Senators Sound Out Policy Experts on Aircraft for Ukraine, Defending Taiwan

Senators Sound Out Policy Experts on Aircraft for Ukraine, Defending Taiwan

Feb. 15, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

Supplying advanced aircraft to Ukraine emerged as a key issue of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s first hearing of the new Congress. Over the course of nearly three hours Feb. 15, national security experts and lawmakers also discussed the upcoming 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the looming specter of China’s Indo-Pacific ambitions, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Roger Zakheim, director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, testified that the national security community has learned over the past year that providing military support capability to Ukraine would not escalate or broaden the conflict. 

“Western support has helped transform the battlefield, badly damaging Russia’s military capabilities and moderated, for now, Putin’s military objectives,” he said. “Going forward, our support to Ukraine, be it with tanks, drones, aircraft, or missiles, should be tailored to executing a counter offensive strategy that rolls back Russia’s gains and restores Ukraine’s sovereign territory.” 

As such, Zakheim encouraged the committee to consider providing additional materiel to Ukraine, including fourth-generation fighter aircraft. 

“I think the point here is: What is the platform going to be used for? Why is it necessary? That is the question that should animate decision making with the emphasis on urgency and speed,” he said. “I think fighter aircraft—ones that this Congress has authorized the U.S. military not to use anymore that could easily be sent over there—could have a material impact on the fight within the sovereign territory of Ukraine.” 

Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) mentioned one of his concerns in Ukraine is the Russians preparing for a spring offensive with Ukraine unprepared. 

Zakheim insisted the focus should be on strategy, not concerns that Ukraine might use a specific platform for something other than what the U.S. would like. 

“If we trust Ukraine to restore its sovereign territory, then we should trust them with the platform to do that and not worry they’re going to use the platform for some other purpose or escalate the battle beyond the territory of Ukraine,” he added. 

King followed up, asking if Ukraine had respected existing limitations, particularly about expanding the conflict back into Russian territory. Zakheim noted some debate about the issue but argued that the Ukrainians would focus on their own sovereign territory. 

Aircraft support was just one issue of many discussed at the hearing, with China and Russia remaining centerpieces of U.S. national security posture. 

“China is our primary competitor; it is the only nation with both the intent and the capability to mount a sustained challenge to the security and economic interests of the United States and allies and partners around the world,” said SASC chairman Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) “At the same time, Russia remains a violent destabilizing force.” 

Reed also emphasized that both countries remain existential threats, and the U.S. should be the alternative to Beijing and Moscow’s attempts to threaten vulnerable populations around the globe. 

Ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) noted that massive Chinese military modernization and Russia’s Ukraine invasion illustrate the need for the committee to provide the tools for their defeat. 

“There’s no doubt that continued real growth in the defense budget topline, above inflation, real growth above inflation, is an absolute necessity,” Wicker said. “We are in the crucial years of this military competition, and we cannot afford to let our guard down.” 

Though there was bipartisan consensus to support Ukraine and the build up capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, the question remaining is how exactly to do that—and how much. 

“Congress has provided billions of dollars of equipment and munitions to help the Ukrainian armed forces defend their country’s sovereignty and independence,” Wicker added. “Although we have provided considerable resources, I remain disappointed that the [Biden] administration has been hesitant to provide Ukraine with advanced capabilities to secure victory.” 

Wicker added that competing with China hinges on robust production of different weapon systems and platforms, particularly naval assets. 

Bonny Lin, senior fellow with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, noted that by 2049, China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities could resemble that of the U.S. But dealing with China has become even more difficult as Xi Jinping established himself as China’s sole leader, and she said she sees no end to China slowing down its ambitions. 

“U.S. engagement efforts, to date, are prone to disruption, and the [People’s Republic of China] continues to stonewall calls for critical dialogues,” Lin said, adding that the U.S. approach has encouraged the Chinese to compete more with the U.S., as well as its allies. “The PRC blames United States and our allies and partners for what it views as its deteriorating security environment and does not view its behavior as problematic.” 

Still, Lin warned that there is a risk that miscalculations on China’s part about such competition could foster confrontation. She also encouraged the U.S. to continue working to strengthen alliances to counter Chinese coercion—alliances that would be crucial to the survival of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island. 

