On ABMS, Air Force Steers Between Status Quo and ‘Boiling the Ocean’

On ABMS, Air Force Steers Between Status Quo and ‘Boiling the Ocean’

Since 2018—when the Pentagon began its strategic pivot toward competition with near-peer powers Russia and China—the Air Force has worked to restructure and advance its Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) program.

Originally envisioned as a replacement for the E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ABMS was reimagined as a holistic “system of systems” designed to seamlessly and securely share data across multiple weapons systems, the service’s contribution to the Defense Department’s broader Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) effort to connect sensors and shooters around the globe.

“What exactly is ABMS? Is it software? Hardware? Infrastructure? Policy?” Gen. David W. Allvin, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, wrote in May 2021. “The answer is yes to all.”  

Five years from the start of that reimagining, Air Force and industry experts made clear at the AFA Warfare Symposium last week that the precise parameters and definition of the ABMS program remain a work in progress. 

“Within the broad construct of what the Air Force is doing with [command-and control and battle management], I would say there is a ditch on both sides of the road we’re traveling that we’re trying to avoid,” said Brig. Gen, Luke C.G. Cropsey, the Air Force’s program executive officer for command, control, communications, and battle management (C3BM).

On one side is the ditch called “status quo,” he said, and there is general agreement in the Air Force that continuing on that legacy path is unsustainable giving the escalating threat. 

“The problem is, if we overcorrect we hit the ditch on the other side of the road, which is trying to connect everything, everywhere, all of the time,” said Cropsey, who characterized that approach as trying to “boil the ocean.”

“That’s not going to work either … because there’s a long list of acquisition programs that adopted that ‘Big Bang’ theory [of connectivity], and they ended poorly as a result,” Cropsey said during a panel discussion.  

The Air Force’s lodestar for avoiding those ditches is to always keep in mind the needs of the warfighter in any future great power conflict.  

“The way we stay in the middle of the road is to be ruthlessly, laser-focused on the operational problems that need to be solved in order for us to win the next fight,” said Cropsey. “We need to stay grounded in the fundamental belief that if we identify and clearly articulate the operational problem we’re trying to solve, and do that in a way that allows us all to share the same vision of the challenge, then we can work our way back through the mission threads and the kill chain and arrive at a solution. That’s what we mean by staying operationally focused.”  

Retired Air Force Lt. Col. Ron Fehlen, general manager of Air and Space Force programs for L3Harris, likened the importance of staying operationally focused to the evolution of the cell phone.

“Frankly, deciding what you want [ABMS] to do from a data perspective is no different from the cell phones we use every day,” Fehlen said during the panel discussion. “I suspect not many of us are using the old ‘flip phones’ anymore, and that’s because we demanded more data and processing power out of those phones, and then we wanted teenagers to be able to stream Netflix on their phones, so we demanded full-motion video.”

That kind of demand-driven process drove cell phone manufacturers towards different bandwidth and security requirements, he noted.

“Similarly, [ABMS] boils down to going through a process of identifying what the warfighter needs, when they need it, and where that data needs to flow” said Fehlen. “Then industry can help take the technology to that next level.”   

Achieving a more holistic command-and-control and battle management “system of systems,” will likely require the individual services to conduct more upfront operational analysis to reach a common understanding of the future battlespace and their roles within it.  

“Many times when we speak to our military customers, we hear ‘Well, we didn’t actually know that the other services were doing it this way,’” said Elaine Bitonti, general manager at Collins Aerospace for connected battlespace and emerging capabilities. “But if the communications system standards for the Air Force are different than for the Army and Navy, and there may be operational reasons for that, it still has an impact.” 

In the case of Collins Aerospace’s work on the largest global command-and-control network for commercial airlines, for instance, the airlines first came together to create a common infrastructure. “They knew that had to have a common infrastructure to run all the data they wanted,” Bitonti noted.  

Dan Markham, director of Joint All Domain Operations at Lockheed Martin, agreed on the need for the armed services to come together early and establish common interfaces and standards.

“It’s important to ensure active participation by the other services early on, so industry doesn’t show up and try and integrate something only to find the interfaces between the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army are different,” he said. “That’s not effective or efficient.”  

WATCH: Video of Russian Fighter Crashing Into US MQ-9 Released

WATCH: Video of Russian Fighter Crashing Into US MQ-9 Released

The Pentagon released video of a March 14 incident involving a Russian Su-27 fighter and a U.S. Air Force MQ-9, which resulted in the American plane crashing into the Black Sea. The MQ-9 Reaper was conducting a surveillance mission when two Su-27 Flankers intercepted it. The Su-27s harassed the U.S. drone by making close passes and dumping fuel on it. Eventually, one Russian fighter clipped the MQ-9’s propeller.

In the short video, which DOD said was edited for length, an Su-27 Flanker makes a close pass over the U.S. surveillance drone. At first, a Russian jet comes up behind the MQ-9 while dumping fuel on the American plane. In a second pass, a Russian jet hits the American plane and the video cuts out. When the picture reappears, the American drone’s propeller is visibly damaged.

The U.S. drone became unflyable, and the American operators brought the drone down in the Black Sea, according to the U.S.

The U.S. says it hasn’t concluded whether the Russian pilots intended to crash into the drone or were trying to disable it with their tactics. Either way, the Russians could not be said to have kept a safe distance from the American plane.

“This was unsafe, it was unprofessional,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said on CNN March 15, describing the video. “It was also tinged with a great deal of incompetence.”

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley made calls to their Russian counterparts.

“We take any potential for escalation very seriously and that’s why I believe it’s important to keep the lines of communication open,” Austin said at a joint press conference with Milley on March 13. “I think it’s really key that we’re able to pick up the phone and engage each other. And I think that that will help to prevent miscalculations going forward.”

The MQ-9’s wreckage lies almost a mile down at the bottom of the Black Sea after it “probably broke up,” Milley said. The U.S. is aware of where the drone landed.

“We know where it landed in the Black Sea,” Milley added. “It’s probably about maybe 4,000 or 5,000 feet of water, something like that. So any recovery operation is very difficult at that depth by anyone.”

Milley indicated the U.S. took steps to prevent any unwanted material from getting into the wrong hands.

“There’s probably not a lot to recover, frankly,” Milley said. “We did take mitigating measures, so we are quite confident that whatever was of value is no longer of value.”

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said the U.S. believes Russia is attempting to recover parts of the MQ-9, but added that deep water would make that mission difficult.

