C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

July 6, 2023 | By David Roza

Airmen recently tested new chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) gear that would replace gas masks and hoods designed decades ago for aircrew aboard transports, tankers, and other aircraft that don’t feature ejection seats.

The new gear was rolled out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on June 5 and announced in a press release a month later.

“We felt that we were overdue an update,” said Master Sgt. Diego Cancino, Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) flight chief with the 445th Operations Support Squadron, in the press release. “The new mask system is a breath of fresh air for both AFE as the equipment maintainers and aircrew as the end user.” 

The old Mask Breath Unit-19P Aircrew Eye and Respiratory Protection (AERP) was no favorite among Airmen. “It’s like flying a plane while wearing a thick garbage bag over your entire body,” said one C-17 pilot, who spoke to Air & Space Forces Magazine but asked not to be identified. “It’s hot, fogs up, is a major situational awareness drainer and in my opinion incredibly unsafe to use in flight.”

That pilot has yet to try the new M69 system. But Tech Sgt. Conner Odom, of the 60th Operational Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, Calif, was elated after it trying it in December. “This equipment is light-years ahead of the legacy AERP,” he said.

m69
U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Mark Kim, 60th Operation Support Squadron aircrew flight equipment technician, models the new M69 Joint Service Aircrew Mask Strategic Aircraft assembly at Travis Air Force Base, California, Nov. 2, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Nicholas Pilch)

Officials say it is cooler to wear, less bulky, and has a better field of vision.  It’s also much easier to put on. Odom said aircrew can spend 10 minutes wrestling their way into the old full-body AERP, but it takes just 10 seconds to don the new M69 mask and only two minutes to put on the full suit. “In a CBRN environment, there isn’t going to be a lot of time to react,” Odom said, so speed is crucial.

Aircrews first started trying the M69 about 2018, when HH-60G Pave Hawk and UH-1N Huey aviators tested it at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. In 2019, C-130J aviators at Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark., conducted operational testing. At the time, Tech. Sgt. Benjamin Leis, of Little Rock’s 19th Operations Support Squadron, said “I think we’re in a far better situation for aircrew protection and the ability to maintain operations in contested environments with this piece of equipment.” He also thought it would be easier to teach others to use.

Now, four years later, 20,273 masks have been fielded and the Air Force will soon declare full operational capability, perhaps by 2024, according to a Wright-Patterson release. That sets “a new standard with system deployment,” said 1st Lt. Gunnar Kral, lead engineer for Joint Aircrew CBRN Protection.

But What About the Planes?

Yet while the M69 system better protects aircrew, what’s less clear is how to protect and, if necessary, decontaminate exposed planes. The C-17 pilot who spoke with Air & Space Forces Magazine flagged this issue as one of ongoing concern.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Joint Biological Agent Decontamination System (JBADS) gained favor for decontaminating aircraft against the virus. Ground crews built temporary shelters around the aircraft and then pumped it full of hot air, killing any lingering virus. 

“JBADS uses high temperatures of 140 to 180 degrees Fahrenheit and controlled humidity levels to eliminate contaminants in an enclosed environment without harming aircraft systems,” the Air Force Research Laboratory wrote of JBADS during the pandemic. “The system enables full decontamination of an entire aircraft.”

But chemical, radiological or nuclear exposure may not be affected by that treatment. JBADS also requires specialized equipment not widely available to most commands. Air Force doctrine recognizes that CBRN exposure could “significantly degrade the rate of force deployment” as aircraft are removed from use, according to Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-40, “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations.” “Until large-frame aircraft decontamination is technically feasible, contaminated aircraft should be segregated from the airlift flow.”

If aircraft have to land at contaminated airfields, commanders may need to establish a site for crew and cargo in between clean and contaminated aircraft, a necessity that would delay time-sensitive deliveries and may not be feasible except in emergencies. Host nations may also object to landing contaminated aircraft in their territory.

“Until internationally recognized standards and legal requirements for acceptable decontamination levels are established, nations may deny transit and overflight rights to contaminated aircraft or cargo,” the publication said.

The C-17 pilot wondered what circumstances might require flying into an exposed area.

“I cannot foresee a scenario,” he said, “where the Air Force would knowingly sacrifice a $220 million jet by purposely flying it into a contaminated environment.”  

