Biden: Three Downed Objects Were For Research, Not Chinese Surveillance

Biden: Three Downed Objects Were For Research, Not Chinese Surveillance

In comments aimed at reassuring the American public and setting the stage for future diplomatic engagements with Beijing, President Joe Biden said Feb. 16 the three aerial objects the U.S. recently shot down were not part of China’s spy balloon fleet.

“The intelligence community’s current assessment is that these three ones were most likely balloons tied to private companies, recreation, or research institutions studying weather or conducting other scientific research,” Biden said in his first formal comments on the unprecedented series of air-to-air engagements over the skies of North America and the downing of the Chinese spy balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4.

Biden added that he expects to speak soon with Chinese leader Xi Jinping about the U.S. decision to shoot down the Chinese spy ballon balloon and to continue the diplomatic dialogue between Beijing and Washington. Thus far, the Chinese have declined high-level talks on the incident, rebuffing Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s attempts to contact his Chinese counterpart.

“We’re not looking for a new Cold War, but I make no apologies,” Biden said. “We will compete and will we responsibly manage that competition so that it doesn’t veer into conflict.”

After the Chinese balloon was detected and traversed North America, the U.S. military downed three objects in the span of three days over the weekend Feb. 10-12. The Pentagon acknowledged it did not know whether any nations might have sent them as spycraft but said they posed a potential danger to civilian air traffic.

The Chinese balloon flew at an altitude of 60,000-65,000 feet, was up to 200 feet tall, and weighed several thousand pounds, according to U.S. officials. But the other “objects,” as the U.S. has termed them, were smaller and flew at lower altitudes. The objects shot down over Yukon, Canada, and Alaska were operating around 40,000 feet, while the object over Lake Huron was at 20,000 feet, according to U.S. accounts.

It now appears those unidentified objects were not a danger to U.S. national security, and Biden said he is directing the administration to develop better procedures for handling unidentified objects in the future.

The goal, he said, will be to distinguish “between those that are likely to pose safety and security risks that necessitate action and those that do not.” To do that, Biden said the U.S. will establish a better inventory of unmanned airborne objects above the U.S. that is accessible and up to date, improve U.S. capability to detect unmanned objects, update U.S. rules and regulations for launching and maintaining unmanned objects, and establish new global norms.

“These steps will lead to safer and more secure skies for our air travelers, our military, our scientists, and for people on the ground as well,” he added.

U.S. officials, including the head of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, said previously that NORAD had adjusted its radars after the Chinese balloon incident. In making that adjustment, U.S. officials said NORAD no longer filtered out slow, small objects, which led to increased visibility of the objects that were subsequently shot down.

“We’re now just seeing more of them partially because the steps we’ve taken to increase our radars,” Biden said.

A group of hobbyists, the Northern Illinois Bottlecap Balloon Brigade, has reported that one of their balloons went “missing in action” after passing near an uninhabited island in Alaska, spurring speculation that it might be one of the objects that was shot down by an F-22.

Autonomous C-130s and C-17s? Air Force Invests in Feasibility Study

Autonomous C-130s and C-17s? Air Force Invests in Feasibility Study

The Air Force is exploring the potential of autonomous cargo craft, awarding a contract to tech company Reliable Robotics to study the feasibility of automating large, multi-engine airlifters. 

Reliable Robotics announced the contract Feb. 8, calling itself a “leader in safety-enhancing aircraft automation systems.” The company has worked with the Air Force before under three phases of Small Business Innovation Research contracts with the Air Force Research Laboratory. Those deals, awarded in May 2021, April 2022, and October 2022, saw Reliable Robotics develop and test its autonomous technology on existing Air Force aircraft. 

This newest study goes further, exploring autonomy specifically for cargo operations, said retired Maj. Gen. David O’Brien, senior vice president of government solutions at Reliable Robotics. 

