NATO Details Leap in Member Defense Spending Ahead of Summit

NATO Details Leap in Member Defense Spending Ahead of Summit

Ahead of a major NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, July 11-12, official statistics show a significant uptick in defense spending among allied members.

Despite that progress, the challenge of achieving the alliance’s spending targets will remain. The U.S. ambassador to NATO said on July 7 as the alliance is set to approve a range of defense plans “that will ensure we can literally defend every inch of NATO territory.”

According to information released on July 7 by NATO, 10 of 31 alliance members are achieving the current goal of spending two percent of their GDP on defense. In 2014, when the goal was first set, only three hit that mark. All members are hitting the objective of spending 20 percent of their defense spending on new equipment.

Twelve countries are spending better than 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, and only one member—Luxembourg—is spending less than one percent. The overall median is 1.87 percent for the alliance. The values for 2023 are estimates based on member reports, NATO said.

In the 16 months since Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO as a whole has also seen an overall eight percent real increase in defense spending above inflation, compared with two percent in 2022. In the same period, overall NATO member spending on equipment leaped from 8.5 percent real growth to 24.9 percent of real growth above inflation.

Julianne Smith, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, told reporters in a July 7 conference call that new, multi-domain regional defense plans that be rolled out in Vilnius. They cover a range of scenarios, including defending the Atlantic and Arctic, protecting central Europe and the Balkans,  and defending southern Europe and the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the plans represented a major bulking up of the alliance.

“To execute these plans, NATO is putting 300,000 troops on higher readiness, including substantial air and naval combat power,” Stoltenberg told reporters at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Smith acknowledged that the new plans will need funding for forces and equipment that will support them.

“We’ll be focusing not only on these multi-domain plans, but we will also be focusing on the resourcing that’s needed to execute the plans, and that takes us to the defense investment pledge” of two percent of GDP, which was set in 2014 as a goal for members to reach by 2024. 

The goal was set after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and the alliance members’ spending has been spurred by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The summit is expected to produce a follow-on pledge that will set two percent as “an enduring commitment” that will be “a floor, not a ceiling,” Smith said.

Early in the 2010s, NATO also started counting how much members were spending on hardware, as equipment inventories were growing old and many members were spending the bulk of their defense money on pay and amenities rather than combat capability.

While in 2014, only seven members were hitting the goal of spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on equipment, in 2023, every member is achieving it, and the median is 27.3 percent for the alliance overall.

NATO’s overall, inflation-adjusted defense spending is also well up. In 2014, NATO was collectively spending $910 billion annually on defense, but in 2023, that figure is $1.1 trillion. While U.S. defense spending has grown from $660 billion to $743 billion during that period, the defense spending of the rest of NATO has increased at a higher pace, from $250 billion in 2014 to $356 billion in 2023. Some of that growth, however, was due to adding three new NATO members since 2017:  Macedonia, Montenegro, and Finland.

As a share of its GDP, Poland is the biggest defense spender in NATO, budgeting 3.9 percent in 2023. The U.S. is second, spending 3.49 percent, followed by Greece at 3.01 percent, Estonia at 2.73 percent, and Lithuania at 2.54 percent. Luxembourg, at 0.72 percent, is the smallest spender, followed by Belgium at 1.13 percent, Spain at 1.26 percent, Turkey at 1.31 percent, and Slovenia at 1.35 percent.

The nations seeing the greatest increase in defense spending since 2014 are mainly in Eastern Europe, closest to the fighting in Ukraine, with Lithuania, Finland, Romania, Hungary and Latvia, and Slovakia all seeing a jump from about 1-1.5 percent of GDP to about 2-2.5 percent.

Poland, Finland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria are all undertaking the greatest increases in equipment spending, from as little as 1 percent to upwards of 36 percent. Poland’s equipment spending has jumped from about 18 percent of its overall budget to a majority of its defense budget at 52 percent.

In 2023, NATO allies are collectively spending an average of about 40 percent on personnel, 30 percent on operations and maintenance, 20 percent on new equipment—including research and development—and 10 percent on infrastructure, but there are outliers in all those categories. Italy and Spain each spend about 60 percent on personnel; Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Poland all spend about 50 percent on new equipment, while Denmark and the U.K. each spend about 40 percent on operations and maintenance.

By NATO’s account, the U.S. spends 27.8 percent on personnel, 1.6 percent on infrastructure, 41.4 percent on operations and maintenance, and 29.3 percent on new weapons.

