Air Assets, Allies Remain Key for Pentagon’s Basing Strategy

Feb. 10, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

Air assets and strategic partnerships remain pivotal components to the Pentagon’s basing strategy, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, Mara Karlin, assistant secretary of Defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities, said during a Brookings Institution online forum Feb. 10.

“The National Defense Strategy is really focused on allies and partners as a center of gravity,” she said. “We have this unparalleled network that I think our adversaries and challengers find incredibly capable, find meaningful, as one thinks about contingencies and also for deterrence.”

In the Indo-Pacific, Karlin emphasized recent “posture investments” throughout the region by DOD in close coordination with allies.

In Japan, the Air Force is replacing older forward-stationed F-15C aircraft with a rotation of more advanced aircraft, including fifth-generation technologies. The service has also begun MQ-9 Reaper operations in Japan to increase domain awareness, and the two countries reached a joint agreement in January to station a Marine Corps littoral regiment on Okinawa.

“That’s going to bring more advanced and mobile capability to help address the full spectrum of fires requirements in the region,” Karlin said.

Other actions in Japan include the addition of Army watercraft to help increase maritime mobility and updating missions that allow more active Japanese contributions to security.

“Japan is going to establish a permanent joint headquarters that’ll work with us on command and control and make us all even more interoperable,” Karlin said. “We’re going to expand how we’re sharing facilities in Japan; we’re going to increase exercises, and that includes exercises in Japan’s southwest islands … and all of this really sings nicely with Japan’s updated defense strategy that they recently highlighted, which just demonstrates a serious effort to invest profoundly in the Japanese self-defense forces.”

Beyond Japan, Karlin also highlighted progress on AUKUS, the U.S.’s trilateral agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom. While the arrangement is principally focused on providing Australia with conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, other advanced military capabilities have been folded in as well—Karlin said Secretary of State Anthony Blinken discussed accelerating technology delivery with his U.K. and Australian counterparts at their first caucus in December.

“Some examples include our cooperation on maritime undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and using all three of our countries’ autonomous systems to enhance maritime domain awareness,” she said. “We’re also leveraging exercises in the region to demonstrate and test advanced capabilities, and we’re pursuing additional collaborative demonstrations, including for hypersonics and autonomous systems over this next year.”

Karlin also noted the planned expansion of rotational bomber and fighter deployments—the Pentagon also plans to conduct more bomber and fighter exercises with South Korea.

The U.S.’s posture in the region has also been bolstered with the Philippines, with the recent announcement that U.S. forces would have access to four more bases in the country under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

“It enables combined training exercises interoperability that lets our forces better cooperate when we’re looking at humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,” Karlin said. “We also are going to restart joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea.”

This cooperation will make combined exercises more complex, help improve joint planning, and ensure the region has advanced capabilities, she added.

These partnerships show a fundamental difference in what the U.S. and China are competing for,Isaac Kardon, senior fellow for China Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, emphasized in a follow-up panel.

“China is not certainly in a position now to substitute for the types of security goods, public, and club, and ally, and partner network, and otherwise, that the United States is providing, and I don’t think we need to worry about that kind of direct symmetric competition,” he said. “We need to worry about what does China’s economic access grant it in terms of strategic leverage, coercive leverage.”

Responding to Russia

Yet it is not only in the Pacific where the Defense Department is looking to bolster its presence. Karlin noted Russia remains an acute, immediate, and sharp threat, requiring vigilance in Europe.

“We are working to deepen our partnerships and enhance our posture in Europe, most notably alongside our NATO allies,” she said. “You saw just how quickly the U.S. military surged forces to Europe as Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine kicked off last February, so we quickly surged forces from about 80,000 or so to over 100,000.”

In addition, F-35s were stationed in the U.K., and additional destroyers were deployed to Rota, Spain. Karlin also touched on a number of other strength enhancements, including Baltic region rotational deployments and forward stationing the Army’s V Corps in Poland.

Moving forward, however, NATO unity will remain a key challenge, said Emily Holland, assistant professor at the Russian Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War college in the follow-up panel discussion.

“The U.S. is seeking to send these strong deterrence signals to Russia, but they’re really emphasizing working through and with partners,” she said. “So it’s important for the administration that where it sent troops, NATO was also sending troops and support at the same time.”

Elsewhere in the Middle East, the U.S. has downsized its presence after two decades of war, but Karlin touted the successes like January’s Juniper Oak exercise, which featured 100 U.S. aircraft, including four B-52 Stratofortress bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and four F-35s.

“What’s meaningful is not just how great the cooperation was between the U.S. military and the Israelis, but that we could come in and we could run such an exercise and have what we believe is an important impact and showing our interoperability and our ability to respond quickly when we need to do so,” she said.

Karlin also emphasized the number of changes she’s seen, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, over the past decade or so.

“You increasingly see cognizance and concurrence of how the threat environment has changed,” she said. “You see a need and a desire by our allies and our partners across the Indo-Pacific, and I would say, a whole lot of agreement by our allies in Europe as well, about the need to focus and collaborate on what we are all doing there to ensure security and stability.”