“We do have indications Russia is likely making an effort to recover MQ-9 debris,” Ryder said during a briefing at the Pentagon on March 16. “We assess it is very unlikely they would be able to recover anything useful.”

However, the U.S. objects to any Russian exploitation of the wreckage.

“The key point here is this is U.S. property and it’s an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset,” Ryder said. “We have capabilities and means at our disposal to protect and safeguard the information which we have taken.”

The U.S. has experienced several near collisions between Russian and Chinese jets and American surveillance planes over the past year. U.S. officials say they are within rights to conduct operations in international airspace, regardless of protests and adversarial harassment.

“The United States will continue to fly and to operate wherever international law allows,” Austin said.

This article was updated with comments from Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder.

How Do You Train for a War in Space? Saltzman Says USSF Is Working on the Details

How Do You Train for a War in Space? Saltzman Says USSF Is Working on the Details

The Space Force increasingly views space as a contested environment it might have to battle through due to China’s increasing capabilities. But that does not mean the service is unprepared if it had to fight tonight, according to Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman.

“That’s why we have the Space Force,” Saltzman said March 15 at the annual defense conference hosted by McAleese and Associates. “In terms of China, we are not lagging behind. If you were conducting a wargame, and you were picking which space force in the world you want on your side, you would pick the United States Space Force. We have the greatest capabilities, we have the most capable force—the envy of the world.”

While China may not have a space force, the People’s Liberation Army stood up the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015. This newest part of China’s armed forces focuses on the “strategic frontiers” of space and cyber, including electromagnetic and information warfare—as well as disrupting adversaries’ capabilities in the same domains.

In light of new threats, most acutely from China, the USSF has moved with urgency. Its fiscal 2024 budget request proposes growing the budget by 15 percent to $30 billion and expanding to 9,400 Active Guardians. The service wants to rapidly put new satellites in orbit, with some going from development to orbit in two or three years. The Space Force also wants to rely more on commercial capabilities, which may be preexisting and can provide a layer of redundancy.

In the 2024 budget, the service hopes to invest in its missile warning systems, update the global positioning system, and launch new vehicles. It would also spend over half its budget, $16.6 billion, on research, development, test, and evaluation. Exactly what that money is for is largely unknown to the general public.

“I struggle a little bit with how to describe the space budget because so much of it is classified,” DOD comptroller Michael J. McCord said. “We have progress on a number of fronts there.”

But Saltzman said the Space Force’s push for readiness is not just a race to acquire more kit to put in orbit.

“When we talk about a gap, what I’m worried about is we’re out in front of the race,” Saltzman said. “But how fast is the competition closing on? How fast do they want to close the gap that they see? And it’s that pace, and it’s the mix of the weapon systems that they’re pursuing. That’s what’s got us concerned. So we’re looking back and saying, what do we need to do next to make sure that we can counter our competition.”

Saltzman’s answer is one typically offered by service chiefs: the U.S. has the best people. In particular, Saltzman highlighted unique aspects of the Space Force’s “flat” organization that streamline command and the ability to commission industry professionals as officers in the service.

But to get as much as possible out of Guardians, the Space Force needs to up its training—Saltzman has noted that there has never been a war in space, and how the Space Force would train for one is still up in the air.

“We’re still working through all the details,” Saltzman said. “It wasn’t prioritized to the same degree about thinking about a contested domain. Now, we are prioritizing that, obviously. But I don’t have the training facilities and infrastructure that allows us to do the kinds of simulations and training that I need.”

The Air Force can fly training missions and drop live ordinance and other services can practice on Earth. But the Space Force must create virtual environments in lieu of traditional exercises. Saltzman said current simulators at the USSF’s disposal are focused on ensuring service members are proficient with systems.

“It’s about how fast we can shift and pivot to resilient architectures that we think will support deterrence and how fast I can provide the tools to our Guardians to do the kind of training they need to be ready to deal with a dynamic thinking adversary,” Saltzman said.

While much of its focus on protecting its satellites, USSF won’t be doing its own live-fire exercises to test our their resilience—though it is concerned about other nations’ anti-satellite weapons tests.

“We’re expanding our capabilities to do constructive virtual training and ranges so that we can conduct those kinds of events,” Saltzman said.

Overall, a Space Force prepared for a fight with China will allow it to deliver better capabilities in peacetime or during a grey zone conflict, according to Saltzman.

“There’s not some day in the future, where X, Y, and Z are accomplished and I will say, we are now ready,” Saltzman said. “If something goes down, the Space Force is going to be there.”

Brown: Air Force Subtracting A-10 from ‘4+1’ Fighter Plan

Brown: Air Force Subtracting A-10 from ‘4+1’ Fighter Plan

With Congress starting to go along with the Air Force’s wish to retire its aging A-10 fleet, Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr.’s “4+1” fighter plan of two years ago is “probably just ‘4’ now,” he said March 15.

“We’re retiring A-10s faster than we originally thought”, Brown said at the annual McAleese defense forum in Washington, D.C. “I think that’s probably the right answer.”

The A-10’s close air support mission can be carried out by a variety of other platforms, Brown said, and the Air Force must move on to cutting-edge capabilities that can survive in contested airspace and will keep the service ahead of China, the pacing threat.

The four fighters in USAF’s plan will be the the:

  • F-35
  • F-16
  • F-15E/F-15EX
  • F-22 before it transitions to the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter around 2030

At the moment, the F-35 is “right behind” the F-16 in overall numbers, Brown said, and “in the not so distant future,” it will become the majority fighter in the combat air forces, presuming the Air Force continues to buy them at a rate of 48 per year.

The F-15E and F-15EX will have a “similar capability” to each other, Brown noted. The service will focus its investments on its newest F-22s and is seeking to retire 32 of the oldest airframes, a move which Congress declined to allow in the fiscal 2023 budget. But the F-22 Block 30/35s will continue to be updated and kept in service until NGAD replaces them, Brown said.

Despite retiring A-10s to find the savings needed to afford new systems, Brown said he has forbidden his staff from using the phrase “divest to invest.” Instead, “we are transitioning to the future,” Brown said.

He also said he engages frequently with staffers on Capitol Hill, where the first element of the discussion is the threat, and after that, the relative contribution of aircraft “in their district that they want to hold onto.” Brown said the Air Force is making headway getting Capitol Hill to see the need to transition to new systems.

Brown noted press coverage of Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s announcement at last week’s AFA Warfare Symposium that the service is pursuing a notional fleet of 1,000 Collaborative Combat Aircraft.

“I don’t know if that will be the actual number,” Brown said, but the effort has three elements.