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

July 6, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Russian fighters dropped flares in front of U.S. MQ-9s over Syria on two consecutive days in escalating tactics intended to disrupt U.S. operations in “a new level” of aggressive behavior by Russian forces, according to U.S. officials.

On July 5 at around 10:40 am local time, three U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones on a mission against ISIS targets were intercepted by three Russian Su-35 fighter jets, which began “harassing” maneuvers, according to U.S. military officials. Then at 9:30 am local time on July 6, Russian Su-34 and Su-35 fighters again intercepted two MQ-9s conducting another anti-ISIS mission.

“These events represent another example of unprofessional and unsafe actions by Russian air forces operating in Syria, which threaten the safety of both Coalition and Russian forces,” Air Forces Central commander Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich said in July 6 statement. Grynkweich condemned Russia’s “dangerous behaviors.”

In the first incident, the Russian fighters dropped parachute flares in front of the MQ-9s, U.S. officials said. The actions forced drone operators to conduct “evasive maneuvers,” according to Grynkewich. A Russian fighter also flew in front of a U.S. MQ-9 and engaged his engine’s afterburner, “increasing speed and air pressure, [the maneuver] reduced the MQ-9 operator’s ability to safely operate the aircraft,” AFCENT said.

The incident was the latest in a series of Russian maneuvers intended to disrupt U.S. drone operations. The Reapers can carry weapons in addition to their native intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. On-board cameras captured the encounter in detail. The U.S. Department of Defense swiftly declassified and released a compilation video late July 5.

The next morning, a Su-34 and a Su-35 dropped flares in front of an MQ-9s while another MQ-9 recorded the incident. The Russian fighters “flew dangerously close, endangering the safety of all aircraft involved,” Grynkewich said in a July 6 statement. The Pentagon also released video of the second incident.

In March, a Russian Su-27 collided with an American MQ-9 over the Black Sea while two Su-27s were trying to harass the American drone. The U.S. declassified drone footage at that time as well. Separately, Chinese fighters harassed a U.S. RC-135 over the South China Sea in May. Such incidents increase the risk of accidents.

Grynkewich and other U.S. military officials have raised alarm over Russian behavior in Syria in recent months, which one U.S. official previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine might be an attempt to “engender an international incident.” After a pause in Russian air activity near U.S. positions over the winter, Russian warplanes resumed regularly overflying U.S. positions in Syria in March. The U.S. positions in Syria also came under deadly attack from Iranian-backed militias the same month.

The U.S. first bolstered its air presence with A-10s, which arrived in late March and have been modified from regular Warthogs to carry small-diameter bombs and other precision munitions. U.S. actions also included a recent training mission in which B-1 bombers fired a long-range JASSM cruise missile and were escorted by allied air forces. Most pointedly, the U.S. rushed F-22s Raptors to the region in mid-June in direct response to recent Russian actions, which does not seem to have made a lasting impact on Moscow’s pilots.

“Russian forces continue to display unsafe and unprofessional behavior in the air,” Army Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, said July 5. “Their regular violation of agreed upon airspace deconfliction measures increases the risk of escalation or miscalculation.”

F-22s were sometimes used in the past to escort the U.S. strike missions on ISIS militants in northeast Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the anti-ISIS campaign, because of the threat from Russian planes, but the U.S. has diminished airpower presence in the region to focus more on the Pacific and Europe since the ISIS self-declared caliphate was defeated. AFCENT currently has around two and a half squadrons of fourth-generation F-16s and F-15Es fighters, as well as A-10s and MQ-9s based in the region.

The U.S. has around 900 troops in Syria to assist its Kurdish allies in fighting the remnants of ISIS. Russia is supporting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. In a recent conference call with reporters, Grynkewich said that Russians have continued to violate mutually agreed upon deconfliction protocols designed to reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict in Syria and keep the two sides’ air forces separate in eastern Syria. Since the spring, Air Forces Central has noted that Russia has gotten as close to 500 feet from manned U.S. aircraft and regularly overflown U.S. troops dozens of times.

A Russian Ministry of Defense official, Oleg Gurinov, said U.S. coalition drones were spotted flying over an area where Russian and Assad regime forces were conducting drills.

“We remind that the Russian side bears no responsibility for the safety of flight of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which were not agreed with the Russian side,” Gurinov said according to the state-owned TASS news agency.

