To Deter Attacks in Space, US Needs Resilience—and an ‘Offensive Threat,’ Experts Say

To Deter Attacks in Space, US Needs Resilience—and an ‘Offensive Threat,’ Experts Say

Space Force officials have frequently touted the young service’s need for resilience, calling for more satellites in different orbits to deter an adversary’s attack. 

But in the complex calculus of deterrence, the Pentagon cannot only rely on defensive measures like proliferated architectures, experts and military leaders said April 5 at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Security Forum. The U.S. also needs offensive options, they said.

“The whole idea of proliferation, of disaggregation, is the defensive part of deterrence equation,” said retired Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, the former commander of Air Force Space Command and current explorer chair of the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence. “And history teaches that that’s never enough—witness the Maginot Line. So I think it’s part of a deterrence strategy, but that deterrence strategy also needs to have the offensive threat to signal to the adversary, to deter them from attacking.” 

The Space Force’s offensive capabilities are mostly hidden behind a veil of classification—much to the chagrin of some national security observers. However, Maj. Gen. David N. Miller, director of operations, training, and force development for U.S. Space Command, said that the Pentagon is working to ensure it can respond as necessary. 

“If we can’t fight through that initial salvo or whatever [an adversary’s] demonstration is, and demonstrate some level of resilience—that we’re going to be able to not just take it, but respond, then it’s not credible,” Miller said. “We will take, at the time of our choosing, whatever the response that we think appropriate. But it is not something that we’re sitting on our hands waiting for, and I want to assure Gen. Chilton that we’re getting after it. We are in a transition from a permissive force design to a warfighting force design.” 

The issue of a combat-credible force postured to hold adversaries’ assets at risk is one that Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman has highlighted in both his “Lines of Effort” and his “Competitive Endurance” theory. He noted it again during a keynote address. 

“A resilient force can deter attacks and, when necessary, withstand, fight through, and recover rapidly from them,” Saltzman said. “A ready force has the training, tactics, and operational concepts required to accomplish mission across the spectrum of operations—from competition to high-intensity conflict. A combat-credible force has the demonstrated ability to execute and sustain operations in the face of a determined adversary.” 

In particular, Saltzman has advocated for responsible counterspace operations—the U.S. cannot have a “Pyrrhic victory” in space in which it wreaks damage that endangers its own assets. That marks a dramatic change from years past, said retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute. 

“It wasn’t that long ago that you couldn’t say space and offense in the same sentence together,” Deptula said. 

But tangible offensive capabilities are crucial to convincing adversaries an attack is not worth it, Chilton argued. 

“The adversary has got to doubt that they can effectively take out all the capabilities that our joint force relies to conduct operations,” Chilton said. “They have to doubt that they can achieve that, they have to doubt that they can blind our operational level from a tactical level and cut off their communications. And they must also believe that we have the capability and the will, and it would be best if we could demonstrate that, to hold immediately their space architecture at risk that they depend on to maintain control of their forces.” 

What exactly those capabilities are will likely remain unknown to the public for now. At the AFA Warfare Symposium last month, Saltzman told reporters he is “comfortable” with the Space Force’s current level of public disclosure.

“I think we have the ability to deter and show enough capability through resiliency to disincentivize the attacks,” Saltzman said. “The idea of reveal and conceal—that’s almost a way of saying, ‘If an adversary is not paying attention to you, are they deterred by you?’ You can talk yourself into a lot of circles about, ‘If I don’t know there’s a capability, will that deter me from something?’ That’s not how we need to talk about deterrence in space. I think I can set the conditions that make any attack into space impractical, non-mission-impacting, self-defeating to some degree.”

NATO Air Exercise Will Offer Germany ‘High Value’ Lessons on F-35 Operations, Luftwaffe Boss Says

NATO Air Exercise Will Offer Germany ‘High Value’ Lessons on F-35 Operations, Luftwaffe Boss Says

JOINT BASE ANDREWS, Md.—The head of the Luftwaffe arrived in the U.S. this week to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. Air National Guard and its F-35s before a massive German-led exercise that is to take place in June to underscore the defense of NATO.

“It’s going to be high value,” Chief of the German Air Force Lt. Gen. Ingo Gerhartz said of his military’s opportunity to learn about the fifth-generation fighter during the upcoming Air Defender 23 exercise.

Germany inked a roughly $9 billion deal for 35 F-35s in December 2022. Gerhartz said the Luftwaffe will begin training on F-35s in the United States in 2026 and operating the jets in Germany in 2027.