“It cannot defend itself, no matter what we do, no matter what equipment we give them,” Lin said when Sen. Joe Manchin, D-W.V., asked if Taiwan could defend itself alone. “When you’re talking about a large-scale invasion event, the major, the vast power disparities that China can bring to bear, Taiwan would not be able to stand.” 

But she added that Taiwan could defend itself with help from the U.S. and allies. 

Speaking to the security environment in Europe, Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the biggest challenge is obtaining regional security on which Europeans can agree. 

“We need to find a formula that’s not entirely dependent on the military and economic power of the United States or its political leadership to ensure long-term success,” Hill said. She also emphasized that nothing in place after World War II and during the Cold War stopped Russia’s annexation of Crime in 2014, let alone its Ukraine invasion in 2022. 

“Western deterrence failed, in part, because American and European policymakers never meaningfully emphasized the West’s red lines; indeed, one might even ask, what were our red lines?” she said. “We certainly did not appear to uphold the post-World War II principle of ensuring independent state sovereignty and territorial integrity after 2014.” 

From a budget standpoint, Zakheim recommended increasing spending levels from that of 3 percent of gross domestic product to 5 percent of GDP. 

“As Congress debates how to manage spending amidst the debt ceiling negotiations, it should be mindful that cutting defense to FY 22 levels, which would be about 10 percent to the top line, would render the defense strategy nonexecutable,” he said. “It would reduce our military to nothing more than a regional force.” 

KC-135s, RC-135s Stand Down Pending Safety Inspections

KC-135s, RC-135s Stand Down Pending Safety Inspections

Feb. 15, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force ordered safety inspections for its entire fleets of KC-135 tankers, RC-135 reconnaissance planes, and WC-135 “nuke sniffers” to ensure no aircraft fly until faulty tail pins are replaced. 

The Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO), issued Feb. 14, affects hundreds of aircraft. But the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center said the inspections should take just 30 minutes and even before the order was issued, at least 90 KC-135s had already cleared the inspections.  

The order came to light when a memo detailing the issue was published on the unofficial amn/nco/snco Facebook page. The Life Cycle Management Center confirmed the memo’s authenticity to Air & Space Forces Magazine. 

According to the memo, the Air Force bought 280 vertical terminal fitting pins—tail pins—from a supplier between 2020 and 2022, but a subsequent quality deficiency report concluded the parts were faulty. An analysis of two pins found they were the incorrect size, made with the wrong material, and insufficiently plated. 

The memo stated that engineering analysis was underway to determine the durability and damage tolerance of the pints, but warned that the aft pins in particular carry much of the weight for the tail fin—and if one of the pins failed, the other would be unlikely to handle the load, a potentially catastrophic risk. 

Exactly how many of the 280 pins in question were ever installed is unclear, but the memo states the tail pins on each aircraft are replaced during programmed depot maintenance, and a preliminary analysis of the depot maintenance data from 2020 to 2022 showed at least 200 aircraft could be affected. The Air Force’s inventory included 394 KC-135s, 22 RC-135s, and three WC-135s at the start of 2022. 

The decision to stand down the entire fleet for inspections was made “out of an abundance of caution, after consulting with our engineering experts,” Col. Michael Kovalchek, senior materiel leader for the Life Cycle Management Center’s Legacy Tanker Division, said in a statement. “We are working closely with Air Mobility Command and all operational users and anticipate all potentially affected aircraft will be inspected.” 

As of Feb. 12, 90 aircraft had been inspected, according to an AFLCMC release, and 24 were found to have nonconforming pins. Those 24, along with any other subsequent aircraft determined to have the faulty pins, will be allowed to fly one more time to a repair location, with most replacement pins only taking a day to install. Most of that work is expected to be done at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex, according to the release. 

The 66 other inspected aircraft have been cleared to fly again. 

Many of the Air Force’s CV-22 Ospreys are also unable to fly pending replacement of clutch components that exceeded a new flight-hour limit. Unlike the tail pin issue, which has yet to result in mishaps, the Osprey stand-down came in response to multiple “hard clutch engagement” incidents, leading to emergency landings last summer. 

Russian Air Force ‘Has Lot of Capability Left’ One Year On From Ukraine Invasion

Russian Air Force ‘Has Lot of Capability Left’ One Year On From Ukraine Invasion

Feb. 15, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

While the red stars on the aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, have not been very visible in recent months, Russia’s air force remains largely intact despite its grinding war in Ukraine, according to independent analysis and official comments.