Personnel spending quoted for all countries includes pensions.

Smith said the alliance will unveil “a package of concrete deliverables” to Ukraine at the Vilnius summit, “in terms of longer-term practical assistance on things like their military modernization and questions of interoperability,” the alliance announcing a new “NATO-Ukraine Council” defense cooperation pact last month during a meeting of the alliance’s defense chiefs.

In Europe, SPACECOM Commander Pledges More Integration with Allies

In Europe, SPACECOM Commander Pledges More Integration with Allies

The U.S. military relies on allies to conduct operations around the globe. Now, the U.S. is pushing for greater cooperation with its partners in Earth orbit.

The head of U.S. Space Command, Army Gen. James Dickinson, took a weeklong trip to Europe June 21-27 to meet with U.S. allies, some of which are starting up their own space commands, SPACECOM said in a July 5 news release.

Dickinson visited U.S. troops at Pituffik Space Base (formerly known as Thule Air Base) in Greenland, before heading to the French aerospace hub of Toulouse.

U.S. military space officials have been making a concerted effort to enhance America’s cooperation with European allies. Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the critical importance space plays in intelligence, command and control, communications, and guided munitions.

In May, U.S. Space Force Lt. Gen. DeAnna Burt, deputy chief of staff for operations, cyber, and nuclear—the service’s Chief Operations Officer—visited NATO headquarters in Brussels in a bid to reinforce U.S. support for the alliance’s burgeoning commitment to space as a military domain. Dickinson also made a pitch to NATO, sharing a “vision for the future of collaboration in space,” according to the command.

Dickinson “focused on the importance of space to the global way of life; the threats facing the domain; the criticality of continued cooperation in ensuring the safety, security, stability, and sustainability of the domain,” SPACECOM said.

Dickinson spoke to NATO’s Military Committee and visited NATO’s Space Center of Excellence, a body established as the “catalyst” of the alliance’s role in space.

NATO declared space was the “fifth domain” in 2019—the year the U.S. Space Command and Space Force were created. In 2021, NATO said “attacks to, from, or within space” could invoke the alliance’s Article Five mutual defense clause.

Space Force will create its component inside U.S. European Command to transfer its existing space operations, part of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, into a component separate from the Air Force.

Dickinson also met with British officials, following Burt’s trip to London a month and a half earlier. Britain, too, has a space command, and the U.S. and U.K signed an agreement last year to work together even more closely in space.

“From a security perspective, an increasing number of countries are looking to use space to enhance their military capabilities and national security,” the Secure World Foundation wrote in its 2023 Global Counterspace Capabilities report.

Dickinson’s visit reinforces America’s push for the U.S. military and its European allies to marshal their forces against common threats such as Russia, which conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2021, a move which the U.S. has repeatedly pointed to as an example of a tangible threat to space operations. China has conducted an ASAT test, mostly recently in 2007, and is bolstering its space capabilities. The U.S. also blew up one of its own satellites in a test in 2008, but has since pledged not to conduct direct-ascent kinetic anti-satellite tests.

“The meetings held, and the information shared this week, will continue to lead to stronger partnerships and integration in the future, ensuring a safe, secure, and sustainable space environment for all,” Dickinson said in a statement following the visit. “The bond between Europe and North America has made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the world’s strongest military alliance, and I’m proud to witness how the alliance is making progress in integration in space.”

How This Little-Known Air Force Data Center Affects the Entire Military

How This Little-Known Air Force Data Center Affects the Entire Military

OFFUTT Air Force Base, Neb.–From the outside, it looks like any other U.S. government building, complete with brick walls, a glass facade, and an American flag out front. But the 557th Weather Wing headquarters here is more than brick and mortar. It is a nerve center that helps military commanders around the world answer one of their most important questions: what’s the weather?

“The level of customers that we have range all the way from the guys sitting out there in tanks to the guys in the Pentagon who need to know cloud coverage so they can see the ground” from space, Mike Thompson, a civilian cyber support technician with the 2nd Weather Support Squadron, a component of the 557th Weather Wing, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Forecasts produced by the 557th Weather Wing drive hurricane evacuation, survival, and rebuilding plans for commanders and emergency managers in the storm path; rain and snow forecasts impact soil moisture, which Army commanders use to plan mobility operations; analysis of turbulence and thunderstorms influence aviation route planning and fuel consumption rates; and reports on unfavorable space weather help commanders anticipate threats to satellite communications and GPS.

