F-22s Deploy to CENTCOM as Russian Pilots Act in ‘Increasingly Unsafe’ Manner

F-22s Deploy to CENTCOM as Russian Pilots Act in ‘Increasingly Unsafe’ Manner

U.S. Central Command announced June 14 that Air Force F-22 stealth fighters have deployed to the Middle East, the latest action amid growing tensions between the U.S. and Russia in the skies over Syria—but also tied to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“This is one place where combatant command [boundary] lines aren’t helpful,” Air Forces Central commander Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said at the Defense One Tech Summit. Grynkewich said he speaks with Gen. James Hecker, head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Force Africa and NATO Allied Air Command, more than any other air component commander “and it’s because of the confluence of Russian activity. … The center of gravity of what Russia is doing right now is of course in Ukraine, but we see that manifesting here.”

In particular, the U.S. has noted “increasingly unsafe and unprofessional behavior by Russian aircraft in the region,” according to a CENTCOM press release about the F-22 deployment. Grynkewich tied that behavior to the March 14 incident in which two Russian Su-27 fighters dumped fuel on and flew in front of a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea. One of the fighters struck the drone’s propeller, forcing the U.S. to intentionally crash the drone, and the Russian pilots were honored by Moscow. That sets a precedent for Russian pilots elsewhere, Grynkewich argued.

“If you’re going to give medals to Russian fighter pilots for pouring gas on a UAV and then knocking it out of the sky by crashing into it while they’re operating over the Black Sea, then the Russian pilots that serve in other parts of the world such as Syria see that and that’s going to incentivize them,” he said. “Now we see similar aggressive behavior, not quite to that degree yet, but we see very aggressive behavior out of their pilots.”

In recent months, Grynkewich has spoken up about Russia upping its harassment of U.S. forces in Syria by overflying U.S. positions with armed fighters, closing within a few hundred feet of U.S. fighters. Air & Space Forces Magazine previously reported that in November, the Russians fired a surface-to-air missile that detonated within 40 feet of an MQ-9 and damaged the aircraft.

Grynkewich said the belligerent behavior could be driven by “a confluence of our adversaries.” As the Russian Air Force uses Iranian-made drones in Ukraine, the Russian government is compelled to act in Iran’s interests in a way which “has resulted in collusion, if you will, between the Russians and the Iranians, both of whom want to see us out of Syria,” he said.

That collusion gets in the way of the real mission in Syria, which is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, Grynkewich added. Instead, Russia, Iran, and Syria seem to be focused on frustrating U.S. efforts there—though he claimed such attempts were fruitless.

“There’s no way they can actually push us out of the airspace,” he said. “I don’t think they want direct conflict with the United States, we certainly don’t want direct conflict with Russia. So to me it’s kind of akin to a gnat swirling around your head. It’s very frustrating and annoying sometimes, but in the end it doesn’t really matter.”

f-22
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor pilot climbs into the cockpit at an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, July 11, 2016. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Larry E. Reid Jr.

Even so, Central Command saw the need to bring in F-22s, as a reminder of America’s “ability to re-posture forces and deliver overwhelming power at a moment’s notice,” the command said in its press release. Still, Grynkewich said U.S. forces strive to maintain a “de-escalatory posture” in the region.

“We ought to all get back to focusing on ISIS and I hope they decide to do that,” he said.

Though U.S. military planners are increasingly focused on countering possible Chinese expansion in the Pacific, the competition with Russia in CENTCOM and China’s economic interests in the Middle East show that the region is still crucial, Grynkewich said. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reported that more than 45 percent of China’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and Grynkewich says China sees the Middle East in part as a gateway to the rare earth minerals located in Africa that are essential for both civilian and military electronic technology. 

“Where the Chinese economic objectives begin, their military interests will follow,” said the general, who cautioned that if the Persian Gulf were to become “a Chinese lake,” it could severely limit U.S. options should war break out in the Indo-Pacific region.

At a tactical level, Grynkewich said many of the challenges U.S. troops face in CENTCOM are akin to what they may face against China in the Pacific. As China adopts an anti-access, area denial strategy using thousands of ballistic missiles and advanced air defenses in Pacific island chains, Iran is using a similar strategy in Southwest Asia, he said. 

“The lessons that we learn here in AFCENT as we look at that tactical problem … after years of thinking just about violent extremist organizations, the lessons that we learn, I would posit are exportable across the entire globe,” he said.

