northrop Grumman’s Palmdale, Calif., Plant on Dec. 2

First B-21 Bomber to Roll Out of Northrop Grumman’s Palmdale, Calif., Plant on Dec. 2

The Air Force and Northrop Grumman will roll out the B-21 Raider from Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif., on Dec. 2, the company announced via Twitter. The rollout is the first for a new Air Force bomber since 1988, when the B-2 Spirit emerged from the same facility.

The invitation-only event will include Air Force and political dignitaries and a limited number of media representatives, according to Pentagon and industry sources. Photography will be permitted, but the Air Force will restrict the size of lenses photographers can use, and viewing of the aircraft will be limited to one section of the facility. No new photographs or artwork are planned to be released in conjunction with B-21 rollout.

Air Force acquisition executive Andrew Hunter teased the announcement at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September, saying the event would happen the “first week of December,” meeting previous service statements that the event would happen by the end of calendar 2022.

The first B-21 needs to emerge from the high-security production facility to begin outside engine runs and taxi tests in preparation for its first flight. The outside activity will mean the aircraft will be visible from outside the plant in the coming months.

First flight, now expected in mid-2023, will happen roughly a year after the Air Force first predicted the new bomber would fly. The service has not said what caused the delay but specifically ruled out supply chain issues stemming from the COVID pandemic.

The Air Force has said six B-21s are in various stages of construction.

When the Air Force awarded the contract for the program—then known as the Long-Range Bomber—in 2015, the service said it would have at least one article ready for operational use in “the mid-2020s.” It has not wavered from that prediction since. Air Force Global Strike Command has voiced a requirement for as many as 150 B-21s, but officially, the Air Force’s requirement is for “at least 100” of the aircraft.

F-35A Crashes at Hill AFB; Pilot Safely Ejects

F-35A Crashes at Hill AFB; Pilot Safely Ejects

An F-35A fighter assigned to the 388th Fighter Wing crashed at the north end of the runway at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, on Oct. 19. The incident occurred at about 6:15 p.m. local time, according to the wing.

The pilot ejected and was taken to a local medical center for observation, Hill Air Force Base said.

“Flying military aircraft is a risky business that we all accept when we go do it,” Col. Craig Andrle, commander of the 388th Fighter Wing, said in a news conference Oct. 19. “These things happen. Tonight, first and foremost, we’re thankful he’s OK. He got out of the aircraft.”

Hill Air Force Base and the 388th Fighter Wing asked followers on Twitter and Facebook who saw the crash or may have found related debris to reach out by email or phone. They said that the cause of the crash was unknown and would be investigated. Andrle said the pilot was returning to Hill from a routine training mission.

Hill is home to the 388th and 419th Fighter Wings, both of which fly the F-35A.

Security camera video obtained by a local news outlet showed the aircraft crashing into a mountainous area and erupting into flames. Multiple videos and photos posted to social media showed the ensuing fire. State fire officials said the crash caused an eight- to 10-acre wildfire on DOD land.

“All of us as pilots take every opportunity we have to mitigate the damage to anything on the ground, so I do know that the pilot made his best effort to avoid any buildings or anything on the ground prior to ejection,” Andrle said.

This was the seventh crash of the Lockheed Martin-made F-35. It was preceded by crashes of two USAF F-35As, two Marine Corps F-35Bs, one U.S. Navy F-35C, one Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A, and one Royal Air Force F-35B.

Report: Better Space Situational Awareness Needed to Mitigate Future Debris Risk

Report: Better Space Situational Awareness Needed to Mitigate Future Debris Risk

The effects of Russia’s 2021 anti-satellite weapon test on just one commercial satellite constellation illustrate the urgency of just one aspect of space safety. 

The nonprofit Aerospace Corp.’s Space Safety Institute, in its 44-page “2022 Space Safety Compendium”—the first of its kind, released Oct. 19—examines not only how the ASAT test’s resulting debris brought about problematic orbital conjunctions in the thousands but also how future constellations, planned in droves over the coming decade, are likely to affect the space environment.

A “dominating commercial space market” is expanding the scope of space missions to include the likes of commercial human spaceflight and even industrial activities such as mining. But all that new activity is also shining a light on the limitations of “current safety measures and norms,” according to the report.

Its authors make 35 recommendations on themes including space situational awareness—in part to try to model the effects of debris—as well as space operations, launch and reentry, “cyber and spectrum,” and human spaceflight safety.

“Some recommendations are broad outlooks for the future,” according to the report, while “others are concrete next steps that the space sector can take. The variety of scope and scale … reflects the diverse set of space safety challenges.”