“There are some products we produce that, if they stopped going out, the commander will get a phone call within the hour,” Thompson said.

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A maintenance team works on an A-10 Thunderbolt II during a snowstorm Dec. 29, 2013, at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. U.S. Air Force Photo by Capt. Brian Wagner

Forecasts cannot be made without data, and the data pouring into the 557th Wing headquarters come from a wide range of sources. The Air Force itself produces some of that data through weather squadrons assigned to Air Force and Army units worldwide. A retired master sergeant with 24 years of Air Force service under his belt, Thompson spent plenty of time producing that data himself while downrange in support of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Northern Watch.

Beyond Air Force weather squadrons, the 557th also pulls in data from military satellites and satellites operated by civilian agencies such as the National Weather Service (NWS), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and partner nations. The 557th often passes satellite data from agencies like NOAA on to other services, making the wing a kind of “satellite broker for the Department of Defense,” Thompson said.

Satellite data is vital for building future weather models. Running those simulations takes a lot of computing power, which is why the 557th operates a $322 million strategic weather high-performance computing center.

“As the Air Force’s largest Special Purpose Processing Node, the computing center is the linchpin force enabler for U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army weather support operations,” according to the wing’s website. “These computing assets generate thousands of critical environmental products and services and deliver essential weather information to forecasters and operational end users every day—on a global scale.”

More data helps produce more accurate forecasts, but U.S. military planners are not the only ones who want that data, which is why Thompson and other cybersecurity professionals with the 2nd Weather Support Squadron are tasked with keeping the nerve center safe from cyber threats. It is a difficult task since the 557th takes in data from such a wide range of sources.

“I was pretty flabbergasted by how many connections we have,” Thompson said.

About 150 enlisted Airmen and civilians across three squadrons are responsible for cybersecurity for the 557th. As a cyber support technician, Thompson analyzes the wing’s data and networks for threats and vulnerabilities. If any irregularities are spotted, the cyber team investigates them for possible dangers, but ideally, the team identifies vulnerabilities and resolves them before they can be exploited.

“We’re looking for bad actors who are knocking on the door and trying to get in,” he said.

With so much information and such a critical mission, the data center’s cybersecurity staff is on the lean side, Thompson said, but they make the best of what they’ve got–the mission is too important for anything less.

‘We’ve Been Doing It Wrong’: SPACECOM’s Shaw Pushes New View of Operations

‘We’ve Been Doing It Wrong’: SPACECOM’s Shaw Pushes New View of Operations

American military space operations are due for a significant overhaul to boost the Pentagon’s capability to deal with growing threats from China and Russia, the deputy commander of U.S. Space Command said July 6. 

“The way we’ve been doing space operations since the dawn of the space age, we’ve been doing it wrong,” Space Force Lt. Gen. John E. Shaw, SPACECOM’s highest-ranking Guardian, said during an event at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Shaw said there could be a “fundamental doctrinal shift” toward more “dynamic space operations.”

While the U.S. military is increasingly emphasizing space capabilities, the Pentagon is still articulating how it should use the space domain in the future.

Some of the debate revolves around organizational issues. The U.S. Space Command was established in late 2019 as a geographic—or, as Shaw prefers, “astrographic”—combatant command responsible for military operations that are 100 kilometers over sea level and extend beyond. The Space Force was established as an independent service later that year. 

That has led to some uncertainty about the division of responsibilities between SPACECOM and the Space Force. The Space Force also has its components within geographic commands, though Shaw noted those Guardians must follow the direction of their respective commanders when employing space capabilities.

“I do think that’s still going to evolve as well,” Shaw said of the component roles. “We need the Space Force components in the theaters.”

Shaw said those would likely focus on the “operational level … to make sure that the integration of space-based capabilities is as effective as it can possibly be in every and any scenario.”

Another question concerns doctrine and who will develop it. Currently, there is one joint publication on the domain, Joint Publication 3-14, which is simply titled “Space Operations.”

“I’ve asked the probing question, ‘Is one volume sufficient?’ And I think the answer is no,” Shaw said.  

“I think we’re going to end up having several joint publications probably along the lines of Space Command and Control, Space Superiority Operations,” Shaw added.

One thing Shaw is sure of is that the U.S. must become more agile about how it conducts operations in space. 

Previously, the U.S. military spent years developing expensive satellites designed to stay in service for many years. To mitigate the risks from Chinese and Russian anti-satellite weapons, the Space Force has pushed for cheaper, more proliferated satellites.

