Air Force CIO Knausenberger Will Depart in June

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The Department of Air Force’s chief information officer Lauren Knausenberger will depart the Air Force in June, the Air Force said Feb. 23. Knausenberger joined the Air Force as Chief Transformation Officer in 2017, and had been CIO since August 2020.

The Air Force aims to identify a successor before Knausenberger leaves, said Air Force spokeswoman Ann Stefanek.

Knausenberger’s departure signals a clean sweep of departing military department CIOs: In January, Army CIO Raj Iyer said he was departing after more than two years, and the Department of the Navy’s CIO Aaron Weis is leaving his post after more than three years next month.

As CIO, Knausenberger oversaw an information technology portfolio valued at around $17 billion.

Since arriving in the department from industry, Knausenberger has been an agent of change and modernization, pushing to update the Department of the Air Force’s IT infrastructure by accelerating a push into the cloud, upgrading cybersecurity, and expanding the use of artificial intelligence. Those efforts mirrored trends throughout the Department of Defense and align with Operational Imperatives like the Advanced Battle Management System, part of a military-wide drive to shortening the “sensor to shooter” loop and gain decision advantage over adversaries through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

The rising use of cyber as a disruptive force to counter U.S. advantages in communications and intelligence raise the stakes for the kind of work Knausenberger pursued for the Air Force.

“I think that most nations want to avoid the attrition that comes from the kinetic in favor of a more quiet cyber war,” Knausenberger said during an event hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in November 2022.

Knausenberger did not say what she plans on doing next. Her Air Force roles were her first in government. Before that, she founded Accellint Inc., a consulting firm, and was a Venture Partner with NextGen Angels, investing in commercial technologies that could be applied to government applications. She also held jobs at American Management Systems and CACI, where she oversaw much of the company’s Intelligence Community portfolio.

Heritage: Here’s How to Answer South Korean Worries Over Nuclear Threats

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

With North Korea increasingly testing long-range missiles and South Korea agitating for its own nuclear deterrent, a new Heritage Foundation report recommends the U.S. work with Seoul to ease its concerns and recommit to the peninsula’s defense.

Bruce Klingner, a Heritage senior research fellow, said in his Feb. 23 report that the South Korean government needs a reassurance. “Seoul is pushing for more tangible signs of U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, greater involvement in U.S. planning for potential use of nuclear weapons in Korean contingencies, and a role in nuclear decision-making during a crisis,” Klingner wrote. “Washington seems willing to be more forthcoming in revising the highly sensitive nuclear relationship but retains clear red lines.”

Klingner said Washington and Seoul should establish a “bilateral nuclear planning group,” which might later be expanded to include Australia and Japan in order to more comprehensively address threats in the Indo-Pacific region. He also advocated for joint training parameters and discussions on potential future strategic weapons deployment, including dual-use aircraft and aircraft carrier battle groups.

“It seems that South Korea would perceive anything less than creating a new body … as insufficient,” Klingner wrote. “Increasing South Korean involvement would be consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which pledged ‘stronger extended deterrence consultation emphasizing a cooperative approach between the United States and Allies in decision making related to deterrence policy, strategic messaging, and activities that reinforce collective regional security.’”

If South Korea were to pursue its own nuclear program, it could be highly disruptive, Klingner said. South Korea would have to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that could upset a host of other dependencies that could destabilize the region, including denuclearization policies that underlie 11 U.N. resolutions that enable sanctions against North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear arms.

“Either action would require the [Nuclear Suppliers Group] to curtail supply of fissile material to South Korea’s civilian nuclear energy program, which accounts for 30 percent of the country’s electricity,” he wrote. “The NSG could also request the return of all previously provided fissile material.”

In addition, the report notes that such a program would violate the Atomic Energy Act and the “nuclear cooperation agreement” between the U.S. and South Korea. And it wouldn’t stop there.

“South Korea developing nuclear weapons could lead to calls in Washington for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, either due to anxiety of being drawn into South Korean escalatory actions of perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone since it no longer trusted the American commitment,” Klingner noted.

The subsequent reaction of China, he adds, would be more devastating than the sanctions China imposed after the deployment of South Korea’s THAAD system in 2016.

Klingner’s report said “deft management” is crucial for the U.S. and South Korea, with the U.S. fostering trust to alleviate South Korea’s concerns and for Seoul to “manage public expectations” at the same time.

