F-16s From Spangdahlem May Head to Kadena After Alaskan F-22s

F-16s From Spangdahlem May Head to Kadena After Alaskan F-22s

F-22s from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, will initially fill in for F-15Cs as they begin to leave Kadena Air Base, Japan, but the Air Force is eyeing a later and longer deployment of F-16s from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, to reinforce the island base, Pentagon officials said.

It would be the second time in as many years that F-16s from Spangdahlem were considered for relocation. The aircraft were to be consolidated with F-16s at Aviano Air Base, Italy, in 2021, but the Pentagon’s Global Posture Review nixed the plan, along with designs to replace them at Spangdahlem with tankers and special operations forces.

The Air Force won’t discuss deployments and won’t comment officially on its plans to backfill the F-15s at Kadena, or any other base, according to a service spokesperson.

“We don’t discuss deployments until the aircraft arrive at their deployed locations,” said the spokesperson, who could not immediately say whether the 44th and 67th fighter squadrons at Kadena, which are giving up their F-15s, will be inactivated.

However, she did say the Air Force is responsible for backfilling the F-15s, and that other services won’t be tapping their aircraft for the mission.

Which aircraft will replace the F-15s “is an Air Force decision. The DOD will use the Global Force Management process to provide backfill decisions that maintain regional deterrence and bolster our ability to uphold our treaty obligations to Japan,” the spokesperson said. “We are doing a phased retirement, to ensure we have enough resources” to meet obligations.

The Global Force Management Process is a Joint Staff function that apportions forces to regional commanders to meet their stated requirements.

Air Force officials have said the preferred approach is to replace the F-15Cs in Japan with new-build F-15EXs. However, having reduced the planned buy of F-15EXs from 144 aircraft to 80, there won’t be enough of the new aircraft to replace the Kadena jets as well as Air National Guard jets based around the U.S.   

The Air Force funded 24 F-15EXs through fiscal 2022 and has requested funds for 24 in both fiscal 2023 and ’24. Deliveries will lag funding by several years, however.

Given Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, pulling F-16s from Europe would be a curious solution to the Kadena backfill problem.

But “it’s another symptom of the Air Force not having been adequately funded to recapitalize its forces in a timely fashion,” retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said in an interview.

The Air Force will increasingly find itself “unable to contribute to its portion of what’s required by our National Security and Defense strategies.” Forward engagement is “fundamental” to those strategies, Deptula said. “If you don’t have the forces available to be forward, you can’t execute that portion of the critical elements that are fundamental to our nation’s security.”

An expeditionary deployment of E-8C Joint STARS ground moving target indicator aircraft ended at Kadena in September without an immediate replacement. However, Air Force officials and outside experts said they don’t see the two developments as an indication that the U.S. or the Air Force has a longer-term plan to shift forces away from Okinawa.

Though Kadena will doubtless be targeted by hundreds of accurate Chinese missiles in the event of a conflict with the U.S. regarding Taiwan, for reasons of forward presence, engagement with regional allies and partners, and intelligence-collection activities, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon the base, Deptula said.

In the event of a conflict, or imminent bombardment, aircraft at the base would likely be evacuated to other locations, he noted.

Adm. John C. Aquilino, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “wants all these aircraft to stay there,” Deptula said, but “they’re unmaintainable” and the Air Force is also short of fighter pilots.

“The situation is only going to get worse,” Deptula said, because the Air Force plans to divest “a thousand more aircraft by 2027.”

Some members of Congress have asked the Air Force to provide a special briefing on the Kadena situation because of concerns that USAF is reducing forward capability in the region at a critical time.

Air Force Looks to Increase ‘Lethality Per Gallon’ With Energy and Climate Goals

Air Force Looks to Increase ‘Lethality Per Gallon’ With Energy and Climate Goals

In early October, the Department of the Air Force released its climate action plan, setting out ambitious goals to slash emissions across its installations, non-tactical vehicles, and aircraft fleets in the coming years.

By December, the department may be ready to release details on how it will go about achieving those goals, acting Assistant Secretary for Energy, Installations, and Environment Edwin Oshiba said Nov. 3—and in doing so, will lay out a path for how to achieve more “lethality per gallon.”