Arms sales to Europe have spiked since Russia invaded Ukraine last year, and one of the platforms seeing an uptick is the F-35, the multi-role stealth fighter made by Lockheed Martin. Germany, Finland, and Switzerland all signed deals for the jets in 2022.

The F-35 deal will enable the Luftwaffe to replace its aging Tornado fleet. In wartime, German F-35s might even be equipped with U.S. nuclear bombs under NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. 

In the meantime, the Air National Guard will send six F-35s to Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany for the Air Defender exercise, which will help the Germans get a head start in familiarizing themselves with the aircraft. 

All told, around 220 NATO aircraft will participate in the exercise, which will run from June 12-23. The Luftwaffe plans to have around 60 aircraft participate, including fighters and tankers.

Modernizing the German Air Force has been a high priority for Gerhartz, who assumed his command in 2018. Gerhartz has flown F-4s, MiG-29s, Tornados, and Eurofighter Typhoons. During the conflict in Afghanistan, he flew more than 50 ISAF sorties in Tornados. His official biography states that he has worked to foster German-Israeli ties, which included joint flyovers over the Israeli parliament in 2021.

Gerhartz said the upcoming exercise will provide a learning opportunity for his airmen.

“We can, first of all, connect the legacy fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons with the F-35,” Gerhartz said. “Let’s see, okay, what is the challenge of operating the F-35? So we are, right now, on the learning side to see how the F- 35 is integrated.”

Lt. Gen. Michael A. Loh, the director of the Air National Guard, said that the ANG has already been passing on lessons to the Germans. 

Air National Director Lt. Gen. Michael A. Loh and Chief of the German Air Force Lt. Gen. Ingo Gerhartz walk the flightline at Joint Base Andrews, Md. Photo by Chris Gordon/Air & Space Forces Magazine

The first Guard unit to operate the F-35 was the 158th Fighter Wing out of Burlington, Vt. That unit will be the one heading to Germany for the June exercise and was previously deployed to Spangdahlem last spring to bolster NATO’s eastern flank

“When you look at a Guard location, it’s not like a big Active-Duty base,” Loh said. “Same thing when you look at a German base.

“So all the lessons learned: here’s the footprint for the simulators, here’s a footprint for the F-35 and for the shelters, and everything else like that, we’ve shared all that data,” Loh added. 

Gerhartz and Loh toured the Andrews flightline April 5, which was filled with U.S. assets that will be heading to Germany including F-16s, F-15s, A-10s, MQ-9s, C-17s, C-130s, KC-135s, and KC-46s. Two fighters roared overhead before touching down at the base. A few minutes later, a pair of Vermont ANG F-35s taxied and parked in front of the two generals.

“It’s good for us,” Gerhartz said.

Editor’s Note: This article was updated April 11 to clarify Germany’s role in the organization of Air Defender.

It’s Official: The Re-Engined B-52 Will be the B-52J

It’s Official: The Re-Engined B-52 Will be the B-52J

Once they receive their new Rolls Royce F130 engines, B-52Hs will become B-52Js, according to the Air Force’s fiscal 2024 budget documents.

The designation resolves a question that had been debated for several years, as the B-52 undergoes some of the most significant improvements in the H model’s 61-year service life.

“Any B-52H aircraft modified with the new commercial engines and associated subsystems are designated as B-52J,” the Air Force said in justification documents for its 2024 budget request.

The service had been considering various designations for the improved Stratofortress, because in addition to new engines, the B-52 will also be receiving a new radar, as well as new communications and navigation equipment and weapons, among other improvements intended to keep it credible and capable through the 2050s.

Given the number of major changes, Global Strike Command had considered using interim designations—“J” model aircraft would have then become B-52Ks.

One of the improved weapons the B-52 was supposed to get was the hypersonic AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), but in the 2024 budget, the Air Force said it’s moving to “close out” the program after a couple more tests and shift its emphasis to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM).

The B-52 re-engining project name has also evolved from the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) to CERP RVP, for Rapid Virtual Prototyping, the Air Force said in its budget request.

The re-engining effort was launched as a mid-tier acquisition in order to save time and get capability sooner. The program will become a Major Capability Acquisition at the end of the RVP effort, the Air Force said.

The upgrades will also open the door to other changes, USAF noted.

“As B-52 CERP brings additional capability to the B-52, emerging security/certification requirements (nuclear hardening, cyber security, program protection, etc.) will also need to be addressed. Several concurrent aircraft upgrades during the B-52 CERP may necessitate temporary facilities or facility upgrades/ modifications.”

