House Passes Compromise NDAA; Here’s What’s in It for the Space Force

Dec. 8, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The House of Representatives voted to pass a new, compromise version of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act on Dec. 8, sending the annual defense policy bill to the Senate and setting up its passage before the end of the year.

Congressional leaders unveiled the mammoth 4,408-page piece of legislation late Dec. 6, with provisions covering everything from the Pentagon’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate to multiyear munition buys to the development of hypersonic weapons.

But for the Defense Department’s youngest service, the Space Force, the bill included dozens of sections covering strategy, structure, and more, as legislators continue to define and shape the service.

More Money Coming?

While the NDAA does not appropriate funds for the Defense Department or any of the services to spend, it does authorize funding for different accounts and generally offers an indication of what lawmakers want to spend on.

And for the Space Force, in particular, the compromise NDAA offers sizable increases on top of the 2023 budget request that was already set to grow by 36 percent.

The biggest jump came in research, development, testing, and evaluation, where authorizers tacked on nearly $770 million to the service’s request of $15.8 billion.

Procurement saw a sizable increase as well, more than $447 million, on top of the $4.08 billion originally requested. Even the operations and maintenance account got a plus-up of $150 million.

Strategy and Policy

While those funding increases still have to be finalized by an appropriations bill—still being negotiated in Congress—the NDAA mostly affects the Pentagon through policy changes. And perhaps the most direct move the NDAA makes on how the Space Force operates is its requirement that before any major satellite acquisition program achieves Milestone A approval—the earliest milestone point and before acquisitions begin—the Space Force must develop “requirements for the defense and resilience of the satellites.”

Another similar provision requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to make publicly available the department’s strategy for protecting and defending satellites in orbit.

Such requirements and a strategy could lead to new levels of transparency within the Space Force, which has struggled with issues of over-classification that even its own leaders have bemoaned. The service’s defensive and offensive space weapons remain shrouded in mystery, which some say has harmed deterrence by not allowing the service to clearly convey its capabilities to adversaries.

Another section included in the bill would expand plans for the Space Force’s “tactically responsive space capability”—the ability to quickly launch new satellites as needed. For several years now, congressional leaders have pushed the service to establish such a program, and this latest NDAA goes further in emphasizing the need for the Space Force to not only be able to launch satellites quickly, but also to be able to sustain and control those satellites.

Among the requirements included, Congress wants the Secretary of the Air Force to provide long-term continuity for such tactically responsive capabilities through the Future Years Defense Program, which stretches five years into the future, and to oversee the development of “tactics, training, and procedures” for such operations. The bill also would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan for the tactically responsive space program every year through 2026.

Finally, the NDAA also includes a section that would impact one of the Space Force’s newest additions—the Space Development Agency. Specifically, the bill calls for a review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to “whether the Space Development Agency should be exempt from the Joint Integration and Development System in order to speed overall fielding of proliferated space systems.”

The SDA has been lauded by many within the Pentagon for its aggressive efforts to launch a proliferated constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit, dubbed the National Defense Space Architecture. However, the agency has never had to follow the JCIDS process that governs almost all Defense Department acquisition programs.

Structure

As in years past, the NDAA includes several provisions giving the Chief of Space Operations the latitude to vary end strength, both for the entire service and for specific ranks, as needed. With the Space Force still accepting interservice transfers and recruiting highly trained personnel from industry, the exact numbers and ratios of Guardians are still stabilizing.

Beyond end strength, though, the NDAA also touches on several basic organizational questions facing the Space Force.

Most prominently, the bill discards a provision that was included in a previous version passed by the House that would have established a Space National Guard. While several National Guard leaders have pushed for the creation of a Space National Guard, saying it is needed to properly align Guard units with space missions to the Space Force, President Joe Biden’s administration has opposed such a move, instead endorsing the idea of a hybrid “Space Component” that folds the traditional Active-duty and Reserve/Guard components into one, with full-time and part-time Guardians.

The NDAA doesn’t go so far as to openly endorse the Space Component concept. But it does ask the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on how the Space Component would work, getting into specific details on how rules, regulations, and policies would be formed to allow Guardians to move between duty statuses, retire, and face promotion boards.

The report would have to have an analysis of how other government agencies would deal with the Space Component, such as determining the proper pay and benefits for current and former Guardians. It would also include a study on what laws might need to be changed to make the Space Component work, and an analysis of other potential issues such as budgetary impacts, the effect on diversity and inclusion, and possible conflicts of interest if a Guardian moves to part-time status while working a private industry job connected to space.