“If North Korea continues its provocative actions, [South Korean] President [Suk Yeol] Yoon will face greater pressure to build an independent nuclear deterrent,” he writes. “Dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to strengthen extended deterrence or any perceived wavering in America’s commitment to defend South Korea would intensify South Korean advocates’ calls for indigenous nuclear options.”

USAF Launches New Study of Cancer Risk in ICBM Crews

Feb. 23, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Air Force Global Strike Command is launching a new study of cancer risks among Airmen and Guardians who worked near intercontinental ballistic missiles and is developing new resources for current and former service members and their families.

“Air Force Global Strike Command and our Air Force takes the responsibility to protect Airman and Guardians incredibly seriously, and their safety and health continues to be my priority,” said AFGSC Commander Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere in a statement.

The “Missile Community Cancer Study” will examine all intercontinental ballistic missile wings and all personnel who support the Air Force’s ICBM mission, according to AFGSC.

Bussiere commissioned study, to be led by the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, asking for an examination of cases of non-Hodgkin lymphoma and other cancers. It is unclear how long the study will take, but the Air Force said it will run in multiple parts and phases, with the results from the initial phase determining subsequent work.

In January, a presentation detailing cancers among missileers who served at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., was posted on Facebook, triggering concern across the missile community and others who have served at Malmstrom, Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and Minot Air Force Base, N.D. The presentation indicated that at least nine service members from Malmstrom had been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma.

Lt. Col. Daniel Sebeck, himself a former missileer and now a Space Force Guardian, created the presentation; it is unclear who posted it on the unofficial Air Force amn/nco/snco Facebook page Jan. 21.

“There are indications of a possible association between cancer and missile combat crew service at Malmstrom AFB,” Sebeck said. Missileers have long worried about the health risks posed by their service, which places them in aging, underground bunkers among a variety of equipment. The Air Force has studied the matter previously, in 2001 and again in 2005. Neither study concluded the community faced serious health risks.

“However,” wrote Seback in his presentation, “21 years later, the study’s conclusion is challenged by the current NHL incidence rate and deserves further attention.”

Sebeck cited “known hazards,” such as chemicals, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, lead, and other materials in ICBM silos and bases which might be potential causes of health issues.

When his comments and findings went public, Bussiere organized a team to try to address the concerns, and held two townhalls to ease concerns in late January. He told Airmen then that he was working with Air Force senior leaders and medical professionals to ensure their worries got the attention they deserved.

“I want a deep understanding of any potential risk there is or could be to our Airmen and Guardians and to the force,” Bussiere said at the time. “This is not about one base, one AFSC, or one rank. It’s about all Airmen of all AFSCs that support our mission and about all of our locations and operating environments.”

AFGSC later released the questions and answers Bussiere, AFGSC Chief Master Sgt. Melvina A. Smith, and AFGSC Surgeon General Col. Lee D. Williams provided during the town halls and encouraged past and present Airmen, Guardians, and family members to come forward with concerns.

The command is now formalizing its response to the issue with a new website that offers detailed questions and answers. Officials promised the site will be continuously updated. The command said it wants missileers to come forward with any concerns and/or to talk with their doctors. The website provides information about non-Hodgkin lymphoma, the two previous Air Force reports on the issue, and a statement from Bussiere assuring Airmen of his commitment to finding any links between work around missile silos and cancer.

Meanwhile, the formal health study will begin to “conduct a formal assessment that addresses specific cancer concerns raised by missile community members across related career fields and also examines the possibility of clusters of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma at intercontinental ballistic missile bases,” according to AFGSC.

“The study will have two study teams and be divided into multiple pieces allowing for a better focus on specific needs, prioritization of the study focuses, and enables the best use of resources and time,” AFGSC added.

The study will draw on active-duty medical data, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ cancer and mortality data, and public cancer registers, according to Williams.

“It is my personal pledge to all Strikers, Airmen, Guardians and family members–past and present–to remain transparent throughout this process and we will continue to maintain an open dialogue,” Bussiere said. “This is my priority.”

Wargame Report: China’s Nuclear Arsenal More Survivable in Taiwan Conflict

Feb. 22, 2023 | By Christopher Prawdzik

China’s diverse nuclear arsenal makes it more survivable and would provide China with more coercive options in a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. The findings were the result of two summer 2022 tabletop wargame exercises conducted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that each pitted China (Red) against the U.S. (Blue).