The Air Force is asking for nearly $3 billion in B-52 procurement across the future years defense plan, starting with a modest $65.82 million in 2024 but ramping up to over $1.1 billion each in 2027 and 2028.

Of the overall amount, the Radar Modernization Program alone claims $845.9 million, peaking in ’27 at $271.95 million. Separately—not included in the procurement account—research, development, test, and evaluation associated with the Radar Modernization Program is requested at $371 million, ending in 2026. The RMP procurement funding is to procure 74 radar kits, three training systems kits, and two engineering and manufacturing development kits.

The new radar is a variant of the Raytheon AN/APG-79, an active, electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar used on the Navy’s F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter. It replaces the APG-166, which the Air Force says suffers from severe “vanishing vendor” issues and parts problems that will make the radar “unsupportable” before 2030.

Besides a dramatic improvement in maintainability, the AESA will add significant new capabilities in search, ground mapping, and electronic warfare. The new radar’s physical footprint is also much smaller than the system it replaces, creating growth capacity in the front of the aircraft. The B-52’s nose-mounted electro-optical blisters will be removed and a new radome installed with the new radar.

The re-engining program is funded for $2.56 billion, all in the RDT&E budget, peaking at $650.5 million in 2025. The program seeks to replace the original-equipment Pratt & Whitney TF33 engines with Rolls Royce F130s. The change is expected to eventually pay for itself through 30 percent better fuel efficiency and elimination of engine overhauls, as the F130 will not need an overhaul for the duration of its expected life on the B-52 wing.

“Along with the new engines, CERP will replace associated subsystems, such as engine struts and nacelles, the electrical power generation system, and cockpit displays,” the Air Force said. “The development, production and installation of new engines and related subsystems will replace the legacy equipment on all 76 B-52H aircraft.”

Including monies expended so far, the total cost of the B-52 CERP Middle Tier of Acquisition effort will be $1.32 billion, including RDT&E, the Air Force said.

The Air Force expects B-52Js with both new engines and new radars to be available for operational use before the end of the decade.

SDA’s Tournear ‘Just Not’ Afraid of Satellite Shootdowns. Supply Chain Is the Greater Worry.

SDA’s Tournear ‘Just Not’ Afraid of Satellite Shootdowns. Supply Chain Is the Greater Worry.

As the Space Development Agency celebrates the successful first launch of its planned constellation of low-Earth orbit satellites, director Derek M. Tournear says he’s no longer concerned about China or Russia trying to shoot U.S. satellites down

“I’m not worried about any physical threats to the satellites themselves. I’m just not,” Tournear said April 5 at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Security Forum

By deploying hundreds of satellites in SDA’s new Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, the Space Force is recalculating the economics of space warfare. SDA’s initial batch of PWSA satellites, dubbed Tranche 0, will number just 28. But close on its heals will be Tranche 1 with more than 150 satellites and Tranche 2 with more than 250. Tranche 1 launches are set to begin in the fall of 2024, and Tranche 2 will follow in 2026. 

“We’ll have hundreds and hundreds of these satellites up there,” Tournear said. “It will cost more to shoot down a single satellite than it will cost to build that single satellite. We just completely changed that value equation.” 

Replacing a space architecture built of massively expensive bespoke satellites with one assembled from numerous relatively cheap satellites, SDA and Tournear aim to convince adversaries that the math is no longer in their favor, rendering essentially useless China’s and Russia’s direct-ascent weapons. In theory, at least, such strikes effectively become as great a threat to the perpetrator’s satellites because of the debris that they would generate as to the U.S. satellites they might seek to shoot down.  

Cost 

For the U.S. strategy to work, SDA must hold down satellite and launch costs while driving increased performance. Tournear said SDA aims for a per-satellite cost under $15 million. 

“I’m counting on internal investments in industry to help push this forward,” Tournear said. “My goal is just like the cell phone model—we will keep the price of the satellites to the government essentially flat. Just like your cell phone has a certain fixed price … But the capabilities will continue to advance. So for that same price, every tranche will give you more and more capabilities for the same price. That’s kind of the model, just like the cell phone. Basically, the price is flat, but each new model has more and more capabilities.” 

Numbers 

The value equation also depends on SDA continuing to put hundreds of active satellites into orbit. Its first Tranche 0 launch this past weekend is a start, but Tournear aims to develop subsequent generations in parallel, similar to the way commercial technology products are developed. He’s already looking to Tranche 1 and Tranche 2, even before he completes Traunche 0.  

Tranche 1 contracts for 126 data transport satellites and 35 missile tracking satellites are already signed, as are orders for 12 satellites in the Tranche 1 Demonstration and Experimentation System. Tournear confirmed that Tranche 1 launches are slated to start in September 2024, with monthly launches to follow. 

