‘We’ve Been Doing It Wrong’: SPACECOM’s Shaw Pushes New View of Operations

‘We’ve Been Doing It Wrong’: SPACECOM’s Shaw Pushes New View of Operations

American military space operations are due for a significant overhaul to boost the Pentagon’s capability to deal with growing threats from China and Russia, the deputy commander of U.S. Space Command said July 6. 

“The way we’ve been doing space operations since the dawn of the space age, we’ve been doing it wrong,” Space Force Lt. Gen. John E. Shaw, SPACECOM’s highest-ranking Guardian, said during an event at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Shaw said there could be a “fundamental doctrinal shift” toward more “dynamic space operations.”

While the U.S. military is increasingly emphasizing space capabilities, the Pentagon is still articulating how it should use the space domain in the future.

Some of the debate revolves around organizational issues. The U.S. Space Command was established in late 2019 as a geographic—or, as Shaw prefers, “astrographic”—combatant command responsible for military operations that are 100 kilometers over sea level and extend beyond. The Space Force was established as an independent service later that year. 

That has led to some uncertainty about the division of responsibilities between SPACECOM and the Space Force. The Space Force also has its components within geographic commands, though Shaw noted those Guardians must follow the direction of their respective commanders when employing space capabilities.

“I do think that’s still going to evolve as well,” Shaw said of the component roles. “We need the Space Force components in the theaters.”

Shaw said those would likely focus on the “operational level … to make sure that the integration of space-based capabilities is as effective as it can possibly be in every and any scenario.”

Another question concerns doctrine and who will develop it. Currently, there is one joint publication on the domain, Joint Publication 3-14, which is simply titled “Space Operations.”

“I’ve asked the probing question, ‘Is one volume sufficient?’ And I think the answer is no,” Shaw said.  

“I think we’re going to end up having several joint publications probably along the lines of Space Command and Control, Space Superiority Operations,” Shaw added.

One thing Shaw is sure of is that the U.S. must become more agile about how it conducts operations in space. 

Previously, the U.S. military spent years developing expensive satellites designed to stay in service for many years. To mitigate the risks from Chinese and Russian anti-satellite weapons, the Space Force has pushed for cheaper, more proliferated satellites.

SPACECOM, Shaw said, is doing its part by pushing for more flexible operations. With anti-satellite weapons, jamming, and the possibility that the U.S. might conduct offensive space operations, largely static platforms will be inadequate.

The old way of doing things was “positional space operations,” Shaw said. “We launch a platform into orbit and we tend to leave it right in that orbit.”

“That’s not going to be sufficient anymore,” Shaw said. “We can’t have those constraints in the future. And so we’re trying to articulate a requirement to the Space Force that we need to be able to have sustained space maneuver for those platforms.”

Navy Intel Brief Urges Robust Challenge to China

Navy Intel Brief Urges Robust Challenge to China

China is “actively destabilizing” the Indo-Pacific region and undermining the international rules-based order—with its island-building, stifling of democracy in Hong Kong, objective to take Taiwan, and dangerous brinksmanship with other countries’ ships and aircraft—yet somehow projects more “moral legitimacy” than the U.S., according to an analysis from the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The U.S. needs to call out China’s bad behavior, hold it accountable, and mount a muscular communications campaign to counter China’s messaging on American actions, according to a recent unclassified Office of Naval Intelligence briefing obtained by Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“We are engaged in an international struggle between competing visions. China is executing a grand strategy, and has been unified in pursuing it comprehensively and aggressively for many years,” according to the briefing, released under the signature of ONI commander Rear Adm. Mike Studeman.

Those ends include being first a regional then global hegemon, wresting influence away from the U.S., and imposing a new world order that favors Beijing, Studeman said. The goal—internally called the “rejuvenation” of China as the world’s greatest power—justifies “any mean” of achieving it, the briefing said.

China is increasingly using “espionage, coercion, pressure, subversion, and disinformation” to achieve global advantage and “shape the international system.”

Winning the competition of visions—between democracy and authoritarianism—means the U.S. cannot afford an “anemic information instrument” and must challenge China’s narrative about its peaceful rise and intentions. Not speaking out “makes the [U.S.] more vulnerable,” according to the brief.

“We need to win the peace as well as prevail in a crisis/war,” Studeman said.

The briefing—marked “unclassified” and intended for members of Congress and the Administration—was dated in June.

Despite China’s obvious heavy-handedness in suppressing ethnic minorities, oppressive domestic surveillance, bullying international neighbors, employing predatory government-to-government loans, international property theft, overfishing and environmental destruction, “abetting global corruption,” and attempting to convert disputed territory by building illegal military bases, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party “are not being held sufficiently accountable for their actions,” the ONI said.

