Senators Launch New Drive for Space National Guard

Senators Launch New Drive for Space National Guard

The push to create a new Space National Guard got a major boost last week as a bipartisan team of Senators offered new legislation—even as the Pentagon works to craft details on a competing plan. 

Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced the Space National Guard Establishment Act on Feb. 16, joined by eight co-sponsors:

  • Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) 
  • Sen. John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.) 
  • Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) 
  • Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) 
  • Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) 
  • Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) 
  • Sen. Mike Braun (R-Ind.) 
  • Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.) 

The 10 backers of the bill is down from the dozen that cosponsored a similar bill in May 2022. That effort died in committee, however, and efforts to insert the measure into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act also failed. Now Feinstein and Rubio are reintroducing the bill to a new Congress. 

There are more than 1,000 members of the Air National Guard involved today in space missions, spread among seven states and one territory—Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, New York, Ohio, and Guam.

“The National Guard’s space units serve under the Air Force, which no longer has responsibility for the space mission,” Feinstein said in a statement. “They should serve under the Space Force with the rest of our space units and fix the organizational disconnect that is undermining their training, resourcing, and recruiting. Leaving the Guard’s space units under the Air Force is shortsighted and undermines our national security.” 

Rubio added: “Creating a Space National Guard would boost our military readiness and increase efficiency. It would also ensure that the Space Force retains needed talent.”  

The debate over creating a Space Guard has been underway since the Space Force was born in December 2019. Proponents want it to ensure Air National Guard units with space missions can retain their expertise, and argue that the cost of the change can be as little as several hundred thousand dollars for chaning name tapes, unit flags, and signs. They want Space-focused Guardsmen to be able to remain connected to their state missions, like disaster relief and humanitarian aid. 

Critics—including the Biden administration—say a separate Space Guard would add layers of bureaucracy, extra cost that might run into the millions annually, and that there is no need to tie space-focused Guardsmen to state missions since the space missions they perform are federal in nature. 

The House versions of the 2022 and 2023 defense authorization bills both included support for the Space Guard, but the measure did not survive the conference report either time.

Instead, the 2022 law included a requirement for a study and a report on how the Space Force should structure its reserve components, including a look at how much a Space National Guard would cost.  

The Space Force has proposed what it calls the “Space Component”—a hybrid structure combining full-time and part-time Guardians. Advocates like its “lean and agile” approach and former Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond described it as the service’s “No. 1 legislative proposal” last year before he retired. 

The 2023 NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on how the Space Component would work, including rules, regulations, and policies for allowing Guardians to move between full- and part-time duty, compete for promotion, and retire. The Space Force must also explain how to manage pay, benefits, and other factors for full- and part-time Guardians and detail changes in legislation needed to support the plan. That level of detail suggests lawmakers were leaning toward the Space Force proposals.

The Space Force report is due March 1, well in time for changes to be included in the 2024 NDAA if Congress approves.

The Department of the Air Force referred questions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which did not immediately respond. 

After N. Korea Missile Test, USAF B-1s, F-16s  Fly in Allied Show of Force

After N. Korea Missile Test, USAF B-1s, F-16s Fly in Allied Show of Force

U.S. Air Force B-1 bombers and F-16 fighters flew alongside Japanese and South Korean aircraft in separate training exercises Feb. 19, a day after North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that fell off Japan’s coast.

North Korea followed with two more ballistic missile tests, as tensions continue to mount in the region. The U.S. and South Korea have pledged more joint exercises.

The two latest bilateral exercises both included B-1B Lancers flying from Guam. The BONEs are part of a Bomber Task Force rotation out of Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., and twice previously flew alongside Republic of Korea fighters earlier this month.

USAF F-16s from Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, and Republic of Korea Air Force F-35s joined the B-1s, according to U.S. Forces Korea. The ROKAF released photos showing two B-1s, four F-16s, and four F-35s, and said the aircraft flew through the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone. The ADIZ is a buffer zone that includes international airspace near the Korean Peninsula.

“The training offered the alliance an opportunity to rehearse short-notice recall missions, demonstrating the U.S.-ROK combined defense capability, and the ironclad commitment to providing extended deterrence in the defense of the Korean Peninsula,” U.S. Forces Korea said in a statement.