Expanding on initial projections that Tranche 2 would consist of a 250-satellite Transport Layer and a 50-satellite Tracking Layer, Tournear said April 5 that the Tranche 2 data transport layer will be split three ways:  

  • 100 Alpha satellites, similar to those in the Tranche 1 Transport Layer
  • 72 Beta satellites with ultra-high-frequency and tactical communications payloads 
  • 44 Gamma satellites, carrying “advanced waveform” payloads 

SDA will issue a request for proposals for the Beta satellites “next week,” Tournear said, with RFPs for the Alpha and Gamma satellites to follow in late 2023 or early 2024. 

Tournear was thin on details about the Tranche 2 Tracking Layer, saying requirements are still being developed by SDA’s Warfighter Council. But he suggested it will encompass “on the order of 54” satellites and said an industry solicitation is likely in between the Alpha and Gamma RFPs. 

Threats 

Looking ahead, Tournear said he is confident SDA’s plan will deter physical attacks on U.S. satellites, but he remains concerned by “common mode failures”—problems or threats that could affect the entire constellation. 

“You can’t proliferate your way out of common mode failures,” he said. 

The two threats in particular: cybersecurity and breaches of the supply chain. 

Defense officials have increasingly voiced concerns about cyber vulnerabilities in space, including by means of ground stations which had not previously been seen as lucrative targets. But Tournear said SDA is now taking steps to ensure those architectures are also secure. 

“That’s why we have a lot of protections and constraints in place on our contracts that aren’t typical on what you would call a commercial, commoditized procurement,” Tournear said. “We put some requirements in it.” 

Satellite supply chains are also of concern. Supply chains in general garnered far greater attention as a result of weaknesses exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but also because breaches at the chip or component level are so difficult to, making the supply chain vulnerable to the likes of China.

Tournear said both problems concern him. “One is just your benign supply chain problems—can we really build these satellites this quickly?” Tournear said. “And we’re building up industry, so yes, we can, so we’re kind of keeping down that supply chain risk. The second one is more the nefarious supply chain [issue], and that’s the actual interdiction by a nefarious actor into a supply chain,” he continued. “We actually put a lot of protections in place in our contracts so that we can evaluate and make sure that we have nondestructive testing in place to detect that.” 

Space Force Looks to Build Ties with More Combatant Commands—Like CYBERCOM and SOCOM

Space Force Looks to Build Ties with More Combatant Commands—Like CYBERCOM and SOCOM

Three years after its initial launch, the Space Force is increasing its integration with the joint force by building relationships and standing up components within more and more U.S. combatant commands, top generals said April 5 at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Security Forum.

Already, the service established components under U.S. Central Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and its subcomponent, U.S. Forces Korea, late last year. Now, leaders are working to establish a component within U.S. European Command—and U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Special Operations Command could potentially follow.

Lt. Gen. DeAnna M. Burt, the deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber, and nuclear, said these steps are part of the Space Force’s process of “normalizing” as a service.

“Every service presents service components to combatant commanders in order to present forces, to be part of the planning, and to deal with that service’s very specific mission and business and to talk to those threats,” Burt said in a panel discussion.

When the Space Force has a presence at combatant commands, it allows Guardians “to do security assistance and security operation, and talk space with our coalition and allied partners by being at the table in all of those meetings with the combatant commands in each of the theaters,” Burt said.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman made a similar point in an earlier keynote.

“Strong relationships with combatant commands are critical to our success,” he said. “We will use the service component model to strengthen space integration in all the combatant commands.”

In particular, the Space Force enjoys a “very tight relationship” with both SOCOM and CYBERCOM, Burt said. Those ties are only natural, given how much space, cyber, and special operations depend on each other, suggested Maj. Gen. David N. Miller, director of operations training and force development at U.S. Space Command.

“It’d be a disservice for the Space Force to only talk with the Space Force,” Miller said in a separate panel. “I spend more time with the CYBERCOM and SOCOM J3s [operations than almost any other J3 … and it’s because of the partnerships that are being developed.”

Burt said a Space Force presence at EUCOM is “on the horizon” and that both CYBERCOM and SOCOM were also interested, “so we’re working through the mission analysis of what those look like.”

However, she also cautioned the small Space Force has to be strategic about its growth plan.

“I can’t grow to the point that I can’t execute,” she said. “And so I want to make sure that we have the right resources, we’re getting them the right personnel, we have all the right players in the right places to do the mission.”