“We are still working on our implementation plan,” Oshiba said in a webinar hosted by the Center for Climate & Security. “My personal goal is to get it out there by mid-December, which is really aggressive. But again, we’ve been doing this stuff for a while—it’s not like we’re starting from scratch here.”

The 24-page action plan identified three main priorities for the DAF:

  • Maintain air and space dominance in the face of climate risks.
  • Make climate-informed decisions.
  • Optimize energy use and pursue alternative energy sources.

To respond to those priorities, the plan identified aspirational goals, supported by more specific objectives in turn broken down into “key results” that the service wants to acheive.

That approach, Oshiba said, has helped the speed with which the implementation plan has been written.

“When we wrote our climate action plan, it was written … in a way that was sort of outcome-based, with key results that, if achieved, would allow achievement of the objectives, which would then allow achievement of the goals,” Oshiba.

As an example, Oshiba cited a “key result” to which the Air Force has attached a particularly aggressive timeline—a pilot program to ensure that by 2026, 10 percent of the aviation fuel at two Air Force operational locations is sustainable and costs the same or less than traditional fuel.

“It’s written in a way that’s specific in its timing,” Oshiba said. “And so it kind of has sort of a built-in measure, if you will.”

However, the department still needs to provide a roadmap for how to implement such a program. That’s where the implementation plan comes in.

“My goal in writing the implementation plan is to then provide the actions necessary to achieve the key results and then monitor the progress in completing those actions, and most importantly, determining ‘Hey, did we achieve the outcome we thought we would, if we would do these actions?’” Oshiba said.

That last part will be critical, Oshiba said, indicating that certain actions in the implementation and key results could be changed or modified as needed if the desired objective isn’t reached.

“I don’t want to measure completion of the actions. I want to measure the outcome. Are we achieving the outcomes we thought we would by doing those actions? And if it doesn’t, that’s OK. We’ll learn from it. We’ll adjust the implementation of climate goals,” Oshiba said.

To that end, the department has implemented a governance structure for the implementation of the climate action plan, with a goal of meeting at least four times per year, Oshiba said.

“I told the folks, ‘Hey look, the implementation plan isn’t etched in stone. We’ll learn as we go … and then we’ll make adjustments. And my idea is to at least look at doing those kinds of adjustments once a year, so that we understand what’s going on with the progress we’re making or not making, look and see what’s going on in the environment, in terms of both the fiscal environment, the security environment, the technology environment, and be adaptive as we move forward,” Oshiba said.

Many of the goals, objectives, and key results the Air Force is seeking in its action plan, however, will take years to realize. For example, the action plan calls for the department to reach net-zero emissions across its installations portfolio by fiscal 2046, more than two decades from now. By fiscal 2030, the department is aiming for all its electricity to be carbon pollution-free.

Some observers have noted that such goals could be hampered, however, by the political state of play in Congress and the White House. With the midterm elections less than a week away and a presidential race that will kick off in earnest in 2023, a shift in political power could result in different priorities, noted moderator John Conger, a senior adviser to the Council on Strategic Risks, a security policy institute.

But Oshiba, along with other energy, installation, and environment officials across the Pentagon, argued that there is bipartisan consensus on the need for things such as energy and the environment given potential impacts on fiscal resources, readiness, and lethality. 

The Air Force in particular, needs better energy efficiency, Oshiba said, noting that the department accounts for 45 percent of the Pentagon’s total energy consumption, with 80 percent of that 45 percent—more than a third overall—going toward operational fuel for aircraft.

“So if we can figure out ways in which we can be more energy efficient, we’re basically increasing lethality per gallon,” Oshiba said. “What that translates to is more time on target if you’re talking about aircraft refueling or a fighter aircraft. It means more cargo per mile if you’re talking about moving cargo across the Indo-Pacific theater. So that is one area that we definitely need to continue our work on, no matter who is in office. Again, it’s about increasing our combat capability moving forward.”