“We’re looking at just sort of the feasibility,” O’Brien told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an interview. ” What is involved? What does it take? Of the various applications and utilities on an aircraft, which ones are most important to the Air Force in providing autonomy?”

O’Brien, who previously worked in Air Force acquisition both as an Airman and civilian, continued: “Then we’ll talk a little bit about aircraft deployment, how they would use it and in what conditions autonomy would really help serve their mission needs.” 

Reliable Robotics is driving toward a future in which cargo aircraft can fly with or without crews, can operate as remotely piloted, minimally manned, or fully crewed, depending on mission. That would reduce manpower requirements and increase flexibility. 

“If they had a solution where they could operate their autonomous large aircraft in the same way they operate their fully crewed aircraft, that provides speed advantages, increased tempo advantages, and provides a lot of utility in terms of aircraft usage,” added O’Brien. 

Managing increased operational tempos with limited manpower could be crucial to operating at effectively in the Indo-Pacific. Air Mobility Command has pushed the envelope with record-breaking endurance missions and experiments with limited aircrew on some flights. 

“The Air Force is definitely focused on being able to generate aircraft, definitely focused on a higher tempo, definitely focused on ways to … surge aircraft in newer ways that provide more opportunity and are less demanding on the operators,” O’Brien noted. “And so autonomy is, I think, a big solution to that.” 

Much of the focus on autonomous and remotely-piloted aircraft is in the combat arena, but cargo operations could be a good fit, as well, to reduce capacity gaps. Reliable Robotics brings new elements to that discussion because it’s intended for use with existing aircraft. 

“Reliable’s autonomy does not preclude piloted flight once installed. And when it’s installed, it’s installed basically in the walls and the ceiling,” O’Brien said. “So we retain and do not disturb the interior compartment. So that can be continued to be used.” 

Optionally-manned aircraft could form a significant part of the Air Force’s future fleet—both the B-21 bomber and Next Generation Air Dominance fighter has been designed with optional manning in mind

For cargo aircraft, autonomy could prove particularly relevant, thanks to demand from commercial carriers that could accelerate the technological development. 

“A lot of the advantages that Reliable is working in its commercial solution for commercial cargo carriers is going to be directly applicable to Air Force operations,” O’Brien said. “And I think that’s why the Air Force is excited about this.” 

Reliable is working with the Federal Aviation Administration to earn safety approval for its technology. But the short term need is to deliver a useful feasibility analysis. “We have a series of tests and tasks that we want to … make sure we satisfy for [the Air Force],” O’Brien said. “We will be meeting with them frequently, we will be getting access to aircraft, we will be getting everything we need to do an assessment on what autonomy for a large aircraft looks like.” 

NORAD Intercepts Russian Warplanes for Second Time in Two Days

NORAD Intercepts Russian Warplanes for Second Time in Two Days

Two U.S. Air Force F-35s intercepted a quartet of Russian fighters and bombers near Alaska on Feb. 14—the second intercept in two days. 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said the Russian flight, which included Tu-95 Bear-H strategic bombers and Su-35 and Su-30 fighters, approached the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, but did not penetrate into American or Canadian airspace.

Two F-35s were dispatched to intercept the Russian planes, supported by two F-16 fighters, an E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system, and two KC-135 Stratotanker refuelers.

NORAD said the Russian aircraft never entered American or Canadian airspace.

The incident followed was very similar to the Feb. 13 intercept of four Russian aircraft—two Tu-95 Bear-Hs and two Su-35s—by two F-16s, also in the Alaska ADIZ, an warning zone that includes international airspace. 

The two intercept missions followed the recent shoot-down of a Chinese surveillance balloon and the shootdowns of other undefined objects by NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. The NORAD statement dismissed any connection between the incidents, noting that “this Russian activity near the North American ADIZ occurs regularly and is not seen as a threat, nor is the activity seen as provocative.” 