Such a study would follow one required by the 2022 NDAA that tasked the Pentagon with conducting a broader analysis of how the Space Force should organize its reserve component and issuing a recommendation on the formation of a Space National Guard. This latest provision is far more detailed in the questions that Congress wants answers to and suggests lawmakers are looking to proceed with figuring out the logistics of the Space Component before its implementation.

The Space Component isn’t the only Space Force structure that is poised to get a closer look as part of the NDAA. Another section would require the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief of Space Operations to submit a report by March 1, 2023, reviewing the status of the new National Space Intelligence Center.

Through the language in the bill, lawmakers seem to express skepticism about the fact that the NSIC, currently run by Space Delta 18, is subordinate to Space Operations Command, “rather than a field operating agency aligned to the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space Force.”

The report would have to address any “perceived mission misalignment, potential mitigating measures, or other structural organization concerns” related to the current structure.

Another report required under the NDAA would be one addressing “the manning required to fully staff the current and planned cyber squadrons of the Space Force.” Specifically, lawmakers want to know:

The specific sourcing of existing billets of the Space Force optimally postured for transfer to cyber squadrons;
The administrative processes required to shift billets and existing funding to cyber squadrons;
The responsibilities and functions performed by military personnel and civilian personnel;
The benefits and risks to the Space Force’s approach of transferring billets to cyber squadrons.

The Space Force currently has a number of cyber-focused squadrons, some within Space Delta 6 focused on defensive cyber operations for space systems and others nested within the Space Force element in the National Reconnaissance Office.

Air Force ‘Building the Airplane as We Fly It’ on New Operational Concepts, Wing Commander Says

Dec. 7, 2022 | By Chris Gordon

The Air Force is still working out the kinks of its new operational concepts, Col. Ernesto M. DiVittorio, commander of the 366th Fighter Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, said during an AFA Warfighters in Action event Dec. 7. The virtual discussion focused on two of the Air Force’s main ideas for future warfare: agile combat employment (ACE), which is the ability to operate from distributed and sometimes austere airfields, and multi-capable Airmen (MCA), the notion that service members will have additional skills to support more dispersed operations.

“We are building the airplane as we fly it with respect to a lot of the concepts that are going to be required to operate as a lead wing,” DiVittorio said when asked how the Air Force envisions the role of multi-capable Airmen.

Overall, the aim is to allow the service to operate with a smaller footprint by ensuring that Airmen have a broader skill set. Multi-capable Airmen are to key ACE doctrine since the Air Force will operate farther from larger, fixed bases with myriad support personnel.

ACE is one of the service’s top priorities. The Air Force and Department of Defense see China as the U.S.’s primary military challenge. According to the latest DOD China Military Power Report, China has increasingly capable ballistic missiles, rockets, and aircraft.

In many ways, ACE is not a new concept. The Air Force’s predecessor, the Army Air Forces, used a similar model in the Pacific campaign in World War II. The U.S. conducted brutal land, sea, and air fights in the Pacific over islands such as Tarawa and Guadalcanal in part to ensure allied control over the airfields there. Ultimately, U.S. air power prevented the American troops from ever having to invade the Japanese mainland.

“After a foothold had been gained on an island, we had Airmen that were landing aircraft, turning them and launching them, and lily padding their way across the Pacific,” DiVittorio said. “We’re taking the next step.”

During World War II, the U.S. had an army of service members adapting on the fly. The tempo of the great war demanded it. Exactly what the 21st century definition of multi-capable Airmen will be is still up in the air. The Air Force knows Airmen need additional skills and more flexibility, but the service has not come up with a firm definition of the concept or explained whether it would mean some jobs require Airmen to know less about more things.

“What we have not codified yet in Department of the Air Force instructions is if we’re going to be giving anything up or if this training will ultimately be additive,” DiVittorio said.

Right now, the service is training multi-capable Airmen to do their own jobs with the same skill level but teaching new skills that align with their current jobs, he said.

“We are training, for instance, our maintenance Airmen to do skills that are tangential to what they currently specialize in,” DiVittorio said. Civilian aircraft maintenance technicians are empowered to do more diverse tasks than Air Force crews, and it’s natural, he said, for the Air Force to try to expand what its current Airmen do.

“They learn sheet metal work. They learn other skills. They don’t just do flight line maintenance,” DiVittorio said. “We’re starting to work on getting people familiar with those skills so that in a highly contested environment where we are under threat, and we do not have a large footprint, we are still able to turn aircraft.”

DiVittorio acknowledged that ACE and multi-capable Airmen won’t replace well-staffed, highly-outfitted garrisons. But he said they are concepts the Air Force sees as necessary for the service to be prepared to go to war.