SPACECOM, Shaw said, is doing its part by pushing for more flexible operations. With anti-satellite weapons, jamming, and the possibility that the U.S. might conduct offensive space operations, largely static platforms will be inadequate.

The old way of doing things was “positional space operations,” Shaw said. “We launch a platform into orbit and we tend to leave it right in that orbit.”

“That’s not going to be sufficient anymore,” Shaw said. “We can’t have those constraints in the future. And so we’re trying to articulate a requirement to the Space Force that we need to be able to have sustained space maneuver for those platforms.”

Navy Intel Brief Urges Robust Challenge to China

Navy Intel Brief Urges Robust Challenge to China

China is “actively destabilizing” the Indo-Pacific region and undermining the international rules-based order—with its island-building, stifling of democracy in Hong Kong, objective to take Taiwan, and dangerous brinksmanship with other countries’ ships and aircraft—yet somehow projects more “moral legitimacy” than the U.S., according to an analysis from the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The U.S. needs to call out China’s bad behavior, hold it accountable, and mount a muscular communications campaign to counter China’s messaging on American actions, according to a recent unclassified Office of Naval Intelligence briefing obtained by Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“We are engaged in an international struggle between competing visions. China is executing a grand strategy, and has been unified in pursuing it comprehensively and aggressively for many years,” according to the briefing, released under the signature of ONI commander Rear Adm. Mike Studeman.

Those ends include being first a regional then global hegemon, wresting influence away from the U.S., and imposing a new world order that favors Beijing, Studeman said. The goal—internally called the “rejuvenation” of China as the world’s greatest power—justifies “any mean” of achieving it, the briefing said.

China is increasingly using “espionage, coercion, pressure, subversion, and disinformation” to achieve global advantage and “shape the international system.”

Winning the competition of visions—between democracy and authoritarianism—means the U.S. cannot afford an “anemic information instrument” and must challenge China’s narrative about its peaceful rise and intentions. Not speaking out “makes the [U.S.] more vulnerable,” according to the brief.

“We need to win the peace as well as prevail in a crisis/war,” Studeman said.

The briefing—marked “unclassified” and intended for members of Congress and the Administration—was dated in June.

Despite China’s obvious heavy-handedness in suppressing ethnic minorities, oppressive domestic surveillance, bullying international neighbors, employing predatory government-to-government loans, international property theft, overfishing and environmental destruction, “abetting global corruption,” and attempting to convert disputed territory by building illegal military bases, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party “are not being held sufficiently accountable for their actions,” the ONI said.

Chinese ships and aircraft are also harassing those of Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and the U.S., among others, making too-close intercepts, discharging flares and chaff in their paths, and making illegal military incursions in other nations’ sea and airspace. It backtracked about allowing “two systems” of government in Hong Kong and Macau, and makes no secret of its plans to assimilate Taiwan by any means necessary, though the preference is through pressure and not military action.

“Xi is most dangerous leader since Mao in terms of willingness to use creeping expansionism and force to resolve territorial issues at his neighbors’ expense,” the ONI said. Meanwhile, China’s military has become “a formidable, highly lethal fighting force” that is “very much a peer” of the U.S. military.

Asked by a reporter if the DOD views China “as a competitor or an adversary” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder said July 6 that America’s “National Defense Strategy makes that very clear. We view them as a competitor and as our pacing challenge.”

The ONI said the U.S. public and the world generally are not paying attention and China’s message of its peaceful intent is winning through. This “lack of attention” or “acquiescence” to China’s moves “invites bolder moves,” Studeman noted.  

If China was to win control of Taiwan, which it claims as a rebel province, it would be disastrous for the U.S. even if China did not use military force, the ONI said.

Such an achievement would give Xi “extraordinary new legitimacy” both domestically and internationally. It would signal an “ideological win over democracy, freedom and the West,” and allow China to absorb a major economy. China would gain greater military power, greater reach into the Pacific domination of China’s near-abroad sea lanes and chokepoints, and give the People’s Liberation Army “confidence in pursuing other territorial claims.”

It would also give Beijing control over critical Taiwanese technology, particularly semiconductor manufacturing, and instantly put China in a position to exploit U.S. weapon systems in Taiwan, such as fighter aircraft, air defenses and other systems.

More nations would likely defer to China after it absorbed Taiwan, and its influence would grow markedly.