“There’s the platform itself. There’s the autonomy. And then there’s the … organize, train and equip; the standing up units,” he said. These elements will be conducted “in parallel versus in serial” fashion, he said.

Just as important, Brown said the Air Force is investing in the munitions that will go with NGAD and CCA aircraft, and he noted emphasis on the AGM-158 JASSM-ER, the Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW), and AARGM-ER, the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile and more upgraded versions of the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Research and Development

While the broader Pentagon focused its fiscal 2024 budget on buying things, Brown said the Air Force has put significant new funding into research, development, test, and evaluation. That’s being done to “give us options,” he said. As the threat evolves and advances, the Air Force needs to be able to shift gears to keep up with it, Brown said, and “you can’t produce what you haven’t started.” But not all technology initiatives will go forward.

Brown said there are no “gaping holes” in the Air Force budget, and the service is moving forward in virtually all areas where it needs to. He cited $26 billion focused on Kendall’s Operational Imperatives. The remainder of the $185.1 billion USAF “blue” budget—meaning what’s left after Space Force and ‘pass through’ funds are subtracted—is focused balancing the “fight tonight” readiness needs of the service versus “what we need for the long term,” Brown said.

Asked what Congress can do in terms of adding funds or emphasis, Brown said what USAF needs most is “a budget on time.”

Bridge Tanker

Addressing the Air Force’s recent decision to abandon its KC-X, Y, and Z plan to recapitalize the tanker fleet, Brown said the move was due to the fact that “the threat is completely different now” than when that plan was crafted more than 10 years ago.

“We will … shorten the bridge tanker” plan which was the KC-Y, and move as rapidly as possible toward what used to be the KC-Z, now known as the Next-Generation Air refueling System (NGAS), Brown said. The old method of relying on derivatives of commercial aircraft such as airliners and freighters for tankers won’t work, Brown said. Instead, NGAS will be a stealthy and more survivable aircraft, and the service is trying to move its development “to the left,” he said.

Air Guardsmen Have Plenty of ‘Multi-Capable’ Skills. Now the Air Force Needs to Track Them

Air Guardsmen Have Plenty of ‘Multi-Capable’ Skills. Now the Air Force Needs to Track Them

As the Air Force pushes forward with the concept of multi-capable Airmen, where troops perform roles outside their usual specialty, the top Air National Guardsman says his command is particularly well-suited to respond, since most members of the Air National Guard bring skills from their civilian careers that can help accomplish Air Force missions.

Other military leaders are starting to realize that as well, director of the Air National Guard Lt. Gen. Michael Loh told reporters at the AFA Warfare Symposium, recounting a conversation with U.S. Cyber Command boss Gen. Paul Nakasone.

“‘They’re developing their own skill sets that I don’t train in the military,’” Loh recalled Nakasone telling him about cybersecurity experts in the ANG. “Then when they come back on mission two years later, it’s unbelievable what you all can do.’”

The problem is that while individual units or commanders may be aware of the multi-capable skills their Airmen bring to the fight, the larger force is not—there is no system for tracking those skills throughout the Guard, Loh said.

“At the unit level, they know their people and they actually see it,” Loh said. “At the organizational level, I don’t have the visibility that I would like.”

For example, if Loh needed a temporary program manager, he would have to contact each unit in his command to find out who does program management. It is a cumbersome process, and Loh wants a human resources system to make it less difficult to find qualified Air Guardsmen.

“Eventually if we get the right human resources system, where I can actually start plugging some of these attributes and capabilities in, then we’ll have a much better [system],” he said.

michael loh
U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Loh, director, Air National Guard, laughs while aboard an U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk assigned to 1st Battalion, 183rd Aviation Regiment, Idaho National Guard, at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Aug. 20, 2022. U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Becky Vanshur.

Under the current system, Air Guardsmen volunteer their unique skills on an ad hoc basis. Loh recalled during a recent visit to western Africa how one Guard member who is an electrical engineer in his civilian job stepped up to fix a transformer problem on his base.

At the same location, a security forces Airman who was born in Côte d’Ivoire volunteered for air advisor training and used his skills as a civilian police officer to build partnerships with local militaries in their own language.

Those kinds of unique skills may play a vital role in a possible conflict with China. The Air Force has doubled down on the operational concept of Agile Combat Employment, where U.S. and allied air bases are dispersed throughout the Indo-Pacific in a way that makes it more difficult for China to target those bases with ballistic missiles. ACE hinges on the use of small air bases that have much less infrastructure and personnel than the established ones Airmen have become accustomed to. That emphasis on a light footprint requires Airmen to perform more tasks with fewer people, hence the concept of multi-capable Airmen.

“Every unit is doing something for Agile Combat Employment,” Loh said. “How do I take a small team and deliver combat airpower?”

Commanders may be able to build those small teams more quickly if they have a system for tracking the skills of Airmen in greater detail. 

“I’m trying to get the infrastructures,” said Loh, who mentioned the Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System as a possible starting point. “There are some capabilities there. Can we actually add some of these other identifiers and make it easy for us to find those individuals?”

The general said it was not an issue of resources or authority to establish such an infrastructure, just a matter of how to go about executing it. He imagined either building a new system like one similar to LinkedIn, where users can list specific skills, or bolting similar capabilities onto an existing system.

Loh said the National Guard is sometimes called “the most flexible force”—and a better talent tracking system might help commanders take full advantage of that flexibility.

Air Force Promotes Most New Senior Master Sergeants Since 2012

Air Force Promotes Most New Senior Master Sergeants Since 2012

The Air Force selected than 1,629 master sergeants for promotion to senior master sergeant—the most new E-8s in a single cycle in 11 years. 

All told, 10.18 percent of 16,031 eligible tech sergeants made the grade, the Air Force Personnel Center announced—the highest promotion rate for E-7s in four years. Average time in grade was 4.4 years, and average time in service was 17.88 years.  

Not since 2012, when more than 1,700 master sergeants were selected, have so many made the cut in a single year. Indeed, this was the first time since 2019 that the promotion rate broke double digits. 

High retention and enlisted grade structure reviews depressed promotions last year to the lowest rates in years, and leaders have warned rates could stay low for years, as the Air Force rebalances the noncommissioned officer corps, especially staff, tech, and master sergeant.  

But the squeeze seems to be easing at senior master sergeant, where promotions increased slightly in 2022 after two years of rates below 8 percent. In the past dozen years, the promotion rate has topped 10 percent seven times. 