“We’re raising a new generation of commanders that are more comfortable accepting risk and making decisions to get after the mission and still take care of the Airmen,” DiVittorio said.

AFMC Boss Tells Supervisors to ‘Revisit’ Telework Posture

Dec. 7, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The head of Air Force Materiel Command is telling supervisors and commanders to “revisit” the current use of telework on their teams, emphasizing the importance of “face-to-face team interaction.”

Gen. Duke Z. Richardson sent the update to AFMC personnel Nov. 30 to explain his “commander’s intent” for telework within the major command, an AFMC spokesperson confirmed to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The update didn’t change any policy regarding telework. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in May 2021, the Air Force released updated guidance on its policies and expanded opportunities, allowing squadron commanders or their equivalents to determine whether positions were eligible for telework, with input from supervisors.

But while the pandemic led the Air Force to dramatically expand its use of telework arrangements, Richardson said in his update that the “timing is right for supervisors to revisit the telework posture and determine the optimal blend for individuals, teams, centers, and the headquarters,” according to AFMC spokesperson Derek Kaufman.

“While maximizing telework at the height of pandemic infections absolutely made sense, the current situation is different,” Kaufman added, summarizing Richardson’s update. “Supporting our joint warfighters, accelerating change and delivering integrated capabilities faster than China, demands long-term and focused effort. [Richardson] articulated a belief face-to-face team interaction yields faster and better solutions.”

Going along with that belief, Richardson identified what Kaufman called “guiding principles” for supervisors at AFMC—that in general, staff should spend a “preponderance” of duty hours at the office, and that teleworking levels will be “higher than before the pandemic, but less than the height of the pandemic.”

Tammy Lyons, acting director of AFMC manpower, personnel, and services, clarified to Air & Space Forces Magazine that “in most cases, the AFMC commander expects personnel assigned to HQ AFMC staff positions to work more time in the office than by telework,” while specific schedules are determined by supervisors based on requirements, eligibility, and mission needs.

“In evaluating telework, compressed work schedules, and similar flexibilities, supervisors are responsible for achieving the mission, while being responsive to unique individual and team circumstances,” Kaufman added.

While the general expectation is for service members and civilians to spend the majority of their time in the office, there isn’t an exact ratio for the entire MAJCOM to pursue—Richardson is not “mandating percentage goals for telework,” Lyons said.

Still, Richardson’s approach does seem to represent a shift from previous views voiced by Air Force leaders who suggested the service would embrace telework writ large even after the pandemic.

In September 2020, then-Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Stephen W. “Seve” Wilson suggested that as many as 30 percent of Air Force employees would permanently telework.

In the same timeframe, then-Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and Services Lt. Gen. Brian T. Kelly said telework could allow the Air Force to change its approach to temporary duty travel and permanent changes of station, letting service members have more stability by living in one location while teleworking to new assignments.

Around the same time, the Defense Innovation Board, responsible for advising the Pentagon on how it can become more innovative and technology-friendly, released a report urging the DOD to embrace remote work and telework by expanding and upgrading its IT networks, offering more opportunities for secure classified work, starting remote work pilot programs, and more.

A year later, in September 2021, then-commander of AFMC Gen. Arnold W. Bunch Jr. told Airmen that “we will not go back to what we were doing before” the pandemic with regard to telework. Specifically, Bunch set a goal of 50 percent of AFMC headquarters staff teleworking either permanently or partially.

By embracing telework during the pandemic, Bunch said at the time, “we have demonstrated that we can execute the mission.”

The balance of in-office work and telework has been a delicate one for employers and employees not just in the military but across the workforce.

Some jobs, particularly in the military, simply cannot be done virtually—for the Air Force, flight line operations, classified programs, and more require in-person work.

But among those who can do their work remotely, a July survey from Gallup of the general public found that 34 percent preferred to telework exclusively, while 60 percent preferred a hybrid of remote and in-office. The survey also found that “the demand for long-term remote flexibility has substantially increased,” with roughly 60 percent of permanent teleworkers saying they would switch jobs if not offered flexibility, and 30 percent of hybrid workers saying the same.

Increasingly, more and more employees are headed back to the office in some form or fashion, though not at the levels seen before the pandemic.

Congress Unveils Compromise NDAA; Here’s How It Would Affect the Air Force Fleet

Dec. 7, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

After weeks of negotiations, top lawmakers unveiled a compromise version of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act late Dec. 6, priming Congress to pass the annual policy bill before the end of the year.

The top Republicans and Democrats from the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee crafted the new legislation, bypassing the usual conference process of resolving differences between the versions passed by each chamber, then sending the bill back for another round of voting.