U.S. Japan Korea
U.S. Air Force B-1s and F-16s fly alongside ROK Air Force F-35s through the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone on Feb. 19, 2023. Photo by ROKAF

In a separate event over the Sea of Japan, the B-1s were joined by American F-16s from Misawa Air Base, Japan, as well as Japanese F-15s, U.S. Forces Japan and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force said. In a release, the Japanese Joint Staff said the exercise involved two B-1s, four F-16s, and three F-15s.

“This exercise was conducted to demonstrate our nations’ rapid reaction capabilities, high levels of force readiness, close coordination, bilateral interoperability, and credible deterrent capacity,” U.S. Forces Japan said in a statement.

Japan U.S. air exercise
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command B-1 bomber and F-16 fighter aircraft conducted a bilateral exercise with Japan Air Self-Defense Force B-15 fighter aircraft February 19, 2023, over the Sea of Japan. Photo by JASDF

A B-1 from Ellsworth previously integrated with Japanese F-15s over the Pacific during a long-duration, CONUS-to-CONUS mission in January.

Pacific Air Forces did not specify whether the same B-1s participated in both exercises Feb. 19. The Air Force has not previously stated how many B-1s were participating in the Bomber Task Force mission, but no image has indicated more than two.

North Korea’s ICBM test launch Feb. 18, its second test this year, was first reported by the Associated Press. The AP said the launch demonstrated the potential to reach the continental U.S., although the missile fell within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, some 200 kilometers from the Japanese island of Oshima.

“We are aware of the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] ballistic missile launch and are consulting closely with the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as other regional allies and partners,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said in a statement. “The United States condemns these actions and calls on the DPRK to refrain from any further unlawful and destabilizing acts. While we have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, or territory, or to our allies, we will continue to monitor the situation.”

INDOPACOM issued a similar statement after the subsequent missile launches early Feb. 20 local time. Those tests landed outside Japan’s economic zone.

According to state media reports, Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, said the DPRK’s “frequency of using the Pacific as our firing range” depends on the frequency with which U.S. forces appear in the region—an apparent response to U.S. and South Korean pledges to ramp up joint training exercises.

South Korean leaders have become increasingly vocal about the need for a nuclear deterrent on the peninsula, either U.S. nuclear weapons or arms of South Korea’s own creation. “We must first secure a concrete nuclear deterrence,” Chung Jin-suk, head of the ruling People Power party, said, according to the Yonhap news agency.

“We need to strengthen our ‘Kill Chain’ so North Korea can never rise to its feet again if it uses nukes on the Korean peninsula,” Chung added, referring to the South Korean program to target North Korea’s leadership in a contingency. “We need to seriously consider developing our own nuclear capabilities if such a response is insufficient.”

Officially, the Pentagon is still committed to its objective of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. But a recent bipartisan, independent commission of U.S. experts recommended the U.S. begin thinking about how nuclear arms might be placed in South Korea should it become necessary to change that policy.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command B-1 bomber and F-16 fighter aircraft conducted a bilateral exercise with Japan Air Self-Defense Force B-15 fighter aircraft February 19, 2023, over the Sea of Japan. Photo by JASDF
IISS: China’s Aggressive Exercises Near Taiwan are a ‘New Normal’

IISS: China’s Aggressive Exercises Near Taiwan are a ‘New Normal’

China’s many exercises and bluff attack runs against Taiwan’s air and sea defenses since the visit to Taipei of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in September 2022 represent a “new normal” for the two countries, the International Institute of Strategic Studies said in the 2023 edition of its annual “The Military Balance” report.

Together with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s aggressive actions offer Taipei “an opportunity to learn how to prepare for and respond to an armed attack,” the report added.

Since the Pelosi visit, the “regular air and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait ‘median line’, which Beijing has said does not exist” have increased, and are probably calculated to both assess Taiwan’s preparedness and wear down its defenses through repeated scrambles, the IISS said. A byproduct is the opportunity to observe U.S. reactions to the threats, particularly the movement of surface and submarine forces in the area.

While the mock attacks may indeed be dress rehearsals for the real thing, they are in keeping with China’s “grey zone” activities, in which Beijing conducts coercive military operations short of physical violence, such as its “island building” campaign to create airbases in disputed waters. Such tactics will likely continue as long as they are successful, the IISS said.