These USAF Units Are Flying in the Large, Joint US-South Korea Exercise

These USAF Units Are Flying in the Large, Joint US-South Korea Exercise

Fighters, tankers, airlifters, and ISR aircraft from every U.S. Air Force base in South Korea and Japan are flying in Exercise Vigilant Storm, the large joint aerial training event between the U.S. and South Korea happening this week—even as North Korea fires off record numbers of ballistic missiles.

All told, approximately 100 USAF aircraft are participating in Vigilant Storm, with the goal of “enhancing interoperability of our forces to work together to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in the region,” Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said Nov. 1.

A Pacific Air Forces spokesperson detailed to Air & Space Forces Magazine the following U.S. aircraft that will be involved in the exercise:

  • F-16s from the 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea
  • F-16s and A-10s from the 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, South Korea
  • U-2s from the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, Osan Air Base, South Korea
  • F-15s and KC-135s from the 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan
  • An E-3 from the 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan
  • F-16s from the 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa Air Base, Japan
  • C-130Js from the 374th Airlift Wing, Yokota Air Base, Japan

In addition, the Navy is sending EA-18Gs, the Marine Corps is sending F-35Bs and F/A-18s, and the Army is participating with a variety of helicopters and the MQ-1 Predator drone.

The Republic of Korea Air Force, meanwhile, will fly F-35As, among other aircraft, and the Royal Australian Air Force has deployed a KC-30A aerial refueler, PACAF has said. The exercise began Oct. 31 and will run through Nov. 4.

PACAF’s list of participating aircraft does not include the B-1B bomber, a number of which the Air Force recently deployed to Guam as part of a Bomber Task Force mission, or A-10s from Moody Air Force Base also deployed to Guam.

The large number of aircraft participating in the exercise was “long scheduled,” Ryder said, but North Korea has treated it as a major provocation, with officials claiming it is preparation for an invasion and issuing veiled threats of a “terrible price” for the U.S. and South Korea, according to Yonhap news agency.

Those threats were followed by a barrage of 23 ballistic missiles Nov. 2, reportedly a record for a single day. One landed in an ocean “buffer” zone, less than 20 miles from the countries’ maritime border, according to the Associated Press.

The missiles resulted in air raid sirens and some South Korean civilians sheltering in underground bunkers.

In a statement, however, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said the launches do not pose “an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies.”

“We are aware of the DPRK ballistic missile launches and are consulting closely with our allies and partners,” the statement reads. “While we have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat … the missile launches highlights the DPRK’s reckless behavior and the destabilizing impact of its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. The U.S. commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad.”

Still, South Korea responded to the missile launches by having fighter jets fire three air-to-surface, precision-guided missiles in an exercise, according to its ministry of defense.

Alaska-Based F-22s Deploy to CENTCOM Amid Iran Threat

Alaska-Based F-22s Deploy to CENTCOM Amid Iran Threat

As concerns have risen in Washington about a potential Iranian attack against U.S. partners in the region, F-22 Raptors have deployed to the Middle East and performed operations alongside F-15E Strike Eagles on Nov. 2, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The deployment demonstrates “CENTCOM’s ability to move combat assets into the CENTCOM region very quickly,” Col. Joe Buccino, the spokesperson for the command, told Air & Space Forces Magazine. CENTCOM declined to say whether the F-22s deployed in response to Iranian threats.

U.S. media reports indicated the previous day that Saudi Arabia was worried about the possibility of an Iranian attack and had shared this information with the U.S.

“We recognize that Saudi Arabia remains under the threat of attack from Iran and from Iran’s proxies, the Houthis in Yemen, and we recognize that there are 70,000 Americans who live and work in Saudi Arabia, including thousands of U.S. troops,” White House National Security Council strategic communications coordinator John Kirby told reporters Nov. 2. 