As with the Feb. 13 incident, NORAD said its forces “anticipated this Russian activity and, as a result of our planning, was prepared to intercept it.” It was unclear whether that was intended to mean NORAD had advance intelligence of specific Russian actions. 

The back-to-back Russian intercepts were the first since October, when Russia flew two Bear-H bombers into the ADIZ and were soon intercepted by American F-16s. 

U.S. intercepts of Russian aircraft were commonplace during the Cold War, but largely disappeared in the 1990s. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin resumed long-range bomber flights, and NORAD intercepts of those aircraft have occurred with varying frequency since then. 

NORAD said it intercepts Russian aircraft six or seven times a year, but that total has reached as high as 15 since 2007. 

The Chinese balloon incursion spurred concern over NORAD’s readiness, which was amplified when NORAD Commander Gen. Glen D. VanHerck blamed a “domain awareness gap” for allowing NORAD to be surprised by the Chinese spy balloon. 

Some of those concerns, however, has been tamped down by the White House’s recent indications that the three most recent unidentified objects shot down were likely “benign.” 

Senators Sound Out Policy Experts on Aircraft for Ukraine, Defending Taiwan

Senators Sound Out Policy Experts on Aircraft for Ukraine, Defending Taiwan

Supplying advanced aircraft to Ukraine emerged as a key issue of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s first hearing of the new Congress. Over the course of nearly three hours Feb. 15, national security experts and lawmakers also discussed the upcoming 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the looming specter of China’s Indo-Pacific ambitions, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Roger Zakheim, director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, testified that the national security community has learned over the past year that providing military support capability to Ukraine would not escalate or broaden the conflict. 

“Western support has helped transform the battlefield, badly damaging Russia’s military capabilities and moderated, for now, Putin’s military objectives,” he said. “Going forward, our support to Ukraine, be it with tanks, drones, aircraft, or missiles, should be tailored to executing a counter offensive strategy that rolls back Russia’s gains and restores Ukraine’s sovereign territory.” 

As such, Zakheim encouraged the committee to consider providing additional materiel to Ukraine, including fourth-generation fighter aircraft. 

“I think the point here is: What is the platform going to be used for? Why is it necessary? That is the question that should animate decision making with the emphasis on urgency and speed,” he said. “I think fighter aircraft—ones that this Congress has authorized the U.S. military not to use anymore that could easily be sent over there—could have a material impact on the fight within the sovereign territory of Ukraine.” 

Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) mentioned one of his concerns in Ukraine is the Russians preparing for a spring offensive with Ukraine unprepared. 

Zakheim insisted the focus should be on strategy, not concerns that Ukraine might use a specific platform for something other than what the U.S. would like. 

“If we trust Ukraine to restore its sovereign territory, then we should trust them with the platform to do that and not worry they’re going to use the platform for some other purpose or escalate the battle beyond the territory of Ukraine,” he added. 

King followed up, asking if Ukraine had respected existing limitations, particularly about expanding the conflict back into Russian territory. Zakheim noted some debate about the issue but argued that the Ukrainians would focus on their own sovereign territory. 

Aircraft support was just one issue of many discussed at the hearing, with China and Russia remaining centerpieces of U.S. national security posture. 

“China is our primary competitor; it is the only nation with both the intent and the capability to mount a sustained challenge to the security and economic interests of the United States and allies and partners around the world,” said SASC chairman Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) “At the same time, Russia remains a violent destabilizing force.” 

Reed also emphasized that both countries remain existential threats, and the U.S. should be the alternative to Beijing and Moscow’s attempts to threaten vulnerable populations around the globe. 

Ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) noted that massive Chinese military modernization and Russia’s Ukraine invasion illustrate the need for the committee to provide the tools for their defeat

“There’s no doubt that continued real growth in the defense budget topline, above inflation, real growth above inflation, is an absolute necessity,” Wicker said. “We are in the crucial years of this military competition, and we cannot afford to let our guard down.” 