“A larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal not only increased the survivability of China’s second-strike capability but also gave the Red teams the ability to threaten or employ nuclear weapons in a limited fashion,” according to “Avoiding the Brink,” a CNAS report released in February. “In short, the Red teams felt that they had a secure second-strike capability and were better positioned to brandish nuclear weapons coercively and employ them if necessary.”

The report also indicated that China has no need to match the U.S. quantitatively when it comes to nuclear capability to be a bigger nuclear threat.

The findings show what China could do in some scenarios and the teams estimated some specific actions on the part of combatants.

“By the Red players’ estimation, the notional 700-warhead nuclear arsenal of the first [exercise] was sufficient to provide a secure second-strike capability and options for limited theater nuclear strikes, allowing them to brandish their nuclear weapons coercively and employ them, if necessary,” the report stated, noting that the same was true in the second exercise with an arsenal of 1,000 warheads. “The size of both arsenals and the diversity of delivery systems and warhead sizes (5 to 300kt) expanded the types of attacks Red could threaten and the set of targets that Red could credibly hold at risk.”

The wargame also revealed that neither team felt early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict was necessary, although both Red teams threatened their use early in each conflict hoping to stop U.S. involvement. Arriving at a conclusion similar to a CNAS wargame scenario in the spring of 2022, the report noted that a fait accompli for China is unlikely. A U.S. defeat of an initial invasion, according to the report, is also unlikely.

Though neither team thought the other would actually use nuclear weapons, a Red team employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam after attacks on the Chinese mainland. The report emphasizes that the battle to disable conventional capabilities could trigger such escalation.

“From China’s perspective, Guam is such a critical American power projection node that it needs to be disabled early in the conflict to give the Chinese invasion a chance of succeeding,” the report states. “The problem is that attacking Guam or the Chinese mainland crosses Blue or Red lines and thus comes with significant risk of setting off a tit-for-tat escalation spiral.”

Preconceived notions on the part of participants were noted as well. For example, the report stated that Blue players were “stuck in a Cold War mindset” assuming limited nuclear use could be countered by strategic superiority. Red players, on the other hand, hesitated to stray from China’s current known nuclear posture.

“Blue players had trouble believing that Red would cross the nuclear threshold, given its current and past doctrine and posture, and underappreciated the fact that China did not need nuclear parity to consider limited nuclear use,” the report noted. “The Red teams were willing to consider limited nuclear use because they did not believe that Blue would respond with a nuclear weapon in kind and thus they could keep the conflict from unduly escalating.”

Still, the results of both wargames indicated that pressure to use nuclear weapons was low, and China’s current posture is to use nuclear weapons only as a retaliatory measure.

Recommendations from the exercises include continuing to explore ways China might employ nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict and ensuring national security personnel understand China’s increasing nuclear capabilities. As a short war appears increasingly unlikely, the report also emphasizes further examining protracted war scenarios. In addition, the report suggests building up research on China’s nuclear capabilities in a similar manner to the research conducted for decades on Russia’s nuclear program.

Air Force Has to ‘Get Our House in Order’ on Pilot Retention Red Tape, Slife Says

Feb. 22, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The Air Force wants its pilots comfortable shifting between Active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve to accommodate life events. But to do this, the USAF must “get our house in order,” deputy chief of staff Lt. Gen. James C. Slife said during a webinar hosted by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on Feb. 21. He also said the service is building metrics to better determine how budgetary issues can affect readiness—particularly flying hours.

Slife said USAF must do all it can to retain pilots in the face of a years-long pilot shortage and is willing to let pilots move between components, but the red tape of such moves is formidable.

“We want to make it as easy as possible for pilots to be able to spend time in the Active Duty, spend time in the Guard, spend time in the Reserve, and move back and forth, based on where they are in life,” Slife said, noting increased mobility between components is key to the Air Force’s retention strategy. “We all have life events and it might be easier for somebody to manage their life events not by leaving the Air Force but by just associating with a different component.”

But he added that it will take a determined effort to navigate the bureaucracy.

“We’re looking at where are all the policy shortfalls are,” he said. “Maybe it’s harder than it needs to be.”

While the issue is more difficult for the Guard, as they utilize state assets, Slife said for the Air Force Reserve, it’s a matter of working through policy issues.

