US Sending More Air Force Fighters to Middle East

Sept. 30, 2024 | By Chris Gordon

The U.S. military is ordering additional U.S. Air Force fighters to the Middle East after Israel launched punishing attacks on Lebanese Hezbollah and killed the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, U.S. officials told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The U.S. will send three additional squadrons of fighter and attack aircraft to the region: an F-16 Fighting Falcon squadron, an F-15E Strike Eagle squadron, and an A-10 Thunderbolt II squadron, Air & Space Forces Magazine has learned. The U.S. is also extending the deployment of current aircraft units in the Middle East to increase the overall number of fighters and attack aircraft in the region, officials said.

The U.S. has pledged to defend Israel from retaliation from Iran, which backs Hezbollah, for the killing of Nasrallah. American F-15Es and F-16s helped Israel fend off a massive Iranian missile and drone attack in April by shooting down some 80 drones.

The U.S. already has F-22 air superiority fighters in the Middle East, which it sent to the region in August. They will continue their deployment.

The Pentagon previously announced that it is keeping the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group, which carries F-35C Lightning II and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, in the Middle East.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters on Sept. 30 that more aircraft and an “additional few thousand” U.S. personnel were heading to the region.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III “believes that that is the best way for our forces in the region to have the defense that they need, and, of course, if needed to come to the defense of Israel,” Singh said.

The USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier deployed last week from Virginia and is expected to head to the Mediterranean Sea. The USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship that carries AV-8 Harrier attack planes, V-22 Ospreys tiltrotor aircraft, and some 2,200 Marines and Sailors from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, is operating in the Eastern Mediterranean.

“This afloat posture is complemented by DOD’s elevated fighter and attack squadron presence, including F-22, F-15E, F-16, and A-10 aircraft, and we will further reinforce our defensive air-support capabilities in the coming days,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said in a Sept. 29 statement.

 F-16s from the 510th Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy, and F-15Es from the 335th Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., first deployed to the region in April of this year.

The U.S. boosted the number of warplanes in the region following Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel by arranging for current units to temporarily extend their deployments so that they overlapped with the incoming forces. The U.S. also conducted such a move in April before Iran attacked Israel.

Singh confirmed the Pentagon was lengthening the deployment of current units while new aircraft came in as part of its move to increase airpower in the region.

“This includes a certain number of units already deployed to the Middle East region that will be extended, and the forces due to rotate into theater to replace them will now instead augment the in-place forces already in the region,” Singh told reporters.

“The Secretary also increased the readiness of additional U.S. forces to deploy, elevating our preparedness to respond to various contingencies and DOD maintains robust and integrated air defense capabilities across the Middle East region, ensuring the protection of U.S. forces operating in the region,” she added.

The U.S. had already deployed a small number of additional ground troops to the region before Israel’s killing of Nasrallah, which occurred in a Sept. 27 airstrike by F-15Is from the Israeli Air Force.

In a statement, Austin said he spoke with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant on Sept. 30 and “reiterated the serious consequences for Iran in the event Iran chooses to launch a direct military attack against Israel.”

Modeling Solar Weather Better and Faster for Decision Advantage

Sept. 30, 2024

Imagine you’re operating a network of ground sensors to track objects in orbit, and you’re successful in identifying a newly launched adversarial satellite. It was launched into very low Earth orbit (vLEO) at an altitude of 350 kilometers, and intelligence suggests it is a reconnaissance satellite with high maneuver capability.

Suddenly a strong solar flare occurs, heating Earth’s atmosphere and increasing the drag force on the satellite, causing it to drop into a lower orbit which you’re now scrambling to find.

“It’s already very challenging for satellite operators to fly their own satellites during a solar storm in LEO, so imagine how hard it is to keep track of a noncooperative maneuvering satellite in the same conditions,” says Matt Shouppe, a leader in Booz Allen’s space business. “Our adversaries know that when their satellites can’t be seen, that’s the best time to maneuver, deploy a covert payload, or perform some other operation they don’t want the U.S. to know about.”

Building on Open-Source Research

Having an accurate space weather forecast would help better predict the effects of drag, a game-changer for satellite operators. “But predicting what the sun is going to do 12, 24, or 48 hours from now is a long-standing challenge,” Matt says.

To better predict solar phenomena, weather professionals are turning to machine learning (ML). A major source is NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), which images the sun every 12 seconds and makes extensive data available to train algorithms.

Open-source resources include not only data like SDO’s images, but also technologies to train them on. “Multiple researchers have been developing computer vision modeling techniques for solar phenomena. That allows today’s researchers to stand on their shoulders, so to speak,” says Dr. Jeremy Bundgaard, a Booz Allen physicist who advances the company’s space solutions. “Scientists can say, ‘What hasn’t yet been tried?’ and experiment.”