Though there was bipartisan consensus to support Ukraine and the build up capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, the question remaining is how exactly to do that—and how much. 

“Congress has provided billions of dollars of equipment and munitions to help the Ukrainian armed forces defend their country’s sovereignty and independence,” Wicker added. “Although we have provided considerable resources, I remain disappointed that the [Biden] administration has been hesitant to provide Ukraine with advanced capabilities to secure victory.” 

Wicker added that competing with China hinges on robust production of different weapon systems and platforms, particularly naval assets. 

Bonny Lin, senior fellow with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, noted that by 2049, China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities could resemble that of the U.S. But dealing with China has become even more difficult as Xi Jinping established himself as China’s sole leader, and she said she sees no end to China slowing down its ambitions. 

“U.S. engagement efforts, to date, are prone to disruption, and the [People’s Republic of China] continues to stonewall calls for critical dialogues,” Lin said, adding that the U.S. approach has encouraged the Chinese to compete more with the U.S., as well as its allies. “The PRC blames United States and our allies and partners for what it views as its deteriorating security environment and does not view its behavior as problematic.” 

Still, Lin warned that there is a risk that miscalculations on China’s part about such competition could foster confrontation. She also encouraged the U.S. to continue working to strengthen alliances to counter Chinese coercion—alliances that would be crucial to the survival of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island. 

“It cannot defend itself, no matter what we do, no matter what equipment we give them,” Lin said when Sen. Joe Manchin, D-W.V., asked if Taiwan could defend itself alone. “When you’re talking about a large-scale invasion event, the major, the vast power disparities that China can bring to bear, Taiwan would not be able to stand.” 

But she added that Taiwan could defend itself with help from the U.S. and allies. 

Speaking to the security environment in Europe, Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the biggest challenge is obtaining regional security on which Europeans can agree. 

“We need to find a formula that’s not entirely dependent on the military and economic power of the United States or its political leadership to ensure long-term success,” Hill said. She also emphasized that nothing in place after World War II and during the Cold War stopped Russia’s annexation of Crime in 2014, let alone its Ukraine invasion in 2022. 

“Western deterrence failed, in part, because American and European policymakers never meaningfully emphasized the West’s red lines; indeed, one might even ask, what were our red lines?” she said. “We certainly did not appear to uphold the post-World War II principle of ensuring independent state sovereignty and territorial integrity after 2014.” 

From a budget standpoint, Zakheim recommended increasing spending levels from that of 3 percent of gross domestic product to 5 percent of GDP. 

“As Congress debates how to manage spending amidst the debt ceiling negotiations, it should be mindful that cutting defense to FY 22 levels, which would be about 10 percent to the top line, would render the defense strategy nonexecutable,” he said. “It would reduce our military to nothing more than a regional force.” 

KC-135s, RC-135s Stand Down Pending Safety Inspections

KC-135s, RC-135s Stand Down Pending Safety Inspections

The Air Force ordered safety inspections for its entire fleets of KC-135 tankers, RC-135 reconnaissance planes, and WC-135 “nuke sniffers” to ensure no aircraft fly until faulty tail pins are replaced. 

The Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO), issued Feb. 14, affects hundreds of aircraft. But the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center said the inspections should take just 30 minutes and even before the order was issued, at least 90 KC-135s had already cleared the inspections.  

The order came to light when a memo detailing the issue was published on the unofficial amn/nco/snco Facebook page. The Life Cycle Management Center confirmed the memo’s authenticity to Air & Space Forces Magazine. 

According to the memo, the Air Force bought 280 vertical terminal fitting pins—tail pins—from a supplier between 2020 and 2022, but a subsequent quality deficiency report concluded the parts were faulty. An analysis of two pins found they were the incorrect size, made with the wrong material, and insufficiently plated. 

The memo stated that engineering analysis was underway to determine the durability and damage tolerance of the pints, but warned that the aft pins in particular carry much of the weight for the tail fin—and if one of the pins failed, the other would be unlikely to handle the load, a potentially catastrophic risk. 