CENTCOM tweeted several photos showing U.S. military aircraft on patrol, including F-22s based at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

The serial number of the KC-135 Stratotanker refueling one of the F-22s is 23498, which indicates that it is assigned to MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. It has been operating in the CENTCOM area since late September, according to flight tracking data from the website ADS-B Exchange. Tail codes on the F-15s indicate that they are assigned to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

CENTCOM did not say when the F-22s had deployed to the region or how many of the stealth air-to-air fighters are now operating there. But F-22s have previously been deployed during a period of high tension. In February, the U.S. sent F-22s to the United Arab Emirates after it was targeted by drone and missile attacks from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

The Wall Street Journal reported Nov. 1 that Saudi Arabia had recently provided the U.S. with intelligence that Iran may strike Saudi Arabia and Erbil in northern Iraq. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia accused Iran of attacking the kingdom’s oil infrastructure with drones and missiles in 2019.

“We are constantly monitoring threat streams in the region and we remain in constant contact with our partners in the region, to include the Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia,” Buccino said Nov. 1. “When appropriate, we will not hesitate to take action to defend our forces or partners in the region.”

In March, Iran launched ballistic missile strikes on the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq. In September, a U.S. warplane shot down an Iranian drone it deemed a possible threat to Erbil. Air Forces Central (AFCENT) regularly conducts counter-drone patrols in the region.

“I think on a daily basis, the threat that we face most—and this is not just U.S. forces or coalition forces that are deployed into the region, but all of our regional partners face—is from the Iranian threat network,” Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, the AFCENT commander, said at AFA’s Air, Space, & Cyber Conference in September. 

Nationwide protests against the theocratic government have roiled Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has blamed Saudi Arabia, among others, for instigating the protests. The U.S. has said it is reevaluating its alliance with Saudi Arabia after the Biden administration accused the kingdom of cooperating with Russia as part of the OPEC+ oil cartel to keep oil prices high after Moscow’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. However, the U.S. has not officially changed its policy toward Saudi Arabia.

“Nothing’s changed in the relationship as of yet,” Kirby said. “But that is separate and distinct from the fact that we recognize that the threat from Iran is real. We remain concerned about that threat. And we’re going to continue to work not only with our Saudi partners but with other partners in the region to better be able to address that threat.”

Space Force to Establish Components for INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, Korea by End of 2022

Space Force to Establish Components for INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, Korea by End of 2022

The Space Force has a new Chief of Space Operations, and by the end of 2022, it will have established components within two more combatant commands and one sub-unified combatant command.

The first new component, for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, will stand up Nov. 22, led by Brig. Gen. Anthony J. Mastalir—Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson said as much last month at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Security Forum.

But while Thompson merely went on to say that components for U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command would follow “very soon,” a Space Force spokesperson confirmed to Air & Space Forces Magazine that the plan is for the CENTCOM component—abbreviated SPACEFOR-CENT—will stand up Dec. 2. That component will be led by Col. Chris Putman.

After that, a component for U.S. Forces Korea, itself a sub-command within INDOPACOM, will stand up “before the end of the calendar year,” the spokesperson said. The component will be referred to as SPACEFOR-Korea and will be led by Lt. Col. Joshua McCullion.

As for when a component within U.S. European Command, or other combatant commands, will be established, the Space Force said “there is no timing confirmed.”

To date, the only component the Space Force has within a combatant command is Space Operations Command within U.S. Space Command.

Moving beyond that to integrate within earthbound combatant commands is important, Thompson said at the Spacepower Security Forum, because it ensures that the Space Force can collaborate “closely with other combatant commanders to make sure that not only can we understand what they need in terms of space capabilities, but they truly and deeply understand the full suite of capabilities available to them in the United States Space Force, from other military services, to our IC partners, and through the commercial sector.”

The continued growth of the Space Force’s structure comes as the service welcomes a new leader, Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, who succeeded Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond as CSO on Nov. 2.
USSF has already established its three field commands—Space Operations Command, Space Systems Command, and Space Training and Readiness Command—and recently integrated the Space Development Agency into its ranks. New Deltas within those commands continue to stand up as well.

New Space Force Leader: Saltzman Formally Succeeds Raymond as CSO

New Space Force Leader: Saltzman Formally Succeeds Raymond as CSO

Leadership of the Space Force changed hands Nov. 2, as Gen. B. Chance Saltzman succeeded Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond as Chief of Space Operations in a pageantry-filled ceremony at Joint Base Andrews, Md., attended by top Pentagon officials, lawmakers, and industry leaders.