The fighting in Ukraine has been dominated by artillery exchanges, and neither side has been able to establish air superiority. But as Russian forces begin a new offensive, there are mounting concerns among Ukrainian allies that Moscow may be preparing to make greater use of its fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.

Though U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III sought to dispel fears that Ukraine will face a qualitatively different Russian air threat, he did acknowledge that Russia still has lots of aircraft, which could put additional stress on Ukraine’s air defenses.

“In terms of whether or not Russia is massing its aircraft for some massive aerial attack, we don’t currently see that,” Austin said Feb. 14 in Brussels. “We do know that Russia has a substantial number of aircraft in its inventory and a lot of capability left.

“We need to do everything that we can to get Ukraine as much air defense capability as we possibly can.”

The abundance of Russian aircraft hasn’t resulted in the Kremlin dominating the skies over Ukraine. Ukraine has been able to hold Russian aircraft at risk with ground-based air defenses, including new Western systems, legacy Soviet-era kit, and man-portable air defenses. Analysts and foreign military officials have frequently noted Ukraine’s skillful employment of air defense systems.

To minimize risk, Russia has resorted to launching long-range missile attacks from bombers in Russian airspace and mounting attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with relatively cheap Iranian-made drones, putting additional strain on Ukraine’s air defenses.

“Russia’s failure to gain air superiority has meant its forces have had to engage targets in Ukraine from long range, with extensive use made of cruise missiles and other weapons,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) wrote in its annual Military Balance report, released Feb. 15. “Air forces on both sides have suffered losses. Russia in 2022 lost some 6–8 percent of its active tactical combat aircraft inventory, but overall fleet size somewhat masks the loss to some individual types, including reductions reaching 10-15 percent for some pre-war active multirole and ground-attack aircraft fleets.”

Russia’s difficulty employing airpower in Ukraine has been hampered by its own doctrine, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said. Instead of using its air force as an independent arm that can deliver decisive blows and support a joint campaign, Russia largely sees the role of fixed-wing aircraft as supporting ground forces.

“Russian air doctrine is very different than Western air doctrine,” Deptula told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “They don’t use airpower other than as a means of an extension of ground forces.”

Deptula pointed to other flaws in Russia’s use of airpower, such as leadership, training, equipment, and the lack of precision targeting.

“They’ve got a substantial number of aircraft in their inventory,” Deptula added. “But it’s not being used, or at least to date, it isn’t being used very effectively.”

Deptula and others cautioned that just because Russia’s air force has so far been held back does not mean airpower is irrelevant over Ukraine or that the West can safely discount the VKS as Ukraine is burning through billions of dollars of kit to fend off Russian attacks.

“The capability of the Ukrainians are growing over time,” said retired Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, who served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander when Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014. “We are sending them air defense capability, but we are not sending them the density of capability so as to completely deny Russia.”

Ukraine also has an air force of its own, and the U.S. has provided the Ukrainians with AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), Zuni rockets, and an unspecified number of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bombs. But Ukraine’s air force has been limited by the need to fly low to avoid Russian air defenses, noted Justin Bronk, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute who has extensively studied the air war over Ukraine.

Russia’s aircraft have also faced some of the same limitations inside Ukrainian airspace due to Ukraine’s air defense network.

“I think there’s some reticence on the part of the Russians to try to do a more fulsome campaign,” Breedlove said, citing Russian inability to effectively conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). “Because they’re not doing SEAD, I don’t think they’re willing to put their best aircraft at risk.”

Russia has shown, however, that it is willing to burn through manpower and assets, even with extraordinarily high costs, over its nearly year-long renewed invasion of Ukraine.

“The fact of the matter is they have a big powerful air force,” Breedlove said.

Despite Inflation’s Bite, China Set Record for Defense Spending in 2022

Despite Inflation’s Bite, China Set Record for Defense Spending in 2022

Feb. 15, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

While most of the world lost ground in defense spending in 2022—mainly due to inflation—both China and many nations in Europe achieved real growth, and China’s spending level set a record, according to analysis by the independent, London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

China’s spending and “military modernization remains the principal area of concern for Washington,” the IISS said in a summary of its findings.

The seven percent increase in China’s defense spending from 2021 to 2022 is its largest in “absolute terms” going back 30 years, according to the report. In real terms—accounting for inflation—China spent $16 billion more in 2022 than 2021. China’s neighbors, particularly Japan and South Korea, significantly increased their own defense budgets in response.