F-35 Deliveries May Resume by March, as Pratt Says It Has an Engine Fix

Feb. 10, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Pratt & Whitney believes it has a fix in hand for the engine problem that may have contributed to an F-35B crash in December, and deliveries of all F-35 fighters, on hold since Dec. 27, 2022, could resume by March, according to the contractor.

“We have developed a near-term remedy that allows the fleet to fly safely, and we expect that F135 engine deliveries could resume before the end of the month,” said Jen Latka, vice president of Pratt & Whitney for the F135 engine, which powers the F-35 fighter.

Latka did not elaborate to Air & Space Forces Magazine on what the fix is, except to say that it addresses “a rare systems phenomenon involving harmonic resonance.”

The Dec. 14 crash that led to the halt in deliveries occurred during an F-35B acceptance flight at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, Texas, facility—the aircraft suddenly pitched forward during a vertical descent and struck the runway. The pilot ejected at zero altitude and survived the escape with light injury.

The crash sparked an investigation, led by Naval Air Systems Command, which in turn led to all deliveries of F135 engines and F-35s being suspended.

A cracked fuel tube found in the wreck, suspected in the early days of the investigation, has turned out not to be a systemic problem, Latka said.

“After thorough review, we can confidently say there were no quality issues with the fuel tube that fractured,” she said.

“We are working closely” the F-35 Joint Program Office, Naval Air Systems Command and the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center “on all aspects of the ongoing investigation, including root cause determination and corrective action development,” Latka said. “Safety for the warfighter is and will continue to be our number one priority.” She noted that the F135 has accumulated 600,000 flight hours, and this experience along with “everything we’ve learned over the last 20 years” will be applied to “continue to mature and modernize the F135.”

A spokeswoman for NAVAIR could not offer an estimate of when the inquiry will be concluded. She offered no comment on whether any inspections or technical orders have been ordered as a result of a safety probe conducted in the wake of the accident.

The F-35 JPO referred queries about the engine situation to Pratt & Whitney.

A Lockheed Martin spokeswoman said the contractor has finished building—and is storing—17 F-35s since the halt in deliveries was ordered at the end of December. Production of the fighters has continued at a normal pace since then.

Several flight tests are required of each aircraft in order to complete the DD250 process, which is the handover protocol of a formal aircraft delivery. The Lockheed spokeswoman could not offer an estimate of how long it would take to complete those flight tests for the 17 aircraft.

Roughly a dozen of the 17 F-35s currently in storage were headed for Air Force duty, a service spokeswoman told Air & Space Forces Magazine. The aircraft were destined for Lakenheath Air Base, U.K.; Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.; Luke Air Force Base, Ariz.; and Hill Air Force Base, Utah, she said.

While there have been “no operational impacts” as a result of the F-35 deliveries hiatus, the Air Force spokeswoman said, she noted a problem with “the F-35 main fuel throttle valve has only impacted production aircraft and a very small number of fielded F-35s with low-time engines.”

The Air Force is “working with the [JPO], Department of the Navy, partners, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney toward a resolution to resume engine and aircraft deliveries as soon as possible,” she added.

Pratt has been lobbying the Air Force to go with its F135 Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) to provide the additional power and cooling required for the Block 4 version of the F-35.

The Air Force is also considering upgrading to one of the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) engines developed by Pratt and GE Aerospace. The two engines—GE’s XA-100 and Pratt’s XA-101—were developed as potential F-35 engine upgrades over a 12-year period. Both provide about a 30 percent increase in fuel efficiency, as well as improved thrust and cooling, thanks to a novel bypass air feature.

However, the JPO has warned the Air Force that it would have to bear the costs for the development of an AETP engine alone, as partners in the program, in the interest of commonality, have to “pay to be different.”

Pratt would prefer the Air Force go with the F135 ECU—even though Pratt has an AETP engine to offer—as such a choice would cement its monopoly as the sole provider of F-35 engines. The AETP option would potentially bring in GE as another source.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has discussed engine development cost-sharing with Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro, but no joint effort has been announced. While GE says its AETP can be adapted to fit any of the three F-35 variants, Pratt has said its version can’t be made to work with the F-35B, which employs a rotating rear nozzle and a vertically-mounted lift fan to achieve vertical takeoffs and landings.

USAF officials have said the F-35 engine question will likely be answered in the fiscal year 2024 President’s Budget, now expected to be released in early March.

USAF Fighters Shoot Down Three Objects in Three Days—But Details Are Scarce

Feb. 10, 2023 | By Greg Hadley and Chris Gordon

U.S. Air Force fighters shot down three separate airborne objects over North America in three days this weekend—one over Alaska, one in Canada, and one above Michigan—but unlike the Chinese balloon that transited the continental U.S. before being shot down by an F-22 off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, the origins of these three new objects, their purpose, and what exactly they are remain unclear.

In a Feb. 12 briefing, Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, head of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), said all three of the objects were similar in size and speed—small and slow-moving—and none presented a “kinetic military threat,” but he declined to offer any other details.

The unprecedented flurry of shoot-downs—VanHerck said he believed it to the first time in NORAD or NORTHCOM history that the U.S. has taken kinetic action against an airborne object—could be explained in part by a heightened state of alert after the Chinese spy balloon, which created an international uproar after it was identified and proceeded to fly over the U.S.