If necessary, the service will go to Capitol Hill and seek legislative changes to make mobility easier, “but we’ve got to get our own bureaucratic house in order, smooth that out,” he said. Still, he noted some pilots have successfully navigated those bureaucratic hurdles.

Slife also said it’s crucial for the Air Force to persuade pilots to stay when their commitments expire, and those who elect to leave—even when offered significant bonuses—often cite quality of life and flexibility to accommodate family illnesses, the birth of a child, or other life events as a big part of their calculus. The Air Force has experienced a shortage of between 1,800 and 2,100 pilots annually over the past seven years.

Slife said there is no magic bullet to convince pilots to stay with the service, and there is no way to grow a “ten-year fighter pilot” in less than 10 years.

The problem is not simply an inadequate number of pilots or potential pilots but “how we manage the inventory across year groups” so the Air Force can have pilots “be squadron commanders one day and operations officers one day, and those types of things,” he said.

He also said the junior ranks must maintain sufficient numbers as well.

Absorption—the number of pilots the Air Force can comfortably merge into units—is the challenge, Slife said.

“If I produce 100 brand new wingmen in any given platform, it doesn’t necessarily help a squadron to dump 100 inexperienced wingmen on that squadron commander,” he said. “We have to be able to experience them.”

The Air Force is looking to put some of those pilots into “our operational test and training infrastructure,” Slife added. “That can help with the absorption challenge we have.”

The service is also looking at other ways to maximize its throughput of pilots, but “some of it [is] we’re just limited by flat capacity,” Slife said.

“There’s only so many takeoffs and landings that you can do at a pilot training base in a day,” Slife said, just one of many variables the Air Force is working on.

Insufficient flying hours is also a factor in some pilots separating, and Slife said that funding for flying hours is an increasingly complex calculation. Some of the capabilities of fifth-generation aircraft, for
example, can’t be exposed in open-air exercises, lest adversaries develop insights into capabilities and tactics.

Flying hours are also affected by legacy aircraft spending more time in the depot, or an insufficient number of spare parts, he said. The increasing fidelity of simulators has also brought into question how the USAF should measure true, open-air flying hours.

“This is one of the key metrics that [Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr.] is paying attention to … and something that I’m spending a lot of time on,” Slife said.

The upshot is that the variables that affect flying hours—depots to parts to exercises—are “well known.” Still, the USAF lacks a clear understanding of the effect of changes on “the ultimate output of aircrew flying hours per month.”

Slife said there’s more good than bad, but he couldn’t say how flying hours will be affected by reducing funding for some of those contributing factors.

The Air Force has “undertaken a fairly involved data analytic effort to map all of those inputs to the outputs that we want to inform the budgeting decisions that our Secretary needs to make every year,” Slife said.

“What’s going to be the impact of cutting funding by this amount? I can tell him exactly what it is. And I can also tell him where to cut it in order to do the least damage to our readiness,” Slife said.

While the Air Force has “a number of models built” to answer those questions, “every platform is different,” according to Slife, and the service is working on a model that will provide a complete picture of the service.

According to figures provided last year to Air & Space Forces Magazine, pilot flying hours across all types of aircraft in the Active-duty force averaged just 10.1 hours per month in fiscal 2021, down from 10.9 hours in 2020.

Pentagon Releases Selfie of U-2 Pilot With Chinese Spy Balloon

Feb. 22, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The U-2 Dragon Lady is a legendary platform in the U.S. Air Force inventory. Previous variants were created to overfly the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. The USAF’s current models continue to be a coveted surveillance asset well after newer aircraft have come and gone.

The U-2’s persistence in the fleet is due to its ability to fly crewed missions at high altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. When a Chinese balloon entered U.S. airspace at 60,000-65,000 feet, according to U.S. officials, that capability was vital. U-2s were able to fly above the Chinese surveillance balloon and collected valuable imagery. And one of the pilots took a selfie to prove it.

Chris Pocock, an author and expert on the U-2, first posted the picture online on his website Dragon Lady Today Feb. 21.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed the image’s authenticity on Feb. 22, and the Department of Defense soon released the image.

A U.S. Air Force pilot looked down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovered over the Central Continental United States Feb. 3, 2023. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed. Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense

“High-resolution imagery from U-2 flybys revealed that the high-altitude balloon was capable of conducting signals intelligence collection operations,” a senior State Department official said Feb. 9.