In the various incursions across Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, dozens of frontline Chinese aircraft and naval vessels behaved as if they were attacking Taiwan but turned away after breaching territorial airspace and waters. In December 2022, some 39 frontline aircraft and three surface combatants were involved. Taiwanese government officials said some of the aircraft and vessels went through the motions of targeting Taiwanese and U.S. vessels in the area.

Though the exercises in August and September were ostensibly a reaction to Pelosi’s visit—Beijing objected to the high-level U.S. official’s recognition of the Taipei government—the activities “were some of the largest organized by the PLA in Taiwan’s vicinity, would have required months of planning and may have been part of Beijing’s overall drive to improve China’s military,” the report notes.

The IISS also acknowledged that the exercises may have been “adapted in light of Pelosi’s visit, or that the PLA was executing a pre-planned contingency response, or a blend of the two.”

Regardless, soon afterwards, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency “was listing a number of approved sales of defense equipment and support services to Taipei since Biden took office,” including contractor support for Taiwan’s PAVE PAWS long-range surveillance radar system, as well as additional RGM-84L Harpoon Block II coastal-defense missiles and AIM-9X Sidewinder II air-to-air missiles. However, these sales remain subject to Congressional approval.

Taiwan needs to develop a balance of conventional and asymmetric means of responding to both grey zone and “full-scale invasion threats” posed by the People’s Liberation Army, the IISS said. More importantly, Taipei needs to develop “measures to deter Beijing in a worsening political and military-security environment across the Taiwan Strait.”

Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen has outlined a response to China’s increasing belligerence, which includes:

  • Increasing Taiwan’s defense budget year over year
  • Increasing production of precision-guided missiles and naval vessels
  • Building means of asymmetric warfare
  • Increasing domestic production of aircraft
  • Creating a self-defense and mobilization agency, also meant to train reservists and provide for civil defense

On this last point, “lessons learned from the war in Ukraine may be more helpful than any gleaned from the post-Pelosi exercises,” the IISS noted.  

“For instance, plans have been discussed to raise the duration of conscription from four months to one year. Similarly, Taipei is developing a centralized approach to civil-defense preparedness.” This area has been given inadequate attention in recent years, the IISS said, referring to it as a “bottom-up” approach rather than an overall government-led initiative.

“These efforts remain nascent and, so far, Taiwan lacks the same level of investment in civil defense that Ukraine looked to develop following Russia’s 2014 assault and annexation of Crimea,” the think tank said.

The IISS noted that U.S. officials have urged Taipei to become a “porcupine;” while it may not be able to build enough capability to defeat China in an all-out war, it could make the Chinese pay an unacceptable price for attacking Taiwan.

The think tank also noted that while President Joe Biden has “on several occasions mentioned the United States’ unequivocal military support for Taiwan in any armed attack launched by the PLA,” Taipei and the U.S. “reportedly disagree about how much focus should be placed on the development of asymmetric capabilities,” with the U.S. urging more effort along these lines.

China has begun using commercial unmanned aerial vehicles to penetrate Taiwan’s ADIZ and “conduct surveillance of islands close to the Chinese mainland.” After a few of these incursions went unchallenged, Taiwan has shot down at least one such UAV “likely in an attempt to set a precedent against further provocation,” the IISS reported.

Taiwan will upgrade its air defenses with 70 F-16 Block 70 aircraft, the most-advanced version of the Fighting Falcon, and the first example of which will be delivered to Bahrain in March. Taipei also “maintains an interest in the F-35,” but the U.S. has kept it off the table as being potentially too provocative.

“In 2022, Taiwan’s purchase of MQ-9B UAVs was confirmed,” and it has budgeted for HIMARS, ATACMS, SRBMs, and precision-guided rockets, types which either have been or are expected to be significant in the Ukraine war.

While Taiwan maintains a defense industrial base “with strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles,” a new defense industrial policy adopted in 2019 “is aimed at further strengthening independent defense-manufacturing capacities,” the IISS reported.

Space Force Seeks New Options for Launch

Space Force Seeks New Options for Launch

The Space Force is opening up competition for rocket launches with a “dual-lane approach,” potentially giving smaller companies a chance to break into the launch business, according to a new draft request for proposals released Feb. 16. 