China’s reported spending is also significantly less than its actual spending, because it does not count many expenditures, such as certain kinds of research and development, space, and civil/military investments as being defense-related. The country’s self-reported defense spending was $242.4 billion in 2022, but the IISS estimates its actual military outlays were closer to $360 billion.

Those numbers still don’t take into account the fact that China spends far less on pay and amenities for its troops than other countries, with more of its funds going toward procuring hardware and conducting research and development.

At $766.6 billion, the U.S. still outspent the next 10 countries combined on military accounts, but its relatively lavish spending on pay and amenities and its higher costs of goods, relative to command economies like China’s, accounts for some of that imbalance.

Russia’s military spending in 2022 was self-reported at $87.9 billion, but the IISS said its true spending is likely well more than double that figure, at $192 billion, and again, its spending on pay and benefits for its mostly-conscript forces is well below that of other countries.  

Inflation’s Bite

Inflation dominated any discussion of defense budgets in 2022, IISS said, noting that although many countries announced new investments and increases in spending based on absolute amounts, global defense spending as a whole declined in real terms for the second consecutive year.

“Soaring inflation has wiped billions from the real value of these investments and caused global defense spending to contract in real terms for the second consecutive year in 2022,” the report noted.

Using 2015 as a base year, “the effective purchasing power of global defense spending has been eroded by almost $850 billion, cumulatively, since 2017,” and by about $66 billion just in the last year, the IISS reported. “As inflation abates, policymakers will have greater scope to pursue procurement priorities, but will still need to balance threat drivers against lingering fiscal challenges.”

Globally, the nations of the world are spending more on defense and getting less. While they laid out $2 trillion for defense in 2022, that bought only $1.69 trillion worth of military goods and services measured in 2015 constant dollars.

The IISS also noted an increase in the use “off budget … special funds” as countries seek to rapidly increase their military spending. Such measures “reduce accountability and transparency” and complicate efforts like the IISS’s to collect comprehensive information, it noted.  

On a regional level, “European defense spending increased in real terms for the eighth consecutive year, although the rate of growth has slowed markedly from 3.5 percent in 2021 to 0.8 percent in 2022, again because of inflation effects,” the IISS said, noting the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In Asia, China’s new aircraft carrier generated headlines, and “its investments in additional and more complex naval vessels continues apace, while its air force is also improving its capabilities: numbers of J-20A combat aircraft have increased further and China has begun to field advanced military aircraft with domestically produced jet-engines,” the IISS said.

In response, Japan is increasing spending while also seeking “new partnerships, including with the U.K.; and Australia continues to work with the U.S. and U.K.” to obtain nuclear-powered submarines.

In the Middle East, where countries are typically high-spenders on defense, budgets collectively shrank about two percent per year, in real terms, for the last three years.  Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for example, spent 8.7 percent and 6.9 percent less, respectively, on defense in 2022 than in 2021.  

Keys to Space Resilience: It’s More Than Orbits, Says DOD’s Plumb

Keys to Space Resilience: It’s More Than Orbits, Says DOD’s Plumb

Feb. 15, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Force made resilience its No. 1 priority in 2022, with proliferated constellations of satellites a focus of this program to ensure systems remain operable even if some elements are lost. This year, resiliency is “baked into all the conversations,” said assistant secretary of Defense for space policy John F. Plumb, but the service now takes a more expansive view of the term.  

“I think it is recognized now throughout the department that resilience isn’t just proliferated orbits,” Plumb said Feb. 14 on one of AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies webcasts. “That may be part of it. But if your ground segment is one station, that’s not resilient at all. That’s not resilient against adversaries, that’s not even resilient against a power failure, perhaps.”  

Resilience is more complicated than it seems at first, Plumb said. “There’s a lot of pieces to it,” he said. “It is one of these things that if you start to pull the thread, you can go farther and farther upstream on any particular piece, and you’re like, ‘Wow, this isn’t resilient.’ So there’s a lot to be done, but you can’t do everything.” 

Concerns about ground stations as a potential “backdoor” through which adversaries might attack Space Force assets using cyber attacks have also been cited by Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman. Plumb acknowledged those risks, and said the Pentagon must do more to harden all its systems against cyber and related attacks.