The image released by the DOD shows an Air Force U-2 pilot looking down on the balloon over “Central Continental United States” on Feb. 3. The spy balloon was shot down over the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4 by an F-22 Raptor from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va.

U-2s can carry a variety of surveillance payloads, including advanced optical equipment, but as the selfie shows even an image captured from the U-2’s cockpit offers a unique high-fidelity look at the balloon from above. The U-2 flights also confirmed that the craft relied on large solar panels to power its sensors, the senior State Department official said. The solar panels are clearly visible in the image released Feb. 22. The balloon was up to 200 feet tall and weighed several thousand pounds according to Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, the head of Northern American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

A U.S. military official previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the U-2 flights were in support of U.S. Northern Command with required legal authority to help the U.S. government collect intelligence on the balloon, as the U.S. military is not authorized to conduct intelligence-gathering flights over the U.S. without special permission.

The military official said other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were also by the U.S. military to gather information on the Chinese balloon but did not provide further details.

U-2s have supported domestic operations in the past, such as the U.S. government’s response to natural disasters such as wildfires and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

U.S. officials said a silver lining of the balloon’s flight over the continental U.S. was the ability for America to collect extensive intelligence and imagery of the craft as it made its days-long trek across the U.S. before being blasted out of the air by an AIM-9X Sidewinder six miles off the coast of South Carolina.

The U-2 flights helped make the U.S. government confident that the large Chinese balloon was in American airspace for nefarious purposes, according to U.S. officials. The military has concluded recovery operations of the balloon’s debris from the ocean floor and the FBI is working to ascertain the balloon’s capabilities.

Saltzman Unveils ‘Theory of Success’ as Space Force Debates Future

Feb. 22, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Hoping to prod a debate on the Space Force’s future, Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman unveiled his “Theory of Success” concept Feb. 22, as the force carves out its military role. Within this debate, he said some ambiguity is acceptable.

Now in its fourth year, the service has outlined a broad goal of space superiority as key to any future U.S. fight. That mission is clear: America’s space assets must be able to provide critical services to the U.S. military, even under attack. But more granular details on how the Space Force plans to operate in the coming years are unsettled.

“The thing about space is, luckily, we haven’t conducted a war that’s gone on in space,” Saltzman said at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We have to figure space superiority out without the benefit of combat feedback. That means we’re going to have to start with a theory; we’re going to have to test it in the wargames and the exercises and the simulators of the world, and try to debate the idea and evaluate the conclusions that we draw.”

Saltzman took over as the second-ever Chief of Space Operations in November 2022. The former Air Force missileer said he intentionally hasn’t mapped everything he plans to do as CSO.

“I’ll knife fight the budget all day in the Pentagon, but I’ve lost kind of the perspective of what it means to literally operate a system in this new contested domain,” he said.

For Saltzman, nearly everything is up for debate in some form, including operational concepts, tactics, and platforms. He hopes the Space Force will welcome new ideas from inside the service, the commercial world, think tanks, and academia.

“If we don’t have some unifying principles to center on, then it really becomes an ad hoc kind of grab bag for capabilities you need to buy or build, or training that you need to give to the Guardians.”

The goal of space superiority is similar to the Air Force’s air superiority lodestar. But the Air Force has developed practical methods of achieving air superiority over decades, with tough lessons learned from conflicts such as Vietnam. With that experience, the Air Force developed specific tactics and platforms to, for example, suppress enemy air defenses to achieve its broader air superiority mission.

To achieve space superiority, the Space Force is formulating ideas such as more proliferated and cheaper satellite constellations to make its capabilities better withstand an attack and stay online. But Saltzman admits leaders in the E-Ring of the Pentagon have not yet figured everything out.

“There’s those of us that learned the old premise that the bomber will always get through,” Saltzman said. “It turns out the bomber didn’t always get through, and we had to kind of revise our thinking on how we provide airpower as an Air Force. I expect fully that our thoughts will evolve over time as we think about this theory of success—what works, what doesn’t work—as conditions change around it.”

However, Saltzman has some idea of what his “Theory of Success” will mean as he seeks to expand on his recently unveiled lines of effort: Fielding Combat-Ready Forces, Amplifying the Guardian Spirit, and Partnering to Win. To Saltzman, that means more quickly fielding up-to-date assets, fostering intellectual problem-solving Guardians, and increasing partnerships with allies, the rest of the U.S. military, and commercial companies. But Saltzman wants the future of the Space Force also defined by things the service has yet to articulate.