In publishing the draft RFP, Space Systems Command announced an industry day event Feb. 28-March 1 to discuss Phase 3 of its National Space Security Launch program.  

Under “Lane 1” of the program, SSC will award indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts to multiple providers, enabling selected vendors to offer launch services beginning in fiscal 2025. The awards will cover a five-year span, with an option to renew for a second five years. To enable as many participants as possible, the Space Force will re-open the solicitation annually so that new competitors can “on-ramp” into the program. 

“Lane 2,” meanwhile, is open only to launch providers that already have fully-certified launch systems. In this part of its program, SSC will award ID/IQ contracts to two launch providers capable of reaching all orbits and providing “mission unique services, launch services support, fleet surveillance, early integration studies, and special studies.”  

This strategy “provides access to diverse commercially available systems, increases resiliency through alternate launch sites and streamlined integration timelines, … enables supply chain stability, and enhances affordability for the most stressing National Security Space missions,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen Purdy, the Space Force’s program executive officer for Assured Access to Space, in a statement. 

The prior Phase 2 contracts, awarded in August 2020, went to United Launch Alliance and SpaceX and shut out challengers Northrop Grumman and Blue Origin. That contract covered launch orders through fiscal 2024, although the actual launches will take place as late as 2027. 

Ever since that award, however, the Space Force has been seeking feedback on how to work with new entries to the launch market, beginning with a Request for Information to industry, seeking feedback on how it could work with launch companies of all sizes and indicating that it might establish “a research, development, test, and evaluation program to accelerate the development of transformational commercial space access, mobility, and logistics technologies that can be on-ramped when available.” 

And while ULA and SpaceX are the only companies to have won NSSL launch contracts, others have emerged as eager contenders, especially for launches that only have to reach low-Earth orbit. In addition to Blue Origin and Northrop Grumman, Rocket Lab, Firefly, and Virgin Orbit are all among the potential competitors for “Lane 1” contracts. 

Debate over the acquisition strategy for Phase 3 reached Congress this past year. In the conference report accompanying the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, lawmakers wrote that the Space Force “should account for changes in the launch industry” and urged the service to “examine all possible options for awarding contracts for launches during the period covered by the phase, including: block buys; indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity; or a hybrid approach,” in addition to other considerations. 

At the same time, legislators have also pushed for the service to consider a “common launch integrator” to coordinate between the government, satellite builders, and launch providers. 

While the new draft RFP outlines the Space Force’s basic approach for Phase 3, the official RFP still needs to be finalized—Space Systems Command is currently projecting that to be released in the third quarter of fiscal 2023, between April and June. 

Side-by-Side: DIA Report Uses Photos to Show Russia Is Using Iranian Drones in Ukraine

Side-by-Side: DIA Report Uses Photos to Show Russia Is Using Iranian Drones in Ukraine

A new report from the Defense Intelligence Agency confirms the drones Russia has used to terrorize Ukrainian cities and pound the country’s infrastructure have been provided by Iran.

Russia has renamed the drones it acquired from Iran, but by drawing on declassified images and publicly available photos, the DIA report shows that Russia has carried out attacks in Ukraine with the same types of unmanned aerial vehicles Iran has used in the Middle East.

Part of what has made the drones used in Ukraine easy to link to Iran is their novel appearance.

“The Iranian-origin Shahed-136, renamed Geran-2 by the Russians, has a distinctive shape, with a delta-wing body and vertical stabilizers extending above and below the body, as displayed in Iranian press and military expos,” the DIA report noted, referring to the one-way attack drone.

“The images circulating in open press of UAVs in Ukraine clearly show the features of the Shahed-136’s delta-wing body and vertical stabilizers,” the report said.

Components of Shahed-136 drones have been recovered in Ukraine, which has enabled DIA to determine it is the same type of UAV Iran has transferred to the Houthis in Yemen and used in a 2021 attack on a merchant vessel. Engine components from drones recovered in Ukraine are of the same type used by Iranian drones, and the DIA found that a recovered Shahed-136 used in Ukraine had an Iranian-made MD-550 engine. The MD-550 is based on a German design, and its use in Iranian drones has been previously documented.