Burt likened the task to changing the engine out of a car while driving it. The Space Force “had to keep delivering space capabilities, because the entire joint force and our way of life depends upon it. … Adding these components is now taking us to the next level to deepen that relationship with each of the combatant commands personally and get after their specific problems or challenges in each of their [areas of responsibility].”

Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of CENTCOM, voiced a similar opinion when the Space Force stood up a component there late last year.

“Space underpins every element of warfighting in the CENTCOM region,” he said in a press release at the time. “Today’s ceremony catches us up to the reality of history: since the Cold War, space has ceased to be a sanctuary. It is no longer solely the realm of progress and peace. Space is now a domain of conquest, conflict, and—for us—cooperation.” 

Lockheed Martin Looks to Boost LRASM Production as US Rushes to Buy Anti-Ship Weapons

Lockheed Martin Looks to Boost LRASM Production as US Rushes to Buy Anti-Ship Weapons

Lockheed Martin has opened a second production line to make two of the Pentagon’s most in-demand weapons: the LRASM anti-ship cruise missile and the JASSM-ER air-to-surface variant. 

Wargames have shown the utility of the missiles in countering a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The problem is that the simulations also show that the stocks of AGM-158C LRASM and JASSM-ER from which it is adapted would be quickly expended in a conflict, putting pressure on the services to boost their modest inventories. 

“I think one of the most glaring gaps in our portfolio is anti-ship weapons, especially air-launched ones, and LRASMs are particularly important since it gives you the ability to attack from standoff,” Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.  

“For several decades, we got out of the ship-killing business,” Pettyjohn added. “You actually do have to invest resources in it.”

Department of Defense documents outlining its latest budget request stressed that its goal is to “maximize” its procurement of LRASM. 

Right now, Lockheed Martin is producing north of 500 LRASMs and JASSMs a year for the U.S. military, and the defense giant says it is working to increase its current capacity so that it can produce roughly 1,000 LRASMs and JASSMs per year. To do so, the new Lockheed Martin facility has increased automation and made other improvements compared with the original production line, both of which are located in Troy, Ala.

“We were able to quickly bring the production line up to speed in order to meet the orders we’ve committed to our U.S. military partners,” Dom DeScisciolo, the LRASM business development lead at Lockheed Martin, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The DOD has placed “quite a requirement on Lockheed to increase that production rate substantially,” DeScisciolo said in earlier remarks April 3 at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference in National Harbor, Md.

The Air Force has mapped up an ambitious long-term plan to acquire LRASMs. The Air Force budget calls for buying just 27 of the missiles in fiscal 2024, with the Navy requesting 91. But the Air Force wants a multiyear procurement contract for LRASMs that would stretch to 2028. That would more than quadruple USAF yearly buys for around 380 additional LRASMs.

The U.S. military’s shift to the Pacific is the main reason for the focus on anti-ship weapons. But the lessons from Ukraine also loom large. Kyiv has been bolstered by massive munitions donations from the U.S. and Western allies, straining U.S. supplies. 

“There is no constituency to support munitions during peacetime,” said retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, the dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “I think Ukraine has kind of shaken the dust out of peoples’ eyes.”

But earlier conflicts also showed the need to maintain large munitions stocks. When the U.S. fought ISIS in Operational Inherent Resolve, it used an enormous quantity of precision-guided ordnance. A 2021 RAND report assessed that 115,983 weapons, mostly precision-guided munitions, were released in coalition airstrikes, and led to shortfalls in U.S. stocks of JDAM guided bombs and Hellfire missiles.

LRASMs and JASSMs have many common components and are made on the same production lines. “As the missiles come down the production line some are earmarked as LRASM, some are earmarked as JASSM,” DeScisciolo said. “They’re all sequenced through based on the demand of the customer.”

Lockheed Martin is now exploring using HIMARS mobile-missile launchers to launch LRASMs. The HIMARS launchers have been an enormous asset for Ukraine, which has used them to conduct so-called “shoot and scoot” precision fires against their Russian adversary. 

“The concept of coupling the unique lethality and range of LRASM with the survivability of the combat-proven HIMARS for a ground-launch variant provides a powerful combination deployable in a variety of scenarios, including conventional and asymmetric warfare,” DeScisciolo said. 

The company is also looking at other “next-generation” LRASM capabilities, he added. Lockheed Martin hopes to make LRASMs work with more aircraft too. Right now, the only aircraft that can launch the weapon are Air Force B-1 Lancer bombers and Navy F-18 Super Hornet fighters. But Lockheed Martin and the military are working on integrating LRASMs with the multi-service F-35 Lightning II fighter and the Navy’s P-8 Poseidon.