Draft NDAA Would End ARRW Early, as Hypersonic Test Concerns Linger

Draft NDAA Would End ARRW Early, as Hypersonic Test Concerns Linger

Air Force leaders have already said they are shifting their focus away the hypersonic Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW). Now, the program may not get funding to complete a final few tests if the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee gets his way.

In his markup of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act released June 12, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) completely removed $150.3 million in completion work on ARRW the Air Force had requested to “close out” and collect data from the program, which the service has said it won’t pursue into production after a series of test failures.

Congress’ interest in hypersonics, however, has not waned. Rogers’ mark includes a boost of $20 million for the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), the Air Force’s other hypersonic program, and the strategic forces subcommittee included a provision in its NDAA markup pushing the Pentagon to submit a hypersonic testing strategy and study two additional hypersonic live-fly testing corridors.

Additional testing corridors could be particularly crucial, as the Air Force Research Lab’s chief technology officer warned June 14 that a lack of testing capacity is the biggest obstacle to fielding new U.S. hypersonic weapons.

In a livestreamed event with Defense One, AFRL’s Timothy Bunning also called for patience and a willingness to accept failures in testing hypersonic weapons. Noting that there has been high-level and public scrutiny of tests that haven’t succeeded, Bunning said “we’re really exercising muscles that we haven’t exercised in a while” relative to hypersonic testing. Hypersonic vehicles are “complex systems, and things go wrong, and we have to be tolerant of that failure,” he added.

ARRW was the most high-profile example of test failures—the missile, developed by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, suffered a series of test failures in 2021 followed by a successful all-up flight in 2022. Then in March, a second all-up test failed.

Shortly after that, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told the House Appropriations defense panel that the service is shifting its focus to HACM, being developed by Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, because it is smaller, has long range, and can be carried by a wider range of Air Force aircraft than the ARRW, which can only be deployed by bombers.

Yet even as the Air Force prepared to move on from ARRW, acquisition executive Andrew Hunter told lawmakers in written testimony March 30 that there is “inherent benefit to completing All-Up Round (AUR) test flights” of ARRW to get the maximum benefit of “the learning and test data that will help inform future hypersonic programs and potential leave-behind capability.”

USAF officials had said that up to four test flights of ARRW could be flown in fiscal 2024 before shutting the effort down. Should Rogers’ mark go unchanged in the final NDAA, the program would end the effort in September, leaving the Air Force with an undisclosed number of test assets which it has said could potentially be used operationally.

In comparison to testing failures like ARRW’s, Bunning argued that competitor nations are “doing lots of tests and they fail all the time, and maybe don’t have the political pressure, [the] public pressure, [the] negative pressure” to succeed in the way U.S. systems do.

In addition to that pressure, Bunning also highlighted the need for more testing the toughest challenge to going faster on hypersonics.

Bunning said the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board reviewed the service’s hypersonics efforts recently and called shortfalls in testing capability the “No. 1 threat” to the portfolio.

“It is not solved,” he said. “We don’t have what we need to … operate at the speed of relevance right now.”

In the fiscal 2023 NDAA, lawmakers directed the Pentagon to submit a hypersonic testing strategy, to be updated every other year, and to study additional hypersonic testing corridors. A year later, those plans are still not submitted, and the strategic forces subcommittee is threatening through its 2024 markup to restrict senior Pentagon official travel until it gets them.

While AFRL is trying to accelerate testing in its part of the hypersonic enterprise through modeling and simulation, as well as cooperative testing with Australia, which has extensive test ranges, the overall capacity is well behind the need, Bunning said.

AFRL’s role in hypersonics is mainly focused on the heat-tolerant materials needed for air vehicles operating in the extreme environment of Mach 5+, where friction temperatures stress typical aerospace materials, Bunning said. AFRL is also working on the “aero packaging” of vehicles and the warheads that go with them, he said.

“We’re trying to stay true to our role … to look forward, provide technologies that we know will have an effect that will shape the fight,” Bunning said.

“Clearly, range and speed are big drivers for the portfolio right now,” and AFRL is pushing hypersonics forward “where needed,” he added.

Lawmakers Want to Know: How Will The Air Force Defend Austere ‘ACE’ Bases?

Lawmakers Want to Know: How Will The Air Force Defend Austere ‘ACE’ Bases?

Members of Congress want to know how the Air Force plans to defend remote or forward-deployed airfields as part of its Agile Combat Employment strategy, in which the service disperses small teams of Airmen and aircraft across a wide area to complicate an enemy’s targeting process. 