DIA

The Shahed-131, a one-way attack drone that the Russians have renamed Geran-1, is similar to the Shahed-136 but of a smaller size. The DIA noted the drones used in the Middle East and Ukraine were so similar that “some components even fractured in the same manner after impact.”

DIA
DIA

Ukraine, the report noted, also recovered a largely intact Mohajer-6 from the Black Sea. That multirole drone, the DIA said, appears to be identical to Iranian systems photographed in Iran and Iraq.

The U.S. accused Iran in October of providing the drones and sending trainers into Russia-occupied Crimea to train Russian forces on how to use them.

Iran initially denied the allegation. Tehran later claimed that the drones it sent were provided before the renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the U.S. says the drones are being provided as part of an ongoing arrangement.

In December, National Security Council strategic communications coordinator John Kirby said Russia and Iran had established “a full-fledged defense partnership” that could lead to the production of drones in Russia. Iranian media has claimed Iran might even receive fighter jets from Russia.

Air Forces Central (AFCENT) commander Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich addressed his growing concern over Iran’s drone supplies at an AFA Warfighters in Action event Feb. 13.

“It’s disconcerting to me that that kind of capacity and capability is being supplied to Russia for the war in Ukraine and I don’t see that changing anytime soon,” Grynkewich said. “Russians are going to continue to want to purchase those drones. The Iranians are going to continue to want to sell them.”

In addition to fueling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Grynkewich expressed concerned Iran’s military capabilities in the Middle East will grow due to its partnership with Russia.

“The other interesting dynamic is in a way it is flipped,” Grynkewich said. “Who is the client state and who is the benefactor? I never thought that I would see when Russia was beholden in some way to the Islamic Republic of Iran, but that is kind of the dynamic that you have.”

Yet another worry is that the military collaboration between Russia and Iran will lead to closer coordination between Russia and Iranian forces in Syria, where the U.S. still has about 900 troops to support the ongoing fight against remnants of the Islamic State as part of Operation Inherent Resolve.

“Both the Russians and the Iranians are trying to maintain or gain a bigger foothold,” Grynkewich said. “We haven’t seen that kind of cohesion between the two sides come together yet, but I think it’s only natural at some point that those kinds of conversations will be going on their side.”

GE Says New F-35 Engine Would Refresh Propulsion Industrial Base

GE Says New F-35 Engine Would Refresh Propulsion Industrial Base

If the Air Force and Pentagon decide the F-35 fighter needs an all-new engine, it wouldn’t just give the jet range and performance improvements—it would drive a refresh of the entire fighter propulsion industrial base, a GE Aerospace official claimed Feb. 16.

Competitor Pratt & Whitney, however, says putting a brand new engine on the F-35 would hurt future development for programs like the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter.

Speaking with reporters about GE’s XA100 Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) powerplant, vice president and general manager of advanced combat engines David Tweedie said he is anticipating the upcoming fiscal 2024 defense budget will include a decision on the future of F-35 propulsion.

GE Aerospace is rooting for that decision to include AETP, which would put it back in contention to power F-35 fighters.

A new powerplant means “an opportunity not just to continue making legacy architecture/legacy-type engines that are currently in production, but to actually fully modernize” the fighter engine industrial base with “the latest technologies,” including many that are in commercial products but “have not yet been introduced into production fighter engines,” Tweedie said.

“It’ll provide a modernized, diversified and more resilient [military engine] industrial base in the United States,” he added.

Competitor Pratt & Whitney, meanwhile, continues to argue in favor of a more incremental upgrade to its current F135 engine.

“AETP technology is best suited for sixth-generation platforms, not the F-35,” Jen Latka, F135 vice president at Pratt, said in a Feb. 16 email to Air & Space Forces Magazine. “A brand-new F-35 engine will unnecessarily disrupt the program of record and divert billions from advanced sixth-gen propulsion solutions,” she said.

Pratt & Whitney has had been the F-35’s sole engine-maker since GE was locked out of the program in 2011. Both companies developed AETP powerplants under yearslong, multi-billion dollar Air Force contracts geared to providing greater range and power to the F-35 at midlife, but the Air Force hasn’t said yet whether it needs or can afford to develop a new F-35 engine.

The F-35 Block 4 needs more power and cooling capability to run its new capabilities, however, so no change at all isn’t a choice.  