The full list of master sergeants selected for promotion in 2023 is available here

Air Force E-8 Promotion Statistics

YearSelectedEligiblePromotion Rate
20231,62916,03110.16%
20221,44317,4198.28%
20211,19417,1076.98%
20201,18415,5447.62%
20191,43413,31610.77%
20181,54913,05411.87%
20171,39111,78811.80%
20161,46711,90412.32%
20151,25714,3628.75%
201499914,8236.74%
20131,36712,83410.65%
20121,70212,35113.78%
20111,27412,37810.29%
20101,26913,7419.24%
Deliveries of New F-35s Resume After Three Months

Deliveries of New F-35s Resume After Three Months

Lockheed Martin has resumed delivering F-35s to the U.S. government, the Joint Program Office announced March 14, three months to the day after they were halted in the wake of a Dec. 14, 2022 F-35B crash. The first aircraft delivered was an F-35A headed for Air Force duty.  

The delivery comes eight days after Lockheed was cleared to resume F-35 flight operations, following Pratt & Whitney’s development of a technical fix to address harmonic resonance issues with its F135 engines, discovered in the aftermath of the December crash.

The JPO has not said how many aircraft or engines were affected by the issue, but Lockheed and Pratt have said changes were made in production to prevent the problem. A fleetwide technical order was issued for all F-35s to be inspected and have a correction applied. Pratt resumed F135 engine deliveries March 2.

Pratt has asserted that the harmonic resonance issue is a well-understood phenomenon and only manifested after more than 600,000 flight hours on the F135 fleet.  

Naval Air Systems Command’s investigation into the root cause of the December crash is not yet complete. Neither NAVAIR nor the JPO have indicated that the harmonic resonance issue was the cause of the accident, which occurred when the F-35B, in vertical flight mode, nosed down into Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, runway from an altitude of less than 50 feet.  

“The Defense Contract Management Agency and the F-35 Joint Program Office resumed acceptance … of F-35 aircraft today from Lockheed Martin and are currently working with U.S. services, partner nations, and foreign military sales customers on the movement of aircraft to their operational units,” the JPO said in a press release.

“Prior to acceptance, the aircraft passed extensive technical and flight worthy checks ensuring their readiness for operational use,” the JPO said.

Lockheed Martin had completed but not delivered 26 aircraft during the time the delivery hold was in place. Those aircraft have been cleared to fly since March 6, and have been going through the DD250 process, which entails a number of flight test checks to ensure the aircraft are safe to fly and to document any deficiencies.  

The company was not able to say how long it will take to clear the backlog of deliveries.

“Resuming acceptance and flight operations was the culmination of two and a half months of exceptionally strong partnerships with the JPO and industry teams,” said Col. Joe Wimmer, Commander of DCMA’s Lockheed Martin Fort Worth operations, in a statement released by the JPO.

“That work allowed us to confidently resume operations safely, and deliver quality jets to our warfighter customers,” he said.

Lt. Gen. Michael J. Schmidt, F-35 Program Executive Officer, said the government-industry F-35 team “worked tirelessly on this effort and their work demonstrates true professionalism and a devotion to accomplish complex missions with stringent ingenuity.”

Meet The Airmen Trained To Repair Massive Aircraft Battle Damage In The Next Big Fight

Meet The Airmen Trained To Repair Massive Aircraft Battle Damage In The Next Big Fight

AURORA, Colo.—At the AFA Warfare Symposium on March 7, the head of Air Force Materiel Command, Gen. Duke Richardson, was asked how the Air Force would respond if it were “punched in the face” during a conflict with a peer adversary like China. The general said his troops had a range of tools to fix the damage of such a punch, including rapid airfield repair and supply surges.

But one of the most important tools Richardson mentioned is a group of maintenance experts who can be dispatched around the world to perform heavy-duty repairs on aircraft that have sustained massive battle damage. 

There are only about 150 of them in the entire Air Force, but Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) Airmen could mean the difference between victory or defeat in a future conflict.

“We’ve got a batch of these ninjas that are ready to go off” and repair aircraft, Richardson said. “So if we get punched in the face, we will be ready to turn that team and move them out smartly.”

ABDR Airmen are masters of their trade. Many of them have already achieved 7-level, also known as “craftsman,” in their specific maintenance field before applying for a spot in the ABDR course. 

“They are multi-capable Airmen already,” said Richardson, himself a former enlisted avionics technician. “They’re crew chiefs, they’re fuels experts, they’re sheet metal, they’re [electrical and environmental], all these different career fields.”

abdr
Avionics technician Staff Sgt. Lance Mosley, 309th Aircraft Maintenance Group Expeditionary Depot Maintnenance, installs a sheet metal repair during an exercise at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, May 21, 2019. U.S. Air Force photo by R. Nial Bradshaw

‘Light and lethal’

The training course to become an ABDR Airman takes place at one of Air Force Materiel Command’s three air logistics complexes across the country: one at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., one at Robins Air Force Base, Ga., and the third at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Each of these complexes perform “depot-level” maintenance and repair on aircraft—the kind of work that can’t be performed at an aircraft’s operational location.

Air Force depots have resurrected a large number of partially-destroyed aircraft over the years. But what happens in the middle of a conflict, when planners may not be able to send a damaged aircraft from Guam or Okinawa all the way back to Utah or Georgia? The answer: Bring the depot to the area of operations. ABDR Airmen stand ready to ship out to a conflict zone at a moment’s notice in order to patch up aircraft. They also pre-position ‘war wagons:’ two pallet positions’ worth of tools and raw materials at far-flung air bases to respond even more quickly to a crisis.

“We try to pre-stage as much as we can so whenever an incident does happen we have those materials on hand, we just need to get our bodies there to install the repairs,” Master Sgt. Kyle Sommerfeldt, one of three ABDR Airmen who Richardson highlighted March 7, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Sommerfeldt said the war wagon is a retrofitted ammunition trailer from the 1970s that now has toolboxes mounted onto it for storing tools and raw materials, making it essentially “just a rolling toolbox,” he said. The Air Force can pre-position them or move them easily aboard a cargo aircraft.

“We like to use the term ‘light and lethal,’” said Tech Sgt. William Kesler, another of the three ABDR Airmen. “Gen. Richardson mentioned us being like a ninja: the lighter we are, the better equipped we are to move quickly throughout the theater and get these aircraft back in the fight.”

abdr
Tech. Sgt. David Miller, 402nd Expeditionary Depot Maintenance Flight C-130 crew chief, explains the repair process on a C-130 aircraft utility hydraulic pump return line at the Warrior Air Base Training Area at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, Dec. 16, 2021. U.S. Air Force photo by Joseph Mather.