“We have been more closely scrutinizing our airspace at these altitudes, including enhancing our radar, which may at least partly explain the increase in objects that we’ve detected over the past week,” assistant secretary of Defense for homeland defense and hemispheric affairs Melissa Dalton said.

“Radars essentially filter out information based on speed,” VanHerck added. “So you can set various gates, we call them velocity gates, that allow us to filter out low-speed clutter. So if you had radars on all the time that we’re looking at anything from zero speed … you would see a lot more information. We have adjusted some of those gates to give us better fidelity on seeing slower objects. You can also filter out by altitude and so with some adjustments, we’ve been able to get a better categorization of radar tracks now, and that’s why I think you’re seeing these overall. Plus there’s a heightened alert to look for this information.”

Still, much about these three new objects, taken down Feb. 10-12, remains unknown, and Dalton acknowledged that whoever launched them may not have been using them for military or intelligence purposes.

“We … know that a range of entities, including countries, companies, research organizations—operate objects at these altitudes for purposes that are not nefarious, including legitimate research,” Dalton said.

And while NORAD and NORTHCOM repeatedly scrambled aircraft to identify, track, and shoot down the objects, VanHerck declined to provide any description of what pilots saw.

“It’s really, really difficult for pilots—at the altitudes we’re operating, with a very, very slow object … going at the speed of the wind, essentially and our pilots are going several hundred miles per hour—to give us what I would consider a factual, scientific-based description of what we see,” VanHerck said.

All told, U.S. Air Force assets from Alaska to Pennsylvania, ranging from fighters to tankers to ISR aircraft, were involved in tracking and shooting down the three objects.

Lake Huron

The most recent takedown took place Feb. 12, with F-16s from the Minnesota Air National Guard’s 148th Fighter Wing downing an object at around 20,000 feet over Lake Huron near the upper peninsula of Michigan, using an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. The object in question was apparently connected to one detected over Montana the previous day.

The F-16s were supported by a KC-135 from Pennsylvania Air National Guard and a E-3 Sentry from Tinker Air Force Base, Okla.

“Based on its flight path and data we can reasonably connect this object to the radar signal picked up over Montana, which flew in proximity to sensitive DOD sites,” Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said in a statement, in an apparent reference to the same ICBM silos at Malmstrom Air Force Base the Chinese balloon flew over. “Its path and altitude raised concerns, including that it could be a hazard to civil aviation.”

F-15s were scrambled from Portland Air National Guard Base, Wash. to search for the object Feb. 11 and airspace was closed over Montana, but no contact occurred.

Ryder said the Pentagon “did not assess it to be a kinetic military threat to anything on the ground, but did assess it was a safety flight hazard and a threat due to its potential surveillance capabilities.”

Yukon

A different encounter, however, did occur on Feb. 11 as NORAD tracked and shot down an object in northwest Canada.

The Pentagon said the object was tracked and monitored over U.S. airspace by F-22s from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. The object then crossed into northwest Canada, and Canadian CF-18s fighters and CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft joined in the hunt.

“Out of an abundance of caution and at the recommendation of their militaries, President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau authorized it to be taken down,” the White House said in a statement. “President Biden authorized U.S. fighter aircraft assigned to NORAD to conduct the operation and a U.S. F-22 shot down the object in Canadian territory in close coordination with Canadian authorities.”

Canadian defense minister Anita Anand said the target was a “small, cylindrical object” which was smaller than the Chinese balloon shot down off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4. Anand said the object was operating at approximately 40,000 feet and was downed approximately 100 miles from the U.S.-Canadian border. Once again, the fighter used an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile for the kill. Canadian authorities have yet to further identify the object.

Alaska

On the other side of the border, an F-22 shot down an object in northeastern Alaska on Feb. 10—also using an AIM-9X.

Ryder said the object was first detected by a U.S. Northern Command ground radar on Feb. 9. A U.S. military official told Air & Space Forces Magazine that F-35s helped identify the object on Feb. 9, and a pair of F-22s from Elmendorf-Richardson were subsequently used for the takedown. F-16s from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska assisted the F-22s with the kill, the official said.

Officials said the object was flying at around 40,000 feet, presenting a danger to civilian air traffic and necessitating it be shot down. In a Feb. 10 briefing, Ryder said Air Force pilots were able to determine the object was likely unmanned but declined to explain why officials could not describe any more details about the object, even while pilots were able to determine it was unmanned.

“We’ll know more and have more information once we’ve recovered this,” Ryder said. “I will give credit to our pilots, that they’re very capable in terms of looking at an object and assessing whether or not this had the potential to be manned. At that altitude, something that small—very, very unlikely that it was manned.”

National Security Council spokesman John F. Kirby did indicate Feb. 10 that the object did not appear to have a “significant” payload or self-propulsive capabilities.

The quick downing of the three objects in quick succession stand in contrast to the Chinese surveillance balloon, which was first detected near the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, before flying over Canada. By the time President Biden gave the order to shoot it down, Pentagon officials have said, it had crossed over from Canada into Idaho and Montana, and Biden and his leaders made the decision not to shoot it until it was over water and not a threat to civilians on the ground.

That decision was criticized by many Republicans, but both Kirby and Ryder said the choice to shoot down the object in Canada far sooner after its initial detection was not based on politics.