To keep its options open, Congress appropriated $203 million late in 2022 for further development of AETP engines, which Tweedie said GE is using to “burn down risk” on its XA-100 version and keep a team of some 400 engineers together. GE has dubbed this effort “Design and Manufacturing Advancement”—a term Tweedie said describes activities akin to Engineering and Manufacturing Development—which will leverage data collected in prototyping and begin production design; continue airframe integration efforts with Lockheed Martin, and sketch out logistics and sustainment plans.

Pratt & Whitney also has an AETP engine to offer, but it has instead pitched what it calls the F135 Engine Core Upgrade, which would allow the company to keep its F-35 monopoly. Latka said in December that company believes the ECU approach would save $40 billion versus an all-new powerplant, counting development and integration costs and the need to flesh out a global support enterprise with new engines and parts.

“Our F135 Engine Core Upgrade will incorporate advanced propulsion technologies…and maintain the existing balanced industrial base. It’s also the only solution that works for all F-35 customers and enables full Block 4 capabilities starting in 2028.”

Tweedie said GE could have an XA100 production model ready for the F-35A and C in 2028—and the engines would integrate “seamlessly” with both aircraft. But making an AETP engine fit the F-35B, which has a unique propulsion system for vertical operations, will require substantially more development work, Tweedie acknowledged. He declined to say how much longer an F-35B-configured engine would take to develop and bring to production. But it can be done, he insisted.

He noted that the F-35A/C and F-35B use different versions of the F135 already; they are “not interchangeable,” although there is some commonality, he said.

The F-35 Joint Program Office asked GE to look at what would be necessary to make the XA100 work with the F-35B’s lift fan, drive shaft and swivel exhaust nozzle, Tweedie said, with emphasis on “how much commonality” and “how much ‘unique’ there would be” between the two versions.

GE was “pleased with the results of the study, in terms of our ability to show a path to make the modifications in a in a B-model derivative that could provide some good capabilities,” he said.

For its part, the JPO agreed “it would be a separate, incremental effort” from the conventional takeoff version, Tweedie continued. “We’ve provided what those incremental costs and timing would be.”

GE gave the JPO and Marine Corps, which operates the F-35B, an estimate of how long a separate AETP engine would take, but Tweedie declined to share it, except that it would be “after” the 2028 target for the conventional takeoff version.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said the service would like the performance improvements offered by the AETP engines, but USAF would have to bear the development costs alone if the Navy and other partners aren’t interested.

“We certainly perceive a significant amount of enthusiasm from the Air Force leadership … over the last few years,” Tweedie said.

“As you know, [on] December 22, 2020, we fired up the first engine and it worked right, and and that has generated a significant amount of onsite visits from a variety of Air Force leadership, to really ‘kick the tires,’ meet the team, see the … built engine, see [it] … disassembled and just truly understand so that they can make the most informed decision,” he said.

Tweedie argued that a new engine is an operational imperative, given the geopolitical landscape, to power an F-35 with “transformational capabilities.”

Repeating previous claims, Tweedie said the XA100 would provide the F-35A with 30 percent more range increase, 20 percent more thrust, and twice as much thermal management capacity, as well as “durability enhancements and readiness improvements that the warfighter needs.”

“This is a requirements-driven decision process,” Tweedie argued. The U.S. must deal with its pacing challenge in China, and “there’s a timeframe associated with that.”

While “we’re certainly glad to see our competitor”—Pratt—recognize that a new core is necessary, “incremental upgrades to existing engines cannot alone meet the actual needs of the warfighter,” Tweedie insisted.  

The Pratt ECU also offers only a seven percent range improvement, he noted.

“It’s not clear that a seven percent increase is something that actually provides operationally meaningful capability to the warfighter,” he said. “So we really feel strongly that the full capability of an AETP solution … is the way to go.”

Also, “injecting competition “into the propulsion world is something that we think can provide a lot of benefits, as has been done on other platforms in the past.”

Biden: Three Downed Objects Were For Research, Not Chinese Surveillance

Biden: Three Downed Objects Were For Research, Not Chinese Surveillance

In comments aimed at reassuring the American public and setting the stage for future diplomatic engagements with Beijing, President Joe Biden said Feb. 16 the three aerial objects the U.S. recently shot down were not part of China’s spy balloon fleet.