Debris from Russia’s 2021 ASAT weapon test, in which it struck a nonworking Soviet satellite with a ground-launched missile, forced SpaceX’s Starlink to maneuver 1,700 times “in the first months” afterward, and on a single day this August, about a third of the constellation passed closely to one or more pieces of debris several thousand times in what’s been termed a “squall.”

Aerospace Corp.’s Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies has worked on software tools to analyze “potential collision and explosion scenarios,” but the report concludes that more such tools “should encompass a vast array of space operations” such as simulating the breakup of debris and predicting the subsequent risk to spacecraft.

Since SpaceX’s Starlink constellation has proven itself effective for the Ukrainian military, Russian officials have said commercial satellites could become military targets.

More recommendations in the report include: 

  • Space situational awareness: A “holistic” approach with enhanced data handling; and reducing the uncertainties in tracking so satellite operators don’t have to be notified as often about close calls.
  • Space operations: Actively removing debris from orbit while creating regulatory processes and ways for stakeholders to collaborate.
  • Launch and reentry: A “comprehensive national airspace system” and taking disposal into consideration when designing a spacecraft. 
  • Cyber and spectrum: Getting “cyber intrusion detection and prevention applications” onboard spacecraft—something the Space Force has said the service’s existing satellites are lacking.
  • Human spaceflight safety: Addressing “the in-space rescue capabilities gap” with rescue plans included in launch plans.
White House: Space Missions Are Federal, so No Need for a Space National Guard

White House: Space Missions Are Federal, so No Need for a Space National Guard

President Joe Biden’s administration is not backing off its opposition to the creation of a Space National Guard, even as a group of lawmakers continue their push for it.

In a statement of administration policy on the Senate’s version of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act released Oct. 18, the White House Office of Management and Budget once again made clear that it believes a Space Guard is unnecessary and instead touted its proposal for a hybrid “Space Component” that includes full-time and part-time Guardians.

Unlike policy statements from last year, however, the OMB went further in arguing that all space missions currently performed by the Air National Guard are federal in nature—meaning states have no need for a Space National Guard.

“DOD’s space missions currently performed by members of the National Guard are solely Federal missions and should be migrated to the Space Component over time,” the policy statement reads.

The White House’s argument, in effect, is that there are no specific missions for which states need military space forces, so those should be consolidated on the federal level.

That’s a new element of the administration’s argument against the Space Guard, an argument it first started making last year when a proposal to establish a Space National Guard was included in the House’s version of the NDAA. 

In its policy statement on that NDAA, the White House contended that establishing a Space National Guard would cost up to $500 million annually, an estimate that proponents of the new Guard argued was based on inaccurate assumptions.

This year, OMB dropped the $500 million annual cost estimate from its critique, instead simply noting the “additional overhead of a separate component.”

On the opposite side of the issue, those in favor of a Space National Guard have argued that the cost would be only several hundred thousand dollars—enough for cosmetic changes such as name tape, unit flags, and signs.

And while the White House is arguing that space missions are all federal, Space National Guard boosters have claimed that many Guard members serve in part because of the state-level missions they’re able to contribute to, such as disaster relief or humanitarian aid.

Ultimately, the proposal for a Space Guard was dropped from last year’s NDAA as top lawmakers drafted a compromise bill outside of the usual conference process. But the issue is back again in this year’s authorization act.

In June, the House Armed Services Committee approved a provision creating the Guard in its markup of the NDAA. That provision was included in the bill the entire House passed in July. 

On the Senate side, the Senate Armed Services Committee did not include the Space National Guard in its markup, a move that the White House said in its policy statement that it “appreciates.” But a group of seven Senators have introduced an amendment that would establish an SNG. That bipartisan group includes Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), who introduced the Space National Guard Establishment Act back in May, alongside 10 other co-sponsors.

The fate of the NDAA amendment remains to be seen. It is one of roughly 900 that have been proposed on the Senate floor. Lawmakers will adopt some of those amendments in a package, actually debate and vote on a few, and simply drop the rest, but those actions likely won’t happen until after the November midterm elections.

New Image Shows How B-52 Will Look After Engine, Radar Replacement

New Image Shows How B-52 Will Look After Engine, Radar Replacement

A new image from Boeing shows how the B-52H will look after a series of modifications that the Air Force has said are significant enough to warrant re-designating the aircraft as the B-52J or K. The image was rendered from a digital prototyping model and is likely to closely resemble the final version.