“A little bit apples and oranges,” Ryder said, noting that because the object was flying at a lower altitude—40,000 feet compared to 65,000—it presented a threat to civil air traffic.

Recovery operations for the Alaska object are still ongoing, VanHerck said Feb. 12. Ryder initially said HC-130, HH-60, and CH-47 aircraft had been assigned to the operation, and VanHerck later said a Navy P-8 and helicopters were still looking for the object.

New Report: Defense Industrial Readiness ‘Going in the Wrong Direction’

Feb. 9, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

There’s a growing “mismatch” between what the National Defense Strategy says is needed for the coming years and the state of the defense industrial base, which is shrinking, less able to surge production, dealing with ever-greater uncertainty, and facing a worsening shortage of workers, according to a new report from the National Defense Industrial Association.

The 2023 edition of the NDIA’s annual report on the health of the defense industrial base said the “resiliency” of the industrial base “was sacrificed as part of the 1990s Peace Dividend.” The qualities that once made the base a “powerhouse”—stable and predictable budgets, a highly skilled, experienced workforce, diversified and modern infrastructure, manufacturing innovation and sufficient capacity—have all “atrophied,” according to the report.

In their place is now a “just-in-time” scheme that offers little depth and ability to “reconstitute” in the event of an unexpected conflict, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That is seemingly at odds with the latest edition of the National Defense Strategy, which says the U.S. must be able to deter war with China—the U.S.’s “pacing challenge” in military capability—or win a protracted conflict if deterrence fails.

The NDIA report was released Feb. 8; the same day the heads of major defense industry associations—including David Norquist, president of the NDIA—testified before the House Armed Services Committee on factors affecting the nation’s ability to surge weapons production for a major war.

Many of the concerns raised by the NDIA have been pointed out before but are continuing “in the wrong direction,” the report said, including:

People: The NDIA notes that while there were three million people working in U.S. defense industries in 1985, that number has dwindled to 1.1 million.
Companies: In five years, the “defense ecosystem” has lost 17,045 companies; vendors that either went out of business, were absorbed by another company, or exited the sector. In the case of small businesses, their departure was often driven by the bureaucracy of dealing with Pentagon contracting or the long delays between proposals and contract awards. The DOD estimates the number of small businesses doing work for the Pentagon fell 40 percent in the last 10 years, despite a growing panoply of programs specifically designed to attract and retain them.
A Shrinking Part of the Economy: As a share of Gross Domestic Product, defense spending has declined from 5.8 percent to 3.2 percent since 1985, “and the Congressional Budget Office projects a further decline to 2.7 percent by 2036.”
Predictability: The federal government has operated under a continuing resolution in 13 of the last 14 years, lowering purchasing power and delaying new starts “essential for modernization,” production increases for programs ready to expand, and advanced procurement funding “essential for building capacity.”
Limited Surge Capability: The lack of investment in infrastructure, equipment, “idle capacity and tooling,” and too much reliance on single-source vendors “challenges both the readiness and reconstitution” capability of the DIB.

The NDIA said the Pentagon “must prioritize removing” the red tape that is “strangling the defense industrial base” and begin a campaign of “significant … predictable” investments to rebuild the DIB’s “strategic endurance and resilience.”

A large part of the NDIA report is a survey of member companies, which come from the aerospace, shipbuilding, vehicles, materials, electronics, and other defense sectors. The NDIA said its survey included responses from 171 companies, who collectively hold 35 percent of contracts of the Pentagon’s acquisition budget, ranging from small shops to major prime contractors.

Collectively, respondents said the Pentagon acquisition process is “growing more—not less—cumbersome,” according to the survey summary. The lack of consistency and predictability of budgets is “breaking companies and causing significant workforce uncertainty,” the latter issue of which is affecting “even our most strategic defense programs.” Inflation—“a cross-cutting issue”—is playing hob with many programs, in part because labor rates are often locked in at the beginning of long-term contracts, and many had small, if any, escalation provisions.

The survey asked about a number of defense industrial climate factors, including:

Inflation: 72 percent of companies surveyed picked “increased labor costs” as the top consequence they’ll feel because of inflation. More than 50 percent chose increased costs of materials and trouble hiring new workers. Rounding out the top six impacts were supply chain delays, employees quitting and reduced customer spending. Only six percent of those answering the survey expected “no major impacts” from inflation in the coming year.
Ease of Doing Business: The Pentagon has a lot of work to do to make it easier for companies to work with it—62 percent of respondents said it’s “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult” to do business with the DOD, compared to 48 percent for other government agencies and 34 percent for nongovernment organizations. Only 13 percent said it was “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to work with the Pentagon, versus 47 percent of nongovernment organizations.
Hiring: Good help is hard to get. For science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) jobs, 82 percent of companies said it’s “somewhat” or “very” difficult to hire workers. It’s the same story for skilled workers and tradespeople, at 64 percent, and workers with security clearances, at 75 percent. In a separate question, companies were asked how hard they expect it to be competing with nondefense companies for workers, and 80 percent answered “somewhat” or “very” difficult.
Toughest Issues: Asked to name “the most pressing issue” facing the DIB, almost a third of respondents—30 percent—said it was the “burden of acquisition processes and paperwork.” About a quarter—23 percent–named “finding and retaining talent,” almost even with “lack of budget stability,” at 22 percent. Inflation was the only other issue to crack 10 percent.
Help Us: The two top answers to “what can government do to help the DIB” were “streamline the acquisition process” and “ensure budget stability,” at 34 percent each. Eleven percent said “enhance funding of research and development for emerging technologies,” nine percent said simplifying the process of security clearances, and six percent want the government to help with training of a skilled workforce.
Outlook: Queried on whether they think general business conditions will improve in the next year, most respondents—45 percent—said things will likely stay the same, with 33 percent predicting “worse” and 22 percent expecting “better.” Asked about how they expect conditions to be in the defense business sector a year from now, 57 percent said “about the same,” but 29 percent expect things will be worse. Only 14 percent expect conditions to be better.