“We are here in this hangar at Andrews, literally witnessing history,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley said. “It might as well be 1947 as it is today—that is what you are witnessing. You are witnessing the divorce of the Air Force from the Army, and now you’re witnessing the divorce of the Space Force from the Air Force.”

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall added, “As the Secretary of the Air Force, I get to attend some pretty historic events. This one is right up there at the top.” Kendall officiated the change of responsibility ceremony. “I’m proud to work with these humble, incredibly capable, and approachable warriors and leaders we are celebrating here today.”

Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, left, took over command of the Space Force in a ceremony officiated by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall at Joint Base Andrews, Md., Nov. 2, 2022. Space Force photo.

Still less than three years old, the Space Force now has its second-ever leader in Saltzman, who takes on the CSO job after spending the last two years as deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber, and nuclear.

In his first remarks after officially taking over as CSO, Saltzman pledged that he would “work relentlessly to make the Space Force the combat-ready force that our nation needs.”

Addressing Guardians directly, Saltzman added that “my goal will be to provide you the resources, tools and training, and experiences needed to unlock your massive potential. … So get ready, because I’m going to need your best as well.”

Saltzman, who now is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and leads some 15,000 personnel, got some early encouragement from both Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, who attended the ceremony, and Vice President Kamala Harris, who sent a message that was read aloud.

“There’s no one better to take the helm than Gen. Chance Saltzman,” Austin said. “He knows his way around the space domain. He’s operated satellites. He’s spent many nights at the Joint Space Operations Center during ICBM alerts. And for the past two years, he’s helped this new service get off the ground.”

In her letter, “The current and future Guardian workforce will be shaped by your leadership,” Harris wrote to Saltzman. “I look forward to further discussions about the challenges and opportunities facing military space operations.”

new space force cso
Gen. B. Chance Saltzman took command of the Space Force in a ceremony officiated by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall at Joint Base Andrews, Md., Nov. 2, 2022. Space Force photo.

Raymond, meanwhile, retires Dec. 31 after 38 years in uniform. He led Air Force Space Command starting in 2016, then became the first member of the Space Force in December 2019. He also served as commander of U.S. Space Command from August 2019 to 2020.

Highlighting Raymond’s foundational role in the nation’s newest service’s, Milley noted that “Jay Raymond literally wrote the plans, literally wrote the doctrine, and literally developed the capabilities that we see deployed today.”

During his retirement ceremony, Raymond was feted with certificates from President Joe Biden and Harris, praising him for his “devotion to duty, honor, and country, in keeping with the long traditions of the finest military in the world,” and noting that his service as the first CSO “will make an impact for generations to come.”

Raymond also received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal for the second time in his career, and his wife Mollie Raymond received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service and a certificate of appreciation from the Space Force.

For his part, Raymond joked that he was now “homeless, unemployed, but humbled and grateful,” and called his time as CSO an “absolute privilege.”

Thanking his staff and leaders such as former Air Force Secretary Barbara M. Barrett, Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson, Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force Roger A. Towberman, and Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) and Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), Raymond also once more made the case for the Space Force’s importance and role in the joint force.

“In establishing the Space Force, the United States capitalized on an opportunity to elevate space to a level that’s consistent with its importance to our national security, and to ensure U.S. and global leadership in the domain,” Raymond said. “And just as the space domain was critical to winning the Cold War, the Space Force represents our nation’s best opportunity to secure peace and deter great power conflict today and into the future.”

Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, the Space Force’s first member and first Chief of Space Operations, passed responsibility over to Gen. B. Chance Saltzman in a ceremony officiated by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall at Joint Base Andrews, Md., Nov. 2, 2022. Space Force photo.
100 USAF Aircraft to Fly in Large-Scale Exercise With South Korea

100 USAF Aircraft to Fly in Large-Scale Exercise With South Korea

Exercise Vigilant Storm, a large joint aerial training event between the U.S. and South Korea, kicked off Oct. 31 with U.S. Air Force fourth-generation fighters flying alongside F-35s from the U.S. Marine Corps and Republic of Korea Air Force.