Deptula and Pettyjohn said that strengthening deterrence against China does not depend on a single missile and that cheaper and more diverse options are also important. LRASMs cost upwards of $3 million per missile, according to budget documents.

“We do need to find ways to buy larger quantities of more affordable weapons,” Pettyjohn said.

B-52s Land on Guam for Latest Bomber Task Force Deployment

B-52s Land on Guam for Latest Bomber Task Force Deployment

The Air Force continues to BUFF up its presence in the Pacific. 

Four B-52 bombers and more than 200 Airmen from Barksdale Air Force Base, La., arrived at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam on March 30 to kick off the service’s latest Bomber Task Force deployment in the Indo-Pacific. 

The aircraft and personnel are part of the 96th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron. While deployed to Andersen, they will participate in training exercises and missions with other services, as well as allies and partners, Pacific Air Forces announced in a release

“The bomber task force, and specifically the B-52s in the Indo-Pacific region, not only allows our crew force to hone their superior technical and weapons system expertise, but also sends an extremely important message,” Lt. Col. Vanessa Wilcox, commander of the 96th Bomb Squadron, said in a statement. “It demonstrates our continued readiness and commitment to our allies in the region to ensure freedom of movement now and in the future, as well as ensures stability in the region.” 

The B-52s’ arrival comes a little less than a month after the end of the last Bomber Task Force rotation at Guam—B-1s and personnel from the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron returned home to Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., on March 5. 

USAF bombers have been active in the Indo-Pacific region since the start of 2023, particularly around the Korean Peninsula as part of the Pentagon’s commitment to expand exercises and cooperation with South Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea, in response to increased missile tests and threats from North Korea. 

B-1s have flown with South Korean fighters four times since the start of February, and B-52s also flew over South Korea with ROK aircraft in early March. 

In addition to the Pacific, B-52s have conducted Bomber Task Force missions in both the Middle East and Europe this year, though in both cases, the bombers were from Minot Air Force Base, N.D. This latest deployment to Guam marks the first BTF for Barksdale aircraft and Airmen in 2023, though the base did send B-52s to Andersen for a quick three-day Bomber Task Force mission in late December. 

A B-52 Stratofortress assigned to a Bomber Task Force from the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, taxis at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Mar. 30, 2023. BTF missions support national security objectives through the speed, flexibility, and readiness of our strategic bombers. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class William Pugh
Keeping the F-22 Credible Through 2030 Will Cost At Least $9 Billion, USAF Leaders Say

Keeping the F-22 Credible Through 2030 Will Cost At Least $9 Billion, USAF Leaders Say

Preserving the F-22 Raptor’s ability to prevail in air combat through the end of the decade will cost more than $9 billion, and that figure depends on lawmakers allowing the Air Force to divest 32 of the oldest fighters, according to budget documents, service spokespersons and USAF leadership’s Congressional testimony.

But if Congress doesn’t allow the retirements—an action taken in last year’s budget—the Air Force will have to rethink not only its F-22 plans but the Next-Generation Air Dominance program as well, since all the savings the service expects to reap from not operating, maintaining, or upgrading those 32 aircraft went into the NGAD account, senior officials said.

“Our budget assumes the success of that proposal” to retire the oldest F-22s, Air Force acquisition executive Andrew Hunter told the House Armed Services Committee’s tactical aviation panel in March 29 testimony.

The Air Force’s proposed fiscal year 2024-2028 spending on the F-22 amounts to $4.2 billion in procurement—with another $1.74 billion “to completion,” circa 2030—and $3.2 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation, for a total of $9.06 billion through the end of the decade. That figure doesn’t include operations and maintenance.

The biggest items are for “sensor enhancement”—requested at $4.13 billion—and reliability and maintainability upgrades, requested at $2.43 billion.

Other major procurement efforts include Link 16 modifications, identification, friend or foe systems, trainer and simulator modifications, anti-jam/anti-spoofing position, navigation, and timing enhancements and modifications to the F-22’s Pratt & Whitney F119 engines.

The Air Force also wants to spend $553 million on stealthy long-range fuel tanks and pylons. Budget documents call for 326 tanks and 286 pylons, which would give each aircraft at least two full sets of each. The F-22 can fly at speeds up to Mach 1.2 with the tanks and pylons, budget documents say.

The tanks and pylons, as well as stealthy-looking pods with an apparent dielectric front-end aperture, have been seen in flight test photos of F-22s captured around Lockheed’s Palmdale, Calif., facilities. They were also shown in an artist’s concept released by Air Combat Command last year, without an explanation of what the underwing stores are.