Kendall and UK Defense Official Look To Accelerate E-7 Wedgetail

Feb. 9, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall welcomed a top British defense official to the Pentagon on Feb. 8, for discussions on Russia’s war on Ukraine, U.K. moves to bolster its role in the Indo-Pacific, and new aircraft purchases by both the U.S. and Royal air forces.

A readout of Kendall’s meeting with U.K. Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey offered new details on the E-7 Wedgetail, the airborne early warning and control aircraft both countries are buying to replace their aging E-3 AWACS fleets. The readout said the two discussed “continued collaboration on the E-7 Wedgetail program, including ways to accelerate U.S. Air Force procurement and fielding of the platform and the importance of achieving maximum interoperability.”

Under current plans, the Royal Air Force has ordered three Wedgetails, with the first being converted from a secondhand Boeing 737 Next Generation airliner. That first aircraft is to be delivered in 2024. The U.S. Air Force is procuring an as-yet-undisclosed number of E-7s, with the delivery of a first “rapid prototype” by 2027.

Yet soon after the USAF announced it was buying the Wedgetail in April 2022, discussions about potentially accelerating that 2027 delivery timeline started—driven in large part by the E-3’s rapidly declining reliability and the service’s eagerness to retire the old aircraft quickly, even to the point of accepting what it called a “small” gap in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Gen. Mark D. Kelly, head of Air Combat Command, said in October 2021 that he wanted the wanted the E-7 in the fleet “two years ago.” The E-3 fleet is now so old and rickety, he said, it requires a “Herculean” effort just to get mission capable rates up to about 50 percent.

Last May, Kendall told lawmakers “there are things that we could do … to maybe get access to aircraft earlier one way or another,” but he did not specify what. It takes two years to build the airframes themselves, let alone the specialized equipment on board. Modifying the 737 Next Generation airframes with the Wedgetail gear takes another two years, Kendall said then, indicating the U.S. was stuck behind other customers awaiting orders.

But two months later, Boeing executives told reporters at the Farnborough International Airshow in July that their company was ready and willing to accelerate the Wedgetail schedule, saying they could ramp up production of the 737 Next Generation airframes to start with. Then in August, program executive officer for the digital directorate Steven Wert suggested the RAF might be able to help accelerate the program.

“We see tremendous opportunities to accelerate test and evaluation, given that we’re buying a system very similar to the U.K. E-7,” Wert said at the time. “Much of the testing can actually be done on a U.K. E-7 or a Wedgetail. So tremendous opportunities, especially with test and evaluation.”

Kendall’s meeting with Heappey, one of the top deputies for U.K. defense secretary Ben Wallace, is the first public discussion since then.

Using British E-7s for test and evaluation ahead of a planned 2025 production decision seems the most likely way the RAF could help the process. Andrew Hunter, assistant secretary for acquisition, has previously said the U.S. Air Force does not want to buy used 737s and convert them like the U.K. has, so the British wouldn’t be able to give their aircraft to the U.S. or defer their buy.

F-35, Ukraine, Indo-Pacific

In addition to Wedgetail, Kendall and Heappey also discussed “aspects of the F-35 Lightning II program,” with Kendall in particular highlighting it as a “key to maintaining a strong and effective integrated deterrence posture in Europe.” The British are slated to buy 138 F-35s, while the U.S. is building up its first F-35 squadrons in Europe at RAF Lakenheath in England.

In addition to the U.K. and U.S., Germany, Switzerland, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland have all either ordered or received F-35s—officials are predicting more than 500 of the fifth-generation fighters on the continent by the end of the decade.

Kendall and Heappey also talked about the situation in Ukraine and their commitment to supporting Ukrainian resistance against Russia’s invading forces, according to the readout. That same day, U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak offered to extend fighter jet training to Ukrainian pilots, while directing Wallace to look into what combat jets the RAF could potentially supply to Ukraine.

Kendall “commended the U.K. for its commitment to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, as evidenced by the Reciprocal Access Agreement the U.K. recently signed with Japan,” the readout said.

The U.K.-Japan agreement, signed in January, allows forces from both countries to be deployed to the other for training and joint exercises, a further sign of growing U.K. involvement in the Indo-Pacific. Britain, Australia, and the U.S. are joined in AUKUS, a trilateral defense agreement, and the UK also is working with Italy and Japan to develop a next-generation fighter jet.

US Used U-2 to Gather Intelligence on Chinese Spy Balloon

Feb. 9, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Some of the most vital information about the Chinese spy balloon gathered by the U.S. military came from U-2 Dragon Lady flights over the continental United States, U.S. officials said Feb. 9.