Using an Autoencoder for Machine Learning

Autoencoders present an intriguing option to speed up machine learning for solar events. These neural networks can compress and represent unlabeled data for unsupervised learning. Highly efficient, the models can detect anomalies and patterns rapidly.

“Our team adapted a transformer autoencoder training scheme to apply ML faster to publicly available data,” Jeremy says. The team has ingested the SDO Machine Learning Dataset—300,000 images taken over 10 years, in nine very high-resolution wave bands. The bands are indicative of specific chemical lines in the sun that correlate strongly with the radiation that will impinge the Earth.

“You can see sunspots and the flares and train the model on that imagery data to make a more accurate prediction of what the sun is going to do next,” says Jeremy.

“Open source keeps the door wide open for research,” says Ginny Cevasco, a senior vice president in Booz Allen’s national security business. “It gives scientists the opportunity to make better use of the data that’s already out there.”

Continual Improvement for Increased Accuracy

The approach is attractive partly because it can be made extensible, leveraged to continually grow. “Once you have the solar model, then anything that’s coincident in time for which you have good data, you can build in,” says Jeremy. “We can build pipelines—like DevOps pipelines, only they don’t degrade. Any additional high-quality data you have, as long as you have an overlap in time, will increase the accuracy.”

For example, if an organization launches a large constellation of satellites to measure atmospheric density with high precision or higher coverage, the team could immediately connect the autoencoder to that data stream and train on it as well.

Additional data such as solar indices, which measure the sun’s activity, and geomagnetic data can also be added. After all the data sources are onboarded, researchers can build a new model using the autoencoder. They can then correlate this model with models that measure the atmospheric drag which solar weather imposes on satellites.

“We can seed the resulting model into an atmospheric model, which in turn seeds an orbit determination model so we can more accurately predict a satellite’s position and velocity,” Jeremy says. That data can then be plugged in as one unified, information-rich source to make other solutions more precise—like Booz Allen’s i2S2, which is built on an open framework to pull in external space data applications.

“Optimizing an autoencoder to focus on one part of the overall drag model challenge shows the power of open-source innovation,” says Ginny. “When someone makes better use of the publicly available data, it helps space work better for everybody.”

Ginny Cevasco is a leader in the national security space business at Booz Allen.

Matt Shouppe is an expert in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA) at Booz Allen.

Dr. Jeremy Bundgaard is an AI and machine learning data science expert at Booz Allen.

The Berlin Airlift: An Example to Emulate 75 Years Later

Sept. 29, 2024 | By Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.) and Douglas A. Birkey

Sept. 30 marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Berlin Airlift. In the first victory of the Cold War, U.S. and U.K. Airmen flew 278,000 sorties, rescuing the people of West Berlin from starvation by blockade after Soviet forces cut off all ground access to the city. Those flights poured in 2.3 million tons of provisions, mostly food and fuel, over 15 stressful months.

Yet the strategic significance of this crucial air campaign was far greater than a massive aerial moving job. The Berlin Airlift demonstrated the criticality of harnessing prudent national security solutions when options are limited and the stakes are incredibly high. Such circumstances abound today.

While the 75th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift’s end deserves to be commemorated as a tremendous achievement, there is no guarantee we could execute such an operation today—a reality that demands attention and action. Legitimate questions regarding decisive national leadership, clear security strategies, and military depth and readiness loom over us today at a time when the U.S. arguably faces a more complex and challenging world than ever before in history.

The roots of the Berlin Airlift extend to the end of World War II, when the allies divided Germany into zones of occupation. A section of Berlin overseen by the Western allies was surrounded by a region under Soviet control. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets blockaded the city in a bid to seize control, effectively threatening to starve the city’s 2 million inhabitants until the allies capitulated.

President Harry S. Truman made a decisive call: “We stay in Berlin, period.”

Realizing that objective was far less clear, however. Initial military options included a direct attack to reopen a key highway corridor. But as this course might invite World War III, it was quickly dismissed. Airlift became the answer not due to raw power, but because it could achieve the ultimate objective: to overcome the blockade.

The airlift was an unprecedented and audacious undertaking: a non-stop parade of cargo aircraft touching down at Berlin’s Tempelhof airport every 45 seconds. Armed with Truman’s clear intent, a viable airlift strategy, and significant airlift capacity that remained in the wake of World War II, the western Allies had the tools to make it work. Individual discipline, dedication to duty, and sacrifice on the part of the aircrews did the rest.

That is what we celebrate today, 75 years later.

But the enduring tenets of that success stand apart from realities we see in today’s U.S. security enterprise.

America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan three years ago signaled the world’s despots that American will is not what it once was. Adversaries took note and have called the U.S. deterrent bluff. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s aggression in the South Pacific, and Iran’s coordinated attacks via Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis should all be seen in the light of that catastrophic failure. The Houthis—relative to world powers, a flea on the tail of an ally cat—shut down the Red Sea to international commerce with no significant consequence. North Korea continues to develop its nuclear arsenal. In each case, the U.S. has responded reactively, rather than through decisive national leadership.