New sensors and stealthy fuel tanks dominate F-22 spending across the future years defense plan.
Air Combat Command’s Gen. Mark Kelly posted this conceptual image on Instagram of an F-22 firing the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile in 2022, offering the first official glimpse of the new weapon. USAF illustration

Aviation experts speculate that the slender pods contain infrared search-and-track systems (IRST) and may have other sensors, as well. A former Lockheed program official has previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine that there is insufficient “real estate” within the F-22’s fuselage to host an IRST, an alternative method of detecting an adversary aircraft built with low radar cross section, like China’s J-20 fighter.

USAF spending plans would see F-22 procurement funding ramp up to over $1 billion a year in fiscal 2026 and 2027, dropping off sharply in 2028 to $426.8 billion. RDT&E on the fighter ends in 2028.

Counting previous spending going back to fiscal 2018, the Air Force is projecting the total cost of keeping the F-22 capable against current and future threats at $16.2 billion, according to an Air Force spokesperson. That comes to more than $100 million for each of the 148 or so F-22s the Air Force plans to retain.

The jets the Air Force wants to divest have been used for basic skills training and not been kept to the same configuration as the frontline fleet. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said he estimates it would cost $50 million apiece to upgrade the them to the current operational fleet configuration, and considerably more to keep them consistent with the rest of the fleet on top of the cost of flying and maintaining them.

Though Air Combat Command has considered requesting funding to upgrade the old F-22s every year for at least eight years, the proposal has always lost out to higher priorities, former ACC commanders have said.

The Air Force asked Congress last year to retire the same 32 F-22s but was rebuffed. It’s asking again this year not only because those aircraft are “no longer operationally representative,” but the cost to bring them up to full capability would be “prohibitive,” Lt. Gen. Richard G. Moore, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, told the HASC tactical aviation panel. They are also no longer competitive with China’s best stealth fighters, he said.

“Upgrading the Block 20s to a combat configuration is cost-prohibitive and very time intensive,” Moore testified. “Based on the most advanced weapons that an F-22 Block 20 can carry now, it is not competitive with the [Shenyang] J-20, with the most advanced weapons the Chinese can put on it.”

And while the Air Force typically does not specify which cost-saving moves pay for which new programs, “in this case, all of the resources that came from the Block 20 went directly to NGAD, and we believe that we must get to NGAD in order to be able to continue confronting Chinese aggression into the ‘30s,” Moore said. “And so that, to us, was a trade that was worth making.”

Opponents of the F-22 divestment argue the Air Force can continue to use the jets for training, but Moore said the configuration of the cockpit is so different from that of frontline aircraft that “there’s negative learning that occurs.” Pilots have to “unlearn some of the things that they learned in the Block 20 when they go to an operational aircraft.”

Pressed by panel members on what the Air Force will do if not permitted to retire the oldest F-22s, Moore said the answer will depend on the level of funding appropriated for the F-22 program

As for what would happen to the NGAD account—since that is where the F-22 savings are supposed to go—Moore replied, “I couldn’t say. … We’ll have to work with the Congress and determine how we’ll make the F-22 program make it to the end of the year, in the event that divestiture is prohibited but continued operations are not appropriated.”

In any event, an Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine the service “does not plan to modernize these aircraft to a comparable configuration to receive the majority of the planned F-22 upgrades.”

Neither the F-22 nor NGAD accounts include funding for the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), which is to be their primary weapon.

A New Air Force-Wide Study Is Analyzing Suicides to Improve Prevention Efforts

A New Air Force-Wide Study Is Analyzing Suicides to Improve Prevention Efforts

The Air Force expects the final report of a sweeping, first-of-its-kind suicide analysis board in the next few months, as the department looks to refine its prevention and response efforts.

The Department of the Air Force partnered with suicide researchers at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences to complete the study, pulling information from personnel records, investigation reports, medical records, and Department of Defense Suicide Event Reports (DoDSER) and compiling over 1,000 data points for each person who died by suicide. The final report is due this spring, Lt. Gen. Caroline Miller, deputy chief of staff for manpower, personnel, and services, wrote in a statement delivered to the House Armed Services Committee at a personnel posture hearing March 29. 

The Air Force “looks to enhance our practices by systematically analyzing factors, identifying aggregated findings and lessons, and delivering generalizable and actionable recommendations to reduce suicide,” Miller said.