The high-altitude reconnaissance flights enabled the U.S. to verify the balloon’s surveillance package was outfitted with multiple antennas that U.S. intelligence agencies say seem intended to collect and geolocate communications.

“High-resolution imagery from U-2 flybys revealed that the high-altitude balloon was capable of conducting signals intelligence collection operations,” a senior State Department official said.

The U-2 flights also confirmed that the craft relied on large solar panels to power its intelligence sensors.

Since an F-22 Raptor shot down the balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, U.S. officials have rejected Chinese claims that the craft was merely an off-course weather balloon. Rather, officials say the craft was part of a larger fleet of Chinese surveillance balloons that have been flying for years over 40 countries in five continents.

The State Department said Feb. 9 that the balloon, and others like it, were manufactured by a company with ties to China’s People’s Liberation Army.

“We know these balloons are all part of a PRC fleet of balloons developed to conduct surveillance operations,” the senior State Department official said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. “These kinds of activities are often undertaken at the direction of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). We are confident that the balloon manufacturer has a direct relationship with China’s military and is an approved vendor of the PLA, according to information published in an official procurement portal for the PLA.”

A U.S. military official told Air & Space Forces Magazine that U-2s were flying in support of U.S. Northern Command with required legal authority to help the U.S. government collect intelligence on the intruder. The official did not specify how many U-2s took part in the missions or how many sorties took place.

The U.S. military official said in addition to the U-2, other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were used to gather information on the balloon while it was in flight, but declined to provide further details.

“Day-to-day we do not have the authority to collect intelligence within the United States of America,” Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, the head of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), told reporters Feb. 6. “In this case, specific authorities were granted to collect intelligence against the balloon specifically and we utilized specific capabilities to do that.”

The balloon first entered the U.S.’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) near Alaska on Jan. 28, according to U.S. officials. NORAD continued tracking it as it entered Canada two days later before re-crossing into American airspace in Idaho on Jan. 31. According to U.S. officials, the balloon drifted near sensitive U.S. national security sites, such as Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., the site of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos.

U-2s have conducted domestic operations in the past, flying in support of the U.S. government’s response to natural disasters such as wildfires and in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. However, as VanHerck noted, the U.S. military is not legally authorized to conduct intelligence-gathering flights over the U.S. without special permission.

The Air Force’s current fleet of 27 U-2S aircraft were manufactured in the 1980s and have a modular architecture that can carry a wide variety of payloads simultaneously, such as advanced optical equipment, signals intelligence, and more.

“We utilized multiple capabilities to ensure we collected and utilized the opportunity to close intel gaps,” VanHerck said Feb. 6.

The U-2 has a ceiling of more than 70,000 feet, which means the aircraft could have flown above the balloon, which U.S. officials said was operating at 60,000 to 65,000 feet.

“The United States sent a clear message to the PRC that its violation of our sovereignty was unacceptable by shooting down the balloon, protecting our own sensitive intelligence, and maximizing our ability to track the balloon and recover the payload to get more information on the PRC’s program,” the senior State Department official added. “The PRC’s program will only continue to be exposed, making it harder for the PRC to use this program.”

Does Congress Care About Defending America’s Skies?

Feb. 9, 2023 | By Brian J. Morra

The following commentary is written by Brian J. Morra, a former Air Force Intelligence officer and retired senior aerospace executive. His most recent article for Air & Space Forces Magazine was “The Near Nuclear War of 1983.” His novel about the 1983 incident, titled The Able Archers, was released in March 2022.

The appearance of a Chinese surveillance balloon over North America in recent days should cause Americans to ponder just how safe they are from aerial attack. Can we defend our airspace from modern drones (unmanned air vehicles), hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, and—yes—from airships? Congress should hold hearings promptly to determine the answer.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the lethal impact of air and missile attacks on civilian lives and economic infrastructure. New graphic images of the destruction wrought by Russia’s air campaign against Ukraine appear daily. Ukraine’s economy is now operating at Depression-era levels. Is the United States any better protected?

The fact is that the United States has not deployed a robust air defense system to secure its territory since the Cold War. Does the American public realize this? Does Congress? We’ve seen in Ukraine that the absence of an integrated national air defense leads to vast death and destruction.

On Feb. 6, Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, the commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), told reporters that his command had not been aware of previous balloon incursions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He asserted that “we did not detect those threats and that’s a domain awareness gap that we have to figure out, but I don’t want to get into any further detail.” Uniquely, NORAD is a binational U.S.-Canada organization that detects air threats to both countries under a unified command structure.

The same day that Gen. VanHerck met with the press, the Chinese government confirmed reports that a Chinese balloon had floated over Latin America and the Caribbean. “These balloons are all part of a PRC fleet of balloons developed to conduct surveillance operations, which have also violated the sovereignty of other countries.” Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary, told reporters.

Apparently, the intelligence community has reassessed indications of four balloon incursions dating back to the Trump administration and determined that they also were perpetrated by the PRC.

According to the White House, the balloon that traversed the United States was first detected on Jan. 28 when it entered Alaskan airspace near the Aleutian Islands. By the end of the day on Jan. 30, it exited American airspace and flew over Canada. The PRC’s balloon re-entered American airspace over Idaho on the Jan. 31. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed President Biden about the presence of the balloon on Jan. 31. The president requested military options to deal with the intruder.