Exactly how many of the 280 pins in question were ever installed is unclear, but the memo states the tail pins on each aircraft are replaced during programmed depot maintenance, and a preliminary analysis of the depot maintenance data from 2020 to 2022 showed at least 200 aircraft could be affected. The Air Force’s inventory included 394 KC-135s, 22 RC-135s, and three WC-135s at the start of 2022

The decision to stand down the entire fleet for inspections was made “out of an abundance of caution, after consulting with our engineering experts,” Col. Michael Kovalchek, senior materiel leader for the Life Cycle Management Center’s Legacy Tanker Division, said in a statement. “We are working closely with Air Mobility Command and all operational users and anticipate all potentially affected aircraft will be inspected.” 

As of Feb. 12, 90 aircraft had been inspected, according to an AFLCMC release, and 24 were found to have nonconforming pins. Those 24, along with any other subsequent aircraft determined to have the faulty pins, will be allowed to fly one more time to a repair location, with most replacement pins only taking a day to install. Most of that work is expected to be done at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex, according to the release. 

The 66 other inspected aircraft have been cleared to fly again. 

Many of the Air Force’s CV-22 Ospreys are also unable to fly pending replacement of clutch components that exceeded a new flight-hour limit. Unlike the tail pin issue, which has yet to result in mishaps, the Osprey stand-down came in response to multiple “hard clutch engagement” incidents, leading to emergency landings last summer. 

Russian Air Force ‘Has Lot of Capability Left’ One Year On From Ukraine Invasion

Russian Air Force ‘Has Lot of Capability Left’ One Year On From Ukraine Invasion

While the red stars on the aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, have not been very visible in recent months, Russia’s air force remains largely intact despite its grinding war in Ukraine, according to independent analysis and official comments.

The fighting in Ukraine has been dominated by artillery exchanges, and neither side has been able to establish air superiority. But as Russian forces begin a new offensive, there are mounting concerns among Ukrainian allies that Moscow may be preparing to make greater use of its fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.

Though U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III sought to dispel fears that Ukraine will face a qualitatively different Russian air threat, he did acknowledge that Russia still has lots of aircraft, which could put additional stress on Ukraine’s air defenses.

“In terms of whether or not Russia is massing its aircraft for some massive aerial attack, we don’t currently see that,” Austin said Feb. 14 in Brussels. “We do know that Russia has a substantial number of aircraft in its inventory and a lot of capability left.

“We need to do everything that we can to get Ukraine as much air defense capability as we possibly can.”

The abundance of Russian aircraft hasn’t resulted in the Kremlin dominating the skies over Ukraine. Ukraine has been able to hold Russian aircraft at risk with ground-based air defenses, including new Western systems, legacy Soviet-era kit, and man-portable air defenses. Analysts and foreign military officials have frequently noted Ukraine’s skillful employment of air defense systems.

To minimize risk, Russia has resorted to launching long-range missile attacks from bombers in Russian airspace and mounting attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with relatively cheap Iranian-made drones, putting additional strain on Ukraine’s air defenses.

“Russia’s failure to gain air superiority has meant its forces have had to engage targets in Ukraine from long range, with extensive use made of cruise missiles and other weapons,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) wrote in its annual Military Balance report, released Feb. 15. “Air forces on both sides have suffered losses. Russia in 2022 lost some 6–8 percent of its active tactical combat aircraft inventory, but overall fleet size somewhat masks the loss to some individual types, including reductions reaching 10-15 percent for some pre-war active multirole and ground-attack aircraft fleets.”

Russia’s difficulty employing airpower in Ukraine has been hampered by its own doctrine, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said. Instead of using its air force as an independent arm that can deliver decisive blows and support a joint campaign, Russia largely sees the role of fixed-wing aircraft as supporting ground forces.