“The intelligence community’s current assessment is that these three ones were most likely balloons tied to private companies, recreation, or research institutions studying weather or conducting other scientific research,” Biden said in his first formal comments on the unprecedented series of air-to-air engagements over the skies of North America and the downing of the Chinese spy balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4.

Biden added that he expects to speak soon with Chinese leader Xi Jinping about the U.S. decision to shoot down the Chinese spy ballon balloon and to continue the diplomatic dialogue between Beijing and Washington. Thus far, the Chinese have declined high-level talks on the incident, rebuffing Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s attempts to contact his Chinese counterpart.

“We’re not looking for a new Cold War, but I make no apologies,” Biden said. “We will compete and will we responsibly manage that competition so that it doesn’t veer into conflict.”

After the Chinese balloon was detected and traversed North America, the U.S. military downed three objects in the span of three days over the weekend Feb. 10-12. The Pentagon acknowledged it did not know whether any nations might have sent them as spycraft but said they posed a potential danger to civilian air traffic.

The Chinese balloon flew at an altitude of 60,000-65,000 feet, was up to 200 feet tall, and weighed several thousand pounds, according to U.S. officials. But the other “objects,” as the U.S. has termed them, were smaller and flew at lower altitudes. The objects shot down over Yukon, Canada, and Alaska were operating around 40,000 feet, while the object over Lake Huron was at 20,000 feet, according to U.S. accounts.

It now appears those unidentified objects were not a danger to U.S. national security, and Biden said he is directing the administration to develop better procedures for handling unidentified objects in the future.

The goal, he said, will be to distinguish “between those that are likely to pose safety and security risks that necessitate action and those that do not.” To do that, Biden said the U.S. will establish a better inventory of unmanned airborne objects above the U.S. that is accessible and up to date, improve U.S. capability to detect unmanned objects, update U.S. rules and regulations for launching and maintaining unmanned objects, and establish new global norms.

“These steps will lead to safer and more secure skies for our air travelers, our military, our scientists, and for people on the ground as well,” he added.

U.S. officials, including the head of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, said previously that NORAD had adjusted its radars after the Chinese balloon incident. In making that adjustment, U.S. officials said NORAD no longer filtered out slow, small objects, which led to increased visibility of the objects that were subsequently shot down.

“We’re now just seeing more of them partially because the steps we’ve taken to increase our radars,” Biden said.

A group of hobbyists, the Northern Illinois Bottlecap Balloon Brigade, has reported that one of their balloons went “missing in action” after passing near an uninhabited island in Alaska, spurring speculation that it might be one of the objects that was shot down by an F-22.

Autonomous C-130s and C-17s? Air Force Invests in Feasibility Study

Autonomous C-130s and C-17s? Air Force Invests in Feasibility Study

The Air Force is exploring the potential of autonomous cargo craft, awarding a contract to tech company Reliable Robotics to study the feasibility of automating large, multi-engine airlifters. 

Reliable Robotics announced the contract Feb. 8, calling itself a “leader in safety-enhancing aircraft automation systems.” The company has worked with the Air Force before under three phases of Small Business Innovation Research contracts with the Air Force Research Laboratory. Those deals, awarded in May 2021, April 2022, and October 2022, saw Reliable Robotics develop and test its autonomous technology on existing Air Force aircraft. 

This newest study goes further, exploring autonomy specifically for cargo operations, said retired Maj. Gen. David O’Brien, senior vice president of government solutions at Reliable Robotics. 

“We’re looking at just sort of the feasibility,” O’Brien told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an interview. ” What is involved? What does it take? Of the various applications and utilities on an aircraft, which ones are most important to the Air Force in providing autonomy?”

O’Brien, who previously worked in Air Force acquisition both as an Airman and civilian, continued: “Then we’ll talk a little bit about aircraft deployment, how they would use it and in what conditions autonomy would really help serve their mission needs.” 

Reliable Robotics is driving toward a future in which cargo aircraft can fly with or without crews, can operate as remotely piloted, minimally manned, or fully crewed, depending on mission. That would reduce manpower requirements and increase flexibility. 