“[W]ith the proliferation of threats and the Air Force’s plan to deploy in remote locations independent from other major service elements, the committee is concerned these critical assets will lack sufficient air defense,” wrote the House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee in its markup of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. 

By February 1, the committee expects a report outlining the Secretary of the Air Force’s plan to provide expeditionary, mobile air defenses to austere airfields, along with the estimated cost, timeline, and additional authorities which might be needed to develop and procure such defenses. 

Base defense was a theme of the subcommittee’s markup, which can direct the Pentagon and the services to come back with reports on issues of concern for certain legislators.

One such report comes with a March 1 deadline for the Secretary of Defense to submit an assessment on how military bases plan to defeat unmanned aerial systems (UAS) using directed energy such as high-energy lasers or microwaves. The Secretary of the Army was also called on to submit a plan for better integrating the findings of the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Systems Office (JCO) into the military’s defense against tiny drones.

Lawmakers are also putting money toward the issue—the chairman’s mark includes an extra $58 million or so above what was requested for counter-UAS programs. The Air Force and other services have performed small-scale experiments with various counter-UAS systems for years. However, the committee wants to see more progress adopting systems at a larger scale across the military, especially systems recommended by the JCO.

“The committee is concerned that the military services, in particular the Army, have neither transitioned proven systems, specifically systems currently operating in combat environments with [U.S. Special Operations Command] or systems that have been recommended by the JCO, to production at scale, nor acquired them for wider deployment across the joint force,” the committee wrote.

Lawmakers seemed particularly interested in directed energy technology, writing that “high-power microwave systems must continue to advance the effectiveness of waveforms against new UAS software and hardware.”

The Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR, a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history. U.S. Air Force photo / Adrian Lucero
The Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR, a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. U.S. Air Force photo / Adrian Lucero

One such system, developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, is thorough —the Tactical High-power Operational Responder. Recently, AFRL tested the experimental weapon against a swarm of drones at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. The system consists of a shipping container-like box with an antenna dish on top that can aim bursts of high-power microwave energy along a wide beam in order to disable groups of small drones, making them drop from the sky.

Though AFRL declined to say how many or what kinds of drones were downed in the test, it touted that the weapon can be carried in a C-130, can be quickly assembled on the ground, and can leverage other detection and targeting systems or use its own. In 2022, the lab selected the company Leidos to build “Mjolnir,” a follow-up to THOR that the lab hopes will improve on its capability, reliability, and manufacturing.

The House panel did not mention THOR specifically in its markup, but it called on the Secretary of Defense to provide a report with more information on the use of directed energy weapons against drones; on how the technology can be integrated into existing security infrastructure; on what effects they might have on the nearby airspace, people, and equipment; on how to train service members to use them; and on how to set up, maintain, and buy large numbers of such weapons.

Directed energy weapons are not the only way to bring down a drone. In January, U.S. troops used a Coyote air defense system to shoot down two drones attacking their base in southeastern Syria. The Coyote is essentially a short-range surface to-air missile that complements air defenses built for other threats such as missiles and crewed aircraft. Integrating those systems and their relevant sensors is a hurdle military planners hope to clear on their way to creating a coordinated air and missile defense system for downrange facilities.

“What I focus on … is advocating for a layered, integrated air and missile defense capability, from the upper tier all the way down to counter-small UAS—a quadcopter flying 50 to 100 feet off the ground at 10 or 20 miles an hour—and everything in between,” U.S. Central Command Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Gregory M. Guillot said in January.

Developing new defenses and integrating them is particularly important as U.S. military planners contend with the “daily threat” of home-brewed air attacks in areas like the Middle East.

“If you’ve got an Amazon card and access to a hand grenade, you’ve now got an over-the-horizon weapon capability,” Rear Adm. Curt Renshaw, director of operations for CENTCOM, said in January.

Guillot’s goal is to integrate information about incoming threats onto one “pane of glass” rather than on five or six different screens or even separate buildings, he said. 

Counter-UAS drone defense
Tech. Sgts. Christina Cary and Jacob Wirick each use a dronebuster to interrupt the signal to an Unmanned Aerial System, during an exercise at Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates, Dec. 3, 2021. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Dan Heaton

Those same concerns seem to apply to the Pacific theater, where Air Force planners hope to strike a balance between protection and mobility.

“Base protection is also imperative, and it can take many forms. At the same time, being a target isn’t our main focus,”  Brig. Gen. Paul R. Birch, then-commander of the 36th Wing at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, said in March. “Rather, the focus is getting our airpower off the ground in a way that is lethal.” 

Officers with the Air Force’s 388th Maintenance Group also emphasized maneuverability when describing contingency locations where F-35s could be refueled and rearmed with as few as a dozen Airmen. 

“Get the jets back up and back in the fight, but then be ready to defend yourself and survive, and when the C-130 comes, get the heck out of there,” Col. Jeremy Anderson, commander of the 388th Maintenance Group, told Air & Space Forces Magazine earlier this month. “That’s the whole point, because by now the enemy has figured out exactly where you’re at, and you are about to get attacked. So load up, get out, and go to the next spot.”

Space National Guard Gains Steam in House

Space National Guard Gains Steam in House

The House Armed Services personnel subcommittee advanced legislation June 12 to establish a Space National Guard and to pave the way for part-time Guardians, rather than form a Space Force Reserve. 

Subcommittee members voted to turn the 14 units and 1,000 space-focused Airmen in the Air National Guard into a new Space National Guard. Lawmakers also offered a measure that would require the Space Force to maintain a single personnel management system, rather than creating a separate Space Force Reserve. 

To become law, the proposals must first clear the House Armed Services Committee when it meets June 23 to vote on amendments, then survive a vote by the full House, and finally survive a conference committee that must reconcile any differences between the House and Senate versions of the final National Defense Authorization Act.  

So while still far from certain, the plan represents the most far-reaching step yet in a debate that has been argued since the Space Force was born: Whether or not the National Guard would have a Space mission, and whether or not the Space Force could carve a path to a simpler force management construct than that of the Air Force, with its active and two reserve components.

The question of a Space National Guard has been hotly debated for years. Proponents—including the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), the Air & Space Forces Association (AFA), and lawmakers from states with space-focused units—say a separate Guard is needed because Air National Guard units with space missions are “orphaned” in the current organizational structure, unattached to the Space Force but left with no corresponding Air Force units. 

National Guardsmen already provide an indispensable core capability for the Space Force and Space Command. Specifically, “…Airman assigned to 16 units across seven states and one territory provide 60 percent of [our] … space electronic war [capabilities], [and] 50 percent of [our] protected satellite communications.”

“Air National Guard personnel provide fundamental capability to the Space Force today,” said AFA President & CEO Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, USAF (Ret.) “Logically, moving those Guardsmen into the Space Force is the right thing to do, ensuring space remains under the control of a single service. A New Space National Guard does not need to be large and unwieldly. It can comprise just those units we have today. And it can do so without a lot of complicated infrastructure.”

Critics—including the White House and multiple Senate leaders—argue a Space National Guard would cost too much, create added layers of bureaucracy, and is unnecessary since there are no specific missions for which states need military space forces.

The House has approved Space National Guard proposals before, only to see them die later in the process. In the 2022 and 2023 NDAAs, Space Guard passed the House but were killed in conference when Senate and House leaders reconciled their bills. 

The White House and the Pentagon, meanwhile, want a single component and have held to that position for months. What makes this year’s plan different is that the HASC personnel subcommittee appears to have incorporated elements of both ideas. 

“We authorize the establishment of the Space National Guard and set a new personnel management benchmark by authorizing the creation of an innovative personnel management system for the Space Force,” subcommittee chair Rep. Jim Banks (R-Ind.) said in a hearing. 

The language on the Space National Guard is lifted from the Space National Guard Establishment Act, introduced by Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.) earlier this year. The bill looks to address some concerns about cost by specifying that it does not “authorize or require the relocation of any facility, infrastructure, or military installation of the Space National Guard or Air National Guard.” Critics have argued creating a new Guard would require new facilities that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 

The portion creating the single personnel management system is extensive—140 or so pages—as it adjusts sections of U.S. law dealing with how Reserve forces are typically managed to account for the Space Force’s proposed new structure. 

At its heart, the legislation would get rid of the idea of a “Regular Space Force” and a “regular reserve” and create one unified system consisting of full-time, part-time, and inactive Guardians. Those on active status who work full-time will be referred to as on “sustained duty,” while part-time personnel on active status will still need to either: 

  • Participate in 48 drills or training periods and spend 14 days on active duty 
  • Spend at least 30 days on active duty 

Proponents say such an arrangement would benefit the Space Force by allowing Guardians to more easily switch from full-time to part-time and back again, as compared to the Reserve forces of the other military branches. 

The language also clarifies that members of the Air Force Reserve with space-related jobs could transfer over into the Space Force. The Air Force Reserve’s main space-focused unit is the 310th Space Wing, with roughly 1,100 military and civilian personnel. 

Still, there are some parts of the legislation that will have to be clarified—while the bill states the Space Force “shall be managed … without component,” the section on the Space Guard states that it will be designated as the “reserve component” of the Space Force. 

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are both reserve components for the Air Force, but the Reserve is always under federal control, while the Guard can be activated for state-level missions. A single personnel management system for the Space Force would reduce the number of organizations on the federal level. 

KC-135s Pull Off ‘Monumental’ Air Bridge to Get Scores of Aircraft to Exercise in Europe

KC-135s Pull Off ‘Monumental’ Air Bridge to Get Scores of Aircraft to Exercise in Europe

Air Defender 23, the German-led air exercise that is the largest in NATO history, kicked off June 12 with roughly 100 of the 250 participating aircraft coming from Air National Guard units across the U.S.—and just getting all of those USAF planes across the Atlantic Ocean presented a unique challenge.

Many of the U.S. aircraft participating in Air Defender are fighters like the F-35, F-15, F-16, and A-10, which often do not have enough gas to cross an ocean on their own. That meant units like the 128th Air Refueling Wing of the Wisconsin Air National Guard had to step in with its KC-135s to ensure the aircraft can keep flying without having to land.

“Moving 100 aircraft over the ocean in the matter of four or five flying days is a monumental feat,” Maj. Brandyn Dietman, deputy director of air refueling for the 128th, said in a recent press release. “Fighter aircraft can’t make it over by themselves, so they need the tankers to build the air bridge to help them get over.”

Planning for Air Defender has been ongoing for some time now, and Dietnam noted the 128th had put in “a year’s worth of work” on the logistics of the air bridge.

After Air Defender 23 concludes, the unit will support air bridge operations back to the U.S. from its temporary assignment at Keflavik Air Base, Iceland, a spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Air bridge operations like those supported by the 128th demonstrate the U.S. and NATO’s ability to effectively respond to a real-world crisis.

“The whole point of this [exercise] is to integrate with our multi-national partners and show that we can seamlessly work as one large coalition force,” Dietman said.

Air Defender will test that integration through a fictional scenario in which an alliance of Eastern European countries invades Germany, triggering an international response to push back the imaginary belligerents. The exercise has been in the making since before Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but officials hope it will send a strong message of NATO airpower and solidarity as the conflict rages on.

“I would be pretty surprised if any world leader was not taking note of what this shows, in terms of the spirit of this alliance, which means the strength of this alliance,” Amy Gutmann, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, told reporters. “That includes [Russian President Vladimir] Putin.”

The exercise will feature real-world simulated combat, missile defense as well as “the political, economic and media levels” of conflict, according to the Germany military.

Beyond U.S. fighter jets, Air Defender 23 also incorporates MQ-9s, C-130s, KC-135s, C-17s, and KC-46s, as well as European fighters such as Eurofighters, Tornados, Gripens, and American-made export model F-16s and F-18s. The exercise will take place mainly in three areas over Germany, though there will also be forward operating locations in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia. 

U.S. bombers are also participating in Air Defender 23—B-1B Lancers from the 7th Bomb Wing are currently on a Bomber Task Force deployment based out of RAF Fairford, U.K., and joined the exercise to conduct hot-pit refueling in Romania. Hot-pit refueling entails an aircraft landing and keeping an engine running while it receives gas so it can quickly take back off again. 

Pentagon Announces New Ukraine Aid Package Focused on Air Defense

Pentagon Announces New Ukraine Aid Package Focused on Air Defense

ABOARD A U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT—As Ukraine begins its long-awaited counteroffensive against Russia, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III is headed to Europe for a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels and the Pentagon announced another batch of military aid aimed at helping Ukraine secure its skies against Russian aircraft, drones, and missile attacks.

The package includes “key capabilities to aid Ukraine’s efforts to retake its sovereign territory and support Ukraine’s air defenders as they bravely protect Ukraine’s soldiers, civilians, and critical infrastructure, as well as artillery, anti-armor systems, and ammunition” the Department of Defense said in a statement June 13.

The successfulness of the nascent Ukrainian counteroffensive remains unclear. But given the unpredictable and grinding nature of the war, the Pentagon added it is attempting to meet “immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements.”

Among other capabilities, the new package includes additional munitions for NASAMS air defense systems, more Stinger man-portable air defense systems, additional GMLRS rockets for HIMARS launchers, and well as “tactical secure communications support equipment,” and 15 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 10 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers. The package is worth up to $325 million, the Pentagon said.

“Our primary focus right now is on ground-based air defense,” a defense official told reporters.

On June 15 in Brussels, Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley will convene with defense officials from around the world as part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a monthly meeting of nearly 50 countries to coordinate aid with Kyiv.

Milley and Austin are traveling also traveling to Germany, where they will head to Wiesbaden to meet troops supporting the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine. Austin will also attend a meeting of NATO’s defense ministers June 16 at NATO headquarters in Brussels ahead of a key summit for the alliance in Vilnius, Lithuania in July.

The recently announced decision by Western allies to help Ukraine’s pilots train on F-16s is expected to be one of the topics discussed during the meetings. The U.S. gave its sign-off for other nations train Ukrainian pilots on the U.S.-made F-16, but it remains unclear how much direct support will come from the U.S. or if there is any possibility of America providing some of its F-16s.

A defining aspect of the war thus far has been the largely mutually denied airspace over Ukraine, though Russia has been able to launch barrages of missile and drones attacks on Ukraine, which has led the West to focus heavily on air defense in its aid to Kyiv.

Russia’s air force is large and more sophisticated than Ukraine’s, but Moscow has been unable to achieve air superiority for most of the conflict. Now, however, Russia appears to be trying blunt the counteroffensive using its airpower. An absence of Russian airpower, some allege, is what led to Ukrainian gains in recent days.

“Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to make tactical gains on June 11 due to heavy rain and fog preventing Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and army aviation (rotary wing aircraft) from striking Ukrainian force concentrations,” the Institute for the Study of War wrote in a June 12 update on the conflict. “Russian sources reported that Russian VKS and army aviation resumed intense airstrikes against Ukrainian forces on June 12 after the rain cleared.”

The Pentagon said its latest announcement was part an effort to “meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs.”

The full package includes:

  • Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS)
  • Stinger anti-aircraft systems
  • Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS)
  • 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds
  • 15 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
  • 10 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
  • Javelin anti-armor systems
  • Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles
  • AT-4 anti-armor systems
  • Over 22 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades
  • Demolition munitions for obstacle clearing
  • Tactical secure communications support equipment
  • Spare parts and other field equipment
House Panel OKs Plan to Retire 99 USAF Fighter Jets

House Panel OKs Plan to Retire 99 USAF Fighter Jets

The House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee approved an Air Force plan to cut 42 A-10s and 57 F-15C/Ds in fiscal 2024. 

The subcommittee’s markup of the 2024 National Defense Authorization bill, unveiled on June 12, would lower the minimum inventory requirements for A-10 and F-15C/D fighters as requested by the Air Force in the President’s budget request earlier this year. 

The full committee meets June 23 to vote on amendments and complete its version of the annual defense authorization, after which the measure must clear the full House. When the Senate passes its version of the bill, the two versions must be reconciled in a conference process that can make further changes. But getting the Air Force plan through the subcommittee markup is a key first step. 

The tactical air and land forces subcommittee markup would surrender those A-10s under a condition, however. If approved, the Secretary of the Air Force would have to devise a plan to ensure air crews maintain proficiency in close air support and would prohibit additional A-10 retirements until that plan is delivered to Congress. 

Any agreement to retire A-10 marks a major victory for the Air Force, which has argued for years that the jets are vulnerable to modern integrated air defenses. Congress approved retiring 21 A-10s last year, however, and the first of those went to the Boneyard only this past April. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. has said the Air Force should retire the entire A-10 fleet by the end of this decade. 

F-15C/D divestment has been less contentious, but cutting 57 in a single year would mean retiring more than a quarter of the 200 or so C/D models remaining, most of which are in the Air National Guard. 

The fighters are among 310 older aircraft the Air Force wants to retire in 2024, among the biggest yearly reductions in memory. The Air Force says cutting those aircraft will free up funds for new F-35 and Next Generation Air Dominance fighter development and purchases. But critics have countered that the Air Force should have sought additional funds, on top of its budget request, rather than give up so many aircraft at once.  

The subcommittee’s markup addresses those programs as well. It would require the F-35 Joint Program Office to break out its Tech Refresh 3 and Block 4 upgrades into a subprogram, answering a recommendation made by the Government Accountability Office in a recent report. 

The bill also includes a provision that would extend oversight of both the Air Force’s and the Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance and Collaborative Combat Aircraft programs. The markup seeks annual progress reports on development and technology maturation, and requires Pentagon officials to establish key performance indicators “regarding flyaway unit cost, gross/weapon system unit cost, aircraft cost-per-tail-per-year, and aircraft cost-per-flight-hour.”  

The Air Force’s NGAD program, shrouded in secrecy for years, is only now beginning to come to light. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said each sixth-generation aircraft will likely cost “multiple hundreds of millions of dollars” per tail, which would make it the most expensive fighter ever. The service started the competition earlier this year.

How the Space Force Will Avoid a ‘Pearl Harbor’ in Space, According to Its No. 2 Officer

How the Space Force Will Avoid a ‘Pearl Harbor’ in Space, According to Its No. 2 Officer

In its official song, the Space Force touts itself as a ‘mighty watchful eye’ keeping watch on both the Earth and space—and the service now has what it needs to live up to that description and avoid any surprise attack, Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson said June 12.

“We’ve gotten to the point where we now have the tools: they’re there, they are either in place or building up,” Thompson said in a livestreamed discussion with retired Gen. Kevin Chilton, Explorer Chair at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence. “If we’re operationally or strategically surprised, shame on us.”

Thompson’s remarks came in response to a question from Chilton on how the Space Force plans to avoid a “space Pearl Harbor,” where an adversary might attempt an operational or strategic surprise in the space domain, on the ground, or in cyberspace.

The Space Force has several capabilities which Thompson said would make it difficult for an adversary to get the drop on the U.S., including an operationally- and tactically-focused space intelligence enterprise; a broad understanding of space domain awareness; joint cyber defense forces; and the branch’s emerging ground moving target indicator capability.

“It’s not just in space, but there is soon to be nowhere on the globe where we won’t be able to see, sense, monitor and take action as required,” Thompson said.

When the Space Force first launched in December 2019, the U.S. government lacked a space intelligence enterprise that was operationally and tactically-focused, Thompson said. There was a robust strategic space intelligence enterprise in the form of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, but Space Force leaders sought to make the budding service the 18th member of the Intelligence Community, and one that tracks not only the technical details of foreign space capabilities, but also their doctrine, training, methods of employment, and the development of counter-tactics. 

“That is probably the first thing that we needed to do and are doing well,” Thompson said.

Underscoring Thompson’s point, the House Armed Services intelligence and special operations subcommittee proposed establishing the National Space Intelligence Center as a field operating agency of the Space Force. The center would “analyze and produce scientific and technical intelligence on space-based and counterspace threats from foreign adversaries,” according to markup language for the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

The National Space Intelligence Center already exists in the form of Space Delta 18, which was launched in June 2022. Establishing the center as a field operating agency would give it the authority to conduct field activities “beyond the scope of any of the major commands” according to the Air Force definition of such agencies.

The second important factor Thompson listed is a new understanding of space domain awareness, one which focuses on possible threats rather than “managing the traffic,” he said. The military is in the process of shifting responsibility for overseeing safe space flight for civil and commercial satellite operators to the civilian Office of Space Commerce.

The third factor is the military-wide build up of cyber defense forces, which should prevent adversaries from gaining the element of surprise in that domain, Thompson said.

The general emphasized effective space domain awareness involves not only detecting suspicious behavior in space but also determining what party was responsible for that behavior. Thompson praised U.S. Space Command for publicly criticizing bad behavior, such as Russia’s 2021 anti-satellite test, which created a dangerous debris field in orbit.

“Calling out those sorts of behavior and making sure that people understand we can and will observe and attribute,” is an important part of maintaining order in space, he said. But space is not the only domain under Space Force’s eye. As the branch takes on the mission of ground moving target indication, the goal is for the U.S. to able to observe and call out bad behavior anywhere on or above the planet.

The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies presented the Schriever Spacepower Series event with Gen. David D. Thompson, Vice Chief of Space Operations on Monday, June 12, 2023, at Air & Space Forces Association headquarters in Arlington, Va. Photo by Mike Tsukamoto/Air & Space Forces Magazine

As the government and private sector expand into cislunar space, the vast area between geosynchronous orbit and the moon, so too will Space Force surveillance. The 19th Space Defense Squadron is specifically tasked with cislunar and extra-geosynchronous domain awareness.

“Our role is space domain awareness and that starts … as low as satellites can operate and goes to infinity,” Thompson said. “As the human race continues to expand out into the solar system and beyond, we believe our responsibility is to understand what is happening in the domain.”

Beyond the Space Force’s observational capabilities, Thompson also highlighted the service’s work on satellite proliferation as key to preventing a devastating surprise attack. Though proliferation is often used in the context of large numbers of satellites, Thompson noted it also refers to distributing capabilities across multiple orbital regimes, multiple domains, and multiple partners. 

“The first thing you do is distribute those capabilities across multiple [orbits], which means that an adversary, if they’re going to attack you in space, has to have a very sophisticated and synchronized means of attacking,” he said. “The second is that you look at ways to augment and/or perform the mission in other domains—air, maritime, cyberspace—such that it is not just space that is the way by which missions are executed.”

It also helps to distribute capabilities among allies, partners, and even commercial services so that an adversary seeking to target those capabilities might say “even if I execute the way I want to, I’m unlikely to have the desired effect,” Thompson said.

However, growing these capabilities to keep up with demand requires hardware and manpower, and Chilton noted that acquiring more of both would become difficult under a defense budget which may face slower growth over the next few years. Thompson said the Space Force has been “blessed” to enjoy double-digit budget growth over the past several years, but he agreed a lean future could inhibit the branch’s ability to keep pace with its expanding mission.

“Either the department may need to look at its priorities for various investments, or we will have to throttle the growth that we have seen and the delivery of capabilities,” he said. “It will simply be incumbent on us to make sure that our leaders inside the Department of Defense and in the White House and Congress understand the risks we’ll take if in fact we cannot continue that.”

NATO’s Biggest Air Exercise Ever Kicks Off, Led by Germany

NATO’s Biggest Air Exercise Ever Kicks Off, Led by Germany

The OCCASUS alliance, composed of the Eastern nations of Murinus, Plumbeus, Griseus, and Cinereus, have invaded Germany, and are “trying to push north to the Baltic Sea,” the German military, or Bundeswehr, said in a release. To do so, the alliance is relying on a mix of sabotage operations and special forces supported from by airpower. In response, NATO has triggered Article V, calling for the collective defense of Germany.

All of this is fictional. But it is the premise of Air Defender 23, a massive air exercise led by Germany and taking place across Europe that kicked off June 12. All told, 25 nations are participating in the nearly two-week exercise.

The exercise has been years in the planning—well before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2022. But the need for NATO to bolster its military might is clear to its members, whose defense ministers will gather later this week in Brussels. Germany has pledged a dramatic change in defense policy and increased spending. NATO has reinforced its eastern flank. Air Defender will test out the alliance’s ability to defend itself with airpower.

All told, some 10,000 personnel and 250 aircraft from NATO nations and Japan are participating. Nearly 100 aircraft of those aircraft are American, almost all from the Air National Guard.

According to the ANG, Air Defender is “NATO’s largest airpower exercise since its inception.”

More than 40 Guard units are participating. Their aircraft include F-35s, F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, MQ-9s, C-130s, KC-135s, C-17s, and KC-46s. Active-Duty F-16s from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, will also join in. European air forces are bringing fighters and other aircraft such as Eurofighters, Tornados, Gripens, and American-made export model F-16s and F-18s.

Because the exercise focuses on a threat from the east and a combined response, aircraft are also operating from forward locations in the Czech Republic and the eastern flank countries of Estonia and Latvia.

The German and U.S. militaries say the exercise encompasses far more than aircraft flying together, but real-world simulated combat, as officials previously detailed to Air & Space Forces Magazine. The scale is large enough that some portions of German airspace will close to civilian aircraft temporarily.

But airpower isn’t the only factor in Air Defender as “the conflict in the imagined scenario is far more complex, also encompassing the political, economic and media levels,” the Bundeswehr says. “The core of the large-scale exercise is to test the military’s ability to react and act in the air in a resilient manner and to be able to protect the population from medium-range missiles, for example.”

“I would be pretty surprised if any world leader was not taking note of what this shows, in terms of the spirit of this alliance, which means the strength of this alliance,” Amy Gutmann, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, told reporters. “That includes Mr. Putin.”