All told, approximately 240 aircraft and thousands of personnel will participate in the five-day-long exercise, Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder told reporters Nov. 1.

“This year’s event, which was long scheduled, will strengthen the operational and tactical capabilities [and] combined air operations and support our strong combined defense posture,” Ryder added.

A Pacific Air Forces spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the exercise will include “approximately 100 U.S. aircraft … from bases within and outside of South Korea.” A release from the 7th Air Force (Air Forces Korea) stated that USAF will fly “fourth-generation jets” as part of the exercise.

Both Osan and Kunsan Air Bases in South Korea have F-16 squadrons, with Osan also hosting a squadron of A-10s and units with the U-2 Dragon Lady ISR plane and HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters.

The exercise comes in a period of increased tensions with North Korea, which has conducted a series of missile tests in the past month, one of which was followed by South Korea and the U.S. flying F-15K Slam Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons in a show of force.

This Vigilant Storm exercise, in particular, has drawn a fierce response from North Korean officials, who claimed Nov. 1 that it is preparation for an invasion and issued veiled nuclear threats of a “terrible price,” according to Yonhap news agency.

Asked to respond to those comments, Ryder reiterated that Vigilant Storm has been “long planned” and will focus on “enhancing interoperability of our forces to work together to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in the region.”

In its release, Air Forces Korea specified that the exercise will challenge the ROK and U.S. air forces to practices missions such as “close air support, defensive counter air, and emergency air operations 24 hours a day.” 

At the same time, “support forces on the ground will also train their base defense procedures and survivability in case of attack,” the release states.

Vigilant Storm is simply the new name for what has previously been dubbed the Combined Flying Training Event, a large annual exercise focused on interoperability that itself was a replacement for the yearly Vigilant Ace exercises, which were suspended as part of diplomatic discussions.

In addition to the U.S. Air Force aircraft that will take part in Vigilant Storm, the exercise will also include F-35As from South Korea’s air force and F-35Bs from the Marines, which arrived at Kunsan Air Base on Oct. 31 from Iwakuni, Japan, according to images shared by the 8th Fighter Wing.

The Royal Australian Air Force, meanwhile, has deployed a KC-30A aerial refueler to take part in the exercise.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated Nov. 2 to correct the name of the exercise, Vigilant Storm.

air force south korea
A U.S. Marine Corps F-35 Lightning II from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 242, out of Iwakuni, Japan, parks at Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Oct. 31, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sadie Colbert.
US Officials Explain Biden’s Shift on Nuclear Policy

US Officials Explain Biden’s Shift on Nuclear Policy

Top U.S. officials aimed to explain why a new Nuclear Posture Review departs from long-held views expressed by President Joe Biden. The Biden administration’s nuclear strategy retains the decades-old policy that the U.S. nuclear arsenal could be used to deter or respond to significant attacks on America or its allies. Biden had previously promoted a shift to a policy in which the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons would be to deter or respond to nuclear attacks.

“Deterrence has not changed that much over the years,” Richard Johnson, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy, said at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council on Nov. 1. The Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review dismissed the Trump administration’s position that nuclear weapons existed to “hedge against an uncertain future” but retained a policy that deems nuclear weapons to be a fundamental part of America’s security strategy.

“But we are at a specific moment now, where I think we do see increases in concerns,” Johnson added, referring to Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine and nuclear saber-rattling by President Vladimir Putin as well as the growth of China’s nuclear stockpile.

During his tenure as vice president in the Obama administration and the 2020 campaign, Biden said he wanted to adopt a “sole purpose” doctrine stating that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons only to deter or respond to nuclear attacks.

“The next administration will put forward its own policies,” Biden said in a speech in Jan. 11, 2017, less than two weeks before the end of the Obama-Biden administration. “But, seven years after the Nuclear Posture Review charge, the President and I strongly believe we have made enough progress that deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.”

Almost six years later, Biden chose not to adopt that action as President. Instead, the document states that while the “fundamental role” of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks, the U.S. might use nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances,” borrowing language from the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review adopted when Biden was vice president.