The House passed its version of the NDAA in July, but the Senate had yet to vote on its own—not to mention hundreds of amendments that had been filed—leaving precious little time for the usual legislative process before this session of Congress ends Jan. 3.

The compromise bill is intended to speed up the process, incorporating elements of the House-passed version, the SASC markup, and other proposals from Representatives and Senators. The House is scheduled to vote on the bill Dec. 7, and the Senate is expected to follow in the next week or so.

The largest change in policy included in the compromise NDAA is undoubtedly the rollback of the Pentagon’s mandate that service members be vaccinated against COVID-19. That policy, first announced by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III in August 2021—has led to nearly 2 million troops getting the vaccine but also sparked legal battles and resulted in thousands of service members getting booted from service for refusing to get the shot.

Prior to the new NDAA being released, President Joe Biden and Austin had voiced support for keeping the vaccine mandate in place, arguing that it was necessary to ensure readiness. But rolling it back was a key policy goal for Republicans, and Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), chair of the HASC, indicated he was open to it, pointing to the general easing of COVID-19 protocols across the country.

It remains to be seen, however, how other Democrats in Congress will react to the mandate’s removal in the NDAA, or if Biden will consider a veto of the bill over the issue. Such a move could spark a Congressional override, something lawmakers last did for the 2021 bill after President Donald Trump blocked it.

While the vaccine policy change is likely to generate the most headlines and debate as the NDAA moves forward, pieces of the 4,408-page bill touch on every aspect of the Pentagon. For the Air Force, the bill would carry major implications for the future of the service’s fleet of aircraft.

Some Divestments Allowed

For years, the Air Force and Congress have clashed over the service’s attempts to retire older aircraft in its fleet, a move intended to free up money for modernization—a strategy dubbed “divest to invest.”

In the 2023 NDAA, lawmakers are prepared to let some retirements go through. After the Air Force asked to retire 21 A-10s, one provision in the bill would allow that process to go through by reducing the congressionally mandated size of the fleet from 171 to 153.

Additionally, the NDAA would amend a previous congressional requirement that the Air Force maintain a fleet of 479 aerial tanker aircraft. The new minimum would be set at 466 planes, allowing for the proposed divestment of 13 KC-135 tankers.

Finally, the bill would eliminate a provision in the 2019 NDAA that required the Air Force to keep at least six E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. That would let the service proceed with its plan to retire eight of 16 remaining E-8s in 2023, followed by four more in 2024.

Some Blocked

But while Congress is ready to let go of some A-10s, KC-135s, and E-8s, it doesn’t want to get rid of other aircraft just yet.

Most prominently, the NDAA includes a section that would block the Air Force from retiring any F-22 fighters until 2027 while maintaining a fleet size of at least 184 Raptors.

That stands in contrast to the Air Force’s stated desire to retire 33 of 36 Block 20 F-22s, reducing the fleet size to 153 aircraft. Service leaders have argued that the Block 20 airplanes are currently rated for training use only because they are expensive to maintain and are increasingly mismatched to the combat-coded versions, reducing their value as training platforms.

A previous version of the NDAA passed by the House Armed Services Committee rejected that plan and went further in requiring the Air Force to instead upgrade those F-22s, a move Air Force officials say would be too expensive.

The new compromise NDAA doesn’t go that far, but it does require a report from the Air Force that includes a “strategy and execution plan … for conducting formal training for F–22 aircrews,” including the reestablishment of one or more F-22 Formal Training Units, where the Block 20 F-22s currently reside. The bill also requires an audit by the comptroller general to determine the costs and timeline for upgrading the aircraft.

In addition to the F-22, the NDAA would fully block any divestment of the C-40 Clipper, used to transport senior military commanders, Cabinet officials, and members of Congress.

Other provisions in the NDAA would prevent aircraft divestments, but with caveats.

No F-15 fighters could be retired until the Secretary of the Air Force submits a report to Congress detailing how, when, and from where the service plans to retire F-15s, any effects from such divestments, an explanation of how to mitigate those effects, and procurement plans for the F-15, especially the F-15EX. The Air Force has said it wants to buy fewer F-15EXs in the long term, a move that some members of Congress have opposed.

The NDAA would also block any retirement of E-3 AWACS aircraft, contrary to the Air Force’s wish to retire 15 of the 31 airplanes in the fleet. However, the bill includes exceptions that would let the service retire some, depending on its progress in acquiring the E-7 Wedgetail, the planned replacement for AWACS.

If the Air Force submits an acquisition strategy for the Wedgetail approved by its acquisition czar, it can cut its number of E-3s down to 21. If the service awards a contract for the procurement of E-7s, it can cut the AWACS fleet down to 18.