Congress should ask the following questions. Why was the president not briefed until Jan. 31 when the balloon entered American airspace on Jan. 28? What is the protocol for informing the White House about an airspace intruder? How clearly do the White House and the Congress understand the respective roles and missions of NORAD and the Missile Defense Agency regarding air and missile threats? Is there a seamless and timely command structure for assessing and dealing with air and missile threats to the United States?

The answers are important because the United States and Canada already face several daunting threats. The most alarming potential threat is a nuclear-armed ballistic missile launched by North Korea. And one must assume that Kim Jong Un has paid careful attention to the Chinese balloon incursion. In past years, Kim has threatened the use of an electromagnetic pulse device to cripple North America. A high-altitude airship might be an ideal delivery platform for such a devastating attack.

For its part, China is in the midst of a massive nuclear arms buildup, shedding its long-stated nuclear policy of “sufficiency” and aiming for nuclear superiority over both Russia and the United States. This week, U.S. Strategic Command issued an unclassified statement stating that China now has more land-based ballistic missile launchers than the U.S. China is advancing its nuclear modernization program faster than most observers thought possible. Both Russia and China have robust hypersonic missile programs, which are designed to defeat our ballistic missile defenses in Alaska and Europe. Iran threatens to deploy a nuclear weapon soon, and it has the means to develop delivery systems for such a weapon.

Congress ought to hold hearings and ask the appropriate defense and intelligence community officials to explain their plans to protect America. If roles and missions are unclear, then get them clarified. If resources are insufficient, which they surely are when our Air Force has the oldest fleet of planes in its history, then Congress should lead the way in determining where money can be reallocated to national air and missile defense without increasing the defense budget. There are plenty of legacy platforms and failed programs the armed services want to divest, where money could be harvested and re-purposed to improve the nation’s air and missile defenses.

Congress has opposed most of the services’ requests to sunset aging platforms and end non-performing programs because members don’t want to take the political heat for job losses in their districts. For the same reason, Congress opposes a new base realignment and closure commission. Closing bases the armed services no longer need would free up billions of dollars that could be applied to improving our national defenses.

The Chinese balloon episode ought to be a wake-up call to the White House and the Congress and not be wished away as the next crisis comes to dominate the headlines. Hold hearings now and take appropriate action based on what is learned. There is no time to waste.

For Defense Industry to Surge Production, Here’s What It Needs, Leaders Tell Congress

Feb. 8, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Rapidly supplying Ukraine with weapons is prompting calls to surge munitions production, but the defense industrial base can’t do it without contractual certainty and funding predictability from Congress, industry association leaders told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 8.

The companies comprising the defense industrial base—“DIB” for short—need “clear demand signals from Congress,” regulations that allow innovation, and action “at the speed of relevance,” Aerospace Industries Association president Eric Fanning told the HASC.

“Federal policy and investment in our national defense can be summed up in two words: unpredictable and inconsistent,” Fanning said.

Over the last 25 years, he noted, “Congress has passed more than 120 continuing resolutions instead of on-time appropriations bills.”

With continuing resolutions comes chronic uncertainty for companies on when or even if they will get paid in a timely manner or proceed to a new phase of development or production. That has deterred many companies from entering the business, driven others out, and deterred some from investing in capacity and long-lead items since they can’t predict when or whether the funding is coming, Fanning said.

The industry is also “still digging out from the effects of sequestration a decade ago,” which could “take years to unwind without a sense of urgency,” Fanning said.

Multiyear contracts, authorization for more long-lead materials purchases and a willingness to spend money on weapons that may not ever be used are the price of production capacity, he asserted.

The DIB has been optimized for peacetime needs, Fanning said, and so “excess capacity for surging is not … built into the system.”

David Norquist, head of the National Defense Industrial Association, said despite two consecutive National Defense Strategies declaring “the post-Cold War world is definitely over” and the need to prepare for military competition with China, “key industrial readiness indicators for great power competition are going in the wrong direction.”

For example, “we should expect the number of workers in the defense industrial base to be increasing. In 1985, the US had three million workers in the defense industry. In 2021, there were 1.1 million workers in the sector, and that number is remaining flat,” Norquist said.

The number of companies doing work in the defense sector has also declined, with some 17,000 companies having left the business in the last five years, he said.

“In particular, the Department of Defense recently estimated the number of small businesses participating in the defense industrial base has declined over 40 percent in the last decade,” he said. That’s likely related to the fact that “from 1985 to 2021, funding for national defense decreased from 5.8 percent to 3.2 percent” of the gross domestic product, and the Congressional Budget Office “projects a further decline to 2.7% by 2032,” he added.

Norquist’s statistics come from NDIA’s annual report on the health of the DIB, called “Warning Signs,” which was released the day of the hearing. It combined a survey of members with third-party data and analyses about the defense ecosystem. Most respondents said that despite “well-meaning” efforts to streamline defense work, most still find it “very hard” to work with the Pentagon, and that a key culprit is the long wait between winning a contract and actually getting it underway with money coming in the door. While big companies can usually ride that out, small businesses can’t.