Tools and materials are not the only things ABDR Airmen bring with them. They also travel with a commissioned aircraft structures engineer—typically a lieutenant or a captain—who can plan out and authorize depot-level repairs in the field.

“As you can imagine, with battle damage repair it’s hard to write exactly what it’s going to look like, so a lot of the times there’s no repair data for it,” Sommerfeldt said. “So you need an actual engineer to say, ‘Here’s what we need to do to fix this kind of damage.’”

That kind of authority helps ABDR crews be prepared for anything, even an A-10 Thunderbolt II coming in with a wing shot off. 

“That’s exactly what we’re in there for,” Kesler said. “For those incidents just like that.”

‘Be there in theater’

The Air Force formed ABDR teams after the Vietnam War, where “rapid area maintenance teams” repaired or modified more than 1,000 aircraft under conditions ranging “from normal industrial facilities to flight lines at operating bases under direct enemy fire,” Air Force Maj. Darrell Holcomb wrotein a 1994 paper on the ABDR program.

Holcomb pointed out it is far more likely for an aircraft to be damaged in a conflict rather than completely destroyed, according to historical data. As an example, he noted that as many as 70 of the 144 A-10s deployed to the Gulf War were damaged, but only five were destroyed. Likewise, the damage to destroyed ratio for the F-4 Phantom II fighter in Vietnam was about four to one, Holcomb said. With such ratios, it helps to have highly-mobile, highly-skilled teams of experts who can get damaged aircraft back in the air. 

“Our overall goal is to be there in theater and get the most expeditious repair on this thing,” said Sommerfeldt. “Now it can go back and fly an operational mission instead of us losing aircraft, attriting out of the fight.”

The Vietnam-era RAM teams were composed mostly of civilians, and while they helped repair many aircraft, the repair times for many incidents of combat damage were still “painfully long,” Holcomb wrote. While the Air Force repaired 59 percent of the aircraft damaged in Vietnam in 48 hours or less, the Israeli Air Force repaired about 72 percent of their combat damaged aircraft in 24 hours or less during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

The U.S. Air Force wanted to fix its aircraft faster, and the development of the A-10, an aircraft designed to take a beating and keep fighting, also helped spur the creation of the first ABDR teams in the 1980s. Since then, ABDR teams have helped keep U.S. aircraft running in combat theaters around the world.

ABDR teams returned about 30 aircraft to service during the Gulf War, and in Afghanistan an ABDR team patched up a C-130 that had 85 holes in its fuselage from enemy mortar fire. A C-5 Galaxy’s cargo door had also been damaged, “so the team split in half to accomplish both repairs at the same time,” Master Sgt. Gian Santos, flight chief for the 402nd Expeditionary Depot Maintenance Flight at Robins Air Force Base, said in a 2022 press release.

“That is how versatile the ABDR teams are and how important this mission is to the Air Force,” Santos said.

ABDR
Tech. Sgt. Harvey, 309th Expeditionary Depot Maintenance avionics technician, performs a fiber optic fusion splice repair on an F-35A Lightning II at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, Sept. 12, 2019. U.S. Air Force photo by R. Nial Bradshaw.

Peacetime Pros

While ABDR teams can perform repairs in the field during a conflict, during peacetime they work in air logistics complexes just like any other depot-level maintainer. Sommerfeldt said the 150 or so ABDR Airmen save the Department of Defense more than $10 million and tens of thousands of man-hours a year, not to mention delivering about 150 aircraft a year back to field-level commanders.

With their years of experience in the aircraft repair business, ABDR Airmen often think of innovative ways to make the repair process more efficient. At the Department of Defense Maintenance Symposium last year, a group of ABDR Airmen won the People’s Choice Award for the DOD Maintenance Innovation Challenge, for their work with the Air Force Research Laboratory to dramatically reduce the amount of time needed to repair fiber optic cables aboard Air Force aircraft.

“Any time where the whole joint force is kind of voting on it and you win something at the DOD level, that was pretty special,” said Sommerfeldt.

Wherever the next conflict unfolds, the ABDR crews can use their expertise to keep Air Force jets and planes running.

“We have a chip on our shoulder, like no matter what’s broken on an aircraft, we can fix it,” Sommerfeldt said. “Nose to tail, no matter how big or how small. Like how Gen. Richardson put it: What happens if we get punched in the face? We have a counter-punch when it comes to the war of attrition. We’re the counter-punch—providing aircraft availability.”

Watch, Read: Gen. B. Chance Saltzman on ‘Guardians in the Fight’

Watch, Read: Gen. B. Chance Saltzman on ‘Guardians in the Fight’

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman delivered a keynote address on “Guardians in the Fight,” laying out his theory of success for the Space Force called “Competitive Endurance” at the AFA Warfare Symposium, March 7, 2023. Watch the video or read the transcript below.

Voiceover:

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back. Please join me in welcoming the President & CEO of your Air & Space Forces Association, Lieutenant General Bruce “Orville” Wright.

Lt. Gen. Bruce “Orville” Wright (Ret.):

Well, this is pretty awesome, I think you would agree. It’s only 10 o’clock in the morning and the Chinese are even more defensive, so God bless you guys. So last spring, our association, your longstanding 76-year-old AFA got a new name, the Air and Space Forces Association. And Space is now our middle name.

The delta is half of our logo. Guardians are in the same fight as our Airmen. We are one team and one fight at the leading edge of the kill web. And just as I had the privilege of introducing Chief Brown to speak on the importance of our Airmen, it is now a humbling privilege to introduce the Chief of Space Operations to speak about our Guardians and their families.

General Chance ‘Salty’ Saltzman is the second CSO in Space Force history. He launched in November, and though it has only been a few short months, Salty is at orbital velocity in shaping strategic objectives for a nation’s younger force. And let me underline, he is a war fighter. And so it is with great honor that I present to you your Chief of Space Operations, General ‘Salty’ Saltzman.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman:

Thank you. Wow. Bright lights, lots of people. This is exciting. It’s a real honor to be here. What an amazing crowd. What an amazing venue. Thanks to Orville, Bernie, Doug, all the AFA team, volunteers, members for this opportunity to speak about the Space Force. Secretary Kendall, thanks for your vision, your leadership, and for setting the right tone for us to get after these critical missions against our threat.

CQ Brown, thanks for being a great wingman. Thanks for showing me what being a leader and a service chief looks like. Wow. How about those senior leader keynotes? Pretty amazing, huh? Pretty. Let’s give it up. Those were … Watching those senior keynote speeches being delivered got me thinking about Ricky Bobby. If you ain’t first, you’re last. Very impressive.