“Russian air doctrine is very different than Western air doctrine,” Deptula told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “They don’t use airpower other than as a means of an extension of ground forces.”

Deptula pointed to other flaws in Russia’s use of airpower, such as leadership, training, equipment, and the lack of precision targeting.

“They’ve got a substantial number of aircraft in their inventory,” Deptula added. “But it’s not being used, or at least to date, it isn’t being used very effectively.”

Deptula and others cautioned that just because Russia’s air force has so far been held back does not mean airpower is irrelevant over Ukraine or that the West can safely discount the VKS as Ukraine is burning through billions of dollars of kit to fend off Russian attacks.

“The capability of the Ukrainians are growing over time,” said retired Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, who served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander when Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014. “We are sending them air defense capability, but we are not sending them the density of capability so as to completely deny Russia.”

Ukraine also has an air force of its own, and the U.S. has provided the Ukrainians with AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), Zuni rockets, and an unspecified number of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bombs. But Ukraine’s air force has been limited by the need to fly low to avoid Russian air defenses, noted Justin Bronk, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute who has extensively studied the air war over Ukraine.

Russia’s aircraft have also faced some of the same limitations inside Ukrainian airspace due to Ukraine’s air defense network.

“I think there’s some reticence on the part of the Russians to try to do a more fulsome campaign,” Breedlove said, citing Russian inability to effectively conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). “Because they’re not doing SEAD, I don’t think they’re willing to put their best aircraft at risk.”

Russia has shown, however, that it is willing to burn through manpower and assets, even with extraordinarily high costs, over its nearly year-long renewed invasion of Ukraine.

“The fact of the matter is they have a big powerful air force,” Breedlove said.

Despite Inflation’s Bite, China Set Record for Defense Spending in 2022

Despite Inflation’s Bite, China Set Record for Defense Spending in 2022

While most of the world lost ground in defense spending in 2022—mainly due to inflation—both China and many nations in Europe achieved real growth, and China’s spending level set a record, according to analysis by the independent, London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

China’s spending and “military modernization remains the principal area of concern for Washington,” the IISS said in a summary of its findings.

The seven percent increase in China’s defense spending from 2021 to 2022 is its largest in “absolute terms” going back 30 years, according to the report. In real terms—accounting for inflation—China spent $16 billion more in 2022 than 2021. China’s neighbors, particularly Japan and South Korea, significantly increased their own defense budgets in response.

China’s reported spending is also significantly less than its actual spending, because it does not count many expenditures, such as certain kinds of research and development, space, and civil/military investments as being defense-related. The country’s self-reported defense spending was $242.4 billion in 2022, but the IISS estimates its actual military outlays were closer to $360 billion.

Those numbers still don’t take into account the fact that China spends far less on pay and amenities for its troops than other countries, with more of its funds going toward procuring hardware and conducting research and development.

At $766.6 billion, the U.S. still outspent the next 10 countries combined on military accounts, but its relatively lavish spending on pay and amenities and its higher costs of goods, relative to command economies like China’s, accounts for some of that imbalance.

Russia’s military spending in 2022 was self-reported at $87.9 billion, but the IISS said its true spending is likely well more than double that figure, at $192 billion, and again, its spending on pay and benefits for its mostly-conscript forces is well below that of other countries.  

Inflation’s Bite

Inflation dominated any discussion of defense budgets in 2022, IISS said, noting that although many countries announced new investments and increases in spending based on absolute amounts, global defense spending as a whole declined in real terms for the second consecutive year.

“Soaring inflation has wiped billions from the real value of these investments and caused global defense spending to contract in real terms for the second consecutive year in 2022,” the report noted.

Using 2015 as a base year, “the effective purchasing power of global defense spending has been eroded by almost $850 billion, cumulatively, since 2017,” and by about $66 billion just in the last year, the IISS reported. “As inflation abates, policymakers will have greater scope to pursue procurement priorities, but will still need to balance threat drivers against lingering fiscal challenges.”