“Those non-traditional industries … cannot afford the many regulatory barriers to entry along contracting timelines and the disruptive uncertainty with annual appropriations,” Norquist said.

He also noted that “in 13 of the last 14 years, we’ve had long continuing resolutions that specifically prevent new starts or increased production rates. These trends are not consistent with creating the defense industrial base required for great power competition.”

And while a “brittle” supply base is a “strategic vulnerability” a “resilient” one “is a powerful deterrent,” Norquist said, echoing recent remarks from William LaPlante, the Pentagon’s acquisition and sustainment chief.

“The condition of the industry today is not the result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it’s successive decisions made over many years,” Fanning said.

He thanked the committee for authorities in recent years that can speed up some kinds of development and acquisition, but said the nation must “empower its workforce to move beyond a compliance culture to one that exercises existing flexibility.”

Witnesses also said they are struggling to attract and retain workforce, which Fanning called the “number one” issue among AIA members.

HASC chairman Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) said the war in Ukraine has “laid bare” the U.S.’s inability to surge weapons production, and he accused the Biden Administration of refusing “to use the authorities and resources Congress gave them last year to provide the necessary relief” from problems spurred by inflation, workforce shortages and bureaucracy.

Rogers and several other members also noted that the U.S. is dependent on China for a number of raw materials, such as rare Earth elements, that play a key role in many weapon systems. But Fanning said that while the aerospace industry can find other sources of the metals, “it’s the processing” of the ores that is largely monopolized by China.

Ranking member Adam Smith (D-Wash.) called the health of the industrial base “a growing … huge challenge” which “we were certainly aware of” before the war in Ukraine and the pandemic. The U.S. “suddenly found ourselves in desperate need of a lot more of certain production items” because of Ukraine “and discovered we did not have the surge capacity” necessary.

“We have heard consistently from our industrial partners, that they are not going to build a level of manufacturing capability necessary to produce stuff if they don’t know that someone’s going to buy it. … The cliché now is that ‘we need a demand signal,’ which basically means we need the government to promise [to] ‘pay us one way or another before we will make the investments to be able to make things quicker and faster.’ So we need to figure that out,” Smith said.

Smith said it won’t be possible to go into overdrive production of every defense article, as “we just do not have the resources … to be able to prepare for every conceivable contingency,” and the private sector won’t make the investment “on a wish and a promise.”

The situation is the result of China throughout the “late 1990s and early 2000s … [being] where you went to make stuff” without having to pay “huge labor costs [and] certainly no environmental regulations. It was cheap. It was easy.” But now, he said, “we are beginning to diversify in a bipartisan way.”

He added that the U.S. can’t meet this challenge on its own, “and I know people don’t like hearing that,” but the capacity situation will require efforts from U.S. allies and partners as well. As much as “people want America to be independent … that’s not the way the global economy works. We need to increase our capacity, absolutely. But we also need to work with trusted partners.”

Fixing the problem will take time, Fanning said, particularly the workforce issue and “building the ecosystem” of the industrial base to be more responsive and resilient.

Norquist said the industry needs “more than a signal” but “a contract” on a multiyear basis, and that will provide all the incentive necessary. Industry wants to “get ahead” of the contract, though, so it can lay in the workforce and infrastructure to compete well for work, so he urged the Pentagon and Congress to be direct in saying what they want and to then back it up with the money.

C-17s Rush U.S. Rescue Teams to Türkiye After Earthquake

Feb. 8, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

A pair of U.S. Air Force C-17s arrived in Türkiye on Feb. 8, carrying disaster relief personnel and equipment to help with the recovery from a massive earthquake.

The 7.8 magnitude earthquake, which struck Feb. 5, has killed at least 12,000 people across Türkiye and Syria and sparked a humanitarian disaster—tens of thousands injured, many people homeless, and others still trapped under the rubble.

U.S. Transportation Command was tapped to transport aid, and within 24 hours of notification, two flights departed, one each from Dover Air Force Base, Del.; and March Air Reserve Base, Calif. The aircraft were from the 305th Air Mobility Wing at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and the 176th Wing of the Alaska Air National Guard.

“Air Mobility Command, under the direction of U.S. Transportation Command and in coordination with The U.S. Agency for International Development is providing airlift to support emergency humanitarian assistance to respond to the devastating impacts following the earthquake in the region,” an AMC spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

According to a release from TRANSCOM, the two flights carried 159 people, 12 rescue dogs, and 170,000 pounds of specialized equipment.

That included specialists and equipment from Fairfax County, Va., and Los Angeles County, Calif. Both teams are certified by the U.S. Agency for International Development for international disaster assistance efforts.

Landing at Incirlik Air Base, they were greeted by U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Jeffry Flake. The 728th Air Mobility Squadron assisted in receiving and unloading the aircraft. Incirlik, located some 200 kilometers from the earthquake’s epicenter, suffered no major damage, according to the 39th Air Base Wing‘s Facebook page. Some facilities were closed on base, but all personnel were safe and accounted for.

More help is expected: Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon’s chief spokeman, told reporters that a team from U.S. European Command would arrive Feb. 9 to assist USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team. Other aid is likely in the weeks ahead. U.S. Air Force assets are crucial for transporting personnel, equipment, and humanitarian aid in response to natural disasters.