Chinese ships and aircraft are also harassing those of Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and the U.S., among others, making too-close intercepts, discharging flares and chaff in their paths, and making illegal military incursions in other nations’ sea and airspace. It backtracked about allowing “two systems” of government in Hong Kong and Macau, and makes no secret of its plans to assimilate Taiwan by any means necessary, though the preference is through pressure and not military action.

“Xi is most dangerous leader since Mao in terms of willingness to use creeping expansionism and force to resolve territorial issues at his neighbors’ expense,” the ONI said. Meanwhile, China’s military has become “a formidable, highly lethal fighting force” that is “very much a peer” of the U.S. military.

Asked by a reporter if the DOD views China “as a competitor or an adversary” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said July 6 that America’s “National Defense Strategy makes that very clear. We view them as a competitor and as our pacing challenge.”

The ONI said the U.S. public and the world generally are not paying attention and China’s message of its peaceful intent is winning through. This “lack of attention” or “acquiescence” to China’s moves “invites bolder moves,” Studeman noted.  

If China was to win control of Taiwan, which it claims as a rebel province, it would be disastrous for the U.S. even if China did not use military force, the ONI said.

Such an achievement would give Xi “extraordinary new legitimacy” both domestically and internationally. It would signal an “ideological win over democracy, freedom and the West,” and allow China to absorb a major economy. China would gain greater military power, greater reach into the Pacific domination of China’s near-abroad sea lanes and chokepoints, and give the People’s Liberation Army “confidence in pursuing other territorial claims.”

It would also give Beijing control over critical Taiwanese technology, particularly semiconductor manufacturing, and instantly put China in a position to exploit U.S. weapon systems in Taiwan, such as fighter aircraft, air defenses and other systems.

More nations would likely defer to China after it absorbed Taiwan, and its influence would grow markedly.

Conversely, American influence and credibility would sharply decline if the Mainland absorbed Taiwan, the ONI predicted, as the U.S. commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific would be questioned, and U.S. allies and partners in the region would likely reassess their U.S. relationships. The U.S. would lose access to a “top ten” trade partner, deterrence would be weakened, and it would be much harder for the U.S. to “forestall further erosion of international norms [and the ] rules-based order.” There would be a perception of “U.S. decline” and there would be no Chinese-speaking democracy in Asia.

Taiwan’s absorption into China would also mean the loss of “critical intelligence collection opportunities” versus China and U.S. influence and standing in the world would be diminished.

The ONI brief suggested that China’s efforts to establish the conditions necessary for a successful takeover of Taiwan seem timed to coincide with Xi’s fourth term as president, in about 2027. Those conditions include isolating Taiwan, setting advantageous military conditions, and increasing its political-military-economic pressures on Taiwan and its partners. The ONI also noted that 2027 is the year by which Xi has ordered the People’s Liberation Army’s “military modernization” be complete.   

“The survival of Taiwan’s democracy is a critical geostrategic issue that carries long-term consequences for China, the U.S., and the broader international community,” the ONI said, but “the China problem is not all about Taiwan,” noting that all of China’s neighbors, both on land and sea, are facing military, economic and diplomatic pressures from Beijing which would be extremely hard to hold at bay individually. The briefing noted ten geographic areas where China is actively challenging borders and territory, and it is increasingly characterizing itself as an “arctic nation” with rights to exploit resources in that area.

The ONI also noted that China controls 40 percent of the world commercial shipbuilding market, with 50 domestic drydocks that can accommodate an aircraft carrier.

However, the ONI noted that both Washington and Beijing have similar self-assessments regarding their military and political capabilities of each other. Both countries perceive that their military deterrent “is eroding or failing.” In response, the U.S. is “taking major actions to enhance perceived shortfalls,” while China is “concerned with its own deterrence strength and lack of effectiveness to date.”

Both sides’ deterrence actions “will lead to responses likely to be interpreted by both sides in the most threatening terms, based on long-held perceptions,” the ONI said. The outcome “may be shifting key timelines, more assertive efforts to signal and show resolve, and systemic instability.” In other words, both sides will be building up to hold the other at bay, and inflate the chances for miscalculation.

The ONI pushed for a relentless communications campaign against China, noting that “people, publics, [and] elites are more easily swayed and misled than assumed. China is succeeding in muddying the already-mistrusted infosphere with conspiracy theories and misinformation, making it harder for decision-makers and citizens to “connect the dots.” The U.S. must “operate” in the information environment employing “both surgical and broad info ‘fires’” to get its message through, the ONI said.

The U.S. is putting all its effort into physical capabilities to deter China, but has a “gap” in shaping its message, which is the foundation of deterrence, the ONI said. China excels in this area, and must be challenged, it said. China views the tension “as the norm” and engages in it every day, Studeman noted. The U.S. has to adopt a similar pace to match its adversary, ONI said.