Another section in the NDAA would prohibit the retirement of any C-130 transport aircraft currently assigned to the Air National Guard. That would mostly affect the aging C-130Hs—the Air Force has said it wants to cut 12 in 2023. The NDAA would also require the Air Force to maintain a C-130 fleet size of at least 271 aircraft.

Aircraft Added

While much in the Air Force-related sections in the NDAA deal with the proposed retirements of aircraft, the bill also would authorize increases in procurement for some types of aircraft.

Funding for those extra purchases still needs to be appropriated—the NDAA doesn’t provide that, and Congress is still negotiating an omnibus spending bill that would provide such funds.

Still, the NDAA offers an indication of what lawmakers want the Air Force to spend more on, namely F-35 fighters, HH-60W helicopters, and EC-37B Compass Calls.

The Air Force’s request for F-35As in 2023 fell to 33 aircraft, well short of previous years’ requests for 48. The NDAA would approve funding for five extra fighters, just shy of the seven included in the Air Force’s unfunded priorities list.

Also included in that unfunded priorities list was four extra EC-37Bs, which are used to disrupt an enemy’s command, control, communications, radar, and navigation. The NDAA would authorize funding for those aircraft.

One kind of aircraft that was not included in the unfunded priorities list was the HH-60W Jolly Green II, designed to replace the HH-60G Pave Hawk for combat search and rescue missions. Indeed, the Air Force has indicated it plans to cut its total buy at 75 helicopters, instead of the originally planned 113.

That’s led to pushback in Congress, and lawmakers included an extra 10 HH-60Ws in the NDAA on top of the 10 requested that would have completed the 75-aircraft fleet the Air Force wanted. On top of that, the NDAA requests a requirements study and strategy from the Air Force for its combat search and rescue mission.

Robins AFB Finishes Environmental Reviews, Clearing Way for New Missions

Dec. 6, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

Robins Air Force Base, Ga., has completed two environmental reviews, clearing the way for new construction to support the bases four new missions sets, which will replace the E-8 Joint STARS mission that has defined the base for decades.

Robins’s transition from the E-8 Sentry has been in the works for more than a year. In June 2021, the Air Force announced those aircraft will retire and four new mission sets would be assigned there: a Battle Management Control squadron, an E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) squadron, a Spectrum Warfare group, and support units focused on the Advanced Battle Management System and Joint All-Domain Command and Control.

Leaders have promised Robins population would remain steady despite the changes. Congress has supported the JSTARS divestment, in contrast to earlier attempts that were blocked with the help of the Georgia delegation. The Air Force plans to retire eight JSTARS aircraft in 2023 and four more 2024, leaving just four of the aircraft after that.

The first E-11A BACN aircraft will arrive in the spring of 2023 and reach full operational capability by 2027; the Battle Management Control Squadron will begin to stand up in 2023 and reach FOC by fiscal 2025.

Also down the line, the 950th Spectrum Warfare Group headquarters is set to be activated in 2027, and construction on a new Battle Management Combined Operations Center is currently in a design review phase.

“This next chapter archives the first-of-its-kind Total Force Integrated Wing tasked with 22 years of continuous global overwatch and begins building the foundations for new Georgia Air National Guard missions, ensuring a bright future for Team Robins,” said Col. Christopher Dunlap, 116th Air Control Wing commander, in a statement. “These four new missions will be essential elements of our National Defense Strategy for many years to come and I am excited our Georgia Air Guard men and women are at the forefront.”

Troops Will See Record Food Allowance Increase In 2023

Dec. 6, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

The Basic Allowance for Subsistence will rise 11.2 percent effective January 1, ringing in the new year with big increases for ever service member. The new enlisted rate is $452.56 per month, while the rate for officers reaches $311.68. That’s the biggest year-over-year increase since 2002, when the Defense Department completed an overhaul of BAS rules.

Enlisted members will pocketabout $45 more each month, and officers will get an extra $31, marking the first time officers’ BAS exceeded $300.

BAS is adjusted annually to match the USDA food cost index. Food prices rose 10.9 percent from October 2021 to October 2022, and are projected to increase between 9.5 to 10.5 percent for the calendar year, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s most recent data.

Inflation in the year ahead remains a mystery. Officials had expected it to slow in 2023, with the Consumer Price Index closer to historic averages, but some industry officials are warning that high food inflation is unlikely to go away soon. Eggs, dairy products, poultry, and processed fruits and vegetables have seen the highest spikes.