“There’s a lot of details to be sorted out, but I also know that the best answers are going to come from the young people that have their hands on the controls for these systems,” Saltzman said. “What I hope is that when they’re in the cafeterias, when they’re in the bars afterward, they’re talking shop. They’re talking about these concepts and they’re debating them, and they’re angry about it because they think they’ve got it right and somebody’s bringing evidence that says they’re wrong.”

Russia ‘Suspending’ New START Nuclear Arms Control Treaty, Putin Says

Feb. 21, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia, the New START agreement, is in peril following a declaration by Russian president Vladimir Putin that Moscow was “suspending” Russia’s participation in the accord.

The treaty sets a limit of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads that each country can deploy. In January, the U.S. said that Russia had violated the accord by blocking on-site inspections.

The U.S. had held out the hope that Moscow would fix the violation. But Putin dug in his heels in a Feb. 21 speech in which he linked Russia’s pullback from the treaty to U.S. support for Ukraine. That has left the two sides fundamentally at odds with scant prospects for compromise.

“We’re not going to change our policy on Ukraine because he’s in a hissy fit over the New START treaty,” said Rose Gottemoeller, who was the top U.S. negotiator of the New START treaty and later served as NATO’s Deputy Secretary General from 2016-2019. “That’s just not going to happen.”

Russia has long valued the New START treaty, which entered into force in 2011 and has constrained the nuclear competition between the two sides. President Joe Biden offered to extend the accord until February 2026 soon after taking office and Russia agreed. For years, inspections have been carried out with little problem.

The on-site visits were suspended by mutual consent in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. But when the U.S. sought to resume inspections in August 2022, the Russians balked. Sharp differences over the Russian invasion of Ukraine have cast a shadow over the agreement ever since.

In a statement following Putin’s remarks, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assailed the U.S. for imposing economic sanctions on Moscow and providing military support for Ukraine in response to Russia’s invasion of the country. Or as Russia put it, the U.S. has sought the “political and economic strangulation of our country.”

In suspending its participation in the treaty, Putin made clear that Russia would continue to refuse inspections. But Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it would continue to observe the treaty’s ceilings on strategic nuclear warheads and the missiles and bombers that are used to deliver them. Russia will also continue to notify the U.S. of ballistic missile launches.

It is not clear if Russia will continue to exchange data on its nuclear forces or notify changes in the status and location of strategic weapons, as the treaty requires.

A greater problem concerns the prospects for negotiating a follow-on accord for New START after the treaty expires.

After Putin’s announcement, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. is “ready to talk about strategic arms limitations at any time with Russia irrespective of anything else going on in the world or in our relationship.”

But some long-time arms control advocates say that negotiating a new treaty will now be harder than ever.

“This attitude on the part of the Russians not to engage on New START and to suspend implementation means that negotiating a new agreement to supersede New START is going to be exceedingly difficult,” said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “It makes it more likely that after New START expires, there will not be limits on the world’s two largest arsenals for the first time since 1972.”

Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle strongly criticized Russia’s actions.

“The Biden administration should declare Russia to be in ‘material breach’ of the New START Treaty and direct the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command to accelerate planning in the event Russia breaches New START caps,” said Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

America must not accept Putin’s gambit, some members of Congress cautioned.

“I vehemently condemn his announced ‘suspension’ of Russia’s participation in New START—the only arms control agreement between Russia and the United States that remains in force—possibly heralding the end of strategic arms control, which for more than fifty years has stabilized our nations’ nuclear relationship,” said Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “As we work to avoid such a dangerous outcome—and resulting nuclear arms race—Putin and his cronies should have no doubt that the United States will defend our country and our allies, continuing to support Ukraine for as long as it takes to prevail.”

Slife: Before a New Force-Sizing Construct, Air Force Needs to Work On CCAs, Common Terms

Feb. 21, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Five years after the Air Force released an analysis stating it needed 386 operational squadrons to meet its obligations under the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the service has no definitive force-sizing construct.

But before it can set one, it must figure out how it will present forces to theater commanders, Lt. Gen. James C. Slife said Feb. 21. The answer to that question will depend on how the service integrates Collaborative Combat Aircraft into its combat units—but USAF is “close” to that solution, he said during a webinar hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

Slife, the deputy chief of staff for operations, said “unequivocally … there is an understanding that we need a force-sizing construct,” but the prerequisite to that “is a force-presentation construct.”