“We have to get past the idea of just a fence or a shell. We have to do defensive depth. The [Cyberspace Solarium Commission] would say that’s not just for satellites, it’s for all infrastructure,” Plumb said. “How do you do defensive depth of your satellite systems, both on ground and in space, so that even if an adversary has some access, the ability to do damage is minimal?” 

Defense in depth joins “Zero Trust” as two key cybersecurity terms now being applied to space systems. Both apply to continuously verifying any user seeking access across a network, and minimizes the impact of any single breach. 

Retired Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, who moderated the conversation with Plumb, noted that resiliency also applies to launch. Almost all Space Force launches today lift off from either Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., or Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Fla. A few launch from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia.

“All three launch infrastructures are on the coast and they’re fixed, and so a little vulnerable to attack more than, say a mobile launch capability or an airborne launch capability,” said Chilton, a former head of Air Force Space Command. “Imagine some of these smaller rockets maybe being able to launch from inland locations—the deserts of Nevada, California, places like that,” he said.

Now the explorer chair of the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence (MI-SPACE), Chilton noted that the U.S. has traditionally avoided inland launches, but added, “The Chinese and Russians certainly do that. They launch from deep within their borders.”

Plumb agreed, saying different kinds of infrastructure could match the missions of different launches.

“There’s a fundamental difference between large [heavy rockets to geosynchronous orbit] and what some of these smaller commercial providers look like they might be able to provide, especially to [low-Earth orbit], with a smaller rocket, smaller footprint,” Plumb said. The question then becomes “How can we kind of use that diversification for resilience not only of our infrastructure, but potentially in some future situation where you actually trying to launch on response?”

Lawmakers have expressed strong support for “tactically responsive space”—the ability to launch satellites quickly following attacks or losses in order to rapidly reconstitute capability. That’s not easy, Plumb said, but added: “You’re going to see us trying to dig into that.“

Even looking beyond the U.S.’s own borders, Chilton pointed to the importance of allies and partners in ensuring the Pentagon has assured access to space—in addition to a whole host of other benefits.

“I think a lot of folks don’t appreciate the fact that geography matters. And so you know if you want to surveil the southern hemisphere space domain, you’ve got to be in the southern hemisphere,” Chilton said. “Unless you’re having a satellite on orbit, but even that has its limitations. So … our allies are going to be critical to not only space domain awareness, but perhaps launch resilience, perhaps some counter-space capabilities that they could bring to bear that would help protect our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians that are operating this domain.”

White House Says Latest Downed ‘Objects’ Were Likely Benign

White House Says Latest Downed ‘Objects’ Were Likely Benign

Feb. 14, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

After days of worry that mysterious objects shot down while flying over North America over the past week might be Chinese spycraft or even alien airships, the U.S. intelligence community indicated Feb. 14 that they may be “totally benign” commercial or research balloons.

“The intelligence community is considering as a leading explanation that these could just be balloons tied to some commercial or benign purpose,” said John Kirby, the National Security Council’s strategic communication coordinator.

In a spate of shootdowns Feb. 10-12, Air Force jets destroyed three “objects” in successive days with four AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. One missile missed its target. The shootdowns followed the downing of a large Chinese surveillance balloon Feb. 4 off the coast of South Carolina after it had crossed the entire continental United States.

Kirby offered the fullest public explanation to date by the Biden administration about the origins of three objects, which were downed over Alaskan waters, over the Yukon, Canada, and over Lake Huron in the Great Lakes. Kirby said the U.S. does not believe the objects were connected to the Chinese government’s spy balloon program or even engaged in intelligence collection against the U.S.

“I want to caveat that we haven’t found the debris,” Kirby added. “We’re still doing the best we can with the observations that were made by the pilots, with the flight profile data that we’ve tried to collect.”

Officials said the missile that missed its target was fired by a Minnesota National Guard F-16 over Lake Huron Feb. 12.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, speaking at a news conference in Brussels with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, said that after the first Sidewinder missed, a second AIM-9 hit the object, which officials have said was flying at about 20,000 feet altitude. The miss was first reported by Fox News. Milley said the U.S. tracked the errant missile as it fell “harmlessly” into the lake and that the surrounding airspace and water had been cleared of any civilians that might have been harmed in the engagement.