So what about this? Next year we’ll have another Jeopardy clip. The answer will be Salty Saltzman. The question will be, who doesn’t want to follow CQ Brown presentation? That’s only halfway a joke. I’m telling you. Now it’s my turn to take you back in history a little bit.

In July of 1997, I was an Air Force intern in the Pentagon assigned to the Air Staff history office. It was an exciting time to be in the office because as of September that year, we were marking the 50th anniversary of the US Air Force. So there was quite a bit of demand for history in the form of research for senior leader speeches, development of handouts for air shows and other events.

And I was blessed at the time to be working under Dr. Dan Mortenson, who had been with the Air Staff history office longer than anyone could recollect. He was an amazing historian, storyteller and very generous with his time. Now, at that time, I’d only been in the Air Force for about five years, mostly performing ICBM operations.

I joined the Air Force through ROTC as a way to pay for college, and I didn’t really come from a family with extensive military background. All that is to say I really didn’t know that much about the Air Force and much less about its history. Dr. Dan set out to fix this. Day after day he would tell stories to me about historic leaders, aircraft, missions of the Air Force, seemed like he knew everything.

In fact, his detail left me to believe that in many instances he may have actually been there and heard the accounts firsthand from witnesses. Almost every night he would pull a book from our shelves and tell me to read it, or at least a chapter that captured the key insights and details. And I remember him telling me that to understand how the Air Force works, you have to understand the early days, the formative years of flight.

You had to understand what the original men and women went through before they were the senior officers making the key decisions. He told me stories, made me read about Ira Aker, Pete Cassada, Loris Norstad, names I’d never heard before. He told me about the Pan-American flights, the question mark flight, Operation BOLO, missions I’d never heard of.

He made me read “Global Mission,” Hap Arnold’s autobiographical account of the development of airpower. I remember this in particular because he gave the book on a Friday and said he wanted to talk about it on Monday. So I spent a weekend slogging through Hap’s 386 pages of questionable prose with mind-numbing details on the early days of aviation.

On Monday, Dr. Dan asked me what I thought, and as I paused to organize my thoughts, he said, “Hard to read, huh?” He said,” Hap was a better pilot than a writer,” and I agreed, but as we talked about it, the storyline became clear. The early days of military aviation, 1920s and ’30s was a time of experimentation searching. The pilots were experimenting with new technology and its military applications, but more importantly, they were searching for a theory of success.

How should airpower be used? What unique contribution could it make to fighting and winning wars? What was different about these weapons and the domain of the air that required dedicated training, education, expertise? Now the circumstances and timelines of spacepower development are not exactly the same as airpower.

I personally have been integrating space capabilities into the joint fight for well over 20 years, and the U.S. has been leveraging space capabilities for many decades more. However, the emergence of space as a contested domain of war itself is a relatively new phenomenon. The experimentation and search for military applications from a contested domain is a much younger proposition and more clearly connect to the air power efforts of the ’20s and ’30s.

When I listen to CQ Brown talk about air power, I hear an Airman that has not only benefited from his 30 plus years of training, education, experiences, but I hear the results of a service that for 75 years in counting, has determined what air powers does and how it does it, the value it brings to the force. It is through this lens and as an evolution of those lessons that I believe the U.S. Space Force must propose, evaluate, and evolve its own theory of success for contesting the space domain and ensure the U.S. can continue to enjoy the advantages we have secured from superiority on the ultimate high ground.

So in memory of Dr. Dan, a great mentor and friend to whom I am forever grateful, I would like to describe a theory of success for the Space Force. This theory is not an answer to the question, but rather a proposal, a point of departure to start the debate and discussions regarding how the Space f\Force accomplishes its primary mission and best contributes to the joint team.

Now before the theory, I think it’s important to set the scene by describing the evolution of the space domain. For over 50 years, the U.S. has built the world’s most capable force enhancing globally integrated space capabilities on the planet with unrivaled abilities to access and exploit the space domain. And this includes world-class satellite communications, missile warning sensors, position, navigation, and timing, and other capabilities that have assured the U.S. military is the envy of the world and the finest combat force in history.

We were so successful in fact that our competitors watched, they plotted and they invested in capabilities to blunt our advantages in space. The rise of these threats against on orbit systems and increasingly threats to the joint force itself from adversary satellites drove us to the realization that we must be able to contest and when necessary control the space domain.

Why? Because these threats are not just academic discussions any longer. From the Chinese anti-satellite system test in 2007 to the Russian test in November of 2021, these irresponsible weapons tests provide a worrisome glimpse of what conflict in the space domain may entail with the potential for unrestrained military force, creating catastrophic levels of debris that could render wide swaths of valuable orbits useless, limiting access to space capabilities that provide prosperity and security for the United States and the world.

We’ve seen a payload launched into orbit, fly around the world, and then re-enter the atmosphere gliding and maneuvering at hypersonic speeds to its target. We’ve seen a demonstration of a satellite grabbed by another satellite’s robotic arm and pulled out of its mission orbit, and it doesn’t stop at tests. We’ve seen cyber attacks knocking out thousands of space-based internet terminals, widespread attempts at satellite communications, and GPS jamming.

The rise of these threats creates the primary mission of the U.S. Space Force to protect our capabilities and defend the joint force from space enabled attack. The United States established the Space Force to protect our nation’s interest in space. Our formative purpose as Guardians is to protect and to protect, we must be able to contest and control the space domain or in military terms, to achieve space superiority.

Contesting and controlling a domain is a complex endeavor, which is why the Department of Defense relies on its military services to dedicate themselves to the purpose. In the same way we need the Air Force to gain and maintain air superiority, the joint force needs its space force dedicated to gaining and maintaining space superiority.

A military service dedicated to a domain gives our joint force the tools, the depth and institutional experience specialized for domain control. In space, this is a critical prerequisite to follow on space operations needed for joint force effectiveness. The service does this by bringing the full weight of its resources and authorities to focus on meeting the challenges of domain control.

In other words, it means your Space Force is focused on developing experts in the space domain, it’s operational concepts and tactics, and finally building domain focused partnerships with other services, government agencies, industry like-minded nations among those partners. So we know what we need to do and why we need to do it. The next question is how? And here again, I think there are lessons to be learned from the airpower theorists during the interwar period.