Globally, the nations of the world are spending more on defense and getting less. While they laid out $2 trillion for defense in 2022, that bought only $1.69 trillion worth of military goods and services measured in 2015 constant dollars.

The IISS also noted an increase in the use “off budget … special funds” as countries seek to rapidly increase their military spending. Such measures “reduce accountability and transparency” and complicate efforts like the IISS’s to collect comprehensive information, it noted.  

On a regional level, “European defense spending increased in real terms for the eighth consecutive year, although the rate of growth has slowed markedly from 3.5 percent in 2021 to 0.8 percent in 2022, again because of inflation effects,” the IISS said, noting the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In Asia, China’s new aircraft carrier generated headlines, and “its investments in additional and more complex naval vessels continues apace, while its air force is also improving its capabilities: numbers of J-20A combat aircraft have increased further and China has begun to field advanced military aircraft with domestically produced jet-engines,” the IISS said.

In response, Japan is increasing spending while also seeking “new partnerships, including with the U.K.; and Australia continues to work with the U.S. and U.K.” to obtain nuclear-powered submarines.

In the Middle East, where countries are typically high-spenders on defense, budgets collectively shrank about two percent per year, in real terms, for the last three years.  Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for example, spent 8.7 percent and 6.9 percent less, respectively, on defense in 2022 than in 2021.  

Keys to Space Resilience: It’s More Than Orbits, Says DOD’s Plumb

Keys to Space Resilience: It’s More Than Orbits, Says DOD’s Plumb

The Space Force made resilience its No. 1 priority in 2022, with proliferated constellations of satellites a focus of this program to ensure systems remain operable even if some elements are lost. This year, resiliency is “baked into all the conversations,” said assistant secretary of Defense for space policy John F. Plumb, but the service now takes a more expansive view of the term.  

“I think it is recognized now throughout the department that resilience isn’t just proliferated orbits,” Plumb said Feb. 14 on one of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies webcasts. “That may be part of it. But if your ground segment is one station, that’s not resilient at all. That’s not resilient against adversaries, that’s not even resilient against a power failure, perhaps.”  

Resilience is more complicated than it seems at first, Plumb said. “There’s a lot of pieces to it,” he said. “It is one of these things that if you start to pull the thread, you can go farther and farther upstream on any particular piece, and you’re like, ‘Wow, this isn’t resilient.’ So there’s a lot to be done, but you can’t do everything.” 

Concerns about ground stations as a potential “backdoor” through which adversaries might attack Space Force assets using cyber attacks have also been cited by Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman. Plumb acknowledged those risks, and said the Pentagon must do more to harden all its systems against cyber and related attacks.

“We have to get past the idea of just a fence or a shell. We have to do defensive depth. The [Cyberspace Solarium Commission] would say that’s not just for satellites, it’s for all infrastructure,” Plumb said. “How do you do defensive depth of your satellite systems, both on ground and in space, so that even if an adversary has some access, the ability to do damage is minimal?” 

Defense in depth joins “Zero Trust” as two key cybersecurity terms now being applied to space systems. Both apply to continuously verifying any user seeking access across a network, and minimizes the impact of any single breach. 

Retired Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, who moderated the conversation with Plumb, noted that resiliency also applies to launch. Almost all Space Force launches today lift off from either Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., or Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Fla. A few launch from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia.

“All three launch infrastructures are on the coast and they’re fixed, and so a little vulnerable to attack more than, say a mobile launch capability or an airborne launch capability,” said Chilton, a former head of Air Force Space Command. “Imagine some of these smaller rockets maybe being able to launch from inland locations—the deserts of Nevada, California, places like that,” he said.

Now the explorer chair of the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence (MI-SPACE), Chilton noted that the U.S. has traditionally avoided inland launches, but added, “The Chinese and Russians certainly do that. They launch from deep within their borders.”