While the U.S. is still investigating the objects that were downed, there seems to be a ready answer as to why so many were detected in rapid succession. Radars can be programmed to filter out data on slow-moving objects so users can concentrate on fast-flying threats. That made it harder to detect balloons moving at the speed of prevailing winds. After the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) discovered the Chinese spy balloon in late January and early February, the filters were turned off, revealing objects that in the past would have been ignored, NORAD commander Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck said Feb. 12.

After the massive Chinese balloon traversed the U.S. for a week, it was finally shot down off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4.

Kirby said an interagency team set up by President Biden would soon determine new parameters for addressing unidentified aerial objects. U.S. defense and intelligence officials, including VanHerck, briefed the Senate Feb. 14.

After the briefing, Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he wanted the government to develop better procedures for dealing with unidentified airborne objects in the future.

“There is not anywhere near as formal a process as there probably should be,” Warner told reporters.

Air Force Launches First ICBM Test of 2023

Air Force Launches First ICBM Test of 2023

Feb. 14, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

Air Force Global Strike Command conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test of 2023 on Feb. 9, launching an unarmed Minuteman III from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif. 

The 11:01 p.m. launch, supported by Airmen from the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., included a test reentry vehicle that landed some 4,200 miles away in the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, according to an Air Force release. 

The test was part of routine missile testing and and “not the result of current world events,” the release said. 

“These test launches verify the accuracy and reliability of the ICBM weapon system and provide valuable data to ensure a continued safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent,” the release continued. 

It was the first launch since the Air Force a pair of ICBM tests were conducted over three weeks in August and September, the only two test launches of 2022. The 91st Missile Wing supported both of those tests as well. 

 The launch also followed by less than a week the Feb. 8 display by North Korea of up to a dozen ICBMs during a military parade, adding to a tense peirod in which:

The Minuteman III entered service in 1970, and will remain in use until the next-generation LGM-35 Sentinel, formerly called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, is mission capable. Sentinel is scheduled to reach initial operational capability in 2029, with full operational capability following in the 2030s. Realistically, that means the Air Force will likely operate the Minuteman for at least another decade.

To Surge Weapons Production, Air Force May Accept Less Efficiency

To Surge Weapons Production, Air Force May Accept Less Efficiency

Feb. 14, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force wants its suppliers to make weapons faster—and it may have to accept less efficiency as the price of the surge production capacity needed for a modern fight, Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. said Feb. 13.

The service is analyzing the weapon stockpile levels it requires for modern conflicts, looking for a balance between inexpensive, less-sophisticated munitions and high-end weapons, Brown said during a talk hosted by the Brookings Institution.

The service is doing “deeper dives on these [issues] to take a really hard look at where we are, from a munitions standpoint,” Brown said.

Over the years, Brown noted, weapons purchases have been structured to be “very efficient,” but “in some cases, to be able to move forward, we have to probably be less efficient.”

Brown’s remarks echo comments from Pentagon acquisition and sustainment chief William LaPlante and other defense leaders who have said the U.S. military must shift from “just-in-time” weapons production—which is efficient but geared for peacetime consumption—to a Cold War-style footing wherein munitions manufacturers have extra capacity in order to surge production for wartime usage.

This is less efficient, but the rapid drawdown of U.S. munitions being provided to Ukraine has highlighted the lack of depth in U.S. weapons production capacity and raised alarm on Capitol Hill that manufacturing is out of synch with world events.

Brown said the Air Force needs to keep in mind the experience of World War II, in which the supply of goods was critical to victory. “COVID taught us a few things about supply chains,” he noted.

However, “we’re also in a different place because of technology, where you’re able to do … digital engineering … and modular capabilities, to be able to do things a bit faster,” Brown added, referring to Air Force initiatives to rapidly design new weapons with modular features, allowing a mix-and-match capability to configure weapons with different seekers, warheads and propulsion systems.

Making munitions modular and with an open-systems architecture can potentially speed up design and production. The Air Force has issued several requests for information to industry to offer ideas on implementing such ideas.  

“I’ve … had a chance to visit some of our industry partners to see how they’re … looking at automation and the ability to build weapons a bit faster than we have in the past,” Brown said.

While Air Force inventories are “in a decent spot,” Brown said he won’t be satisfied with mere sufficiency.

“I want to make sure we have an overwhelming advantage,” he said.