Pentagon leaders have increasingly emphasized the need for higher pay and allowances for military personnel. The 2023 budget request included a 4.6 percent pay raise, the largest in two decades, and officials anticipate higher housing allowances, as well. The proposal also included a new “basic needs allowance” that would give extra cash to service members’ whose pay is less than 130 percent of the federal poverty guidelines of the Department of Health and Human Services. Congress has yet to finalize action on the 2023 budget and the Pentagon is currently operting on a continuing resolution, which expires Dec. 16. Congress must either approve a budget or another CR by that date.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall hammered home care for “people” in his address to Airmen and Guardians at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September—noting among other things he was reversing planned cuts to special duty pays that had generated controversy because they came amid rising inflation. Likewise, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass said she was pushing for a “holistic military compensation review” to identify ways to more quickly respond to rising costs.

Basic Allowance for Subsistence Over Time

YEAR	OFFICER	ENLISTED	PERCENTAGE CHANGE
2023	$311.68	$452.56	11.20
2022	$280.29	$406.98	5.30
2021	$266.18	$386.50	3.70
2020	$256.68	$372.71	0.90
2019	$254.39	$369.39	0.00
2018	$254.39	$369.39	0.30
2017	$253.63	$368.29	0.00
2016	$253.63	$368.29	0.10
2015	$253.38	$367.92	2.90
2014	$246.24	$357.55	1.50
2013	$242.60	$352.27	1.10
2012	$239.96	$348.44	7.20
2011	$223.84	$325.04	0.36
2010	$223.04	$323.87	0.00
2009	$223.04	$323.87	10.00
2008	$202.76	$294.43	5.20
2007	$192.74	$279.88	2.80
2006	$187.49	$272.26	1.90
2005	$183.99	$267.18	5.00
2004	$175.23	$254.46	4.80
2003	$167.20	$242.81	0.50
2002	$166.37	$241.60

Air Force Working on Fuel-Saving, 3D-Printed ‘Microvanes’ for C-17

Dec. 6, 2022 | By Chris Gordon

The Air Force is considering making aerodynamic retrofits to one of its flagship cargo planes in an effort to save on fuel and be kinder to the environment.

As part of a project that has been in the works for years, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center are in the process of airworthiness certification to fit microvanes on C-17s. Microvanes are small fin-like additions that attach to the fuselage to reduce drag. The Air Force says fitting the parts to the existing fleet could save millions of dollars per year in fuel.

“This is a great step forward on an existing aircraft for fuel efficiency and mission enhancement,” Ed Clark, an AFRL engineer, told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an email.

The microvanes are a prime example of “bringing modern technologies forward on an older aircraft,” said Clark, a member of the Future Force Energy office at AFRL’s Materials and Manufacturing Directorate.

Clark said AFRL first began working on the technology in 2014 and that work to fit microvanes to C-17s began in 2015.

Microvanes were originally developed by Lockheed Martin in collaboration with the Air Force. They are commercially available for C-130 and have already been installed on some Canadian Armed Forces aircraft of the type. In 2021, the Department of Defense awarded a contract to Metro Aerospace, which holds the license to Lockheed Martin’s patent on the technology, to explore putting microvanes on Air Force’s C-130s and “help validate drag-reduction concepts that can be developed and applied to commercial aircraft, other aircraft such as the C-17, KC-135, and future vertical lift.”

The C-17 microvanes are fin-shaped structures that attach to the aft of the fuselage. Cargo planes have historically had high drag in that area because of upsweep in the fuselage required for the rear cargo door, which microvanes can help reduce, according to a Lockheed Martin study.

The Air Force Research Laboratory says it took several new steps in the development of the microvanes so they could be tested with limited interruption in the service’s fleet of around 220 aircraft. C-17s have been sometimes been stretched thin and required to conduct massive airlift operations on little notice. The AFRL team sought to minimize disruption to the fleet.

The team used Computational Flow Dynamics (CFD) to help design, test, and evaluate the efficiency of the parts. The microvanes are 3D-printed from DuraForm GF/DuraForm ProX GF composite material, reducing the complexity required when producing and fitting them to the aircraft.

Modern design tools allowed the the team to make “a safe and integral gain to the aircraft while not impacting operations,” Clark said. “This is a 3D-printed device which can be installed in a short amount of time utilizing Air Force aircraft maintenance personnel.”

By reducing drag, the Air Force can save fuel by reducing the workload of the engines. C-17s with microvanes installed save around one percent in fuel over regular C-17s, according to the service. The Air Force says those savings are significant if added up over the fleet.

“When installed across the C-17 fleet, including Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircraft, the Air Force estimates the microvanes will pay for themselves in fuel savings in seven months and save over $10 million per year,” according to a release from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Air Force for Energy, Installations, and Environment.