Misinformation is “filling vacuums” when the real facts are not pushed front and center, Studeman said. The report notes “whoever frames the narrative, dominates the narrative.”

C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

Airmen recently tested new chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) gear that would replace gas masks and hoods designed decades ago for aircrew aboard transports, tankers, and other aircraft that don’t feature ejection seats.

The new gear was rolled out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on June 5 and announced in a press release a month later.

“We felt that we were overdue an update,” said Master Sgt. Diego Cancino, Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) flight chief with the 445th Operations Support Squadron, in the press release. “The new mask system is a breath of fresh air for both AFE as the equipment maintainers and aircrew as the end user.” 

The old Mask Breath Unit-19P Aircrew Eye and Respiratory Protection (AERP) was no favorite among Airmen. “It’s like flying a plane while wearing a thick garbage bag over your entire body,” said one C-17 pilot, who spoke to Air & Space Forces Magazine but asked not to be identified. “It’s hot, fogs up, is a major situational awareness drainer and in my opinion incredibly unsafe to use in flight.”

That pilot has yet to try the new M69 system. But Tech Sgt. Conner Odom, of the 60th Operational Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, Calif, was elated after it trying it in December. “This equipment is light-years ahead of the legacy AERP,” he said.

m69
U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Mark Kim, 60th Operation Support Squadron aircrew flight equipment technician, models the new M69 Joint Service Aircrew Mask Strategic Aircraft assembly at Travis Air Force Base, California, Nov. 2, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Nicholas Pilch)

Officials say it is cooler to wear, less bulky, and has a better field of vision.  It’s also much easier to put on. Odom said aircrew can spend 10 minutes wrestling their way into the old full-body AERP, but it takes just 10 seconds to don the new M69 mask and only two minutes to put on the full suit. “In a CBRN environment, there isn’t going to be a lot of time to react,” Odom said, so speed is crucial.

Aircrews first started trying the M69 about 2018, when HH-60G Pave Hawk and UH-1N Huey aviators tested it at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. In 2019, C-130J aviators at Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark., conducted operational testing. At the time, Tech. Sgt. Benjamin Leis, of Little Rock’s 19th Operations Support Squadron, said “I think we’re in a far better situation for aircrew protection and the ability to maintain operations in contested environments with this piece of equipment.” He also thought it would be easier to teach others to use.

Now, four years later, 20,273 masks have been fielded and the Air Force will soon declare full operational capability, perhaps by 2024, according to a Wright-Patterson release. That sets “a new standard with system deployment,” said 1st Lt. Gunnar Kral, lead engineer for Joint Aircrew CBRN Protection.

But What About the Planes?

Yet while the M69 system better protects aircrew, what’s less clear is how to protect and, if necessary, decontaminate exposed planes. The C-17 pilot who spoke with Air & Space Forces Magazine flagged this issue as one of ongoing concern.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Joint Biological Agent Decontamination System (JBADS) gained favor for decontaminating aircraft against the virus. Ground crews built temporary shelters around the aircraft and then pumped it full of hot air, killing any lingering virus. 

“JBADS uses high temperatures of 140 to 180 degrees Fahrenheit and controlled humidity levels to eliminate contaminants in an enclosed environment without harming aircraft systems,” the Air Force Research Laboratory wrote of JBADS during the pandemic. “The system enables full decontamination of an entire aircraft.”

But chemical, radiological or nuclear exposure may not be affected by that treatment. JBADS also requires specialized equipment not widely available to most commands. Air Force doctrine recognizes that CBRN exposure could “significantly degrade the rate of force deployment” as aircraft are removed from use, according to Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-40, “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations.” “Until large-frame aircraft decontamination is technically feasible, contaminated aircraft should be segregated from the airlift flow.”

If aircraft have to land at contaminated airfields, commanders may need to establish a site for crew and cargo in between clean and contaminated aircraft, a necessity that would delay time-sensitive deliveries and may not be feasible except in emergencies. Host nations may also object to landing contaminated aircraft in their territory.

“Until internationally recognized standards and legal requirements for acceptable decontamination levels are established, nations may deny transit and overflight rights to contaminated aircraft or cargo,” the publication said.

The C-17 pilot wondered what circumstances might require flying into an exposed area.

“I cannot foresee a scenario,” he said, “where the Air Force would knowingly sacrifice a $220 million jet by purposely flying it into a contaminated environment.”  

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

Russian fighters dropped flares in front of U.S. MQ-9s over Syria on two consecutive days in escalating tactics intended to disrupt U.S. operations in “a new level” of aggressive behavior by Russian forces, according to U.S. officials.

On July 5 at around 10:40 am local time, three U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones on a mission against ISIS targets were intercepted by three Russian Su-35 fighter jets, which began “harassing” maneuvers, according to U.S. military officials. Then at 9:30 am local time on July 6, Russian Su-34 and Su-35 fighters again intercepted two MQ-9s conducting another anti-ISIS mission.

“These events represent another example of unprofessional and unsafe actions by Russian air forces operating in Syria, which threaten the safety of both Coalition and Russian forces,” Air Forces Central commander Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich said in July 6 statement. Grynkweich condemned Russia’s “dangerous behaviors.”

In the first incident, the Russian fighters dropped parachute flares in front of the MQ-9s, U.S. officials said. The actions forced drone operators to conduct “evasive maneuvers,” according to Grynkewich. A Russian fighter also flew in front of a U.S. MQ-9 and engaged his engine’s afterburner, “increasing speed and air pressure, [the maneuver] reduced the MQ-9 operator’s ability to safely operate the aircraft,” AFCENT said.

The incident was the latest in a series of Russian maneuvers intended to disrupt U.S. drone operations. The Reapers can carry weapons in addition to their native intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. On-board cameras captured the encounter in detail. The U.S. Department of Defense swiftly declassified and released a compilation video late July 5.

The next morning, a Su-34 and a Su-35 dropped flares in front of an MQ-9s while another MQ-9 recorded the incident. The Russian fighters “flew dangerously close, endangering the safety of all aircraft involved,” Grynkewich said in a July 6 statement. The Pentagon also released video of the second incident.

In March, a Russian Su-27 collided with an American MQ-9 over the Black Sea while two Su-27s were trying to harass the American drone. The U.S. declassified drone footage at that time as well. Separately, Chinese fighters harassed a U.S. RC-135 over the South China Sea in May. Such incidents increase the risk of accidents.

Grynkewich and other U.S. military officials have raised alarm over Russian behavior in Syria in recent months, which one U.S. official previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine might be an attempt to “engender an international incident.” After a pause in Russian air activity near U.S. positions over the winter, Russian warplanes resumed regularly overflying U.S. positions in Syria in March. The U.S. positions in Syria also came under deadly attack from Iranian-backed militias the same month.

The U.S. first bolstered its air presence with A-10s, which arrived in late March and have been modified from regular Warthogs to carry small-diameter bombs and other precision munitions. U.S. actions also included a recent training mission in which B-1 bombers fired a long-range JASSM cruise missile and were escorted by allied air forces. Most pointedly, the U.S. rushed F-22s Raptors to the region in mid-June in direct response to recent Russian actions, which does not seem to have made a lasting impact on Moscow’s pilots.

“Russian forces continue to display unsafe and unprofessional behavior in the air,” Army Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, said July 5. “Their regular violation of agreed upon airspace deconfliction measures increases the risk of escalation or miscalculation.”

F-22s were sometimes used in the past to escort the U.S. strike missions on ISIS militants in northeast Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the anti-ISIS campaign, because of the threat from Russian planes, but the U.S. has diminished airpower presence in the region to focus more on the Pacific and Europe since the ISIS self-declared caliphate was defeated. AFCENT currently has around two and a half squadrons of fourth-generation F-16s and F-15Es fighters, as well as A-10s and MQ-9s based in the region.

The U.S. has around 900 troops in Syria to assist its Kurdish allies in fighting the remnants of ISIS. Russia is supporting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. In a recent conference call with reporters, Grynkewich said that Russians have continued to violate mutually agreed upon deconfliction protocols designed to reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict in Syria and keep the two sides’ air forces separate in eastern Syria. Since the spring, Air Forces Central has noted that Russia has gotten as close to 500 feet from manned U.S. aircraft and regularly overflown U.S. troops dozens of times.

A Russian Ministry of Defense official, Oleg Gurinov, said U.S. coalition drones were spotted flying over an area where Russian and Assad regime forces were conducting drills.

“We remind that the Russian side bears no responsibility for the safety of flight of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which were not agreed with the Russian side,” Gurinov said according to the state-owned TASS news agency.

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder dismissed Russian accounts in a July 6 briefing, which was conducted before the second incident was announced.

“We have been in Syria for many years now fighting ISIS as part of an international coalition,” Ryder said. “That is no surprise to anyone.”

“To suggest that somehow, you know, this is our fault, it’s ridiculous,” Ryder added.

Russian actions are not just limited to U.S. aircraft. A Russian Su-35 also maneuvered July 6 close to two French Rafale aircraft as they flew near the Iraqi-Syrian border. “The pilots maneuvered in order to control the risk of an accident before continuing their patrol,” the French military said in a tweet.

Grynkewich has repeatedly questioned Russia’s motives, saying they undermine American efforts to defeat the remnants of ISIS—a goal Russia ostensibly supports.

“We urge Russian forces in Syria to cease this reckless behavior and adhere to the standards of behavior expected of a professional air force so we can resume our focus on the enduring defeat of ISIS,” Grynkewich said. “The safety of military personnel and the success of the mission against ISIS depend on the professional and responsible conduct of all forces operating in the region.”

Editor’s Note: This story was updated with details of a second incident between U.S. and Russian aircraft.

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

Q&A with Air Force Reserve Col. Tri Trinh (ret.) and Navy Reserve Senior Chief Petty Officer Alex Antrim (ret.).

Q: What was your personal experience as a member of the military, and what made you look into non-CAC authentication alternatives? 

Tri:

In 2019, I was a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve on full-time military orders working at the Pentagon under the Secretary of the Air Force Chief Data Office. I helped deploy the Air Force Connect enterprise mobile app as a Spark Tank project. AF Connect had a CAC feature that used a mobile CAC reader and physical Common Access Card (CAC) to authenticate into CAC-enabled sites. The footprint of a mobile CAC reader and CAC card sticking out of a phone and tablet got old fast.

With the YubiKey from Yubico, I was able to use the DISA Purebred Registration Application to enroll and provision my YubiKey with my CAC certificates and PIN.

I was dual-hatted as a Squadron Commander at the time with a government issued iPhone. I turned in my government iPhone and used my personal phone to access .mil email. Having to carry an extra phone for email when I already had access with a YubiKey was a burden I didn’t need, so it really made my life easier. 

Alex:

As a Navy Reservist, I was not issued a government laptop or mobile device to perform military-based tasks. Reservists have to rely on their own devices when not in drilling status.  This meant buying my own smart card reader – sometimes more than one –  so I could use my CAC. With varying USB connections on my devices, it was hard to keep the right dongles at the ready. 

When I found out that YubiKeys were approved to hold DoD-issued credentials, similar to my CAC, I jumped at the chance to put one to use. I was able to find a Purebred agent in my Navy Reserve unit that helped provision my FIPS YubiKey with Purebred credentials. I was instantly impressed with how easy the YubiKey was used to authenticate into the Navy workstations in my unit’s computer lab.  When I plugged the YubiKey into the Navy desktop computer, it saw the credentials, asked for PIN, and I was logged into the workstation.

I had the same easy experience with YubiKey on my personal laptop, so I could check email and attend Teams meetings in between drill weekends. The last test was for my personal mobile phone which was successful too. I was able to shelve my smart card readers and get to work. 

How has authentication changed in the armed forces, and where do you see it going in the next decade?

Alex: 

The military is often slow to move on new authentication standards, so other than the shift from CAC credentials to the PIV standard (aligning with the federal government’s PKI), service members must still rely on smart cards to authenticate to devices and services. However, I can confirm people at high levels are looking closely at the most up-to-date FIDO2 standard and are working through testing. I hope and expect that soon there will be an approval document coming from the DoD CIO office. Flexibility is going to be really important to service members. A uniformed person should not have to worry about multiple CAC readers or what device is within reach.  All they need to have is their provisioned YubiKey, plug it into their device, and conduct business as usual.

Tri: 

The good news is that YubiKey is a multi-protocol authenticator, so it can closely follow the evolution path that DoD is on. Once DoD gives the green light on deploying FIDO2 credentials for stronger authentication, YubiKey is already FIDO2 compliant and the transition should be seamless. 

How does a hardware-based authentication device like the YubiKey make service members’ lives easier? 

Alex:

One important and positive difference between the YubiKey and the CAC is that no identifying and amplifying information is on the YubiKey. The CAC is instantly recognizable around the world as a form of identification for members of the U.S. Armed Services.  Service members serving overseas are taught to blend in and not draw attention to themselves (for good reason). But try doing that when a DoD identification card is hanging out of a laptop or mobile phone when you’re in public at a coffee shop! If it’s a dongle, or something larger like a reader, there’s a much higher likelihood that it breaks. A low profile device like the YubiKey ends up being a huge value-add to those serving outside the continental US. 

Tri: 

Definitely agree. And there are a number of other reasons you might want more flexibility and speed when you’re overseas. For example, you only get one CAC – if you lose it, you’re looking at weeks of downtime while you struggle to get a new one issued. But if you have a backup YubiKey in your kit, and you’re able to authenticate with it, you’ve solved that problem. Even if you don’t have a backup handy, getting a replacement can be done same-day, plus some shipping time, as you won’t have to go through the CAC-replacement channels. 

Speaking of “low profile,” are there other security concerns service members have that are avoided when you can authenticate without a reader? 

Alex: 

Well, as I mentioned, the port connections on different devices and laptops often require more readers than one person wants to carry while traveling or working in a non-military-base environment. Some readers have even been known to carry malware, as they are not required to have the same compliance checks as a YubiKey. So if a service member unwittingly gets a reader from some unauthorized provider, there’s a significant risk that it could be compromised and create a vulnerability. 

Tri: 

Right. CAC remains a very secure channel for authentication, especially when it’s used at sanctioned workstations or on base. When you’re talking about gaining access to a military installation, or proof of eligibility for healthcare and military benefits (e.g. commissary, BX/PX/NEX, billeting), then you’re still going to go with CAC. It’s not going anywhere.

But we live in a much more mobile work environment world than we did 20 years ago. So it’s worth discussing how we can augment current authentication in different contexts, especially mobile environments. How do we add value and make things easier to use for the rank-and-file servicemember who may be working at multiple sites, that’s what we’re working on improving. 

What other applications would strong non-CAC authentication have, the ones we may not immediately think about? 

Alex: 

I think mission partners are something to consider. The military works with so many mission partners that don’t have CAC-enabled ability to authenticate securely. 

DoD wants to maintain secure coalition networks for intelligence and data sharing with mission partners. Those networks often bring new authentication challenges. FIDO2 is an option to bring phishing-resistant MFA to non-CAC eligible mission partners that need to securely authenticate into a coalition network. 

Tri: 

There’s another benefit for those who have already served. If you’re working with a hardware-based key like a YubiKey, that can be carried with you once you are discharged from the service. So even after you no longer have a CAC, you can use a YubiKey to log on to VA services, the IRS, or other federal and state agencies that support FIDO2. 

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

The Pentagon is moving to block Chinese and Russian organizations from obtaining U.S. technology secrets through academia, according to a Department of Defense memo made public on June 30.

The memo, signed by Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, lists more than 80 Chinese and Russian academic, scientific, engineering, or cultural institutions that have engaged in “problematic activity” geared at improperly gaining access to classified U.S. research or influencing teaching staff or students. The memo is a response to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which sought a Pentagon response to foreign intelligence exploitation of U.S. academic institutions.

The memo requires a review of new research contracts and prohibits Pentagon money going to projects that involve one of the blacklisted entities, based on their previous track record in harvesting U.S. technology secrets, or simply having suspect relationships with Chinese and Russian intelligence organizations.  

Those on the list have “been confirmed as engaging in problematic activity as described in Section 1286 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended,” the Pentagon said. “These include practices and behaviors that increase the likelihood that DOD-funded research and development efforts will be misappropriated to the detriment of national or economic security or be subject to violations of research integrity or foreign government interference.”

The listing of “these foreign entities underscores our commitment to ensuring the responsible use of federal research funding and safeguarding our critical technologies from exploitation or compromise,” said Shyu in releasing the memo.

The goal of the memo and policy is three-fold, Shyu said:

  • To ensure the security of DOD-funded fundamental research
  • To ensure that participants in sensitive research “fully disclose information that can reveal potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment”
  • To provide “clear messaging” to those doing fundamental research about what constitutes “acceptable and encouraged behaviors” as well as activities “that may lead to challenges in securing DOD research funding.”  

Along with the suspect “foreign entities” list, the Pentagon posted a “Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research,” which now requires that any basic research funded by the Defense Department “go through a review for potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment rising from foreign influence.” The policy includes a template for DOD program managers to follow in awarding contracts for research, to help them spot “signs of potential foreign influence and appropriately mitigate risk.”

The Pentagon “encourages academic institutions, industry partners, and the public to review the list and exercise caution when engaging with entities listed,” Shyu said.

China and Russia have both engaged in long-term cyber espionage, stealing technology secrets from U.S. companies, and the new effort is aimed at thwarting similar efforts through colleges and universities.

Not all of the targeted institutions are focused solely on direct espionage. One, the “Confucius Institutes,” awards scholarships to students in a variety of academic fields and offers free Chinese language lessons, along with free trips to China to students with desirable knowledge. The Heritage Foundation described the Confucius Institute as a “Trojan Horse,” seeking to convince American students and professors that China is a benign actor and a potentially constructive partner in research, when actually, Heritage said, it is part of a “soft power” campaign to encourage research organizations to share sensitive knowledge with China.

The Confucius Institute has satellite locations on scores of U.S. university campuses, but the new guidelines say that from 2024 forward, no American college or university with a Confucius Institute presence can receive Pentagon research money without a detailed waiver.  

Other organizations on the list have lent or granted money to research organizations and universities, in exchange for access to the results of defense-oriented research.  

The Government Accountability Office identified the practices of these suspect entities in a 2020 report and urged the Pentagon to put policies in place that would protect U.S. research and researchers from hostile entities posing as scientific benefactors.

Shyu and her recent predecessors have pushed for greater Pentagon-academic partnerships to address technology challenges that could have commercial benefit to the U.S. economy, as well as military-only challenges that could make headway with funding or resources supplied by the DOD. Hypersonics testing capabilities are among those the Pentagon is setting up at academic institutions.   

The FBI has reported an uptick in recent years of Chinese and Russian research organizations attempting to recruit agents in the scientific community, or inducing them to sell or share their work, or research to which they have access.

Classified Information Regulations Need Improvement, DOD Finds

Classified Information Regulations Need Improvement, DOD Finds

After the Department of Defense conducted a 45-day review of its classified information programs, policies, and procedures, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said the “overwhelming majority” of DOD personnel with access to classified information are “trustworthy” in a memo released on July 5. However, the DOD still needs to improve how it handles classified information by clarifying its regulations, Austin wrote.

The review was ordered after Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira, a Massachusetts Air National Guardsman, allegedly shared a trove of classified documents on the war in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and Middle East military theaters, and other sensitive subjects on an online group chat.

The review “identified areas where we can and must improve accountability measures to prevent the compromise of [Classified National Security Information], to include addressing insider threats.”

A senior defense official who requested anonymity told reporters on July 5 that the 45-day review did not delve into the specifics of Teixeira’s case, which is still being investigated. Instead, the review focused on “umbrella-level of department policies and procedures,” the official said.

The senior defense official said one of the most important findings was that the Department of Defense needs to establish a consistent way for low-level security managers to stay in touch with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and vice-versa. That kind of two-way dialogue is essential for continuous vetting, a process whereby the background of a cleared individual is regularly reviewed.

“As we’ve transitioned to continuous vetting, we need to get to that local area security manager and make sure they understand what is available to them, what information they can have on their personnel, how important that accountability relationship is,” the official said.

Beyond fostering a dialogue with DCSA, the Department of Defense also needs to clarify its standards for handling classified information, the official said. These standards, which vary between organizations and between different varieties of classified information, can be difficult to keep straight, the official said.

“As someone who’s read a lot of DOD policies, they are not the clearest documents always,” the official said. “I am not surprised that as they’ve layered on top of each other … and as this complex classified information environment has grown, that there’s a need to make sure that we are looking at them from a stand-back distance to make sure they’re understandable and that our workforce can use them to the best of their ability.”

Ambiguity can lead to inconsistency in how standards are applied. One example the official referred to is a requirement for top secret control officers, who are responsible for “receiving, dispatching and maintaining accountability of all Top Secret documents” according to Air Force regulations. The senior defense official said public-facing policy states that top secret control officers are optional, but other policies state that they are mandatory, which can cause confusion.

“Then if you get into what is a reportable offense and who you have to report it to … some of that is also confusing,” the official said. “If you’re a local level security manager managing a joint unit for example, who do you report it to, how do you do all of that?”

The official said clear regulations are especially needed to keep pace with a growing number of locations where classified materials are handled. Besides the large, highly-fortified facilities like the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency, there is a growing number of smaller facilities which require unique ways of keeping classified information secure, she said.

Instead of a single point of failure, the official said that multiple factors contribute to security incidents. The 45-day review provided a chance “to make sure that we looked at this as quickly as possible to make sure that we made the improvements that we could quickly” as the Teixeira investigation continues, the official said. That kind of self-assessment is in line with industry best practices for mitigating insider threats.

“If there were a perfect solution for this, I’d be out of a job,” Daniel Costa, technical manager of enterprise threat and vulnerability management at The National Insider Threat Center at Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute, told Air & Space Forces Magazine in April.

“There’s an inherent risk that comes along with doing business,” he added. “What we’re talking about is human nature, and thinking about insider threats as an inherent risk to organizations requires real careful planning and organization-wide participation to reduce that risk to acceptable levels.”

Besides the 45-day military-wide review, the Department of the Air Force is conducting a review of its policies regarding classified information and an Inspector General review of security practices at Teixeira’s unit, the 102nd Intelligence Wing

In his June 30 memo, Austin also directed all Department of Defense component heads to take a range of steps meant to ensure that Department of Defense personnel are assigned to a Security Management Office; that military Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) comply with Intelligence Community Directive requirements; that all SCIFs and Special Access Program Facilities (SAPFs) are accounted for in a centralized tracking system; that personal or portable electronic device use is prohibited in those facilities; that Top Secret Control Officers are required for top secret information; and that a Joint Management Office for Insider Threat and Cyber Capabilities is established for monitoring threats and user activity across all military networks.

To enhance communication with the DSCA, Austin directed the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security, Ronald S. Moultrie, to make a plan for analyzing training needs; examining or improving how to make continuous vetting information more readily available, and optimizing tools for sharing that information within the military. Many of the deadlines for taking these steps fall between July 31 and December 31 of this year.

Both Austin and the senior defense official expressed a desire to avoid overcorrecting by placing unnecessarily restrictive policies on information sharing as the military works out better practices for handling that information.

“The Department is mindful of the need to balance information security with [the] requirement to get the right information to the right people at the right time to enhance our national security,” according to a fact sheet on the security review provided to the media.

Air Force Tests New Drone Airspace Management System

Air Force Tests New Drone Airspace Management System

Deconflicting airspace was rarely a problem in the early days of Predator drones, but today the number and types of drones is rapidly expanding, with some that can be carried in backpacks and others that lift off vertically. That makes managing airspace a challenge.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James C. McConville complained about the “industrial age” system for deconflicting crewed aircraft, drones, and surface-to-surface rockets during an exercise last winter. Air Force officials told Air & Space Forces Magazine soon after that the Army and Air Force were working to develop a better approach in the future.

Now the Air Force has a CLUE about what that future looks like: the Collaborative Low-Altitude UAS Integration Effort, a product of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Information Directorate and AFWERX, AFRL’s innovation directorate. The new UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system was installed at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

“Airspace management will play a key role for the future of air mobility,” Darshan Divakaran, AFWERX’s head of airspace innovation and partnerships said in a June 29 news release.

Located at Eglin’s Duke Field, the UTM system seeks to prove that “current “air traffic management systems can ensure complete safety as drones and electric vertical takeoff and landing [eVTOL] aircraft take flight,” according to the Air Force.

Eglin’s 413th Flight Test Squadron is responsible for evaluating and testing the commercial CLUE system, AFWERX said. “The testing will focus on evaluating the UTMs’ capabilities for deconfliction, communication, and security, as well as low-altitude weather and beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations.”

Eglin is the primary proving ground, but testing also will take place elsewhere, AFWERX said. The Air Force is also working with Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, and NASA in seeking to maintain tracks on the small UASs at altitudes up to 12,000 feet .

Future testing at Eglin will involve a variety of UASs under 70 pounds, a size that will allow the drones to “fly more often and with fewer restrictions,” according to Maj. Riley Livermore of 413th Flight Test Squadron. The Air Force then hopes to start testing how electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, larger drones, and other aircraft can be operated together.

The CLUE system at Eglin has been used to “track two to three simulated uncrewed systems operating in their designated airspace along with live, manned air traffic,” said Brooke Ezell of AFWERX. “This provided a really helpful picture for how manned and uncrewed air traffic can coexist safely.”

Thousands of Airmen Spread Across Pacific in Massive Mobility Exercise

Thousands of Airmen Spread Across Pacific in Massive Mobility Exercise

The U.S. and its allies kicked off a massive air exercise, Mobility Guardian, on July 5 in the Indo-Pacific region. Run by Air Mobility Command, the highly anticipated exercise has been billed as one of the most critical Air Force drills of the year, with 3,000 personnel directly supporting the exercise and 70 aircraft participating. As the Department of Defense shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific, logistics will be key to enabling the U.S. military to be ready to fight thousands of miles away from the continental U.S.

“This year’s MG23 reflects an evolution from the exercise’s previous three U.S.-based iterations and aims to understand and overcome distance to deliver the mobilization, deployment, and sustainment functions that the Joint Force, allies, and partners depend on to respond to challenges worldwide,” AMC said in a news release.

Participating allies include Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in a training event that spans 3,000 miles and runs non-stop until July 21.

The exercise “will turn planned integration into operational integration within the theater,” said Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, in a statement. Mobility Air Forces, he added, would stretch “to meet future demands and protect shared international interests with our allies and partners.”

Preparations for Mobility Guardian have been underway for more than a year. The biennial exercise, first launched in 2017, had previously been limited to the continental U.S. The 2023 edition is the “largest full-spectrum readiness exercise in AMC, which dates back to 1992. The exercise will support 15,000 U.S. forces and serve as “cohesive glue” for Air Force drills throughout the Pacific, the command said.

To reach its operating locations for the exercise, a Royal Air Force A400 flew over 20 hours nonstop from the U.K. to Guam, a record sortie for A400. The RAF said its participation in the exercise marks a “strategic demonstration of the UK’s commitment to operate in the region.”

“AMC’s role in enabling the meaningful maneuver of forces throughout the theater underscores the necessity of logistics and realistic interoperability in the region,” the command said.

Airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, command and control, and humanitarian and disaster assistance missions will all be exercised over the coming weeks. Minihan, was previously deputy commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has been focused on preparing his Airmen for a possible fight with China—sometimes landing in hot water for bellicose language.

But Minihan’s command noted that Mobility Air Forces (MAF) are vital to any future U.S. military operations in the Pacific, which would require airlifting troops and supplies and tanker refueling to allow the Air Force and other services to operate over vast distances.

“This is a proving ground for the MAF’s new status quo tested through the application of flexible and agile concepts,” said Lt. Col. Jake Parker, Mobility Guardian exercise director.

Minihan previewed the exercise at AFA’s Warfare Symposium in March, making clear Mobility Guardian is intended to be a learning experience.

“Some things won’t go perfect,” he said then. “We’ll go back and we’ll work harder to get it and we’ll close gaps as quick as we can.”