The Air Force is looking for “that balance” between “highly capable weapons that are very expensive, but you may not have that capacity,” and the less-costly, level-of-effort weapons to prosecute a long-term campaign, Brown said.

Analysts have predicted a war with China over Taiwan could require hitting upwards of 50,000 targets, and a high tempo of airstrikes could empty munitions bins in less than two weeks.

The Air Force also needs its Joint All-Domain Command and Control system to be functional, so that it can make the best use of the munitions it has, Brown said.

The JADC2 element is critical, as hitting “moving targets at scale is really important.” Brown said there’s a danger of a mismatch, in which “you can have a bunch of targets [with] no munitions, or a bunch of munitions and no targets because you can’t move the information.”

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has supplemented his seven “operational imperatives” with task forces to study future requirements in three “cross-cutting” operational areas that underlie all other activities: munitions, airlift, and electronic warfare.

The Weapons Functional Integration Team is co-chaired by Brig. Gen. Jason Bartolomei, the program executive officer for weapons and head of USAF’s armament directorate, and Col. Christopher Buckley, chief of weapons development and requirements in the Air Force Futures shop.

Each of the cross-cutting teams is co-led by an acquirer and an operator in order to ensure that what USAF buys is operationally suitable and arrives within a relevant timeframe. The teams also have heavy input from industry, who provide context on what is realistically possible.  

Each of the cross-cutting teams is also developing a roadmap of their focus areas, charting the planned deployment of new capabilities and the sunsetting of old ones no longer deemed credible or relevant. The weapons team is building its roadmap, which is classified.

Bartolomei told Air & Space Forces Magazine in a January interview that the roadmap is iterative and continually updated, but that an early version informed the fiscal year 2024 defense budget request.

NORAD: F-16s Intercept Russian Bombers and Fighters Near Alaska

NORAD: F-16s Intercept Russian Bombers and Fighters Near Alaska

Feb. 14, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

U.S. warplanes intercepted four Russian aircraft operating near Alaska, the Department of Defense announced Feb. 14. But the U.S. stressed the Russian mission was not unsafe or provocative and the aircraft did not pose a threat.

On Feb. 13, two Russian Tu-95 Bear-H strategic bombers and two Su-35 Flanker-E fighters entered the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said in a statement. The Alaska ADIZ serves as an early warning buffer for North America that includes international airspace, and NORAD said that Russian aircraft did not enter American or Canadian airspace.

“This Russian activity in the North American ADIZ occurs regularly and is not seen as a threat, nor is the activity seen as provocative,” NORAD said.

In addition to the two F-16s fighters that intercepted the Russian aircraft, NOARD had other assets backing up the mission including two F-35A Lightning II fifth-generation fighters, one E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system, and two KC-135 Stratotanker refuelers.

Russian aircraft have conducted long-range flights that enter the ADIZ for decades, and American planes have routinely been sent to intercept them. The last incident occurred in October 2022, when Russia flew two Bear-H bombers into the ADIZ which were also intercepted by American F-16s. However, those bombers were not accompanied by Russian fighters as they were during this latest mission.

The Tu-95 is a large propeller plane that has been in service since the 1950s. U.S. intercepts of the Bear and other Russian aircraft were commonplace during the Cold War. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered long-range flights of strategic bombers to resume, and NORAD intercepts of those aircraft have occurred with varying frequency since then.

“Since Russia resumed out-of-area Long Range Aviation activity in 2007, NORAD has seen a yearly average of approximately six to seven intercepts of Russian military aircraft in the ADIZ,” NORAD said. “These numbers have varied each year from as high as 15 to as low as zero.”

According to NORAD’s statement, it expected the most recent Russian flight. It was unclear if NORAD had any intelligence of the specific Russian actions on Feb. 13 or was awaiting a Russian mission after a months-long lull in Russian activity in the ADIZ.

NORAD was originally created by the U.S. and Canada in 1958 to help defend the continental U.S. against Russian bombers. The command said it did not believe the Russian flight was an attempt to probe America’s air defenses after the recent shoot-downs of a Chinese surveillance balloon and other objects by NORAD and U.S. Northern Command.

“NORAD also assesses that this Russian flight activity is in no way related to recent NORAD and U.S. Northern Command operations associated with airborne objects over North America during the last two weeks,” the statement said. “NORAD routinely monitors foreign aircraft movements and as necessary, escorts them from the ADIZ.”