During the 1920s and ’30s, the Air Core Tactical School-educated cadre of air-minded professionals who developed a theory of success for our service, The Industrial Web Theory. That theory was used to inform operational concepts like high altitude precision daylight bombing. This concept led to mission requirements like long-range aircraft with accurate navigation, self-protection, which informed program acquisitions like the Northern bomb site, the B-17, the B-24, which were organized into forces like Eighth Air Force, which developed tactics like the combat box and interlocking fires.

Now as we know, combat is a cruel teacher and there are intense lessons to learn and the services must learn and adapt to them. At the beginning of World War II, there was a belief that due to their tactics, the bomber would always get through. But Airmen learned in blood that these tactics were not sufficient, which resulted in a shift in the strategy with a new operational objectives to establish air superiority, which started the theory and acquisition cycle again, resulted in P-51s conducting fighter sweeps over Berlin by 1944.

Now I admit this is an overly simplistic summary of the airpower evolution of World War II, but the logic is sound. Without a theory, the service cannot effectively and efficiently make all the necessary decisions, perform the key activities that must be accomplished in order to accomplish the mission. In short, a theory of success provides an answer to the question of how to get the mission done.

For the U.S. Space Force, the theory of success is necessary in order to orchestrate our efforts in pursuit of space superiority. A theory of success provides Guardians with shared purpose, a common understanding of our overall strategy towards the objective. It defines our organizing principles, it clarifies the assumptions we’re making. It helps identify the equipment we need to buy and the training Guardians will need to be effective.

A theory of success gives you something to point to, a guiding light, if you will. It says this is what matters most for the mission we are charged to perform. So this brings me back to the success theory for United States Space Force. As Secretary Kendall alluded to, this is a working theory which I’ve tentatively titled Competitive Endurance.

The title is intended to capture the notion that we are in a state of competition with our pacing challenge and that remaining in that state is preferable to the alternative states of crisis or conflict. Furthermore, we must have the endurance to maintain this state recognizing fully that managing the stability will require an active process of campaigning.

I intend Competitive Endurance to be a starting point for a dialogue, I believe is critical, absolutely critical to the success of our young service. The goal of the theory of success is to maximize the Space Force’s contribution to integrated deterrence and deter a crisis or conflict from extending into space, but if necessary, allow the joint force to achieve space superiority while also maintaining the safety, security, and long-term sustainability of the space domain.

The approach has three core tenants. Tenant one states we must be able to avoid operational surprise. Avoiding operational surprise in space requires comprehensive and actionable space domain awareness. And by that I mean the ability to make sure we understand what’s happening in space, but also identify behaviors that become irresponsible or even hostile.

And lastly, our ability to avoid operational surprise is an imperative with regards to establishing space superiority. In essence, space forces must be able to detect and preempt any shifts in the operational environment that could compromise the ability of the joint force to achieve space superiority. This requires an enhanced level of space domain awareness. So we are investing heavily in new sensors. We are investing in advanced data management decision support tools.

You will clearly see this tied to the department’s operational imperatives for ABMS and JADC2. We are exploring commercial capabilities to augment this mission in areas and partnerships with allies to expand our information sharing. The second tenant for Competitive Endurance states the U.S. Space Force must deny first-mover advantage in space.

The visibility, predictability, and reconstitution timelines associated with current military space architectures favor the actor that goes on the offensive first. This is an unstable condition that works against deterring attacks on space assets. We can’t have that. Therefore, the Space Force must shift this balance by making an attack on satellites impractical, even self-defeating, discouraging an adversary from taking such actions in the first place.

One way to do this is by investing in resilient space order of battle, as Secretary Kendall has outlined in operational imperative number one. Consistent with the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on resilience, the Space Force is investing heavily in shifting to more resilient space architectures. Our emerging force designs incorporate attributes like disaggregation, distribution, diversification and protection, maneuverability and proliferation.

Architectures with these present targeting problems for an adversary, they recover more quickly from an attack and make mission disruption far tougher to achieve. All of this creates deterrence. If an adversary has little chance of denying space missions through attack, the incentive to attack at all much less first will be reduced. Let me offer a couple of vignettes to drive this point home.

Without resiliency in the architecture jamming of a few geosynchronous communication satellites could have an outsize of impact. If space-based communications is spread across hundreds of satellites in different orbits, jamming efforts become much tougher, non-mission impacting and therefore impractical. When our missile warning constellation goes from a few satellites to dozens and operates in several different orbits, the overwhelming force that would be required to disrupt the mission would prove to be so escalatory and self-defeating that attack itself would be far less likely.

In summary, when we complicate targeting, we get resiliency and the resiliency raises a threshold for attack, which equates to deterrence. Remove the first mover advantage and the resulting stability increases deterrence. The final tenant for competitive endurance is that space forces must prepare to achieve space superiority via responsible counter-space campaigning. There are several elements of this.

First, we must continue to lead the effort in being responsible in space as Secretary of Defense did with the publishing of the DOD’s tenants of responsible behavior. We must encourage like-minded nations to support these tenants and join us in confronting nations that choose to act in irresponsible ways in space. The Space Force is actively working with international allies and partners to expand the coalition of nations who share our goal of responsible use of space.

Secondly, competitive endurance recognizes that counter-space activities may be necessary to prevent adversaries from leveraging space enabled targeting to attack our forces. But we will balance our counter-space efforts with our need to maintain stability and sustainability of the orbits we are required to use.

Space Force must preserve U.S. advantages by campaigning through competition without incentivizing rivals to escalate to destructive military activities in space. The Space Force is investing in capabilities that protect our joint force from space enabled targeting while understanding that we cannot have a Pyrrhic victory in this domain.

In other words, efforts to control the domain cannot inflict such a devastating toll on the domain itself that our orbits become unusable for follow on operations. And this is not something the other domains have to worry as much about, but it’s just one of the unique aspects that Guardians will have to understand in depth. Let me show you another.

Now this picture is pretty self-explanatory. 24 February, commercial airlines staying away from Ukraine. Now as a general rule during active hostilities, noncombatants take great efforts to avoid war zones. And this holds true in most other domains, contested airspace, sea lanes, the streets of a city under siege. Our domain’s a little different. In space you cannot easily leave the war zone.

There’s no easy way to physically separate civil, commercial, military satellites from one another because the laws that govern orbits are immutable. These laws also dictate that the domain is not self-healing, a kinetic strike that generates debris resulting in long-lasting hazards that could perpetuate for hundreds of years or even longer.

Understanding orbital mechanics and the laws that govern space operations is just one example that shows the need for well-trained, educated personnel in our new dedicated military service. The Space Force is dedicated to protecting us interest in space and defending the joint force from space enabled attack.