Clark said the microvanes program has cost approximately $5 million so far to develop. AFRL hopes to complete airworthiness certification soon on C-17s.

“Our goal is calendar year 2023 with added flight verification and in service testing in the first half of the year,” Clark said.

In 2023, “the Air Force will determine the best option for production of the microvanes for the C-17 fleet,” he added.

DNI Skeptical Russia Can Reconstitute Effectively for Spring Offensive

Dec. 6, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

Russia’s ability to refit and reconstitute for an expected spring offensive in Ukraine is in some doubt, because of its inability to domestically produce the weapons it is using, according to Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence. But she also doesn’t see any evidence that Vladimir Putin will give up his ambitions of “controlling” Ukraine.

In a Dec. 3 interview with NBC’s Andrea Mitchell at the Reagan Defense Forum in Simi Valley, Calif., attended by Air & Space Forces Magazine, Haines said U.S. intelligence expects the current “reduced tempo” of the Ukraine conflict, with Russia withdrawn to the far eastern portions of the country, to continue into the spring.

“Then, once you get past the winter the … question is: what will the counteroffensive look like?” Haines said.

The intelligence community expects both Ukraine and Russia to go into a “refit, resupply, … reconstitute” mode, “so they’re prepared for the counteroffensive.” However, “we actually have a fair amount of skepticism as to whether or not the Russians will be, in fact, prepared to do that,” Haines said. Rather, she is more optimistic for the Ukrainians.

Russia’s stockpile of weapons is in question, Haines explained.

“I can’t give you precise numbers in this forum, but … it’s really pretty extraordinary, and our own sense is that they are not capable of indigenously producing what they are expending, at this stage.”

That’s why Russia has been “going to other countries … to try to get ammunition and … we’ve indicated that their precision munitions are running out much faster [than that of the Ukrainians] in many respects.” Russia is known to have solicited weapons from North Korea, China and Iran, which would be compatible with Russian systems because their original design was Russian.

So far, Russia has not gotten “a lot” of artillery from its client states, she said.

The size of Russia’s weapon stockpiles and how much is available for them “to use in different conflicts … are obviously all questions that we look at quite carefully with our allies and partners,” Haines said, hinting that Russia may have significantly limited military options for conventional action beyond Ukraine.

Haines is not certain that Russian President Vladimir Putin truly understands what’s happening in Ukraine and may be getting sugar-coated reports from underlings unwilling to anger him.

“This has obviously been an issue that’s been discussed pretty widely. … What I can say is, I think Putin was surprised by his military’s … lack of performance” in Ukraine, Haines offered.

“I do think he is becoming more informed of the challenges that the military faces in Russia, but it’s still not clear to us that he has a full picture at this stage of just how challenged they are,” with regard to “shortages of ammunition, … morale, supply issues, logistics, a whole series of concerns that they’re facing.”

While Putin’s grasp of Russia’s poor status in the war may only now be dawning on him, he’s not changing his plans, Haines said.

“He has not changed his political objectives; at least we don’t see evidence of that,” she said.

If his objective is to retake control of Ukraine, “there are a lot of interpretations of what that means,” Haines added—Putin continues to say Ukraine is part of Russia’s sovereign territory, but “what does that mean for his near-term military objectives? Are they going to be as expansive as they were at the beginning? Or does he at some point recognize that he’s incapable of doing what it is he intended to, originally, and … downscale what it is that he’s willing to accept?”

American intelligence believes “he may be willing to do that on a temporary basis with the idea that he might then come back at this issue at a later time.”

Haines said that Russia’s campaign of strikes at Ukraine’s power infrastructure may be hurting, but isn’t having the desired effect of breaking the country’s will to resist.

“As we watch … the population fight for their country and then see the just outrageous illegal attack on civilian infrastructure, such as the grid [and] gas … heating [and] a variety of other things … we’re not seeing any evidence” of Ukrainian will to resist “undermined … at this point.” The strikes are also calculated to “affect Ukraine’s capacity to … prosecute conflict,” which may have an effect long-term, especially on Ukraine’s economy, which is “obviously suffering very badly.”

Iran has given or sold unmanned aircraft to Russia and has ham-handedly tried to avoid responsibility for the results, Haines said. Iran first denied it, then “said, ‘Well, these were given before the war’ … They had a variety of different excuses.” Russia is also seeking other kinds of precision munitions from Iran, she said. “That will be very concerning,” she added, but declined to discuss the issue further.

Haines declined to offer estimates of Russian casualties but said both sides are taking fewer losses as the pace of operations slows.