“We think that the declaratory policy that we’ve selected is stable and sensible and, frankly, stabilizing,” Johnson said. “But it is true that there are—for a narrow range of high consequence, strategic attacks that would have those sorts of strategic effects using non-nuclear means—that potentially there could be nuclear employment.”

Biden was pressured by U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific not to shift to a policy of “sole purpose.” Allies have also opposed adopting a policy of “no first use” meaning the U.S. would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Many countries feared that by stating the U.S. would only use nuclear weapons in a nuclear conflict, Russia and China might be encouraged to launch devastating attacks without resorting to nuclear weapons.

U.S. allies “were very vocal with the White House, and State and Defense Departments, about this issue,” said Jon Wolfsthal, who served as senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017 and is now a senior adviser for Global Zero, a group that is advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. “They are worried about anything that could be seen as a weakening of America’s commitment to their defense. And given the importance Biden gave to rebuilding alliances, those concerns won out over the substantive debate about whether threatening first use was credible or necessary.”

U.S. officials acknowledged that after consulting with American allies and military officials, the administration decided not to shift to a “sole purpose” doctrine, though it remains a long-term ambition.

“We spent many, many months talking to lots of allies in a process that I somewhat inappropriately called nuclear speed dating, where we talked to many, many allies, both in our Euro-Atlantic region and NATO, and in the Indo-Pacific to get their perspective on this,” Johnson said. “The document also makes very clear that we still have as a goal to move towards a sole purpose declaration, but that we’ll have to identify concrete steps to do that and work with our allies and partners to get there, but because of some of these, sort of a narrow range of these high-consequence attacks, that could have strategic effects using non-nuclear means, especially some that we see, particularly affecting our allies and partners, we felt we couldn’t move in that direction at this time.”

The document intentionally did not lay out what attacks might rise to the level of “strategic.”

“The Nuclear Posture Review does not make a definition or provide examples of what we mean by a narrow range of high-consequence strategic attacks,” Johnson said. “What we do say is that we think that they are a very narrow range, and we think that the bar for nuclear employment in such cases is very high.”

The Biden administration reiterates the view that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO recently conducted its annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, which practices putting U.S. nuclear weapons on allied fighters.

While the New START treaty limits some of Russia’s long-range nuclear weapons until 2026, China is building an arsenal of around 1,000 nuclear weapons it plans to field by the end of the decade, according to the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

“No matter what we do, in 2026 that treaty will expire,” said Alexandra Bell, the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. “We don’t understand where China is going with this.”

China and Russia are not engaged in arms control talks with the U.S.

“We’ll be facing a world in which there are potentially no constraints over the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world for the first time in over 50 years,” Bell added. “It’s not a safer world.”

The Nuclear Posture Review originates from the Department of Defense, but the decision to use nuclear weapons is ultimately up to the President. The Nuclear Posture Review, while considering views from the U.S. military and American allies, is a product of Biden’s thinking, the U.S. officials said.

“We forwarded our options to the President, and the President decided, and this is the decision that he made with this particular approach,” Johnson said.

Kendall: NDS Doesn’t Call For a Larger Air Force; Expect Major Changes as USAF Modernizes

Kendall: NDS Doesn’t Call For a Larger Air Force; Expect Major Changes as USAF Modernizes

The Air Force won’t get larger anytime soon as a result of the new National Defense Strategy, and competition with China and Russia, though gravely serious, doesn’t constitute a new Cold War, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said at a defense conference.

“I do not expect major changes in force structure,” Kendall said at an Aviation Week defense conference in Washington, D.C. Rather, “What you should expect is major changes in … equipment and modernization.”

Kendall was responding to a question about what force structure changes would be driven by the new NDS, an unclassified version of which became public Oct. 27. The document did not offer any kind of a force-sizing construct that would establish how big any of the armed forces need to be, although the stated goal is for the U.S. to be able to defeat one peer adversary while deterring a second. Defense officials have said the appropriate size of the services will be determined through further analysis and the ongoing development of the Joint Warfighting Concept.