A theory of success points us in a direction, orients us to ensure stability and competition, whether our adversaries is the preferred state relative to crisis or conflict, and taking every action to deter crisis or conflict while maintaining the safety, security, and sustainability of the space domain is our prime directive. To further organize and focus space force activities and investments, I’ve set three main lines of efforts going forward.

The first LOE, implementing competitive endurance will require the space force to field combat ready forces. This focuses on building resilient, ready, combat credible capabilities. Technology makes space operations possible, but the Space Force does not present technology systems or even capabilities to the joint force. We present space forces.

This is a small but important distinction. Our space systems may be capable and resilient, but they will only be operationally effective if its personnel has the experience, the sustainment for the mission. We must ensure we have the equipment and the training, expertise, sustainability, so that our forces are prepared to conduct prompt and enduring space operations against an adversary.

Now, train like you fight, that’s a time tested requirement for combat credible forces. Therefore, Guardians need to be able to practice their tactics on a training range or in an emulated environment with a digital twin of their weapon system. To this end, the Space Force is investing in an operational test and training infrastructure, high fidelity simulators, virtual environments, war games, and realistic exercises.

This brings me to LOE number two, amplifying the Guardian spirit. It is our Guardians and their spirit that makes the Space Force an indispensable component of the joint force. Now, to me, Guardian spirit is a collective representation of what it means to be a member of the Space Force. It describes the most positive attributes of our workforce and distinguishes us as a separate service.

If we can amplify the Guardian spirit, we will benefit from the critical thinking, creativity, determination, patriotism of our force. Individuals who embody the Guardian spirit will thrive in the space force. Those without it will struggle. Like all ethereal ideals, the Guardian spirit is easy to recognize yet difficult to explain and define. At a minimum, I think those who exhibit the Guardian spirit share three core traits. They are principled public servants and understand how meaningful public service is to our nation.

Selfless public service is the foundation of our organization and the source of the trust the American people place in the U.S. military. Additionally, these Guardians are space minded war fighters committed to defending the nation, protecting its interests and defeating its enemies. And lastly, they are bold and collaborative problem solvers.

They engage with, analyze, debate new ideas, perpetually challenging the status quo. Our Guardian talent is our most important operational advantage and empowering them will lead to our success. It is Guardians who will take the theory of competitive endurance and give it structure, define the next level of objectives, tasks, activities, and determine its measures of performance and effectiveness.

And that said, I know that even with our talented Guardians, we can’t go it alone, which leads me to my third line of effort. Partnering to win is about further developing partnerships, alliances, coalitions as a core strength of the United States. Our competitors do not have anything close to it. Spacepower is a collaborative endeavor, and this collaboration is essential in the execution of the national defense strategy elements of integrated deterrence and building enduring strategic advantage.

Even with superlative talent and exceptional capabilities, the Space Force will not succeed without robust joint coalition, international, interagency, academic, and commercial partnerships. Partnerships are part of our very core structure as a service. I greatly appreciate the leadership of Secretary Kendall and General Brown. One team, one fight is a critical mantra for the Space Force because we will continue to rely on the Air Force for many important infrastructure and sustainment functions.

In concert with the National Defense Strategy, we must continue to cultivate partnerships that build enduring strategic advantages. This means building mutually beneficial partnerships that expand the capacity, capability, and resiliency of our space forces. This makes our coalition stronger, creates global stability and deters aggression. One key activity that we are undertaking in the establishment of Space Force is the establishment of Space Force service components.

By integrating directly with our allies and partners in their regions, we have an opportunity to work together on a daily basis, building trust, sharing information, creating a better understanding of our mutual strengths and challenges. Last year, we established components in Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Central Command.

We are working to establish a component in European Command and we’ll follow that in other combatant commands soon. As I close here, just let me say that for over the past 50 plus years, Guardians and Airmen before us have built the world’s most capable globally integrated space force on this planet.

Their charge included the words, support, deliver, enhance, enable, integrate. We will continue that legacy, but we will evolve to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. Guardians in the fight will have to add, compete, protect, defend, deter, and defeat to our lexicon. It’s my job as the CSO to charter a course that gives Guardians the tools they need to be successful.

We are investing to cover our operational imperatives. We are investing to support the National Defense Strategy and we are investing to ensure the Space Force has the systems, people, and processes to implement our theory of success. As I close, I want to reiterate, this is a working theory called competitive endurance. It’s not policy or doctrine, but rather an operational hypothesis we must continuously evaluate.

My ideas on this topic are a point of departure. As our understanding of the operational environment matures, the assumptions and principles that guide our action must evolve as well. My final comment is a challenge to all Guardians, mission partners, other stakeholders, think deeply and critically about what I’ve proposed here. Challenge the assumptions, make your own assertions, recommendations, test your ideas, share those ideas broadly.

The journey we are on must evolve our thinking and our capabilities. It is critically important and requires a sense of urgency and we must get it right. I have every confidence you will. Thank you. Sempra supra.

Voiceover:

General Saltzman and General Wright, please remain on stage for the presentation of the Colonel Bradford W. Parkinson United States Space Force Innovation Awards. Will Captain Brandon Hufstetler, please come forward. Captain Hufstetler developed a multiplayer online space electronic warfare virtual simulator that provided space operators a real-time platform to practice space war fighting tactics.

Further, captain Hufstetler’s use of the DevOps paradigm embodied the fail fast mentality that facilitated accelerated adoption across the force. This zero cost virtual solution fills a major training gap and provides flexible, scalable, and operationally relevant hands-on electromagnetic warfare training across the service.

The United States Space Force proudly presents the Colonel Bradford W. Parkinson Innovation Award individual category to Captain Brandon Hufstetler, Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. Will miss Angela Blankish and her team please come forward.

The space rapid capabilities office, ground command, control and communications GC3, team developed a first of its kind approach to contracting and software development by blueprinting a process for supporting on the fly make versus buy decisions and centralized systems integration processes. The team also established a responsive customer feedback process to ensure the changes were modified rapidly to accelerate adoption.

This agile construct drives real speed into the acquisition process, improves first run quality, and delivers capabilities faster, enabling us to maintain technological advantage in space. The United States Space Force proudly presents the Colonel Bradford W. Parkinson Innovation Award team category to the space rapid capabilities office, ground command, control, and communications GC3 team, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

Thank you, General Saltzman and General Wright. Ladies and gentlemen, please remain in your seats. The next session in the Aurora Ballroom, joint war fighting requirements, the forces needed to fight and win will begin in just a moment.