As to China’s role in supporting Russia, Haines said President Xi has been trying to “play … both sides of this game. … They are continuing to work with Russia on a variety of things. They continue to … have meetings, find ways to support [Russia] in international fora to help them manage … efforts to expose what the Russians are doing or provide condemnation. And they are providing different forms of assistance.”

While China has not provided Russia “anything that is determinative of military assistance, … there are things on the margins … [that] concern us and we’ll obviously keep watching this.” She added that there’s “no evidence” that China has been responsible for reigning in Putin’s recent rhetoric on using nuclear weapons.

However, “I think it is fair to say, from our perspective, that Xi’s voice on this is going to be obviously among the most compelling to Putin on this issue.”

Asked if Putin’s position is becoming more precarious, with more outspoken protests about the war—some even coming from oligarchs—Haines said, “we’ve seen increasing … dissent among the elites,” big-city mayors and “more significant figures in Russia” offering “more critical views of the war … than you have in the past.” However, none of it “amounts to likely regime change.”

The dissent from the elites “could shape some of his decision-making,” and the U.S. is trying to understand this dynamic better, she said. Protests in the street don’t seem to influence Putin, she added.

Report: F-16 Pilot Violated Air Force Rules While Intercepting Civilian Aircraft Before Crash

Dec. 5, 2022 | By Greg Hadley

A pilot incorrectly believed he had lost control of his F-16 when he ejected from it over western Louisiana this past March, resulting in the destruction of the $27 million aircraft, according to a new Accident Investigation Board report.

The report also faulted the pilot and the flight lead accompanying him during the training exercise for failing to follow Air Force rules and regulations as they attempted to intercept a civilian aircraft that was not participating in the exercise.

The March 23 crash did not result in any serious injuries to the pilot, a member of the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Air National Guard.

According to the report, the incident took place during a routine exercise for two F-16s taking off from Ellington Field Joint Reserve Base, Texas, to practice an Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) as part of a NORAD mission as well as air-to-air refueling.

During the training exercise, however, the two F-16s encountered a civilian aircraft that was in an established hold with a nearby regional airport.

Without contacting the civilian aircraft or the air traffic control agency, the flight lead pilot directed an unplanned low-and-slow visual identification intercept of the aircraft, in violation of Air Force training rules that require such intercepts to be coordinated beforehand so the aircraft being intercepted won’t maneuver.

“As a result, the [civilian] aircraft conducting an instrument holding pattern at Beauregard Regional Airport resulted in multiple unpredictable turns. … These uncoordinated turns further increased the level of difficulty for the [F-16s] during their intercept,” the report author states.

As the two F-16s performed the intercept, both pilots flew slower than the minimum airspeed training requirements for that altitude. The flight lead was able to identify five of the six digits in the civilian aircraft’s tail number. The second pilot then approached aircraft to read the last digit, but in doing so closed to within 300 feet of it, again violating Air Force training regulations.

As the second pilot completed the intercept, he went to raise his F-16’s trailing edge flaps using the Alternate Flaps switch in the cockpit. In doing so, however, he inadvertently flipped the switch for his fighter’s Digital Backup, located next to the Alternate Flaps switch. That caused the F-16 “flight control laws [to] default to their false (not active) state, irrespective of the actual airspeed,” per the report.

The trailing edge flaps began retracting, an action that was “normal and indicative of a correctly operating flight control system” when the DBU switch has been flipped. But it caused the F-16 to shudder, and the pilot took that to mean the aircraft had “departed controlled flight,” leading to him decide to eject.

The time between the pilot flipping the wrong switch and the initiation of the ejection was brief—just four seconds, according to the report.

After that, the F-16 crashed in a sparsely wooded area, impacting the ground “in a steep, slow, upright approach and possible rotation,” according to an analysis. An image included in the report shows the remains of the fighter at the crash site, with only a few pieces of the aircraft still easily identifiable.

The AIB report determined that the main cause of the crash was the pilot’s “failure to effectively maintain positive control of the [aircraft] throughout the low speed, low altitude environment,” specifically pointing to his flipping of the DBU switch and lack of familiarity with the F-16’s handling characteristics leading to his mistaken belief that the aircraft was out of control.

On top of that, the report said the pilot and flight lead’s decision to involve a non-participating civilian aircraft in a training exercise substantially contributed to the crash, as did their failure to follow Air Force regulations governing airspeed, separation between aircraft, and pre-flight briefings on the training mission.

More broadly, the report author found in interviewing witnesses from the 138th FW’s Detachment 1 at Ellington Field that many members of the squadron didn’t have the necessary understanding “as to whether performing low/slow VID intercepts against nonparticipating and uncoordinated aircraft is a permitted practice.”