“We have to go through a transformation,” Kendall said. In the space domain, “my analogy is, imagine you have a Merchant Marine, and you woke up one day and discovered you needed a Navy. That’s essentially what the Space Force’s situation is.”

For the Air Force, “it’s really about getting on to the next-generation set of capabilities. It’s about transforming … to what we’re going to need for the future. So that’s kind of where we’re headed.”

There won’t be any “major changes … anytime soon” in numbers of fighter squadrons, Kendall said. The Air Force has dropped its stated requirement for 386 squadrons, unveiled in 2018 by former Secretary Heather Wilson, and service leaders now will not quote a new figure.

“We have a lot of commitments around the world, [and] we need a certain-sized force to meet them,” Kendall said, but he didn’t offer numbers.

“We are doing some divestitures. We’ll do more of those, to free up resources as we transition and modernize,” he said, suggesting the Air Force will actually get smaller in the near term.

However, “If I try to look down the road five, 10, 15 years, it’s possible to imagine a larger force structure.” But he said that will probably be a force in which manning levels are “fairly stable,” but the equipment “has been swapped out for next-generation equipment.” In his earlier remarks, Kendall noted that one of his seven operational imperatives is “uncrewed combat aircraft,” or up to five autonomous aircraft directed by and flying in formation with a single pilot in a fighter.

Future force structure will also depend “on a number of external factors,” Kendall said—a reference to how the U.S. might respond to the way adversaries size and use their own forces.

Kendall was asked if the Cold War is over, and whether a new one is taking its place.

“I think the Cold War is over,” Kendall said, saying the struggle between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was about ideologies—communism versus “democracy and free-market capitalism”—and that the conflict resolved. The Soviet Union “doesn’t exist anymore,” Kendall said.

While modern-day Russia “has influence over some small states, the states that comprised the Soviet Union are pretty much independent now.” The Ukraine war is Russia’s attempt “to reassert control” over some of its former territory.

“But it’s anything but cold” now, Kendall said, with a hot war raging in central Europe.

Unlike the Soviet Union, “Russia doesn’t have the economic clout to be the kind of threat” it once was, he said. “I think the current situation is very, very different … Russia is just not the same scale of threat.”

In the NDS, Russia is referred to as an “acute” threat, Kendall said, because “it still has a formidable military. It’s demonstrating a lot of shortfalls right now, but in the next few years, I would expect it to recover.” Also, “the propensity for aggression has been demonstrated pretty clearly … I don’t expect that to change anytime soon.”

Kendall said “We will see where all this takes us. But it’s not a Cold War situation” or a “continuation” of the Cold War.

Neither does he see the situation with China as a Cold War.

“It could become something like that,” he acknowledged, but the “fundamental reason” why it’s not is because China’s economy has become “intertwined” with that of the rest of the world.

“There is a lot of economic dependency between China, in particular, and its customers in the world and … its sources of raw materials, as well … So I think it would be harder to de-couple, economically, than during the Cold War,” when there were “two distinct spheres” of economic activity.

Also, China doesn’t seem to be pursuing “wars of national liberation” as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. China’s military objectives, he said, are “more about control of things in their region, to be the hegemon there, if you will.”

He said China is also seeking to expand its influence around the world, such as through the “One Belt, One Road” construct, which, Kendall noted, “is not doing all that well.”

He thinks China sees itself “as the great power … essentially replacing the United States as the largest economy and the country with the greatest influence in the world. But not in the same sense as the Soviets were interested in wars of national liberation. It’s a different model.”

China is trying to export a governance model, though, he said, and it’s one of “state control … One-party, autocratic rule, which they think has led to their improvement in their living conditions” and a stable state.

It’s stable, he said, but “individual freedoms are not respected,” and dissent with the party in power isn’t tolerated. But “that’s their model, and they’re trying to push it.”

It’s “not impossible” that an economic “separation” could come about between the West and China and that it could spur a new Cold War, “but we’re not there now,” Kendall said. “And I think there are some pretty strong forces that, hopefully, will prevent that from happening.”