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder dismissed Russian accounts in a July 6 briefing, which was conducted before the second incident was announced.

“We have been in Syria for many years now fighting ISIS as part of an international coalition,” Ryder said. “That is no surprise to anyone.”

“To suggest that somehow, you know, this is our fault, it’s ridiculous,” Ryder added.

Russian actions are not just limited to U.S. aircraft. A Russian Su-35 also maneuvered July 6 close to two French Rafale aircraft as they flew near the Iraqi-Syrian border. “The pilots maneuvered in order to control the risk of an accident before continuing their patrol,” the French military said in a tweet.

Grynkewich has repeatedly questioned Russia’s motives, saying they undermine American efforts to defeat the remnants of ISIS—a goal Russia ostensibly supports.

“We urge Russian forces in Syria to cease this reckless behavior and adhere to the standards of behavior expected of a professional air force so we can resume our focus on the enduring defeat of ISIS,” Grynkewich said. “The safety of military personnel and the success of the mission against ISIS depend on the professional and responsible conduct of all forces operating in the region.”

Editor’s Note: This story was updated with details of a second incident between U.S. and Russian aircraft.

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

July 6, 2023

Q&A with Air Force Reserve Col. Tri Trinh (ret.) and Navy Reserve Senior Chief Petty Officer Alex Antrim (ret.).

Q: What was your personal experience as a member of the military, and what made you look into non-CAC authentication alternatives? 

Tri:

In 2019, I was a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve on full-time military orders working at the Pentagon under the Secretary of the Air Force Chief Data Office. I helped deploy the Air Force Connect enterprise mobile app as a Spark Tank project. AF Connect had a CAC feature that used a mobile CAC reader and physical Common Access Card (CAC) to authenticate into CAC-enabled sites. The footprint of a mobile CAC reader and CAC card sticking out of a phone and tablet got old fast.

With the YubiKey from Yubico, I was able to use the DISA Purebred Registration Application to enroll and provision my YubiKey with my CAC certificates and PIN.

I was dual-hatted as a Squadron Commander at the time with a government issued iPhone. I turned in my government iPhone and used my personal phone to access .mil email. Having to carry an extra phone for email when I already had access with a YubiKey was a burden I didn’t need, so it really made my life easier. 

Alex:

As a Navy Reservist, I was not issued a government laptop or mobile device to perform military-based tasks. Reservists have to rely on their own devices when not in drilling status.  This meant buying my own smart card reader – sometimes more than one –  so I could use my CAC. With varying USB connections on my devices, it was hard to keep the right dongles at the ready. 

When I found out that YubiKeys were approved to hold DoD-issued credentials, similar to my CAC, I jumped at the chance to put one to use. I was able to find a Purebred agent in my Navy Reserve unit that helped provision my FIPS YubiKey with Purebred credentials. I was instantly impressed with how easy the YubiKey was used to authenticate into the Navy workstations in my unit’s computer lab.  When I plugged the YubiKey into the Navy desktop computer, it saw the credentials, asked for PIN, and I was logged into the workstation.

I had the same easy experience with YubiKey on my personal laptop, so I could check email and attend Teams meetings in between drill weekends. The last test was for my personal mobile phone which was successful too. I was able to shelve my smart card readers and get to work. 

How has authentication changed in the armed forces, and where do you see it going in the next decade?

Alex: 

The military is often slow to move on new authentication standards, so other than the shift from CAC credentials to the PIV standard (aligning with the federal government’s PKI), service members must still rely on smart cards to authenticate to devices and services. However, I can confirm people at high levels are looking closely at the most up-to-date FIDO2 standard and are working through testing. I hope and expect that soon there will be an approval document coming from the DoD CIO office. Flexibility is going to be really important to service members. A uniformed person should not have to worry about multiple CAC readers or what device is within reach.  All they need to have is their provisioned YubiKey, plug it into their device, and conduct business as usual.

Tri: 

The good news is that YubiKey is a multi-protocol authenticator, so it can closely follow the evolution path that DoD is on. Once DoD gives the green light on deploying FIDO2 credentials for stronger authentication, YubiKey is already FIDO2 compliant and the transition should be seamless. 

How does a hardware-based authentication device like the YubiKey make service members’ lives easier? 

Alex:

One important and positive difference between the YubiKey and the CAC is that no identifying and amplifying information is on the YubiKey. The CAC is instantly recognizable around the world as a form of identification for members of the U.S. Armed Services.  Service members serving overseas are taught to blend in and not draw attention to themselves (for good reason). But try doing that when a DoD identification card is hanging out of a laptop or mobile phone when you’re in public at a coffee shop! If it’s a dongle, or something larger like a reader, there’s a much higher likelihood that it breaks. A low profile device like the YubiKey ends up being a huge value-add to those serving outside the continental US. 

Tri: 

Definitely agree. And there are a number of other reasons you might want more flexibility and speed when you’re overseas. For example, you only get one CAC – if you lose it, you’re looking at weeks of downtime while you struggle to get a new one issued. But if you have a backup YubiKey in your kit, and you’re able to authenticate with it, you’ve solved that problem. Even if you don’t have a backup handy, getting a replacement can be done same-day, plus some shipping time, as you won’t have to go through the CAC-replacement channels. 

Speaking of “low profile,” are there other security concerns service members have that are avoided when you can authenticate without a reader? 

Alex: 

Well, as I mentioned, the port connections on different devices and laptops often require more readers than one person wants to carry while traveling or working in a non-military-base environment. Some readers have even been known to carry malware, as they are not required to have the same compliance checks as a YubiKey. So if a service member unwittingly gets a reader from some unauthorized provider, there’s a significant risk that it could be compromised and create a vulnerability. 

Tri: 

Right. CAC remains a very secure channel for authentication, especially when it’s used at sanctioned workstations or on base. When you’re talking about gaining access to a military installation, or proof of eligibility for healthcare and military benefits (e.g. commissary, BX/PX/NEX, billeting), then you’re still going to go with CAC. It’s not going anywhere.

But we live in a much more mobile work environment world than we did 20 years ago. So it’s worth discussing how we can augment current authentication in different contexts, especially mobile environments. How do we add value and make things easier to use for the rank-and-file servicemember who may be working at multiple sites, that’s what we’re working on improving. 

What other applications would strong non-CAC authentication have, the ones we may not immediately think about? 

Alex: 

I think mission partners are something to consider. The military works with so many mission partners that don’t have CAC-enabled ability to authenticate securely. 

DoD wants to maintain secure coalition networks for intelligence and data sharing with mission partners. Those networks often bring new authentication challenges. FIDO2 is an option to bring phishing-resistant MFA to non-CAC eligible mission partners that need to securely authenticate into a coalition network. 

Tri: 

There’s another benefit for those who have already served. If you’re working with a hardware-based key like a YubiKey, that can be carried with you once you are discharged from the service. So even after you no longer have a CAC, you can use a YubiKey to log on to VA services, the IRS, or other federal and state agencies that support FIDO2. 

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

July 5, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The Pentagon is moving to block Chinese and Russian organizations from obtaining U.S. technology secrets through academia, according to a Department of Defense memo made public on June 30.

The memo, signed by Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, lists more than 80 Chinese and Russian academic, scientific, engineering, or cultural institutions that have engaged in “problematic activity” geared at improperly gaining access to classified U.S. research or influencing teaching staff or students. The memo is a response to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which sought a Pentagon response to foreign intelligence exploitation of U.S. academic institutions.

The memo requires a review of new research contracts and prohibits Pentagon money going to projects that involve one of the blacklisted entities, based on their previous track record in harvesting U.S. technology secrets, or simply having suspect relationships with Chinese and Russian intelligence organizations.  

Those on the list have “been confirmed as engaging in problematic activity as described in Section 1286 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended,” the Pentagon said. “These include practices and behaviors that increase the likelihood that DOD-funded research and development efforts will be misappropriated to the detriment of national or economic security or be subject to violations of research integrity or foreign government interference.”

The listing of “these foreign entities underscores our commitment to ensuring the responsible use of federal research funding and safeguarding our critical technologies from exploitation or compromise,” said Shyu in releasing the memo.

The goal of the memo and policy is three-fold, Shyu said:

  • To ensure the security of DOD-funded fundamental research
  • To ensure that participants in sensitive research “fully disclose information that can reveal potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment”
  • To provide “clear messaging” to those doing fundamental research about what constitutes “acceptable and encouraged behaviors” as well as activities “that may lead to challenges in securing DOD research funding.”  

Along with the suspect “foreign entities” list, the Pentagon posted a “Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research,” which now requires that any basic research funded by the Defense Department “go through a review for potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment rising from foreign influence.” The policy includes a template for DOD program managers to follow in awarding contracts for research, to help them spot “signs of potential foreign influence and appropriately mitigate risk.”

The Pentagon “encourages academic institutions, industry partners, and the public to review the list and exercise caution when engaging with entities listed,” Shyu said.

China and Russia have both engaged in long-term cyber espionage, stealing technology secrets from U.S. companies, and the new effort is aimed at thwarting similar efforts through colleges and universities.

Not all of the targeted institutions are focused solely on direct espionage. One, the “Confucius Institutes,” awards scholarships to students in a variety of academic fields and offers free Chinese language lessons, along with free trips to China to students with desirable knowledge. The Heritage Foundation described the Confucius Institute as a “Trojan Horse,” seeking to convince American students and professors that China is a benign actor and a potentially constructive partner in research, when actually, Heritage said, it is part of a “soft power” campaign to encourage research organizations to share sensitive knowledge with China.

The Confucius Institute has satellite locations on scores of U.S. university campuses, but the new guidelines say that from 2024 forward, no American college or university with a Confucius Institute presence can receive Pentagon research money without a detailed waiver.  

Other organizations on the list have lent or granted money to research organizations and universities, in exchange for access to the results of defense-oriented research.  

The Government Accountability Office identified the practices of these suspect entities in a 2020 report and urged the Pentagon to put policies in place that would protect U.S. research and researchers from hostile entities posing as scientific benefactors.

Shyu and her recent predecessors have pushed for greater Pentagon-academic partnerships to address technology challenges that could have commercial benefit to the U.S. economy, as well as military-only challenges that could make headway with funding or resources supplied by the DOD. Hypersonics testing capabilities are among those the Pentagon is setting up at academic institutions.   

The FBI has reported an uptick in recent years of Chinese and Russian research organizations attempting to recruit agents in the scientific community, or inducing them to sell or share their work, or research to which they have access.

Classified Information Regulations Need Improvement, DOD Finds

Classified Information Regulations Need Improvement, DOD Finds

July 5, 2023 | By David Roza

After the Department of Defense conducted a 45-day review of its classified information programs, policies, and procedures, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said the “overwhelming majority” of DOD personnel with access to classified information are “trustworthy” in a memo released on July 5. However, the DOD still needs to improve how it handles classified information by clarifying its regulations, Austin wrote.

The review was ordered after Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira, a Massachusetts Air National Guardsman, allegedly shared a trove of classified documents on the war in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and Middle East military theaters, and other sensitive subjects on an online group chat.

The review “identified areas where we can and must improve accountability measures to prevent the compromise of [Classified National Security Information], to include addressing insider threats.”

A senior defense official who requested anonymity told reporters on July 5 that the 45-day review did not delve into the specifics of Teixeira’s case, which is still being investigated. Instead, the review focused on “umbrella-level of department policies and procedures,” the official said.

The senior defense official said one of the most important findings was that the Department of Defense needs to establish a consistent way for low-level security managers to stay in touch with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and vice-versa. That kind of two-way dialogue is essential for continuous vetting, a process whereby the background of a cleared individual is regularly reviewed.

“As we’ve transitioned to continuous vetting, we need to get to that local area security manager and make sure they understand what is available to them, what information they can have on their personnel, how important that accountability relationship is,” the official said.

Beyond fostering a dialogue with DCSA, the Department of Defense also needs to clarify its standards for handling classified information, the official said. These standards, which vary between organizations and between different varieties of classified information, can be difficult to keep straight, the official said.

“As someone who’s read a lot of DOD policies, they are not the clearest documents always,” the official said. “I am not surprised that as they’ve layered on top of each other … and as this complex classified information environment has grown, that there’s a need to make sure that we are looking at them from a stand-back distance to make sure they’re understandable and that our workforce can use them to the best of their ability.”

Ambiguity can lead to inconsistency in how standards are applied. One example the official referred to is a requirement for top secret control officers, who are responsible for “receiving, dispatching and maintaining accountability of all Top Secret documents” according to Air Force regulations. The senior defense official said public-facing policy states that top secret control officers are optional, but other policies state that they are mandatory, which can cause confusion.

“Then if you get into what is a reportable offense and who you have to report it to … some of that is also confusing,” the official said. “If you’re a local level security manager managing a joint unit for example, who do you report it to, how do you do all of that?”

The official said clear regulations are especially needed to keep pace with a growing number of locations where classified materials are handled. Besides the large, highly-fortified facilities like the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency, there is a growing number of smaller facilities which require unique ways of keeping classified information secure, she said.

Instead of a single point of failure, the official said that multiple factors contribute to security incidents. The 45-day review provided a chance “to make sure that we looked at this as quickly as possible to make sure that we made the improvements that we could quickly” as the Teixeira investigation continues, the official said. That kind of self-assessment is in line with industry best practices for mitigating insider threats.

“If there were a perfect solution for this, I’d be out of a job,” Daniel Costa, technical manager of enterprise threat and vulnerability management at The National Insider Threat Center at Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute, told Air & Space Forces Magazine in April.

“There’s an inherent risk that comes along with doing business,” he added. “What we’re talking about is human nature, and thinking about insider threats as an inherent risk to organizations requires real careful planning and organization-wide participation to reduce that risk to acceptable levels.”

Besides the 45-day military-wide review, the Department of the Air Force is conducting a review of its policies regarding classified information and an Inspector General review of security practices at Teixeira’s unit, the 102nd Intelligence Wing. 

In his June 30 memo, Austin also directed all Department of Defense component heads to take a range of steps meant to ensure that Department of Defense personnel are assigned to a Security Management Office; that military Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) comply with Intelligence Community Directive requirements; that all SCIFs and Special Access Program Facilities (SAPFs) are accounted for in a centralized tracking system; that personal or portable electronic device use is prohibited in those facilities; that Top Secret Control Officers are required for top secret information; and that a Joint Management Office for Insider Threat and Cyber Capabilities is established for monitoring threats and user activity across all military networks.

To enhance communication with the DSCA, Austin directed the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security, Ronald S. Moultrie, to make a plan for analyzing training needs; examining or improving how to make continuous vetting information more readily available, and optimizing tools for sharing that information within the military. Many of the deadlines for taking these steps fall between July 31 and December 31 of this year.

Both Austin and the senior defense official expressed a desire to avoid overcorrecting by placing unnecessarily restrictive policies on information sharing as the military works out better practices for handling that information.

“The Department is mindful of the need to balance information security with [the] requirement to get the right information to the right people at the right time to enhance our national security,” according to a fact sheet on the security review provided to the media.

Air Force Tests New Drone Airspace Management System

Air Force Tests New Drone Airspace Management System

July 5, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Deconflicting airspace was rarely a problem in the early days of Predator drones, but today the number and types of drones is rapidly expanding, with some that can be carried in backpacks and others that lift off vertically. That makes managing airspace a challenge.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James C. McConville complained about the “industrial age” system for deconflicting crewed aircraft, drones, and surface-to-surface rockets during an exercise last winter. Air Force officials told Air & Space Forces Magazine soon after that the Army and Air Force were working to develop a better approach in the future.

Now the Air Force has a CLUE about what that future looks like: the Collaborative Low-Altitude UAS Integration Effort, a product of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Information Directorate and AFWERX, AFRL’s innovation directorate. The new UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system was installed at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

“Airspace management will play a key role for the future of air mobility,” Darshan Divakaran, AFWERX’s head of airspace innovation and partnerships said in a June 29 news release.

Located at Eglin’s Duke Field, the UTM system seeks to prove that “current “air traffic management systems can ensure complete safety as drones and electric vertical takeoff and landing [eVTOL] aircraft take flight,” according to the Air Force.

Eglin’s 413th Flight Test Squadron is responsible for evaluating and testing the commercial CLUE system, AFWERX said. “The testing will focus on evaluating the UTMs’ capabilities for deconfliction, communication, and security, as well as low-altitude weather and beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations.”

Eglin is the primary proving ground, but testing also will take place elsewhere, AFWERX said. The Air Force is also working with Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, and NASA in seeking to maintain tracks on the small UASs at altitudes up to 12,000 feet .

Future testing at Eglin will involve a variety of UASs under 70 pounds, a size that will allow the drones to “fly more often and with fewer restrictions,” according to Maj. Riley Livermore of 413th Flight Test Squadron. The Air Force then hopes to start testing how electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, larger drones, and other aircraft can be operated together.

The CLUE system at Eglin has been used to “track two to three simulated uncrewed systems operating in their designated airspace along with live, manned air traffic,” said Brooke Ezell of AFWERX. “This provided a really helpful picture for how manned and uncrewed air traffic can coexist safely.”

Thousands of Airmen Spread Across Pacific in Massive Mobility Exercise

Thousands of Airmen Spread Across Pacific in Massive Mobility Exercise

July 5, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The U.S. and its allies kicked off a massive air exercise, Mobility Guardian, on July 5 in the Indo-Pacific region. Run by Air Mobility Command, the highly anticipated exercise has been billed as one of the most critical Air Force drills of the year, with 3,000 personnel directly supporting the exercise and 70 aircraft participating. As the Department of Defense shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific, logistics will be key to enabling the U.S. military to be ready to fight thousands of miles away from the continental U.S.

“This year’s MG23 reflects an evolution from the exercise’s previous three U.S.-based iterations and aims to understand and overcome distance to deliver the mobilization, deployment, and sustainment functions that the Joint Force, allies, and partners depend on to respond to challenges worldwide,” AMC said in a news release.

Participating allies include Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in a training event that spans 3,000 miles and runs non-stop until July 21.

The exercise “will turn planned integration into operational integration within the theater,” said Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, in a statement. Mobility Air Forces, he added, would stretch “to meet future demands and protect shared international interests with our allies and partners.”

Preparations for Mobility Guardian have been underway for more than a year. The biennial exercise, first launched in 2017, had previously been limited to the continental U.S. The 2023 edition is the “largest full-spectrum readiness exercise in AMC, which dates back to 1992. The exercise will support 15,000 U.S. forces and serve as “cohesive glue” for Air Force drills throughout the Pacific, the command said.

To reach its operating locations for the exercise, a Royal Air Force A400 flew over 20 hours nonstop from the U.K. to Guam, a record sortie for A400. The RAF said its participation in the exercise marks a “strategic demonstration of the UK’s commitment to operate in the region.”

“AMC’s role in enabling the meaningful maneuver of forces throughout the theater underscores the necessity of logistics and realistic interoperability in the region,” the command said.

Airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, command and control, and humanitarian and disaster assistance missions will all be exercised over the coming weeks. Minihan, was previously deputy commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has been focused on preparing his Airmen for a possible fight with China—sometimes landing in hot water for bellicose language.

But Minihan’s command noted that Mobility Air Forces (MAF) are vital to any future U.S. military operations in the Pacific, which would require airlifting troops and supplies and tanker refueling to allow the Air Force and other services to operate over vast distances.

“This is a proving ground for the MAF’s new status quo tested through the application of flexible and agile concepts,” said Lt. Col. Jake Parker, Mobility Guardian exercise director.

Minihan previewed the exercise at AFA’s Warfare Symposium in March, making clear Mobility Guardian is intended to be a learning experience.

“Some things won’t go perfect,” he said then. “We’ll go back and we’ll work harder to get it and we’ll close gaps as quick as we can.”

Can Cargo Be Delivered ‘To, From, and Through’ Space? DOD Wants Ideas Soon.

Can Cargo Be Delivered ‘To, From, and Through’ Space? DOD Wants Ideas Soon.

July 4, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Space is taking on more responsibilities for the U.S. military, from command and control to missile warning. Next on the agenda: cargo.

In a June 30 solicitation, the Defense Innovation Unit is seeking “novel commercial solutions that enable responsive and precise point-to-point delivery of cargo to, from, and through space.”

DIU was founded to adopt commercial technology and non-traditional suppliers by bypassing conventional acquisition processes.

“Rocket cargo” is already being explored by U.S. Transportation Command and the Air Force Research Laboratory, but those efforts are focused on point-to-point logistics for heavy payloads up to 100 tons. The aim is to support austere operating locations in the midst of future conflict with uncrewed space vehicles, eliminating the need for overflight rights or putting air or space crews at risk.

DIU is focused on smaller payloads, from tens to hundreds of kilograms. It aims to conduct proof-of-concept demonstrations of rockets to deliver cargo to objects to orbit, deliver cargo from one orbit to another, or use space to deliver cargo to a point on Earth.

“The ability to rapidly re-constitute space-based capabilities or re-supply payloads or cargo at precise locations for time-sensitive logistics (in-space or terrestrially) is a critical but presently non-existent capability,” the DIU said. “Sustaining isolated or remote platforms or teams of people affordably and at scale additionally requires evaluation of emerging technology solutions that potentially satisfy commercial, civil, and national security needs.”

The Space Force has a future concept of “tactically responsive space” which could use commercial space launch in a time of crisis. Like the Merchant Marine, which can be tasked to deliver materiel in a time of war and commercial cargo carriers, which TRANSCOM leveraged when moving cargo for Ukraine to Europe after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, space may also have rapid-fire needs. “There is a need to deliver and return payloads and cargo accurately, safely, and on demand” and it wants proposals that are viable even without demand from the DOD.

Following the model of the Space Development Agency, which is pursuing a rapid-acquisition strategy for satellites, DIU seeks a solution that could meet a “lead time, in hours or days, from order to launch and orbital insertion,” and that is “flight-ready” in 24 months. DIU asked for submissions by July 17, a scant two weeks, and expects responding companies to show elements of hardware within 90 days of contracting.

Tim Ryan, the Senior Resident Fellow for Space Studies at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said DIU’s premise makes clear the growing importance of space not just in the Space Force, but throughout the Department of Defense.

If successful, the concepts DIU hopes to demonstrate could expand to incorporate larger payloads and conduct “suborbital delivery of cargo,” both for military objectives and potentially to assist in disaster response in the future.

SPACECOM’s New Senior Enlisted Leader Puts Guardian in Key COCOM Role

SPACECOM’s New Senior Enlisted Leader Puts Guardian in Key COCOM Role

July 4, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

U.S. Space Command’s new senior enlisted leader will be a Guardian, the first ever picked to advise a combatant command. Chief Master Sgt. Jacob C. Simmons will succeed Marine Corps Master Gunnery Sgt. Scott H. Stalker, the Pentagon said in a June 26 announcement.

Simmons is currently the senior enlisted leader for Space Operations Command (SpOC) at Peterson Space Force Base, Colo. He took that role in 2022, following in the footsteps of Chief Master Sgt. John Bentivegna, who was recently tapped to become the next Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force. Chief Master Sgt. of the Space Force Roger A. Towberman, the second-ever Guardian, was SPACECOM’s senior enlisted leader, as well as CMSSF, for four months, from April to August 2020, before turning the reigns over to Stalker.

“Space is ubiquitous,” Simmons said in comments at AFA’s Air, Space, & Cyber Conference in September 2022. “It is involved in every mission, it is involved in every capability, and it must be intertwined as such.”

Guardians must work closely with members of other services, he said, as he will now as the top enlisted member at U.S. Space Command.

“We have to be integrated,” Simmons said last year. “We have to be interoperable.”

Simmons was one of the five finalists to replace outgoing Towberman to become the second-ever senior non-commissioned officer in the service’s history.

Simmons “has served in leadership positions at squadron, group, wing, major command, and Air Staff, as well as joint and multi-national duties in United States Space Command, United States Southern Command, United States Strategic Command, and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” according to his official Space Force biography. Simmons first enlisted in the Air Force in 1992.

“I enlisted into the military because I wanted to do something that mattered; something I could be proud doing until I figured out which way was up for my life,” Simmons said in a 2018 interview.

Before becoming an Airmen and later a Guardian, Simmons came close to joining the Army, he said.

“Growing up at Fort Hood, Texas, I actually had every intention of joining the Army and would have been a Soldier had I not listened to a still small voice during one life-changing event,” Simmons said. “While getting set to sign my very final piece of Army enlistment paperwork at MEPs [Military Entrance Processing Station], an Airman walked by in service dress. I stopped just shy of the oath when I realized that in my eagerness to get ‘life’ started, I didn’t research all of my options. I owed myself that.”

That experience will likely serve Simmons well as the senior enlisted leader of SPACECOM where he will hear from the rank and file members of all services and advise the commander of U.S. Space Command, Army Gen. James H. Dickinson.