Plumb agreed, saying different kinds of infrastructure could match the missions of different launches.

“There’s a fundamental difference between large [heavy rockets to geosynchronous orbit] and what some of these smaller commercial providers look like they might be able to provide, especially to [low-Earth orbit], with a smaller rocket, smaller footprint,” Plumb said. The question then becomes “How can we kind of use that diversification for resilience not only of our infrastructure, but potentially in some future situation where you actually trying to launch on response?”

Lawmakers have expressed strong support for “tactically responsive space”—the ability to launch satellites quickly following attacks or losses in order to rapidly reconstitute capability. That’s not easy, Plumb said, but added: “You’re going to see us trying to dig into that.“

Even looking beyond the U.S.’s own borders, Chilton pointed to the importance of allies and partners in ensuring the Pentagon has assured access to space—in addition to a whole host of other benefits.

“I think a lot of folks don’t appreciate the fact that geography matters. And so you know if you want to surveil the southern hemisphere space domain, you’ve got to be in the southern hemisphere,” Chilton said. “Unless you’re having a satellite on orbit, but even that has its limitations. So … our allies are going to be critical to not only space domain awareness, but perhaps launch resilience, perhaps some counter-space capabilities that they could bring to bear that would help protect our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians that are operating this domain.”

White House Says Latest Downed ‘Objects’ Were  Likely Benign

White House Says Latest Downed ‘Objects’ Were Likely Benign

After days of worry that mysterious objects shot down while flying over North America over the past week might be Chinese spycraft or even alien airships, the U.S. intelligence community indicated Feb. 14 that they may be “totally benign” commercial or research balloons.

“The intelligence community is considering as a leading explanation that these could just be balloons tied to some commercial or benign purpose,” said John Kirby, the National Security Council’s strategic communication coordinator.

In a spate of shootdowns Feb. 10-12, Air Force jets destroyed three “objects” in successive days with four AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. One missile missed its target. The shootdowns followed the downing of a large Chinese surveillance balloon Feb. 4 off the coast of South Carolina after it had crossed the entire continental United States.

Kirby offered the fullest public explanation to date by the Biden administration about the origins of three objects, which were downed over Alaskan waters, over the Yukon, Canada, and over Lake Huron in the Great Lakes. Kirby said the U.S. does not believe the objects were connected to the Chinese government’s spy balloon program or even engaged in intelligence collection against the U.S.

“I want to caveat that we haven’t found the debris,” Kirby added. “We’re still doing the best we can with the observations that were made by the pilots, with the flight profile data that we’ve tried to collect.”

Officials said the missile that missed its target was fired by a Minnesota National Guard F-16 over Lake Huron Feb. 12.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, speaking at a news conference in Brussels with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, said that after the first Sidewinder missed, a second AIM-9 hit the object, which officials have said was flying at about 20,000 feet altitude. The miss was first reported by Fox News. Milley said the U.S. tracked the errant missile as it fell “harmlessly” into the lake and that the surrounding airspace and water had been cleared of any civilians that might have been harmed in the engagement.

While the U.S. is still investigating the objects that were downed, there seems to be a ready answer as to why so many were detected in rapid succession. Radars can be programmed to filter out data on slow-moving objects so users can concentrate on fast-flying threats. That made it harder to detect balloons moving at the speed of prevailing winds. After the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) discovered the Chinese spy balloon in late January and early February, the filters were turned off, revealing objects that in the past would have been ignored, NORAD commander Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck said Feb. 12.

After the massive Chinese balloon traversed the U.S. for a week, it was finally shot down off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4.

Kirby said an interagency team set up by President Biden would soon determine new parameters for addressing unidentified aerial objects. U.S. defense and intelligence officials, including VanHerck, briefed the Senate Feb. 14.

After the briefing, Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he wanted the government to develop better procedures for dealing with unidentified airborne objects in the future.

“There is not anywhere near as formal a process as there probably should be,” Warner told reporters.