Before this analysis board was commissioned, the Air Force’s major commands each performed an annual suicide analysis board where service leaders and subject matter experts reviewed suicide deaths and submitted a report to the Air Force’s integrated resilience office. This new board expands that approach by applying the framework of the Department of Defense’s Standardized Suicide Fatality Analysis to the entire Department of the Air Force.

“This report represents the first standardized and public health-driven methodology for conducting suicide death reviews across the DAF,” Air Force spokesperson Maj. Tanya Downsworth told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “The final reports will include actionable recommendations to inform DAF suicide prevention, intervention, and postvention programming.”

The new board is expected to increase the reliability of the department’s findings, as well the “generalizability of identified lessons learned and recommendations,” she said.

Risk Factors

When the Pentagon released its annual suicide report Oct. 20, it showed the total number and rate of services members who died by suicide declined from 2020 to 2021, a small sign of progress amid a general upward trend over the past decade. For example, the Air Force and Space Force lost 51 Active-Duty Airmen and Guardians to suicide in 2021, compared to 82 in 2020. 

“While we are cautiously encouraged by the drop in these numbers, one year is not enough time to assess real change,” Beth Foster, the executive director of the Pentagon’s office for force resiliency, told reporters at the time. “We need to see a sustained long-term reduction in suicide rates to know if we are making progress.”

In the meantime, the Department of Defense and the Air Force are working to identify patterns and risk factors to help better inform prevention efforts. Miller told Congress on March 29 that after accounting for age and sex differences, the suicide rate for Active-Duty Department of the Air Force personnel was 13.9 per 100,000 people, which she said was “lower than the historical U.S. rate for a comparable demographic pool.”

The largest demographic subset of Airmen and Guardians to have died by suicide in 2021 were single enlisted men below the age of 30, between the ranks of E-1 and E-4, using a firearm, Miller said. Male Airmen and Guardians are 3.3 times more at risk of dying by suicide compared to female Airmen and Guardians, while Airmen and Guardians at the age of 30 or younger are at an increased risk of suicide than their counterparts over the age of 30.

Miller also said more than 60 percent of the Airmen who died by suicide had access to some kind of lethal means in their household. Data collected in 2021 showed that less than 15 percent of those Airmen had safely stored their firearms in safes with locks or outside the home, which the Department of the Air Force recommends as part of its effort to put time and space between suicidal service members and lethal means

To encourage so-called time-based prevention, the Air Force distributed over 202,000 locks, safe storage training materials, and firearm retailer tool kits, Miller said. The service wants to “build a culture in which safe storage is commonplace, accelerating our efforts to save lives by reducing immediate access to firearms for those in distress” and by preventing accidental firearm-related injuries or deaths, the general added.

Beyond firearms, Miller said that last year, 18 percent of Airmen and Guardians who died by suicide were facing legal and administrative problems at the time of their deaths. To address this issue, Miller pointed out the Limited Privilege Suicide Prevention Program, which gives increased confidentiality with mental health care providers to Airmen or Guardians who may be at risk for suicide after hearing they are under investigation for possible UCMJ violations. 

Another program aimed at the issue is the Investigative Interview Warm Hand-Off policy, where after an interview with an Airmen under investigation, the investigator will hand that Airmen off to their commander or first sergeant. According to Air Force policy, the commander or first sergeant must then run through a check list to make sure the Airman has access to mental health care.

Policies

The Air Force’s findings so far share much in common with those of the Pentagon. In February, the Pentagon’s Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) released a report which made 127 recommendations to enhance suicide prevention efforts across the force. The recommendations were grouped into high, moderate, and low priority, though some of the high-priority measures could prove controversial.

For example, seven of the report’s 23 high-priority recommendations involved more closely regulating the purchase and storage of firearms by service members. One involved raising the minimum age for purchasing firearms and ammunition on Department of Defense property to 25, while another was to implement a seven-day waiting period for any firearm purchased on Department of Defense property.

In its report, SPRIRC wrote that 66 percent of Active-duty suicides involved a firearm, as did 72 percent and 78 percent of Reserve and National Guard suicides, respectively.

A policy to limit firearm availability had a positive impact on Israeli suicide prevention efforts, SPRIRC pointed out. But implementing some of these measures could require Congress to repeal sections of military law, a tall order given some lawmakers’ fierce opposition to gun control laws.

A separate Pentagon working group is expected to present an implementation plan to Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III in June. In her statement to Congress, Miller said the Department of the Air Force “stands ready” to put that plan into action. In the meantime, the service wants to continue to better understand the problem.

“Moving forward, we intend to examine all suicide deaths from 2018-2021 and each year after as we strive toward zero deaths by suicide,” Miller said.