The notion of will directly ties to strategy. Too often these days, we see reluctant U.S. policy approaches that cede the initiative to opponents. Deterrence—the avoidance of conflict through the credible threat of a forceful response—only works if adversaries clearly believe they are held under threat. In no sport can a team win through defense alone. There comes a point where offense must come into play in order to win the contest.

These days, however, America is lacking in its ability to field an effective offense, whether measured in capability or capacity. The U.S. Air Force—descendants of the Airmen who executed the Berlin Airlift—is now the smallest and oldest in its history. Readiness is at dangerously low levels. Today’s Airmen would be significantly resource challenged to execute a major sustained operation on the scale of a 21st century version of the Berlin Airlift. Our Space Force is likewise under-resourced. So too is our Navy.

The United States must reset and rebuild the capacity and capability to answer and deter the threats now facing the nation.

A photo from the inside of Reach 871, a U.S. Air Force C-17 flown from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Qatar on Aug. 15, 2021. USAF

The good news is that a reset is possible and the case for action is abundantly clear. America faces an array of adversaries whose objectives are directly opposed to our interests and values. Russia persists in its war of attrition against Ukraine, rattling the nuclear card as a means to deter Ukraine’s suppliers from removing limits on how western arms are used. China is designing a force expressly to counter and defeat the United States. Iran is doing all in its power to sew division throughout the Middle East.

These rivals are playing for keeps. National leadership must respond accordingly, which includes articulating the case for action to the American public. As the Berlin Airlift proved, strength is an essential pre-condition if we want to preserve peace in a very dangerous world.

The time has come as well to reinforce decisive leadership in the military. It is time to stop focusing on what adversaries are doing to us and instead pursue strategies that seize the initiative. This does not necessarily mean direct conflict, but it certainly means clearly stating positions, holding to them, and playing to win. Otherwise, U.S. credibility will be shattered.

Above all, we must sufficiently resource our men and women in uniform to answer the challenges they face. If we ask them to risk the ultimate sacrifice, we must do all in our power to equip them for success—not forgo advanced technological capability because of self-imposed and arbitrary budget caps.

America met the moment 75 years ago. The Soviets relented and the routes into West Berlin were reopened. We must meet the moment again today. Too much is at risk to consider any other course.

Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula is the Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Douglas A. Birkey is the institute’s Executive Director.

F-16 Navigation System Failure in Bad Weather Led to Crash off Korea: New Report

Sept. 27, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

A critical failure of an F-16’s navigation system and its backup, coupled with poor weather conditions, led to a crash off the coast of South Korea last December, destroying the $28 million fighter, according to an Air Force Accident Investigation Board release Sept. 26.

The F-16 was flying from Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, for a training mission on Dec. 11, 2023. The pilot, who ejected safely, sustained no serious injuries and was returned to full flight duties a few weeks later.

The investigation found the crash was primarily due to a failure in the aircraft’s embedded global positioning and inertial navigation system known as EGI. The EGI combines GPS and inertial navigation that tracks movement using onboard sensors. When the EGI fails, the pilot loses access to critical navigation and must rely on backup instruments.

But in this case, the backup also failed the pilot; investigators faulted a malfunctioning backup Standby Attitude Indicator (SAI) and poor weather conditions with limited visibility as causes of the pilot’s disorientation that contributed to the crash. The SAI shows the jet’s orientation—whether it’s level, climbing, or turning.

Although the exact cause of the EGI failure remains unclear due to the loss of the black box, a power outage is suspected to have triggered the malfunction, as seen in similar past incidents.

“Based on the data available, I could not determine why the EGI malfunctioned,” Col. Philip Lancaster, the board president, wrote in the report. “The ‘most likely’ cause of failure is a loss of power which may or may not be visible to the pilot.”

The incident began shortly after the 8:23 a.m. takeoff of a four-ship formation of F-16s from Kunsan during a routine exercise. The pilot involved in the mishap encountered dense cloud cover, forcing him to rely fully on the aircraft’s navigation system to fly, a state known as instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

About 15 minutes into the flight, the jet’s EGI system malfunctioned, wiping out the pilot’s critical navigation and attitude displays that are essential for keeping the plane level or on course.

“The absence of the EGI failure while in IMC may have prevented this mishap,” the report stated.

With the EGI down, the pilot tried to rely on the backup SAI, which had already shown some faulty pitch and bank data earlier in the flight. Hoping for clear skies, the pilot then started a descent through the clouds.

The system kept giving conflicting readings, showing a climb while airspeed and altitude instruments indicated a descent. This mismatch of data with the cloudy conditions led to the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation—a condition where the pilot could not accurately interpret the aircraft’s position relative to the horizon.

“After transitioning to the SAI, the Mishap Pilot had difficulty maintaining level flight and overall spatial orientation due to the weather conditions and a poorly performing SAI, so the [pilot] prioritized a descend below the forecasted ceiling (believed to be 3,500 ft) where clear sky was expected,” the report stated.

The pilot told one of his wingmen to follow closely, about 500 feet behind, while relaying altitude and airspeed information during the descent. However, the report noted that radar data alone from the other F-16 wasn’t enough to resolve the mishap pilot’s spatial awareness. When the other pilot’s radar showed the mishap plane slightly climbing, the mishap aircraft’s SAI still indicated a nose-up position with continued altitude loss.

“When unable to find airspace free of clouds at 3,000 feet, the Mishap Pilot attempted to level off, causing further disorientation,” the report read.

At around 8:42 a.m., the pilot attempted to eject, though without the black box data, the exact timing and aircraft position at ejection remain uncertain. Shortly after, the F-16 crashed into the Yellow Sea, approximately 81 nautical miles west of Kunsan. The jet, belonging to the 8th Fighter Wing, was completely destroyed, with a valued loss of $28,259,045. The pilot was rescued by a Republic of Korea Navy ship and treated for hypothermia.

Since last year, Kunsan has experienced three F-16 crashes, occurring in May and December of 2023, and January of this year. No personnel have been injured in any of the crashes, and the Air Force has stated that the incidents do not appear to be related.

“The Air Force is working to limit the impacts of temporary power fluctuations on flight instrument systems in the F-16,” the service said in a statement following the release of the report.

The investigation report for the third F-16 crash in January this year is still being conducted and its results will be published “as soon as they are available,” the statement added.

USSF Awards Contracts for New C2 Software to Manage Frequently Moving Satellites

Sept. 27, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Rapid Capabilities Office, charged with quickly delivering cutting-edge, often-classified technologies for the Space Force, has awarded orders to 20 different small companies to work on software for commanding and controlling satellites that move around in orbit.

The program, dubbed Rapid Resilient Command and Control (R2C2), could be crucial as the Space Force considers the concept of “dynamic space operations,” in which instead of station-keeping to preserve fuel, satellites move frequently to dodge threats, gather data, be refueled, and more.

In June, the Space RCO announced it was creating a pool of vendors for R2C2 through what is called an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, estimated to be worth $1 billion over five to seven years. The Sept. 26 announcement marks the first awards from that contract, with each company receiving up to $600,000.

“These awards are designed to help the awardees gain a baseline understanding of the current architecture, capabilities, and processes used within R2C2 and onboard essential personnel, while also providing the government team insight into the awardees’ classified processing capabilities and management processes,” the RCO said in a release.

The software these vendors will build will help operators at ground stations to manage “dynamic USSF satellites with protect-and-defend missions” at the tactical level, according to the release, as well as other satellites’ rendezvous and proximity operations planning, telemetry, and tracking and command.

Space RCO director Kelly Hammett said in December 2023 that R2C2 is fundamentally about “connecting the mission and the capability in the satellites with the ability to C2 them in a dynamic environment.

Hammett also said at the time the program was being managed by a combined office between his organization and Space Systems Command and had made good progress since starting in February 2023.

“We brought a couple of our design agents on contract. We have a number of demos,” he said then. “We’re actually going to be showing working software here in the next three months.”

In its Sept. 25 release, the Space RCO said that in May, the program “deployed mission-unique software to the cloud and demonstrated end-to-end data flow for a classified USSF satellite program,” followed by a demo in August in which the team was able to feed commands through its software on a commercial cloud to an on-orbit Space Force satellite.

The R2C2 program is closely related to another Space RCO effort, the Satellite Communications Augmentation Resource. That program will modernize the Space Force’s aging Satellite Control Network and allow the service’s array of antennas to connect with multiple satellites at a time, greatly expanding operators’ ability to talk with their satellites.

That bandwidth and speed will be crucial for dynamic space operations, requiring operators to be much more hands-on in directing satellites where to go and when to do it. That will require upgraded battle management software such as R2C2 to ensure operators have a full picture of what’s happening.

It’s all a far cry from most current satellite’s movements and operations, which mostly requires Guardians to focus on “station keeping,” or ensuring they stay in place in orbit.

PHOTO: Russian Aircraft Intercepted By US F-16 in Russian-Style Camo. Here’s Why

Sept. 27, 2024 | By Chris Gordon

When a Russian warplane ventured near Alaska earlier this month, it faced a familiar—if perhaps unexpected—sight.

On a trip into the Alaska Air Identification Zone (ADIZ) in September, a Russian Ilyushin Il-38 maritime surveillance aircraft was photographed by the U.S. military flying alongside a fighter with navy blue, light blue, and gray camouflage, complete with bright red numbering—the colors of the Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS. But the aircraft was an American F-16 flying a routine intercept mission for NORAD.

How a Russian-styled fighter intercepted a Russian warplane is a story of U.S. Air Force restructuring.

The F-16, from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, was from the 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, which flies 1980s-era, “pre-block” Vipers. The unit is tasked with homeland defense. But until February, that unit was known as the 18th Aggressor Squadron, tasked with simulating enemy combatants for dissimilar training.

When asked earlier this month about the unit—and specifically whether the bold paint jobs that mimic other nations, a notable feature of Air Force aggressor squadrons, were still on the jets—the commander of U.S. forces in the area noted that the planes still have vestiges of their past.

“They have a variation and a mix of paint jobs, but we’re still on the journey of the development there,” Lt. Gen. Case Cunningham, the commander of the Alaskan NORAD Region, Alaskan Command, and the 11th Air Force, said in an interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine on Sept. 16. “Great Airmen, doing incredible work with the mission that they’ve been given.”

Cunningham is familiar with aggressors, having previously commanded the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., which runs the Red Flag combat training exercise series complete with a fleet of aggressor aircraft.

The change to the 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron aligned the unit with “national priorities,” Lt. Gen. David S. Nahom, Cunningham’s predecessor, said earlier this year. The move allowed the unit to “organize, train, and equip for their primary combat mission of providing aerospace control for homeland defense missions,” the 354th Fighter Wing said in an April news release.

“From an 11th Air Force perspective, we’re essentially the force provider to Alaska NORAD region—the alert forces that we have that stand at the ready to run those intercepts,” Cunningham said. “We just stood up the 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron not that long ago, under Lt. Gen. Nahom’s command, and that kind of bears the brunt of most of that—taking the intercepts there. But we have a much broader alert force that makes that happen so that is definitely a total force team.”

U.S. Air Force Col. Curtis Dougherty, commander, 354th Operations Group, addresses the crowd during the 18th Aggressor Squadron redesignation at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Feb. 2, 2024. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Carson Jeney

Cunningham pointed out the squadron’s work during an intercept of a combined bomber patrol of Russian and Chinese aircraft in the Alaska ADIZ in July, during which the squadron worked with F-35s, also from the 354th Fighter Wing, and Canadian Royal Air Force F-18 Hornets.

During September, there were four Russian flights into the Alaska ADIZ within the span of a week during a Russian naval exercise, each involving multiple aircraft. Another Russian flight of four aircraft occurred Sept. 23.

The Chinese and Russian flights were all in international airspace as Alaska ADIZ stretches beyond American and Canadian territory, and ADIZ intercepts around the world often occur, including intercepts of American aircraft. The U.S. has intercepted Russian planes near Alaska since the Cold War.

“Even though on the surface, just because you see the pictures, it seems like what happens in Alaska NORAD region is easy,” Cunningham said. “But making that look easy is part of the awesomeness of the team that pulls all that off, because the distance, the geography that exists in the Arctic and across Alaska is significant—underappreciated often. It’s basically like going from the East Coast to the West Coast of the United States and pulling off an intercept.”

CCA Drones Could Cost Less Than $1,200 per Pound—But Can They Get Sensors to Match?

Sept. 27, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

Collaborative Combat Aircraft—the autonomous “wingmen” drones the Air Force is pursuing to pair with manned fighters—can truly provide “affordable mass” because their per-pound cost could be two-thirds or even less than a crewed fighter, experts said last week at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

During a Sept. 18 panel, officials also discussed the reasoning behind the design priorities for CCAs and how they are being developed.

“You buy aircraft by the pound,” noted Robert Winkler, vice president of corporate development and national security programs at Kratos Defense and Security Systems.

Crewed fighters and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft “normally cost somewhere between $4,000 and $6,000 a pound,” Winkler said. But years of studies from the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center have led to flying autonomous prototypes with a “baseline now … down to $1,200 a pound for CCA-type equipment, and everybody’s working hard to get even below $1,000 a pound,” Winkler said.

Some companies are even saying they can reduce the price to $600-$800 a pound, Winkler added. “That’s how you get the affordability, at the same time that you get the survivability.”

What is not yet in hand, Winkler warned, are “exquisite” sensors whose price matches the low cost of the airframe.

“The major cost of [CCAs] is going to be mission [equipment],” he asserted. The Air Force’s radars, electro-optical cameras, and ISR equipment are “the best weapons sensors on the planet [but] … what we don’t have is in the middle. We don’t have something that fits, that can be used multiple times, but it’s an exquisite sensor, and we need to get to that part as well; to bring that cost down.”

Survivability—often achieved through stealth—must go hand-in-hand with affordability, Winkler added.

“Obviously, you don’t want to have these aircraft get out there and just get all get shot down. And obviously, you don’t want them to be ‘silver bullets,’ where they cost so much that you can’t afford to lose them. So there is a right balance,” that must be found between those considerations, he said.

CCA drones must have the “right blend of onboard/offboard [mission equipment] and organic survivability treatments and methods such that you have a high probability to get the aircraft back without driving the cost or the ceiling [so high] that you’re afraid to” risk the platform, he said.

“That’s really what we’re after, is affordable mass. So there’s a knee in the curve where that happens. And I think we’ve everything you see on the [exhibition] floor today is pretty much balanced for affordability.”

The conference’s technology expo featured full-scale models of Anduril’s “Fury” drone and General Atomics’ unnamed aircraft, which have been selected as the finalists for the first increment of CCA, as well as GA’s actual XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing System (OBSS), which flew last summer and shares many design features with the company’s CCA.

A model of Anduril’s Fury drone on display at the AFRL booth at the Tech Expo – Air, Space & Cyber Conference on September 17, 2024. Photo by Mike Tsukamoto/Air & Space Forces Magazine

Minimal Maintenance

Beyond mass, CCA drones will also need to fit with the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment model, operating from remote and austere locations throughout a theater. To that end, General Atomics is aiming to “get rid of any kind of scheduled maintenance,” said Dave Alexander, president of GA’s Aeronautical Systems division.

It will be necessary to put oil and fuel in a CCA. “But other than that, I think we really need to design this system that you don’t touch it out in the field,” Alexander said—minimizing the need for spares and test equipment.

General Atomics has learned from experience with its Predator and Reaper families of remotely-piloted aircraft to “minimize the system. Keep it simple and keep it all-electric,” Alexander said, noting that all-electric aircraft have reduced maintenance needs and higher reliability.

“Let’s design these things so you don’t put wrenches on them … [and with] the minimum equipment list,” Alexander said.

Jason Levin, senior vice president for air dominance and strike at Anduril Industries, agreed with the need to reduce maintenance and added that “the whole point is to reduce manpower and be a force multiplier. We don’t want to add people with the system CCA is delivering. We want to minimize people, minimize infrastructure … autonomy for the whole life cycle; pre-flight, post-flight, maintenance.” That includes minimizing ground equipment and eliminating unique ground equipment when possible.

The goal is to “make the system as easy and intuitive to operate with” and minimize the training needed for operators, he added.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Kunkel, Director, Air Force Force Design, Integration and Wargaming; Dave Alexander, President, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.; Robert Winkler, Vice President of Corporate Development & National Security Programs, Kratos Defense and Security Solutions; Jason Levin, PhD, Senior Vice President for Air Dominance and Strike, Anduril Industries during a panel discussion. Photo by Jud McCrehin/staff

Missions and Testing

Levin also said Increment 1 drones will be constantly improved and updated with what’s learned in perpetual flight testing and software updates. Several members of the panel said that as the CCAs take shape, there’s no substitute for live-fly development of their autonomous brains.

“We have a fleet of surrogate jets we fly at our test sites, so we can take the same autonomy, do the simulation, hundreds of thousands of runs, push it into the jets and fly at our test site,” Levin said. “And we have hundreds of flights of flying these aircraft in multiship formations, doing collaborative autonomy. We’re able to get that feedback early and improve the system over time.”

The main effort for the first increment of CCAs will be rectifying the relatively low internal missile loadout on crewed fifth-generation fighters, according to Maj. Gen. Joseph Kunkel, director of force design, integration, and wargaming.

In the Air Force’s initial analysis of CCA, Kunkel said, the service looked at a wide variety of possible missions—electronic warfare, ISR, suppression of enemy air defenses, etc. Eventually, officials decided that for the first increment, the CCA version that had “the most impact on the battlefield was, frankly, a missile truck; something that could perform the air-to-air mission and be part of this system that produces or achieves air superiority. So that’s why we went with the CCA that we have now,” Kunkel said.

Narrowing the focus for the first increment also met the objective of “to “get something that could have an impact on the battlefield” as quickly as possible, Kunkel said.

Other missions, new weapons, and different kinds of aircraft will be included in other increments, Kunkel added, saying he’s “certain” of it.

Even if CCAs were not “affordable mass,” they would be worth pursuing because they open up new tactical possibilities and allow the Air Force to “take risks we wouldn’t take with something that has a person in it.”

Kunkel noted that an experimental unit has been created at Nellis Air Force Base to put CCA technology in the hands of operators and let them experiment with it to find new possibilities for battlefield use.

“This is not a test unit, this is an operational unit. And the thought is, bring in our warfighters that have some experience with this from all different backgrounds. And not only the flyers that would actually fly and develop tactics, but also folks on the ground, so we can learn exactly what we need from an autonomy perspective.”

Senator to DOD: Redo Study on Suicide by Job Specialty

Sept. 26, 2024 | By David Roza and Rachel S. Cohen

About two months after the Pentagon released a congressionally mandated study on military suicide rates broken down by career field, the senator who led the charge for the study is telling Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III that the released data falls short of what was required by the law.

“I am concerned that the Department did not fully comply,” with section 599 of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, Sen. Angus King Jr. (I-Maine) wrote to Austin in a Sept. 19 letter that was posted to the unofficial Air Force subreddit Sept. 24. A spokesperson for Sen. King’s office confirmed the letter was authentic.

In response to a query from Air & Space Forces Magazine, a Defense Department spokesperson said, “We continue to work with our partners in Congress on efforts to prevent suicide” and that the Department’s practice “is to respond directly to any requests from members of Congress.”

The Pentagon originally faced a deadline of Dec. 31, 2023 to provide a breakdown of military suicides since 2001 by year, military job code, and status (Active-Duty, Reserve, or National Guard). It further directed DOD to compare per capita suicide rates to the overall suicide rate for each service, the wider military, and to the national suicide rate over the same period of time.

The goal of the study was to better understand specific factors, such as workload, that contribute to military suicide deaths.

“Anecdotally we know [suicide rates are] really bad in certain career fields,” retired Master Sgt. Chris McGhee said in an April interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine. A former F-16 maintainer, McGhee was a key advocate in pushing King’s office to add the measure to the NDAA.

“I consider this to be a starting point to investigate what is going on within those career fields that is driving these suicide rates,” he said in April.

When the study finally came out on July 31, it identified military jobs with the highest rates of suicide, including infantry, explosive ordnance disposal and diving, combat engineers, medical care specialists, and “not elsewhere classified” technical specialists, a catch-all term that includes mortuary affairs, firefighters, and nuclear, biological and chemical warfare specialists.

However, the study fell short of Congress’ mandate in several areas. For one thing, it provided data going back only as far as 2011, rather than 2001 as directed, despite the fact that the Defense Department in 2010 produced an in-depth study of suicide deaths between 2001 and 2009.

A DOD spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the Pentagon could not provide the data requested by Congress prior to 2011, because “the Department had not comprehensively tracked collateral information about suicide deaths; as a result, it is not able to correlate deaths from suicide with occupational codes prior to 2011.”

The study also did not break down suicide rate data year-by-year or by each occupational code. For example, the Pentagon lumped all aircraft maintenance fields into one category, “aircraft and aircraft related,” without specifying the precise jobs in the category or the number of deaths in each job specialty.

It also did not distinguish between types of aircraft such as helicopter, fighter, airlift, drones, or other types that vary wildly in terms of operational tempo and spare parts availability. It also aggregated the total for special forces, conventional infantry, and military training instructors, fields that entail many different skills and challenges.

The data also lacks context, said Katherine Kuzminski, Deputy Director of Studies and the Director of the Military, Veterans, and Society Program at the Center for a New American Security.

“If there’s 36 Special Forces deaths by suicide, is that 36 out of 40, or is that 36 out of 10,000?” she said in August. “The way it’s lumped together, it’s difficult to get a sense of what [the data] truly means.”

The Pentagon cited DOD regulations for its decision because of the small numbers in data sets. “Military service component rates will not be calculated when the number of suicides is less than 20,” as it could invite statistical instability, the study read. “Instead, only the number of suicides will be reported.”

That differs from the 2010 study, which did list suicides for each year by service, as well as aggregated rates for all eight years, even when that number was just one person. Not breaking down the data year by year also obscures the potential impact of specific events such as the 2014 Air Force drawdown, where about 20,000 Airmen left the service, McGhee said.

Kuzminski said the study provided “a good starting point that will now help members of Congress and their staff create more specific questions,” but McGhee argued it fell short of the legal requirements.

“The law required certain data, not DOD interpretations and solutions,” he said. “If DOD wanted to provide their own interpretation for context, there is no issue. But to supplant their interpretation as data, in violation of the law is problematic.”

King made a similar argument in his Sept. 19 letter to Austin. The senator said he understood that there are inconsistencies in data sets and challenges with providing reliable suicide rates, but he requested the Pentagon provide:

disaggregated suicide rates for each occupational code for each year going back to 2001. If there are fewer than 20 service members who died by suicide and a rate would be inconsistent, then provide this caveat; and

the ‘raw data’ of disaggregated service member suicides (not rates) by year of the number of suicides by each occupational code, including those data sets that are below 20

“If there is incomplete data, then I urge you to include as much information as possible rather than rejecting all data for a given year,” King wrote. “Including the ‘raw data’ with the rates will help to address the challenges you identified with invalid or incorrect conclusions based solely by comparing rates.”

It could be a while before the next steps materialize. The senator asked for a response by Nov. 1 that will “include a decision on whether the Department will provide the data” and a timeframe for redoing the report.

The spokesperson pointed out that the Pentagon, under Austin’s direction, launched the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee in 2022, and “is substantially enhancing data efforts to prevent a range of behaviors, including suicide,” through more integrated prevention and evaluation efforts.

Service members and veterans who are in crisis or having thoughts of suicide, and those who know a service member or veteran in crisis, can call the Veterans/Military Crisis Line for confidential support available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. Call 988 and press 1; text 988; or chat online at VeteransCrisisLine.net/Chat.

Pentagon Needs More Accountability to Speed Acquisition: Former Defense Officials

Sept. 26, 2024 | By Rachel S. Cohen

U.S. military leaders must embrace flexibility, train the next generation, and hold themselves accountable if the Pentagon hopes to deliver cutting-edge weapons and vehicles to the battlefield in a timely manner, three former defense officials said in a report released Sept. 25.

The report, written in partnership with the Washington-based think tank Center for a New American Security, is the latest missive in a decadeslong endeavor to reform the defense acquisition’s famously sluggish enterprise to better respond to modern threats.

The report, authored by Michael Brown, former director of the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit; Ellen Lord, the first undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment; Robert Work, a former deputy defense secretary; and Andrew Metrick, a former defense fellow at CNAS, pushes the Pentagon to improve in both leadership and technical development to reach its goals.

Faced with the prospect of becoming embroiled in a fast-moving war with China or Russia that could render American combat tech obsolete within months, advocates are urging the Pentagon to build on its progress before the U.S. falls too far behind its adversaries.

“While the DOD is able to deliver relevant, urgent capabilities to U.S. warfighters at speed and scale from traditional and nontraditional sources with existing authorities, policies and procedures, it fails to do so in a regular, institutionalized fashion because of a risk-averse culture that often does not leverage existing options that are new, agile and responsive,” the report said.

Pentagon leaders must create a supportive culture of innovation that empowers product teams from government and industry with consistent funding and clear objectives, the report said. The department must grow more comfortable with pursuing quick wins rather than waiting for a more complex but capable solution to come to fruition. And the military should better understand the acquisition tools and partnerships at their disposal to move new ideas through the so-called “Valley of Death” to deliver them to real-life troops.

Some service members and military software-development shops have adopted those objectives piecemeal to bring their own ideas to fruition. But the Defense Department has been slow to adjust its broader culture to match, typically requiring that acquisition programs undergo a long process of planning and review rather than iterating on a basic solution. It can also be difficult to repurpose money to speedily develop something new when real-world conditions demand a pivot.

“In an environment characterized by multiple geopolitical threats to a rules-based world order, it is incumbent upon the DOD to continue evolving its business systems to allow emerging technologies to be applied to war fighting capability in a relevant timeframe,” the report states.

To solve the problem, the former defense officials want the Pentagon to mirror the tech industry rather than continue acquisition processes that can take decades to deliver a working product.

Their recommendations come as Silicon Valley and tech startups across the country are increasingly vying for a place in the defense-industrial complex, despite the culture clash that has put small businesses and the commercial tech sector at odds with government acquisition.

Senior leaders need to set clear metrics for projects and release public updates on their progress, the report said. The former defense officials hope doing so would set an example for lower-level leaders to embrace accountability as well.

Each military service should create new career opportunities by rotating “promising individuals” through jobs in operations, research and development, and acquisition, the report also recommended. Doing so can help streamline each part of the process and illuminate ideas that more-siloed workers might not have otherwise seen.

The Defense Department must also pursue “iteration and adaptation” rather than perfection, and allow the offices that manage systems development to “address the art of the possible,” the former leaders argued.

“This action is only possible if Congress provides flexible and timely funding that allows the DOD to move funds in the year of execution,” they wrote.

To understand what’s on the line, the report noted, Ukraine’s defense against Russia stands as a stark example.

The beleaguered nation has kept Russia’s much larger military from seizing vast swaths of Ukrainian territory by rushing new capabilities to the front lines. By eschewing the red tape that slows military development, Ukrainian forces have wielded commercial drones for intelligence-gathering missions and enemy targeting and repurposed Jet Skis as fireships—significantly cheaper and faster options than seeking new tech tailor-made for those missions.

The report noted that the U.S. also has a history of thinking outside the box in wartime—but that it needs to do so all of the time.

“While a war in the Indo-Pacific is likely to require some systems that are different than those in Ukraine, the United States must drive similar responsiveness and urgency into its capability development processes,” the report states.

The report is a product of a defense technology task force launched by CNAS in October 2023 and chaired by Brown, Lord, and Work. Their recommendations come as the Air Force undertakes a sweeping reorganization that aims to streamline the bureaucracy that can doom fresh software and hardware initiatives.

A new Integrated Capabilities Command will try to better meet the needs of combat units around the world by considering their real-world requirements in advance and bridging the gap between first developing a system and upgrading it over the long term.

But the Air Force has already had success in units that break the mold. The report hailed the achievements of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, which helps launch technologically advanced, secretive aircraft like the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle and the B-21 Raider bomber.

RCO leaders prize “product over process” by empowering low-level employees to take chances, allowing the team to directly connect with senior leaders and governing through a board of directors rather than the typical acquisition chain of command, the former defense officials noted.

“These examples demonstrate that an empowered product team—those staffed with the right talent with access to senior leadership—can deliver impactful capabilities that meet clear warfighter needs on time and at scale,” they wrote.