Here the Air Force is stymied because its definitions of what constitutes a squadron or providing a certain capability differ from those of the other services and theater commanders, Slife said. For example, the Air Force defines a squadron as 24 aircraft, but the Joint team counts a squadron as 12 airplanes. And when an AWACS capability is requested, it may be for only one aircraft, rather than a detachment of several.

“So when I talk about a force presentation construct, what is the thing that the Air Force presents to the Joint force? Is it a wing? Is it a squadron? Is it fighter squadrons? … What is the unit of measure that we that we need to adopt?” he said.

Once there’s a shared understanding of what’s to be presented, “then we can have a conversation about … how many of those things do we need and what does the force generation process imply,” Slife explained. He acknowledged that the Navy and Army already have clearly-defined ways of presenting units of capability to theater commanders.

“It’s a matter of prioritization and being transparent with the Joint force so they understand this is what we have available,” he added. The Air Force needs to “unemotionally lay out our capacity” to the combatant commanders and the rest of the Joint force.

Theater commanders also need to understand that if they need more Air Force capability, “we’re going to have to buy more Air Force, because this is all the Air Force we have.” He said he would like to see Combatant Commanders “not argue with the Air Force, but … argue for the Air Force,” in this respect.

Slife said his marching orders from Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. include leading the service “towards a force presentation construct; … the predicate to being able to talk about what our capacity, our force-sizing construct needs to be.”

Asked about the “Force We Need” level of 386 operational squadrons set in 2018—but subsequently never codified by doctrine or in budget requests—Slife called it a “starting point.”

“I’m not sure that that is the end of the conversation,” he added.

Until the presentation model is figured out, “I think it’s probably preliminary to talk about a sizing construct that goes along with that,” Slife said, allowing that 386 operational squadrons is “probably not wildly off the mark, but we won’t know until we get a little more fidelity on the on the force presentation model.”

Slife said the Air Force is also wrestling with what squadrons will look like when Collaborative Combat Aircraft enter the mix. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has notionally described a single fighter controlling up to five CCAs, but it all depends on the capability of the escort aircraft, Slife said.

“It depends on what types of CCAs we’re talking about. There may be more than one type for different roles. I don’t think it’s necessarily going to be a homogenous fleet, and so, depending on the mission, it may be different.” The ratio of crewed fighters to CCAs may vary “for an air superiority mission” relative to “a SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) mission,” he said.

“We have to … work through a lot of our conceptual work on this before we can say for sure,” he said. He expects CCAs to be “transformative in many ways” but it will take “more exercises and more [war] games … to try out that concept, see what works, what doesn’t work, where they have greatest utility and bring those capabilities … into relevant formations based on what we learned from our experimentation.”

A working hypothesis based on that analysis will be finished “sooner rather than later,” Slife predicted. But USAF is not yet ready to “put a thumbtack in that and start programming against a conceptual idea of what that squadron of the future would look like.”

Those “rigorous” wargames and analyses are needed “to find out whether … we need to adjust our hypothesis to react to what we’re finding in our in our experimentation work,” regarding the ratio of crewed to uncrewed aircraft, he said.

However, “we’ve got to make sure our thinking keeps up with the pace of technology,” which is moving rapidly in CCAs, he said.

In November 2022, Kendall told a defense conference the most recent National Defense Strategy does not set a force-sizing construct and that he does not anticipate “major changes” in the number of squadrons “anytime soon.” He said, however, that he does expect changes in “equipment and modernization.” For the Air Force, the NDS means “transforming … to what we’re going to need for the future.”

While he declined to discuss numbers, Kendall told the defense symposium that “we are doing some divestitures” to free up resources and hinted that USAF will actually get smaller in the near term. However, he said that five to 10 years “down the road … it’s possible to imagine a larger force structure.” It will depend on external factors, including how foreign militaries size themselves and the threat they pose to the U.S.

Slife said in assessing the right size and equipment for the Air Force, “it’s not just…the constant tension between mission and resources, but risk,” which he said is “often overlooked.” There’s a certain degree of risk with focusing on the current situation and having capability to deal with here-and-now threats, and also risk in focusing on the future to the decrement of current capability, he said. The Air Force is constantly seeking to balance those three concerns.