Prominent in the image are the larger-diameter fans of the new F130 engines to be built by Rolls-Royce North America. Also noteworthy are how the engine nacelles, each containing two engines, are set higher and farther forward than the nacelles for the Pratt & Whitney TF-33 engines with which the B-52 has been flying since 1962. The new engines are set higher in part to provide more ground clearance. The need to validate how the new engines/nacelles will behave in relation to the wing and flap system is a major part of the flight testing program set to start in the next two years.

A B-52H Stratofortress aircraft assigned to the 23rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron takes off at RAF Fairford, U.K., Sept. 21, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Eugene Oliver.

The nose of the aircraft will also be streamlined, losing the blisters that currently house the forward-looking infrared/electro-optical viewing system to facilitate the new radar, a variant of the AN/APG-79 used on the Boeing F/A-18EF SuperHornet. The FLIR/EO system was used for terrain avoidance and battle assessment, but some of those functions will migrate to the radar or already have shifted to either a Litening or Sniper targeting pod, which the B-52 can carry on a wing pylon.

In addition to the engines and radar, the B-52 is getting an updated cockpit, a “hybrid” analog-digital engine control system, communications and navigation enhancements, and the deletion of one crew member station.

Also prominent in the images are two large humps on top of the fuselage, near the wing roots. A Boeing spokesperson said the humps are “not new and not part of our program,” but they seem larger than any fairings or blisters now in that area, which house GPS and other comm/nav equipment. Pressed, the Boeing spokesperson said, “I have nothing for you on that,” a phrase that sometimes indicates a classified issue. The humps’ location and size might suggest a larger, anti-jam GPS antenna.

New engines were the major reason the B-52G became the B-52H in 1962, Col. Louise Ruscetta, senior materiel leader for the B-52, said in August.  But given that the combined engine/radar program represents “the largest modification in the history” of the B-52, a new designation is likely, Ruscetta said. There may be an interim designation because the radar will be installed before the engines and will drive a change in operating and maintenance manuals and documentation. The documents will change again once the engines have been replaced. The Air Force and Air Force Global Strike Command are looking at “how do we define” the new variant or variants, Ruscetta said.

The new radar is an active electronically scanned array type as used by fighters. It will take up far less room than the old mechanically scanned system, so the change will create growth space for electronic warfare functions, Ruscetta said. At least some of the B-52 fleet will be operational with both new radars and new engines by the end of the decade.

F-16s Intercept Russian Bombers Near Alaska, NORAD Says

F-16s Intercept Russian Bombers Near Alaska, NORAD Says

A pair of U.S. Air Force F-16s intercepted two Russian bombers flying near Alaska on Oct. 17, NORAD announced. The bombers never entered U.S. or Canadian airspace. Officials said they did not see the Russian planes as a threat or provocation.

“No indication that there was any unsafe, unprofessional behavior,” Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters. “They did not pose a threat.”

The Tu-95 Bear-H bombers were tracked entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ. An ADIZ can include international airspace to help identify approaching aircraft early. The Alaskan ADIZ covers a large area over the Pacific. 

The Alaskan NORAD Region detected, tracked, and positively identified the bombers entering and operating in the ADIZ before dispatching two F-16s to intercept them. NORAD’s press release did not specify which units the F-16s belonged to.

The 354th Fighter Wing at Eielson Air Force Base operates F-16s. RED FLAG-Alaska 23-1, the latest installment in the regular Red Flag series of exercises, is currently taking place as well, with F-16s from the 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base, Japan, flying in the area.

In its release, NORAD officials stressed that the Russian bombers flying in the ADIZ “is not seen as a threat nor is the activity considered provocative.”

“NORAD tracks and positively identifies foreign military aircraft that enter the ADIZ” and “routinely monitors foreign aircraft movements and as necessary, escorts them from the ADIZ,” the statement added.

In September, NORAD announced it had identified and tracked “two Russian maritime patrol aircraft” in the Alaskan ADIZ. Similar incidents occurred in March and January of 2021.

None of those instances, however, involved Russian bombers, and no fighters were sent to intercept those aircraft. The last time NORAD announced that it had identified any Russian bombers in the ADIZ was in September 2020, and the last time it announced that it sent fighters to intercept any aircraft was in August 2020.

This most recent incident comes amid increased tension between the U.S. and Russia. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked international outrage. America has imposed severe sanctions on Russia and sent billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine. 

Earlier this month, Russia and NATO said they would proceed with large-scale nuclear exercises in the coming weeks, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin has engaged in nuclear saber-rattling that has raised fears he might use his arsenal. The NATO exercise, called Steadfast Noon, is centered at Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium.