Watch, Read: ‘Answering the Warfighters’ Needs’

Watch, Read: ‘Answering the Warfighters’ Needs’

Andrew P. Hunter, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, and Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney, the Military Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration joined Air & Space Forces Magazine’s Editor in Chief, Tobias Naegele, for a discussion on “Answering the Warfighters’ Needs” at the AFA Warfare Symposium, March 7, 2023. Watch the video or read the transcript below.

Tobias Naegele:

Hi, good afternoon. So, our session is titled Answering the Warfighters’ Needs. And our panelists, couple of very senior leaders responsible for acquiring platform systems, weapons for Airmen and Guardians, are here to talk about how they do that to maximize the warfighter advantage. Andrew Hunter, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, and Major General Steve Whitney, Military Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration.

So, one brief thought and then I’ll hand it over to you. It’s 40-some years since the Packard Commission said acquisition was taking too much time. The average weapons system was taking 10 years to be deployed and we’re going to move a little bit faster. Well, I don’t know that we’re moving a whole lot faster yet. So this session is about speed. Let’s hear how you’re addressing that. Andrew, you want to start?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Well, thanks, and it’s great to be back at AFA. I’m mindful that the last AFA session that at least I attended was with… I did a panel with General Richardson and we talked about our joint priorities. And I want to touch on that just a little bit, but spend more time talking about how we’re going to go after those priorities, which will speak to how we’re addressing warfighter need and how we achieve the speed and the pace that we need to achieve in the acquisition system. So just a recap briefly, the focus priority areas I discussed last time’s delivering operational capability of the warfighter, shaping a vibrant integration base for strategic competition and transforming the acquisition enterprise for the 21st century. And if you had heard a speech like this or a presentation from a lot of my predecessors, I think those priorities are ones that would be pretty consistent over time. So not necessarily anything earth-shattering there.

I think what’s different now is the clarity of vision that is being brought to this work by the operational imperatives work that the secretary and the chief have led. That really clarifies for us a lot of the issues that often keep us tied up in knots early on in the process. What’s the capability that’s really going to make a difference? When do we really need to field it in order to have the impact that we want? What’s the right strategy to get there? And to my mind, the work of the operational imperatives has really clarified a lot of those questions, because we understand what we’re being tasked to go acquire and why it’s so important. We understand the timeline that we have to deliver to, which is meaningful military capable to be fielded as soon as possible.

And so it simplifies the mission. It gives us a very clear set of parameters to work forward. And our job is to get after it, which we are doing in the acquisition system, and I think jointly between AQ and SQ. And then the question of how, OIs also gave us kind of a steer on that, because the operational imperatives were developed with close coordination between the operational requirements communities and the acquisition community, working very closely together. And I think the key to delivering on them both in terms of delivering the right capability and delivering it at pace is going to be to continue that same degree of coordination, of integration between those of us who are carrying out the acquisition programs with those who are going to be fielding these systems, so that we are constantly understanding how to prioritize and make trade-offs in order to deliver on time. Very similar undertaking from what I did in my last go around at the Department of Defense in the rapid acquisition world, where we were meeting command or operational needs.

I also thought, I was intrigued by the chief’s comments early this morning about distinguishing function and mission. Obviously, both incredibly critical in a lot of ways. I think that is what we’re talking about here because Steve and I are essentially functional advocates and run functional organizations, but we’ve got to tie what we’re doing to the mission. And that’s what the operational imperatives is helping us do. And then just lastly, in terms of opening comments, I want to say that I think the speed, the pace that we’re talking about, it comes from that integration. It also comes from our approach to the industrial base and how we leverage their capabilities. And if you think of that longer timescale that we sometimes devolve into, it tends to be the case when you look at those programs that they may be competitive on the front end, but competition at some point stops. And you’re left with a single provider that you’re trying to work with over a long period of time.

You also see that a lot of these programs are high stakes decadal competitions, that it’s one and done and then you’re committed. And that tends to build a lot of pressures in the system that we then have to address through our process, and it slows us down. By contrast, if you look at a lot of our newer programs that we’ve been pursuing in recent years, and I give full credit to many of the people, many of our PEOs who developed these strategies and approaches, and also to my predecessor who put a lot of this approach in place, is continuous competition with incremental delivery of capability where you don’t have this high stakes, winner takes all, once in a decade or once in multiple decades, but it is constantly ongoing, driving innovation and driving pace.

And then the last piece that I’ll just mention is leveraging our digital engineering capability, which helps us acquire the technical data that we need to continue, continuous competition over time and drives the technological maturity in our design process that helps us move faster. So those are kind of the high points and I’m sure we’ll get into the details and I’ll pause there.

Tobias Naegele:

All right, Steve.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Thank you, sir. First off, sir, thank you very much. I agree with your comments. But let me just start off with it’s an honor to be here today to represent my boss. He’s the Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, Honorable Frank Calvelli. And more importantly, to represent the men and women in the United States Space Force in the Space Acquisition Enterprise. These are truly historic times. You talk about it and we talk a lot. Those of us who wear the blue name tag talk about the standup of the Space Force and the standup of a new service. The FY20 NDAA also did something that’s completely unique in our entire federal government. It created a second service acquisition executive to be focused solely on space. Nowhere else in the federal government are there two acquisition executives within the same department.

Not interior, not agriculture, not commerce, not the Navy. We actually have two confirmed individuals to help us guide our acquisition. I think that’s a unique strength of where we’re at. I think it allows us, as Chief Saltzman said, to have focused individuals on the specific challenges of the domain and the specific challenges that we have as we go about acquiring our space systems. Honorable Calvelli has a number of priorities, we’ll get into those as we go through, and he’s got some thoughts on how best to go after that. But his basic priorities are speed, resiliency and integration. How do we get capability in the hands of the warfighter quickly? How do we get it that we know it’s going to be there when it’s needed? And how does we get it so that it delivers the effect it needs to for the joint war fight?

I think Honorable Hunter went down that route a little bit in the conversation about getting after the fight from China and where we’re trying to see the threat going. And that’s kind of our focus. The other historic time that we’re seeing in space acquisition actually is in the commercial industry. There is historic unprecedented investment by our private industry in terms of where they want to go, whether it be SATCOM or launch or whatever. And that presents us a unique opportunity to try and figure out how they can do that. How do they go off? I, as a former GPS program manager used to talk about I had the largest satellite production line. I did 10 satellites over the course of 15 years. Starlink is pumping out 42 satellites a launch every other day. So that allows for a different mindset is how we go about producing these. And we start talking about what can we capitalize on that and how do we turn that into our capabilities? And I look forward to getting into the conversation as we talk about how we take advantage of those opportunities.

Tobias Naegele:

Okay. So let’s come back and just focus on speed and maybe an example from each of you of where you really are accelerating the process, what you’re doing differently and how you’re getting there first. And Andrew, you want to go first?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah, well, I’m a big believer that the ability to go fast is really building upon a solid foundation. You can’t just roll out of bed one day and decide “I’m going to go acquire a complex multi-billion dollar defense capability and I’m going to do it in five years.” It just simply doesn’t work that way. But when you’ve built a solid foundation, you can move quite rapidly. So I would point to an area that the secretary talked about in his speech this morning, which is the collaborative combat aircraft, CCA. We expect to and we plan to move out very rapidly to field an initial increment of CCA. And of course, the secretary gave us a steer this morning on fielding a pretty large number as a planning factor of that capability. So that’s a fast timeline and it’s not just onesies and twosies, right? It’s a substantial quantity.

I think, though, that we can say that we have the ability to do that because of the foundation that has been laid through the Skyborg program, through AFRL, where many of the critical enablers, the critical technologies acquired to make that a meaningful military capability, that work, a lot of it has been done, substantial risk reduction work has been done in that space. Plus industry has been investing heavily in this area. They’ve got in many cases relevant designs for the kind of capability we’re [inaudible 00:11:15] with, that they have been flying and developing and iterating on over multiple years. So it’s our ability to build on that foundation of experimentation, of investment and of technical work and risk reduction that’s going to allow us to feel the CCA capability on what I think is a pretty favorable and-

Tobias Naegele:

Aggressive schedule.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Aggressive timeline.

Tobias Naegele:

But there’s another piece to that, too, is that because you’ve had that industry competition, you’ve had a lot more potential players-

Andrew P. Hunter:

We do.

Tobias Naegele:

… building those aircraft than conventional fighters. So on the space side you’ve done similarly, you are building on the rapid proliferation of satellites in space.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

We are. And so, I mean as Honorable Hunter said, it’s important to know where you’re headed, otherwise you’re going to end up getting pulled off first base and getting picked off. So you got to be careful to make sure you’ve got the strategy down to where you’re headed to know what’s going on. And I think our ’24 president’s budget will lay out some of those steps for folks. Honorable Calvelli has what he calls a formula, if you will, for helping program managers in Space go after this. And I just want to take a moment and walk you through that. First off is to build smaller systems. Building a satellite system that’s going to last for 15 years requires you to put a certain level of testing and a certain level of requirements into it. Building a large structure requires you to reinforce it and so forth.

If you build a smaller satellite, you’re going faster, you’re doing the upfront engineering to try and get it to fit. And so that helps you go faster, step one. The second thing is to try and reduce, if not eliminate, non-recurring engineering. Too often we spend a lot of time trying to figure out how I can get just 5% or 2% more performance out of a sensor, and we’ll spend 10, 15 years to get that 2%. Whereas if we would’ve just put and flown what we had, then we could’ve iterated a couple of times. Now, that doesn’t mean we don’t want to do experiments in NRE, we just don’t want to do them in our baseline programs. We want to work with the lab, with the AFRL, with General Pringle’s team, to be able to work those experiments. We want to work with industry as they do their [inaudible 00:13:25].

The third thing he wants to do in his formula is to try and drive the time from initiation to launch to less than three years. I think what we’re seeing in the commercial world right now, we’re seeing quite often that the teams that are successful can actually go from the start of a design to launch in about 24 months. And so how do we do that? And so to try and get us to into a tempo and try to do it. And then the third thing he wants to try and utilize is fixed-price contracts. And that step is really about budget stability. As a six-time Pentagon veteran, our Pentagon loves to talk about a five-year fight up and a one-year budget. And so if you’re on a fixed-price contract, you kind of put some stability into that.

So those four things are ways that we see this playing out. And the example I give you is our missile-warning missile-track pivot that we’ve been doing. And we’ve got two different groups going after that. We’ve got the Space Development Agency, and we’ve got SSC. Space Development Agency is doing the LEO missile-warning missile-track and trying to get out there and they’re coming up on their first launch here in a few weeks. And then we’ve got the SSC team, which is building after the MEO layer, or the medium earth orbit layer. And so our design has the two of them playing together, but they’re both using these four tenets or four steps in the formula to try and get after it. And at the same time, utilizing what Honorable Hunter was saying with competition, and how do I invigorate companies to want to play? And so all that is the tools we have, and so how do we use them?

The last tool I’d bring out is we’ve changed space acquisition from a place where we had a single PEO, we had a single three-star that made all the decisions, and we’ve pushed that decision making down. And now depending upon how you count, we’ve got five PEOs at Space Systems Command. We’ve got a space rapid capabilities office. The Space Development Agency is a PEO. We’re working with DAF RCO. We’re working with AFRL. And all those entities are producing capabilities for us. We’re pushing that decision making down as the last step, I’d say.

Tobias Naegele:

So software is the thing that makes these nice little devices so effective. And the wonderful thing is you can roll that out and you can change it and iterate. And that’s, in a sense, the secret sauce to adding capability faster. What are we doing to make that more possible and to do it more rapidly with things that are already fielded?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah, I think Steve and I may have very similar answers to this question because I don’t think there’s any fundamental difference to how we do it on our side versus on their side. But a lot of it is building into the software development process. First of all, setting up the process so it doesn’t take years. So you have to design a process that delivers capability in sprints, in days-

Tobias Naegele:

You have to change the requirements process.

Andrew P. Hunter:

… months, not years timeframe. So you’re right, the government has to bring its side of the equation of saying, we can actually provide you with a needs statement that you can work to and then give you another one in six months’ time, or less, actually preferably less, in order to drive that pace. But it’s also building in, if it’s an aircraft system and the software you’re doing addresses some element of flight safety, it’s building in the ability to do an airworthiness process as you write, not as a big bang at the end, or on, again, a multi-year timeframe. And the other certifications that are required for that software to actually be fielded. And I think we’ve come a long way in engineering our processes around that. We still do have a ways to go. There’s still some things that we can do better. And then automating the test, where we can do automated test, and where we can’t do automated test, real-life test. Schedule it and turn around the results rapidly so we can respond to them.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Right, sir, I’d agree with you. I’ve seen it work well when we do incremental capabilities and they’re on a regularly scheduled tempo. I’ve seen it struggle when we try to do the big bang approach. I’ve got my OCX scars abound. But the things that I would tell you is the short timelines, the small capabilities, the incremental capability builds are important. I think, sir, your point about testing, and testing isn’t just deploy it to the ops arena and test it there. It’s every night that I rewrite code to test it that night against the dev system and then come in the morning and figure out what worked, what didn’t, and get on it.

The last piece that’s really key, and I’m sure we’ll talk more about this, but this is a team sport. This isn’t a acquisition system or acquisition career field problem. This is a team sport. We need operator involvement to tell us what it is you want, to help us set the requirements, to help us with that testing, to help us get that capability delivered and to help us work through when is it good enough to just start going versus the full up, “I’ve got to go through operational acceptance, which is a 15-month process, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.” Well, maybe the tool that I’m building you is good enough to use now.

Tobias Naegele:

So operational testing, and the combination of the testing and the DevOps approach, DevOps being a software approach, but it’s kind of what you’re doing with the B-21. You’ve got operators out there and they are working every level of that program. Is that happening enough in other places? Are we doing that across the board, or is that a kind of an unusual circumstance and not typical?

Andrew P. Hunter:

It’s a best practice. I’d say we’re doing more and more of it. It’s absolutely my goal that we do significantly more of it. And we were. I think the B-21 program has pioneered some of how this is done really well. And we’ve been fortunate that with a really great relationship with Global Strike that they gave us access to a continuous set of folks from there, from units, real operators to work with us through that. It’s not always possible to do that, I know, and some of our parts of the force are really stressed. But where it is possible, it’s been incredibly helpful, and we are doing it in more programs beyond B-21.

Tobias Naegele:

In Space, too?

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

I agree, sir. I think the biggest challenge is keeping it small and incremental so that as I work and build a relationship with my operator brethren, I have that relationship. When I do the big bang approach and I turn to you and get the requirements, three, four program managers later, there’s going to be three, four different operators and you’re going to have different opinions and so forth. And so going short, going fast, that relationship is key and we’ve got to work that really hard.

Andrew P. Hunter:

And if I could just, sorry, just give one more example that I should have given, which is on E-7, which is a new capability that we’re going to acquire. We have the opportunity because Congress has agreed to let us divest some of the AWACS in this calendar year to actually take a unit. And because there are E-7s already flying and operating in the wild, with our partners in Australia, they have an opportunity to go.

Tobias Naegele:

It’s the Outback, not the wild.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Well, it seemed a little wild to me, I was just there. But yes, I think you’re right. But we have the opportunity to team with our partners and leverage that. And then those same folks will come back and inform our acquisition program.

Tobias Naegele:

So, we got a room full of Airmen and Guardians, and I suspect that everyone has had the experience of why did they design it this way? Whose idea was this and why didn’t they ask me? And we’re kind of getting at this, but I think that probably in the back of everybody’s mind is what is it that I’m supposed to take away from this? What can we tell, what can you tell Airmen and Guardians that will help them understand some of that why did they do this to me and why didn’t they ask?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah. Well, I love the way Steve put it, that acquisition is a team sport. So we’re not going to do good designs if we aren’t closely integrating throughout the acquisition process with the user community, with the customer. So I guess my message is if there is an acquisition effort that is relevant to the work that you do on a daily basis, either you or someone who wears the same uniform and does the same job, we need those folks to be our partners and to engage with us. And like I said, it’s tricky. How do you do that in a way that makes sense, that doesn’t take away from mission, but that allows us to get that feedback into the acquisition process? When I was a young congressional staffer and I had stars in my eyes and I thought, “Well, we just pass a law to fix things,” which apparently is not how it works.

Tobias Naegele:

We can dream.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah, we can dream. Tried to put a provision in the defense authorization bill that said for every major acquisition program, there should be an operational unit that is teamed and paired with that acquisition program to be the representative of the user. Well, we’re doing something not totally unlike that in some of our acquisition programs now.

Tobias Naegele:

That’s cool.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Agree, sir. As I said, team sport, that’s not to discount, to say that the operator has nothing else to do. The operator has a very important mission to do. I need some time and some cycles from them as well to help me make sure I’m giving them what they need. Part of that too comes in how you set requirements and what you set those requirements at. So I’ll just pick on one set of requirements, requirements need to be bound in something that’s operationally relevant. We have a requirement we’ve been debating for the better part of 12 years with regards to our handheld GPS units. And the requirement that’s up for debate is that to be able to use your handheld GPS unit, 100% power on for 19 consecutive hours on two AA batteries.

And physics doesn’t allow you to do that, but it’s not operationally relevant because nobody’s going to walk around with a light shining on their face as they go through the fight. “Let me highlight my target for you.” And so help us set operationally relevant requirements. Help us take advantage of what commercial is. If that’s good enough to get us started, help us do that. Don’t set up requirements such as we have to go down to military development. Sometimes 30% of requirement is better than 100% of nothing. And so that’s something we need to think about as we work our way through that.

Tobias Naegele:

So, in the fall I was out at SSC and they had all these banners. And I can’t remember exactly what they said, but something along the lines of “Remember the threat,” or “Don’t forget the threat.” “The threat is real,” maybe. And so I asked people, I said, “Well, you don’t put up a sign like that if you don’t think that it’s an issue.” And so I’d like to hear your take on the acquisition workforce and what has to happen to evolve the acquisition workforce to understand the threat as seen by the warfighters.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Great question, sir. I would say that I think for too long our acquisition workforce got enamored with the system they were building and not the reason why it existed. As a GPS guy, it was real easy to get into the mission and talk about it and get everybody excited about it, but some of the other ones were a little bit more difficult. I think there’s been a lot of work to make sure we’re educating folks, because the other part was, “Hey, well, there’s a threat, but I can’t tell you, it’s classified.” And so it started back in the 2017 timeframe when we started doing unclassified threat briefs for everybody at the center at the time and getting the entire workforce. Honorable Calvelli is using that though as he goes forward in his messages with industry to share with them as well what we’re seeing as the threat, so that they can know where to think about investing their dollars and capabilities for what capabilities they might have on the shelf to help us out.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah, no, I think that piece of being threat informed is absolutely critical. And you have to structure that into a program, either early on or if you have to backwards engineer it, then you do that. Because the threat is moving incredibly fast.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

It is.

Andrew P. Hunter:

And when I talk about operational imperatives, I say, we have a pacing threat and the pace is quick. It’s a daily challenge to keep up, so we have to be mindful of that. And the acquisition system, there’ve been areas in the past, more traditional programs where they say, “Hey, you’re moving the goal post on me. I had a Milestone B, they told me what threat I was trying to address.” Now, that was 15 years ago and it turns out things have happened in the last 15 years. So we have to get away from thinking about that. And I think the approaches that we’re taking with more rapid increments, again, less high stakes, you’re not loading the ability to address every possible future threat onto one design, one iteration of what you’re trying to do.

And be willing to say, “Yeah, no, we’re going to fill that increment and it’s going to do what we said it was going to do, but we’re already posturing for future increments and we’re already working with industry to understand what can they do that we can plug in. And it won’t count, if you will, against our acquisition program baseline for increment one, but we will be in a position to field it rapidly going forward.” And so that, I think, balances operational risk. It’s that balance of operational risk and acquisition risk that I think we’re able to using those kinds of approaches that we can do better.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

And I think, sir, if I could just use a quick example for everybody. Everyone’s got their own cell phone, right? And every six months, or every three, four, six months, you see a new phone come out. It’s not that that program took six months to do. It was that they have multiple programs running with incremental improvements along the way. That’s really what we’re talking about here for our capabilities. How do we build systems for space and for air that take advantage of those incremental capabilities?

Tobias Naegele:

So that every satellite that goes up over a eight-year period isn’t the same?

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Correct.

Tobias Naegele:

You can incrementally improve-

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Incrementally improve it, it’s got new capabilities, it’s got a new software. Or maybe if I build a string of 10 and they’re up and ready to go at one launch, it’s the next string type of a deal. And I think we’ve seen that again in our missile-warning missile-track between SDA and SSC.

Tobias Naegele:

So you’ve talked, Andrew, several times you’ve mentioned risk. And I think in the time that I’ve covered stories about acquisition, risk is always at the heart of it. But one of the problems is the risk aversion of the acquisition professionals. Nobody wants to be the guy who might go to jail for breaking the rules or might get in trouble because that was protested or they don’t want to risk a protest. How do you build in, what are you doing to help them understand that risk is okay, as the chiefs have indicated and that failure is okay sometimes? Sometimes.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Right. And true statements, right? Failure is okay at times. We need to structure the way we approach risk so that we don’t have failures that take down decades worth of effort or billions of dollars worth of effort. So we got to be judicious in how we posture ourselves for risk, but we have to take risk. And in some cases, I talked about that balance between acquisition risk and operational risk. And the secretary earlier today commented on, if you look at collaborative combat aircraft, we have to understand the art of the possible on the near term and go for that.

And I think we’ll see substantially increased operational capability with fielding those capabilities in the near term. So we are actually reducing operational risk by the way that we’re going to pursue that program, but we’re not dealing with an excessive acquisition risk. And then as we iterate and as we go into additional increments and generations of capability, we’ll buy down even more operational risk. And it’s keeping that balance going forward and keeping it well-balanced, which is where we in the acquisition side, we can’t figure that out on our own. That’s where that integration with the operational community is so essential.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

I would agree, sir. I’d say failing forward is an interesting concept. We’ve got to get in that mentality that this is a learning experience. When you do smaller increments, you have more opportunities to see it all the way through a life cycle or all the way from the start to the finish. And so our program managers and our engineers get a chance to, for lack of a better word, build scar tissue as they take on challenges and they learn from mistakes, or they learn from things that didn’t go exactly like they thought. And what we’re looking for is how do they work that into the next iteration to not make the same mistake twice? I think that’s the real challenge. And I think, again, going small allows you to get those faster cycles to get through that. And then eventually, you’ll build up the bench of acquisition program managers who have experiences and will be able to move rapidly at scale.

Tobias Naegele:

Let’s talk for a moment then about the industry piece of this. It’s a team sport. You can’t acquire if they’re not willing to play ball with you. And that industrial base is not always as large and as vibrant as you might like. So what are you doing to expand the industrial base, and to ensure that you’ve got the competition in all the different places that you need it?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Well, let me give an example because I’ve been talking about it a lot in the last couple days, which is on our next generation refueling system, the NCAS program that the secretary talked about this morning, and we’ve had several days of dialogue on it. My intention with that program is to leverage an approach that we’ve pioneered on other programs, that it’s harder to talk in detail about because they’re classified, but it-

Tobias Naegele:

We won’t tell anybody.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Just among us. It’s to leverage vendor pools. So relatively broad vendor pools. What I’ve talked about with NCAS is that we would want to have in a vendor pool for NCAS, airframe providers, mission system providers, a wide range and a wide swath of industry. So you don’t get into, again, this sort of high stakes decadal competition, where all the mission systems are defined early on, they’re aligned with a prime with whom they’re sort of locked to that team and everyone else is locked on another team. And then those locks, we can’t unlock them as we go on. And then we can’t come back later and say, “Well, okay, it turns out the key mission system is something that I was doing a little work on, but I didn’t necessarily have prioritized exactly right when we did the first chalk line of what we thought this was going to look like.”

So that approach, having a vendor pool, a wide variety of providers, working with them as we go through an analysis of alternatives for NCAS, so that we understand what’s really out there, how do these things, mission systems, airframes, actually, in a family of systems approach actually come together and work together to create an integrated capability that’s going to meet the needs of the joint force? And it’s continuous. No one is ever out of the game. They always have an opportunity at that next shot to be in the game again.

Tobias Naegele:

So are you building a dream team in that scenario, or are you-

Andrew P. Hunter:

I might have to incorporate that term.

Tobias Naegele:

Are you the assembler of these different pieces?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah, so I mean, obviously we’re still talking about contracts here. So there is a process. So when it comes to formulating a vendor pool, you have to go out and people have to provide offerings and explain why they have something they bring to the table that’s worth having, that’s relevant to the game. And you select, you select folks into the vendor pool. But it’s not one and done. You can select additional providers into the vendor pool over time. So you’re never foreclosing the opportunity of finding someone who has something you need that wasn’t on the team before. You can bring them on to the team later on. But you do have a process that tells you who’s got game and who doesn’t.

Tobias Naegele:

And I’m assuming you got to have open systems, you’ve got to own a lot of the IP or it’s not going to work.

Andrew P. Hunter:

That’s right.

Tobias Naegele:

So, can you do the same thing?

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

We can. And what we’re seeing on the Space side, again, is we build small and we’re seeing, I’ll use missile-warning missile-track as another example again. We’re seeing awards of satellite builds to multiple contractors in a tranche or in an epoch. And then we’re being very clear with industry that the next round will be an open competition again so that you’re not locked out if you didn’t get it. And so we’re being very clear, we don’t want to fake anybody out like Lonnie Smith running to second base in the ’91 World Series. So we want to make sure that we’re really clear in where we’re going so that industry understands. And I think that comes through honest and open conversations at industry days and so forth, as we meet with the industry team and let them share what we’re seeing and what our plans are to the best of our abilities.

Tobias Naegele:

Do you have enough open interaction with industry that’s not at risk of compromising programs? Do you get to have open meetings frequently enough? Do you have enough contact?

Andrew P. Hunter:

I would say by and large, when I talk to our PMs, our material leaders and our PEOs, generally the answer is yes. There may be areas where we could do better and we could bring on a wider swath. And I know from the industry side, the smaller the company or the more non-traditional their approach, the harder it is to get in the door or to get through that barrier. I think that’s something we’re constantly working on and we have to keep constantly working on, because it’s not just the same old usual suspects who always have the right answer. And I think some of these techniques that honestly, as I came into this job, it’s been about a year now, in the Air Force, I wasn’t aware of all the innovative work that had happened in Air Force acquisition to set up these vendor pools and to make it a very broad, open conversation. So I think it’s a real step forward, but for sure we can continue to expand that and to do better.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

I agree, sir. You can always communicate better, you can always have more conversations. But I think we’ve tried to do very open and frank conversations. I know our SSC team has done what they call reverse industry days where they’ll put out a statement of a problem and then they’ll have a conversation for two days with industry, listening to how they would handle that. I know that SDA does industry days all the time, trying to understand the latest in technology and where it’s going. So I think that’s a very valid mechanism. But too often industry days are tied to there’s a contract. We’ve got to get into this conversation where it’s about, “Hey, this is the problem we’re facing and I want to know what you have to help me fight this.”

Andrew P. Hunter:

And this is, if I could just add on to what I said earlier, this is an area where I think if you talk to the community and say, “Who does this well?” people will point to SOCOM. Their special operations community is always out there for the technology areas they’re interested in, going out, talking to people, finding providers. They have the advantage of scale, small scale in this case, and being nimble. But AFWERX has been that engine for the Air Force of being able to constantly be out with small businesses, with non-traditional providers, putting out problem sets for them, or just having open calls for them to submit their good ideas and processing through that and essentially scouting the technology that’s out there.

Tobias Naegele:

So one thing that I think some of us at AFA have recognized is that you do have contact with executives, who are often subject matter experts who graduated from the services. You don’t necessarily have working-level Airmen and Guardians meeting working-level engineers, who might actually be able to solve problems in twice the speed if they didn’t have to go through so many layers of conversation. How do we accelerate that kind of conversation? I mean, this kind of gathering can be that, but what else could be done to accelerate that interaction at that working level?

Andrew P. Hunter:

Yeah. Well, I mean, I thought the awardees this morning that got that General Larry Spencer Award, I mean, what a phenomenal example, and eye-watering what they were able to do and how much money they were able to save us over what I’m sure will be an extended period of time through AFWERX Sparks, which is that effort to get out into the units and to really solicit and to find ideas at that level and then implement them. And I know that’s something the vice chief has been instrumental and really passionate about, and I think it’s a great approach.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

Agree, sir. I think it’s been a fantastic tool.

Tobias Naegele:

Okay, so we got two minutes left, which means that you got each, you’ve got one minute. I have a brief question and then you can say anything else you want in your minute. Each of you has a major flight program coming, so when does B-21 fly and whatever else you want to say? 60 seconds, you’re on.

Andrew P. Hunter:

Well, I said this earlier today and I got a chuckle. I said, “B-21’s going to fly when we’re ready.” And I got a chuckle from our media colleagues.

Tobias Naegele:

I think that was a groan.

Andrew P. Hunter:

That’s a non-answer, but actually there’s something to that, right? Because with a lot of these decisions, the question, then there’s a second order question, which is what is it that we need to be ready? What do we need to know? And I think too often when people think about acquisition, they think, well, there’s a date on a sheet somewhere that says, this milestone will happen at this point in time.

No, it’s going to happen when we’re ready, and we have to understand what we need to know to be ready. And by the way, if we’re ready, and maybe it’s before we had penciled it in on our calendar, that’s okay, we can move forward. Or maybe half of it’s ready and half of it’s not. Well, if we can separate those things and say we’re ready to make this decision, not ready to make this decision, then we’re going to make the one we’re ready for and we’re going to defer the one we’re not. So I think there’s actually, if I could say so, there’s more in that answer than meets the eye. But we are looking to have flight in 2023.

Tobias Naegele:

All right. We’re standing by. You, sir.

Maj. Gen. Steve Whitney:

All right. So the Vulcan, real simple. We have a contract with ULA for a launch sometime this fall. And in our agreements, they are required to produce two certification flights prior to that launch. They are in their efforts to take care of that and I would defer that question to them as far as with the first flight. But we’re going to hold them to that contract of two cert flights, and our team stands ready to review the data when it’s available.

Tobias Naegele:

Well, okay. So we’re out of time. Thank you so much. I found it interesting. I hope everybody else here did.

Chinese Balloon Means NORAD Now Getting Proper Attention, VanHerck Says

Chinese Balloon Means NORAD Now Getting Proper Attention, VanHerck Says

AURORA, Colo.—After a Chinese high-altitude spy balloon traversed the United States in late January and early February, much of the public spotlight focused on Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, the head of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

And the question at the top of most minds: How did this happen?

VanHerck has had to answer tough questions from Congress and from the media about why NORAD could not better track the object.

But for VanHerck, the incident has now become a call to arms. The man in charge of America’s homeland defense is finally in the spotlight as the Pentagon talks of an increasingly assertive China and a Russia that is lashing out against its foes.

“Actually, that high-altitude balloon was a great opportunity for NORAD and United States Northern Command to get some attention that I think we deserved,” VanHerck said during a panel at the AFA Warfare Symposium on March 6.

VanHerck, who has been in his job since 2020, has long clamored for better capabilities to see the threats America faces.

Domain Awareness: Hey, you can’t deter, you can’t defeat something if you can’t detect it,” VanHerck said, highlighting his top focus for the command.

On top of that, VanHerck said, he also needs “information dominance” in order to provide decision-makers more time to consider their options.

“That’s about getting more time,” VanHerck explained. “The only thing I can’t get the President and the Secretary of Defense enough of is time.”

In the case of the Chinese balloon, it wasn’t displaying “hostile intent,” so VanHerck didn’t have the authority to act right away. Information had to run up the chain of command. President Biden didn’t learn of the balloon’s existence until days after it first entered U.S. airspace on Jan. 28, administration officials have said.

VanHerck himself knew the Chinese balloon program existed since August 2022, he said. The balloons had been detected by the intelligence community in incidents dating back to the Trump administration. The U.S. is now working to exploit the Chinese balloon’s debris for information

“Going forward, we know a lot more now,” VanHerck said.

VanHerck wants to eventually be able to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to improve his threat detection capabilities, alluding to some of the capabilities the Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept promises. But in VanHerck’s case, he doesn’t want an AI-assisted automated balloon-killing device. When the ultimate backstop to protect the U.S. is its nuclear arsenal, what NORAD needs is information.

“I think the services are focused too much on ‘sensor to shooter,'” VanHerck said. “We need more sensor to decision-maker.”

Added VanHerck: “I think we’ve been too focused on deterrence by punishment and that doesn’t give our most senior leaders many options. What we have to do is give options to our senior leaders to create and fill that space. Those options are what I would say are deterrence by denial.”

Ultimately, the balloon incident was a wake-up call to the whole nation, perhaps for the better, VanHerck said.

The Chinese balloon drew intense scrutiny of NORAD’s mission from the top brass at the Pentagon and the West Wing of the White House. When the U.S. adjusted its radar settings so it would no longer filter out slow-moving objects such as balloons, NORTHCOM ended up shooting down three objects that were likely harmless on President Joe Biden’s orders.

But VanHerck has long pointed out that cruise missiles are the most acute threat to the American homeland, along with ballistic missiles, and Russia has already proven it can launch long-range cruise missiles from inside its own airspace and target another country in its attacks on Ukraine. NORAD’s North Warning System radar network is an antiquated relic of the Cold War that was designed for Soviet bombers. VanHerck has previously warned that Russian air-launched cruise missiles could be a possible threat to the homeland. He also sees an increased risk from ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Meanwhile, NORAD is moving to update the North Warning System and has next-generation missile interceptors coming online—eventually.

“We’re pretty much stuck with what we have in the near term, VanHerck said. “I think the future of homeland defense looks vastly different than it does today. It’s autonomous unmanned platforms that can loiter for long times. That can create domain awareness. We can do kinetic and non-kinetic effectors.”

Whatever the future holds for America’s homeland defense, it will likely be better resourced than in the past.

“It’s great to have that opportunity to tell our story about the challenges we face—the domain awareness challenges we have in the homeland,” VanHerck said. “Magically, the appropriators want to talk to me.

US Policy Is Prolonging the War in Ukraine 

US Policy Is Prolonging the War in Ukraine 

The following commentary is written by Brian J. Morra, a former Air Force Intelligence officer and retired senior aerospace executive. His most recent article for Air & Space Forces Magazine was “The Near Nuclear War of 1983.” His novel about the 1983 incident, titled The Able Archers, was released in March 2022. 

The United States is pursuing a ‘gradualist’ policy in Ukraine, ratcheting up the pressure on the Russian invaders by progressively arming the Ukrainian military. Gradualism didn’t work in Vietnam, and it may not work in Ukraine. 

In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson feared that the war in Southeast Asia might escalate out of control. He worried Moscow would threaten Berlin and that the People’s Republic of China might enter Vietnam with massive ground formations like it did in Korea.

Johnson tried to calibrate the American use of force in Vietnam to send nuanced “messages” of American resolve to the leaders in Beijing and Moscow. The White House increased pressure on Hanoi through its air campaign, gradually increasing airstrikes and then backing off to see the impact. Johnson viewed airpower as the key component of this messaging exercise. Johnson’s gradualism and failure to use airpower decisively prolonged the war and led to additional years of death and destruction. 

It wasn’t until President Richard Nixon discarded that policy and instead decided to use airpower appropriately that Hanoi finally agreed to get serious about the Paris peace talks. 

Today, despite repeated pleas from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for combat aircraft, U.S. President Biden insists that Zelenskyy “doesn’t need” F-16s. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has reinforced the president’s position, indicating that the Biden Administration is carefully measuring Ukraine’s tactical needs on a case-by-case basis. In a classic example of gradualism, Sullivan did not rule out providing Ukraine with F-16s at some later date.

Absent a coherent strategic framework for resolving the conflict, it’s tempting for the Biden Administration to focus on Ukraine’s needs on a week-to-week or a month-to-month basis. That tactical, short-term focus is prolonging the war. 

Like Johnson in Vietnam, the Biden administration seeks to orchestrate a carefully calibrated policy in Ukraine. The problem is that wars are messy and unpredictable, calibration is not a precise science, and the enemy may interpret gradualism as weakness.  

The Biden administration’s concerns about escalation are legitimate. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have trotted out threats of nuclear escalation since early in the current conflict—and to great effect. Those threats have limited NATO’s freedom of action and are the root cause of Biden’s incrementalist, gradualist approach. President Biden is managing the risk of escalation by not providing Ukraine what it needs to win decisively. 

A long war is not in Ukraine’s interest. Zelenskyy is telling us that time is not on his side and that he needs to achieve a military victory sooner, rather than later. A longer war also increases the potential for Iran and China to arm Russia in earnest. CIA Director William J. Burns has issued public warnings that Beijing may soon expand its role as an arms supplier to Moscow, raising the stakes in the conflict and increasing the risk of escalation. 

The Biden administration’s gradualism has taken Washington from providing Ukraine with Javelins and Stingers to sending HIMARS and promising Abrams tanks. Stepping up support over time is not a strategy toward a satisfactory end game, however.

Gradualism in Vietnam led to a disastrous outcome. Let’s not make the same mistake in Ukraine.

Lessons from Vietnam: ‘I Shall Always Be Grateful’

Lessons from Vietnam: ‘I Shall Always Be Grateful’

The AFA Warfare Symposium kicked off March 6 with three storied heroes of the Vietnam War. This is the first in a three-part series on their talks.

Lt. Col. Gene Smith (Ret.). Smith joined the 333rd Tactical Fighter Squadron at Takhli Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand, in August 1967. For the next two months, Smith flew 33 combat missions in his F-105 Thunderchief over North Vietnam. His 33rd mission, Oct. 25, 1967, struck Phúc Yên Air Base, just north of Hanoi. It was his last.

Maj. Gene Smith in front of his F-105 in October 1967, the month he was taken as a POW in North Vietnam. Courtesy photo.

“We took off that day, a beautiful afternoon,” Smith recalled. As the flight lead, he had carefully briefed his team to drop their bombs at 9,000 feet, no higher. “Guess who exceeded the 9,000 feet? Me. And when I pulled off the target my airplane got hit. Instantly, the airplane tumbled.”

Pitching uncontrollably, Smith bailed out awkwardly, sustaining a deep flesh wound in his right leg as he exited the cockpit. His parachute opened and he descended; as soon as his feet touched the earth, he was surrounded. Vietnamese soldiers armed with AK-47s fired, sending two bullets ripping through his left leg. 

“They undressed me with a machete and off we went to the Hilton,” Smith said, referring to the notorious Hoa Lo prison known eupemistically as the Hanoi Hilton. It would be his home for the next 1,967 days, where he and hundreds of other Airmen prisoners endured interrogation and torture.

“We spent five and a half years,” Smith said. “That’s the hardest part to understand about our conditions, is how long it was. The horrible indefiniteness of it all.”

Smith returned as part of Operation Homecoming on March 14, 1973; in all, 591 Americans came home as part of the operation between Feb. 12 and April 4 of that year.

Surviving was the true test of the their endurance.

“You can’t teach resiliency,” Smith said. “You can teach some of the factors in the equation. But you learn resiliency as a child. You learn resiliency when you’re in high school or college. You learn resiliency in your first days in the military, I hope. But the way we got through that was faith. Faith in God. Faith in your country. Faith in your family, that they would always be there for you. Faith in your fellow POWs.”

The faith that helped Smith withstand the darkest years of his life did not lead him to a lifetime of resentment or despair, but to a lifetime of service and repayment to his nation and his Air Force. 

“The most beautiful flag I’ve ever seen in my life was on the tail of a C-141 that pulled up into Gia Lam and took me, Lee Ellis, John McCain, Chuck Rice, and a whole list of others that were in that group,” Smith said. “I shall always be grateful. I shall always be grateful to my nation. I shall always be grateful to the Air Force for the wonderful life I’ve had.”

Space Force to Take on the Army’s Missile Warning Ground Stations in October

Space Force to Take on the Army’s Missile Warning Ground Stations in October

AURORA, Colo.—Space Delta 4, the Space Force unit responsible for missile tracking and warning, will take over responsibility for the Joint Tactical Ground Stations from the Army in October, its commander said March 6. 

The Army was originally slated to keep the JTAGS mission, even as the Space Force took over other services’ space missions, but last September 2022 it became clear that could change. At the time, Maj. Gen. Doug Schiess, vice commander of Space Operations Command, indicated the two services were in early discussions about transferring JTAGS. The transfer was confirmed in a January release about the Buckley Space Force Base

Space Delta 4 commander Col. Miguel A. Cruz, speaking at the AFA Warfare Symposium, said the transition is slated for October, expanding Delta 4’s broad portfolio. 

“By the time all this coalesces, Delta 4 is going to have orbital sensors, ground-based sensors doing the strategic mission, ground-based sensors doing tactical missions and of course, all the array of antennas around the world that ensure that data transfer goes from one place to another,” Cruz said. 

The transfer will also create logistical responsibilities for Space Base Delta 2, the mission support unit also headquartered at Buckley. 

“When we look at the JTAGS sites, there’s a level of installation support—what type of infrastructure and, more importantly, parts and being able to sustain that,” said Col. Marcus D. Jackson, commander of Space Base Delta 2. “And so when we look at what’s being transferred over from the Army to the Space Force, … we will establish [memorandums of understanding] with the Army on the requirements for supporting JTAGS representatives on site, being able if you need to store equipment, if you have to store parts, having that as part of the interrelationship with Space Force and the Army. We’re in the process of working and doing that now.” 

That work is all part of the operational nitty-gritty of transferring missions across services. 

“It’s not like you can flip a switch and say ‘Here you go. Here’s the keys to the new mission and off you go,’” he said. “There’s a lot of planning that goes into transferring a mission into another service, to include the number of people that are going to transfer, how you’re going to train them, the training pipeline, the sustainment activities that goes with that because now money and sustainment responsibility go from one service to another.”  

In order for the transfer to proceed smoothly, Cruz added, the Space Force will lean on the “resident expertise” of the Soldiers in the Army. Some will become inter-service transfers, while others will filter out over time rather than leaving all at once. 

“It’s not like we’re going to be all Guardians on day one. Actually on day one, we’ll have a number of Guardians—we already have about 14 of them among the various JTAGS detachments—and then gradually transition those Soldiers as their normal PCS cycle ensues. That allows us the opportunity to hit the ground running, but also kind of go with the training wheels as we take that over.” 

Further developments at Buckley could follow. Col. Robert J. Schreiner, commander of the Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado at the base, said he “would not be surprised to see some evolution of the mission as we evolve to diverse and proliferated architectures, as we evolve to new and emerging mission sets for our mission partners.” 

ADF-Colorado is controlled by the National Reconnaissance Office and doubles as Space Delta 20, working with industry, other services, other government agencies, and allies—highlighting the vast number of organizations that have a presence at Buckley. 

“We have 110 other mission partners on site that we care for day in and day out,” Jackson noted. 

Another of those mission partners is the Colorado Air National Guard, which is also undergoing changes. The Colorado ANG has had both air and space missions for years now, but two of its units are at a crossroads, said Col. Chris J. Southard, commander of the 140th Wing. 

The 140th flies F-16s but is hoping to gain new aircraft like the F-35 or F-15EX before its current fighters are retired around the end of the decade, Southard said. Meanwhile, the 137th Space Warning Squadron operates the Mobile Ground Systems trucks that communicate with the Defense Support Program (DSP) constellation. But with those DSP satellites past their anticipated service life, the squadron is also in need of a new mission.  

USAF Shakes Up Its Plan for Tankers: Fewer ‘Traditional’ Refuelers, Focus on Stealth Future

USAF Shakes Up Its Plan for Tankers: Fewer ‘Traditional’ Refuelers, Focus on Stealth Future

AURORA, Colo.—The Air Force is dumping its decade-old strategy of a three-phase tanker recapitalization plan, replacing it with a strategy that will yield about 75 traditional tankers beyond the current run of the KC-46 and then focus on a future, survivable tanker, Air Force acquisition executive Andrew Hunter said March 6.

“We have come to the determination that the kind of KC-X, -Y, -Z strategy that was established in the 2009-2010 timeframe is no longer fit for … meeting the air refueling needs of the joint force in the 2030s and beyond,” Hunter told reporters at the AFA Warfare Symposium.

The new Next Generation Air-refueling System, or NGAS, is “focused on ensuring” that USAF tankers in the mid-2030s and later “will be able to survive and operate in a much more contested environment than the tankers of the past or the tankers that are in our current fleet,” which include the KC-46, Hunter said.

Through analysis done as part of Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s operational imperatives, Hunter said there are too many “threats that are posed by potential adversaries to high-value aircraft, including tankers,” and USAF needs an approach that addresses those threats while still meeting its obligations to refuel the joint force “in all of the critical operations that are required for high intensity conflict.”

Hunter said the Air Force consulted with Boeing and Lockheed Martin on when they could deliver new tankers after Boeing finishes its current contract for 179 KC-46s. Boeing could produce an uprated KC-46 by 2032 and Lockheed could provide an “LMXT” tanker, based on the Airbus A330, by 2034. By that time, USAF doesn’t want to be buying traditional tankers anymore, Hunter said.

Buying 75 further “traditional” tankers beyond the 179 KC-46s, USAF can stick to its schedule of retiring the KC-135 and KC-10, Hunter explained. After that, it will pursue a competitive program for a new airplane, but he indicated the KC-46 offers the best opportunity to “dovetail” with current production and not have a break in tanker recapitalization. The Air Force will decide on how to approach the purchase of the 75 aircraft—whether it will be sole source or competitive—in the next few months, he said. Either choice would require negotiations, but a sole source award to Boeing could move the program faster. He noted that if the KC-46 is chosen, it will likely cost more; not only because of new capabilities that will be added, but because USAF got “a very good deal” on the KC-46.

The KC-46 has been a fixed-price contract that Boeing knowingly underbid. So far, the company has taken more than $6 billion in losses on the program, costs that USAF might have had to bear otherwise.   

“We do expect,” based on the information provided by Boeing and Lockheed, that “that that may lead us towards KC-46 as the answer … to that ‘five-year KC-135 recapitalization effort,’  is what we’re calling it,” Hunter noted. “But we do need to hear from industry before we make any final determinations.”

The plan for KC-Y had been to buy about 150 more traditional tankers, Hunter said, but the new plan will “accelerate” the purchase of more advanced aircraft for the mission.

Kendall has for the last year cautioned that the Air Force would probably forego a competition for a so-called “bridge tanker,” preferring to save the money and time of a competition and put those resources toward a more advanced aircraft. A second tranche of KC-46s would have new capabilities in communications and possibly control of uncrewed air vehicles, Kendall has said, but Hunter said those extra capabilities will be scaled back in the new scheme.

“We will go on contract for the last of those [179 KC-46s] in FY 2027 and take deliveries of those aircraft in 2029. So we were looking at a gap of … tanker production, under a competitive approach,” Hunter said.

“The last stage of the business case analysis will be giving industry information about our revised path forward and getting their responses about what they can provide and then make a sourcing determination … by the middle of this … calendar year,” he said.

An analysis of alternatives will get underway this year for the NGAS, and Hunter said that process could take 18 months “to a couple of years.” He also said the Air Force is looking toward an “increment one” of NGAS, and that the aircraft might be iterated in several variants, in order to get a stealthy tanker as soon as possible.

The Air Force wants to work with “a wide variety of potential industry partners, in order to inform our efforts and make sure that the capabilities that are being considered in the AOA is the best, the most innovative and effective options that are out there. … We will look at a clean sheet of paper approach not constrained to commercial derivative aircraft,” Hunter said.

The NGAS will have to have “the ability to go deeper into contested airspace … more advanced self-protection-type capabilities, more advanced networking capabilities,” Hunter said.

The Air Force revealed the NGAS name and idea in a Jan. 31 solicitation to industry. In that request for information, it said it seeks a new tanker to be in service circa 2040.

Asked if the NGAS strategy is an attempt to end-run or wait out Congress—some members of which are unhappy with Boeing’s KC-46 performance and want to see more tanker competition—Hunter said “there’s not a way around Congress.” If Capitol Hill “doesn’t like the plan that I’ve just described to you, they will have something to say about it” and this will “have an impact on our plans. I think we’re very aware of that.”

He said the Air Force will “make our best case that this is the right plan, the right path going forward … And we’ll get feedback. We’ll see what comes out in the … draft legislation and will respond accordingly.”

Ukraine Has Lost 60 Aircraft, Taken Down 70 in Russian Invasion, Hecker Says

Ukraine Has Lost 60 Aircraft, Taken Down 70 in Russian Invasion, Hecker Says

AURORA, Colo.—Ukraine has lost roughly 60 aircraft so far since Russia’s renewed invasion of the country in February 2022, while the Russians have lost more than 70, according to the top U.S. Air Force commander for Europe. After Russia’s larger air force failed to establish air superiority in the early days of the war, the air picture has turned into a mutually denied environment, Gen. James B. Hecker said March 6 at the AFA Warfare Symposium.

“Russian, as well as the Ukrainian, success in integrated air and missile defense have made much of those aircraft worthless,” according to Hecker, who serves as the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa and NATO’s Allied Air Command.

“[Russia has] downed over 60 Ukrainian aircraft,” he added. “Ukraine’s downed over 70 Russian aircraft. So both of their integrated air and missile defense, especially when you’re talking about going against aircraft, they’ve been very effective. And that’s why they’re not flying over one another’s country.”

Russian air defenses are located in Russia, Belarus, and parts of occupied Ukraine—and have the ability to move around. That has made it difficult for Ukraine to use airpower in the combined arms counteroffensive the Ukrainians are planning for the spring and summer. 

“They’re not doing a whole lot,” Hecker said. “They can’t go over and do close air support.”

The U.S. has attempted to bolster Ukraine’s air force with AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, which have been jerry-rigged to work with the country’s Soviet-designed fighters.

“Obviously, they’re not as integrated with the airplane as it would be if they’re on the U.S. aircraft, so they do have limitations,” Hecker said of Ukraine’s employment of HARMs. “But they’re doing a pretty good job.”

The U.S. has also recently provided Ukraine’s air force with JDAM precision-guided bombs that have extended the Ukrainians’ strike capability. Hecker said that allows them to hit targets slightly beyond the current range of the GMRLS rockets fired by HIMARS launchers. The GMLRS rockets the U.S. has provided Ukraine have a range of nearly 50 miles. The U.S. has declined to provide Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles which have a range of nearly 200 miles.

“Recently, we’ve just got them some precision munitions that had some extended range and can go a little bit further than a gravity drop bomb,” Hecker said. “And it has precision. That’s a recent capability that we were able to give them probably in the last three weeks.”

But Ukraine still must fly low to terrain mask its aircraft against Russian surface-to-air missiles. Ukraine has asked for U.S. fighters such as F-16s, but the Biden administration has declined to provide them despite objections from some U.S. lawmakers.

Lockheed Martin Clears Crucial Hurdle to Restarting F-35 Deliveries

Lockheed Martin Clears Crucial Hurdle to Restarting F-35 Deliveries

Lockheed Martin restarted flying operations at its Fort Worth, Texas, facilities March 6, paving the way for deliveries of F-35s to resume after a nearly three-month hiatus. It’s not yet clear when the first new F-35 of 2023 will be delivered.

“We resumed F-35 production flight operations today following an F135 engine mitigation action,” the company said in a press statement. The move follows action by Pratt & Whitney to resume deliveries of F135 engines with the issuance of a technical order to address issues of harmonic resonance in the powerplants.

Lockheed has completed but not delivered 26 F-35s since the hold on flying operations was put in place after a mid-December crash of an F-35B at Fort Worth. Acceptance flights by Lockheed and Defense Contract Management Agency test pilots are needed to ensure the aircraft work properly and that any deficiencies can be documented.

“Safety remains our top priority; we will deliver the aircraft as quickly as possible after undertaking the multiple checks and test flights needed,” a Lockheed spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Flying was halted Dec. 14 as precautionary measure after the crash; the hold on flying meant acceptance tests could not proceed. Pratt stopped delivering F135 engines at the end of December.

Although Pratt and the F-35 Joint Program Office had said the harmonic resonance problem only affected a small number of aircraft, the entire worldwide fleet of F-35s will get a retrofit to fix the issue, which Pratt said only showed up after more than 600,000 hours of F135 engine operations. Officials from the engine maker told reporters early last week they had identified a fix and resumed deliveries of the engine March 2.

A time compliance technical directive (TCTD) was then issued by the JPO; aircraft that were not affected by the harmonic resonance issue will not have any flight restrictions placed on them while they wait for the fix, while the small number of aircraft that were grounded will be cleared to fly once they get the retrofit, which takes between four and eight hours, a JPO spokesperson said.

A Lockheed Martin spokesperson said all 26 undelivered F-35s will either get the retrofit before flying or receive an already modified engine. There are no changes required for aircraft production to incorporate the retrofit, the spokesperson added.

Maintaining What Matters: An Engine Fit for the F-35

Maintaining What Matters: An Engine Fit for the F-35

The looming decision on the future of the F-35’s engine—Pratt & Whitney’s F135—has fostered plenty of debate, with some suggesting the F135 should be completely replaced with a new engine through the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP), while others say integrating a new adaptive engine into the F-35 would be wasteful and unnecessary.

Even Pratt & Whitney—which is developing its own adaptive engine, the XA101, through AETP—insists that the F-35’s continued aerial dominance as a joint strike fighter depends on incremental upgrades to the existing technology powering it.

“Adaptive engines are sixth-gen technology,” said Jen Latka, Vice President of Pratt & Whitney’s F135 program. “That technology is what keeps us at the forefront in terms of the U.S.’s national advantage, so we are very thankful for the adaptive engine program—but while it’s critical to develop sixth-generation propulsion technologies, the AETP engines aren’t optimized for the F-35 program.”

The solution proposed by Pratt & Whitney, a Raytheon Technologies company, is an engine core upgrade (ECU) that can meet DOD imperatives for the F-35 that adaptive engines can’t, particularly maintaining tri-variant commonality—adaptive engines won’t fit in the F-35B and likely won’t be retrofitted into already fielded F-35s, and will not deliver a meaningful quantity of Block 4-enabled F-35s by 2028, when the warfighter needs them.

The ECU is a limited scope upgrade—the product looks very similar to the existing motor in the F-35 but incorporates the latest design tools into the same supply base. The upgrade wouldn’t require any of the F-35’s interfaces to change and is limited to what Latka calls “the power module,” which is just the core of the engine.

“What that means is you can come into depot for your regularly-scheduled overhaul with the current configuration and then leave depot with the upgraded core,” Latka said. Because the upgraded engine is retrofittable, the upgrade could be dropped in F-35s in the depot in addition to on the assembly line—greatly accelerating the pace at which Block 4-enabled F-35s will reach the operational fleet.

Photo courtesy of Pratt & Whitney.

Pratt & Whitney estimates that the ECU can save the DOD a total of $40 billion over the life of the program, but in near-term savings alone it has a clear advantage over a new engine. Latka reports that development will cost around $2.4 billion for the entire Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase over the five-year Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). That’s just a fraction of the price tag on fully developing an AETP alternative, which Secretary Frank Kendall has said will cost nearly $7 billion and result in reduced procurement volumes.

“In the next five years, there’s billions of dollars that could be saved,” Latka said. “And it’s not only the cost of a new engine—it would be that plus the core upgrade, because the core upgrade will need to be done regardless, to support the international customers and the STOVL variant.”

“And in comparing production costs, the core upgrade remains the financially prudent option. An upgraded F135 would be production cost neutral,” she said, “while the initial cost of a brand-new adaptive engine would be about two and half times that of current the F135 and would add about $4 billion in production costs across the life of the program.”

“We’ve already come down the learning curve and taken out 50 percent of the cost of the engine,” she added. Even accounting for an AETP learning curve, Latka said AETP “would still be more expensive than the current motor because it’s significantly heavier.”

While the savings offered by Pratt & Whitney’s single development program are impressive, they’re marginal compared to lifecycle savings. Sustainment is a crucial piece of the debate over F-35 engines, but its implications extend beyond just the cost. Pratt & Whitney’s solution can potentially save the Pentagon tens of billions of dollars over the F135’s (and the F-35’s) lifecycle because it retains an infrastructure that has already been built and invested in—and when sustainment efforts are disrupted, disruption soon follows.

“With a new adaptive engine, you are going out there and having to create a second infrastructure,” Latka said. “So, you would need all new tooling, all new support equipment, and all new depots. You have to fund two sustaining engineering teams, two configuration management teams … you have two of everything because you’re maintaining two totally different products.”

Photo courtesy of Pratt & Whitney.

Bifurcation threatens the interoperability of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, which depends on a common engine and global spares pool among American and international F-35 operators. The maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) network devoted to the F135, for instance, already has multiple locations around the globe that will be able to support ECU sustainment as well—with more planned in the future. But F-35As powered by AETP engines wouldn’t be able to utilize that extensive sustainment network and would need to stand up a parallel AETP sustainment network at a significant cost.

“The drive right now has got to be around maximizing interoperability among the partners,” Latka said. “Another issue is whether the adaptive engine is exportable; it’s sixth-gen technology. Perhaps it could be exportable one day, but it doesn’t appear to be right now.”

And with global tensions on the rise, Latka said, there’s a strict timeline on not only improving the F-35’s operating capabilities but also growing the fleet before a potential conflict happens. That’s harder to do while trying to fit brand new, unproven engine technology into an existing jet.

“When we think about the timeline and the pacing threats, cutting tails hurts that fight,” Latka said. “But secondly, we need to field an engine upgrade as fast as we can.”

While adaptive engine technology boasts improved range over the existing F135, Latka said that these enhancements could distract from what really matters to the combatant commanders: getting as many Block 4-enabled jets fielded as quickly as possible. Block 4 quantity and readiness equals relevant capability.

Pratt & Whitney has said its upgraded engine will be ready to enter service by 2028, facilitating SECAF’s readiness imperative while offering performance improvements and significant cost avoidance that allows increased investment in the Secretary’s other operational imperatives. But Latka reiterated that these improvements are ancillary to ensuring operational readiness—it’s quantity and Block 4 capabilities that truly matter, and Pratt & Whitney’s Engine Core Upgrade would deliver both while saving billions of dollars and ensuring commonality across the fleet of F-35s operated by the DOD and allied partners around the globe.