“If they had a solution where they could operate their autonomous large aircraft in the same way they operate their fully crewed aircraft, that provides speed advantages, increased tempo advantages, and provides a lot of utility in terms of aircraft usage,” added O’Brien. 

Managing increased operational tempos with limited manpower could be crucial to operating at effectively in the Indo-Pacific. Air Mobility Command has pushed the envelope with record-breaking endurance missions and experiments with limited aircrew on some flights. 

“The Air Force is definitely focused on being able to generate aircraft, definitely focused on a higher tempo, definitely focused on ways to … surge aircraft in newer ways that provide more opportunity and are less demanding on the operators,” O’Brien noted. “And so autonomy is, I think, a big solution to that.” 

Much of the focus on autonomous and remotely-piloted aircraft is in the combat arena, but cargo operations could be a good fit, as well, to reduce capacity gaps. Reliable Robotics brings new elements to that discussion because it’s intended for use with existing aircraft. 

“Reliable’s autonomy does not preclude piloted flight once installed. And when it’s installed, it’s installed basically in the walls and the ceiling,” O’Brien said. “So we retain and do not disturb the interior compartment. So that can be continued to be used.” 

Optionally-manned aircraft could form a significant part of the Air Force’s future fleet—both the B-21 bomber and Next Generation Air Dominance fighter has been designed with optional manning in mind

For cargo aircraft, autonomy could prove particularly relevant, thanks to demand from commercial carriers that could accelerate the technological development. 

“A lot of the advantages that Reliable is working in its commercial solution for commercial cargo carriers is going to be directly applicable to Air Force operations,” O’Brien said. “And I think that’s why the Air Force is excited about this.” 

Reliable is working with the Federal Aviation Administration to earn safety approval for its technology. But the short term need is to deliver a useful feasibility analysis. “We have a series of tests and tasks that we want to … make sure we satisfy for [the Air Force],” O’Brien said. “We will be meeting with them frequently, we will be getting access to aircraft, we will be getting everything we need to do an assessment on what autonomy for a large aircraft looks like.” 

NORAD Intercepts Russian Warplanes for Second Time in Two Days

NORAD Intercepts Russian Warplanes for Second Time in Two Days

Two U.S. Air Force F-35s intercepted a quartet of Russian fighters and bombers near Alaska on Feb. 14—the second intercept in two days. 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said the Russian flight, which included Tu-95 Bear-H strategic bombers and Su-35 and Su-30 fighters, approached the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, but did not penetrate into American or Canadian airspace.

Two F-35s were dispatched to intercept the Russian planes, supported by two F-16 fighters, an E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system, and two KC-135 Stratotanker refuelers.

NORAD said the Russian aircraft never entered American or Canadian airspace.

The incident followed was very similar to the Feb. 13 intercept of four Russian aircraft—two Tu-95 Bear-Hs and two Su-35s—by two F-16s, also in the Alaska ADIZ, an warning zone that includes international airspace. 

The two intercept missions followed the recent shoot-down of a Chinese surveillance balloon and the shootdowns of other undefined objects by NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. The NORAD statement dismissed any connection between the incidents, noting that “this Russian activity near the North American ADIZ occurs regularly and is not seen as a threat, nor is the activity seen as provocative.” 

As with the Feb. 13 incident, NORAD said its forces “anticipated this Russian activity and, as a result of our planning, was prepared to intercept it.” It was unclear whether that was intended to mean NORAD had advance intelligence of specific Russian actions. 

The back-to-back Russian intercepts were the first since October, when Russia flew two Bear-H bombers into the ADIZ and were soon intercepted by American F-16s. 

U.S. intercepts of Russian aircraft were commonplace during the Cold War, but largely disappeared in the 1990s. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin resumed long-range bomber flights, and NORAD intercepts of those aircraft have occurred with varying frequency since then. 

NORAD said it intercepts Russian aircraft six or seven times a year, but that total has reached as high as 15 since 2007. 

The Chinese balloon incursion spurred concern over NORAD’s readiness, which was amplified when NORAD Commander Gen. Glen D. VanHerck blamed a “domain awareness gap” for allowing NORAD to be surprised by the Chinese spy balloon. 

Some of those concerns, however, has been tamped down by the White House’s recent indications that the three most recent unidentified objects shot down were likely “benign.”