Conversely, American influence and credibility would sharply decline if the Mainland absorbed Taiwan, the ONI predicted, as the U.S. commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific would be questioned, and U.S. allies and partners in the region would likely reassess their U.S. relationships. The U.S. would lose access to a “top ten” trade partner, deterrence would be weakened, and it would be much harder for the U.S. to “forestall further erosion of international norms [and the ] rules-based order.” There would be a perception of “U.S. decline” and there would be no Chinese-speaking democracy in Asia.

Taiwan’s absorption into China would also mean the loss of “critical intelligence collection opportunities” versus China and U.S. influence and standing in the world would be diminished.

The ONI brief suggested that China’s efforts to establish the conditions necessary for a successful takeover of Taiwan seem timed to coincide with Xi’s fourth term as president, in about 2027. Those conditions include isolating Taiwan, setting advantageous military conditions, and increasing its political-military-economic pressures on Taiwan and its partners. The ONI also noted that 2027 is the year by which Xi has ordered the People’s Liberation Army’s “military modernization” be complete.   

“The survival of Taiwan’s democracy is a critical geostrategic issue that carries long-term consequences for China, the U.S., and the broader international community,” the ONI said, but “the China problem is not all about Taiwan,” noting that all of China’s neighbors, both on land and sea, are facing military, economic and diplomatic pressures from Beijing which would be extremely hard to hold at bay individually. The briefing noted ten geographic areas where China is actively challenging borders and territory, and it is increasingly characterizing itself as an “arctic nation” with rights to exploit resources in that area.

The ONI also noted that China controls 40 percent of the world commercial shipbuilding market, with 50 domestic drydocks that can accommodate an aircraft carrier.

However, the ONI noted that both Washington and Beijing have similar self-assessments regarding their military and political capabilities of each other. Both countries perceive that their military deterrent “is eroding or failing.” In response, the U.S. is “taking major actions to enhance perceived shortfalls,” while China is “concerned with its own deterrence strength and lack of effectiveness to date.”

Both sides’ deterrence actions “will lead to responses likely to be interpreted by both sides in the most threatening terms, based on long-held perceptions,” the ONI said. The outcome “may be shifting key timelines, more assertive efforts to signal and show resolve, and systemic instability.” In other words, both sides will be building up to hold the other at bay, and inflate the chances for miscalculation.

The ONI pushed for a relentless communications campaign against China, noting that “people, publics, [and] elites are more easily swayed and misled than assumed. China is succeeding in muddying the already-mistrusted infosphere with conspiracy theories and misinformation, making it harder for decision-makers and citizens to “connect the dots.” The U.S. must “operate” in the information environment employing “both surgical and broad info ‘fires’” to get its message through, the ONI said.

The U.S. is putting all its effort into physical capabilities to deter China, but has a “gap” in shaping its message, which is the foundation of deterrence, the ONI said. China excels in this area, and must be challenged, it said. China views the tension “as the norm” and engages in it every day, Studeman noted. The U.S. has to adopt a similar pace to match its adversary, ONI said.

Misinformation is “filling vacuums” when the real facts are not pushed front and center, Studeman said. The report notes “whoever frames the narrative, dominates the narrative.”

C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

C-17 Airmen Try Out New Chemical Warfare Gear

Airmen recently tested new chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) gear that would replace gas masks and hoods designed decades ago for aircrew aboard transports, tankers, and other aircraft that don’t feature ejection seats.

The new gear was rolled out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on June 5 and announced in a press release a month later.

“We felt that we were overdue an update,” said Master Sgt. Diego Cancino, Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) flight chief with the 445th Operations Support Squadron, in the press release. “The new mask system is a breath of fresh air for both AFE as the equipment maintainers and aircrew as the end user.” 

The old Mask Breath Unit-19P Aircrew Eye and Respiratory Protection (AERP) was no favorite among Airmen. “It’s like flying a plane while wearing a thick garbage bag over your entire body,” said one C-17 pilot, who spoke to Air & Space Forces Magazine but asked not to be identified. “It’s hot, fogs up, is a major situational awareness drainer and in my opinion incredibly unsafe to use in flight.”

That pilot has yet to try the new M69 system. But Tech Sgt. Conner Odom, of the 60th Operational Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, Calif, was elated after it trying it in December. “This equipment is light-years ahead of the legacy AERP,” he said.

m69
U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Mark Kim, 60th Operation Support Squadron aircrew flight equipment technician, models the new M69 Joint Service Aircrew Mask Strategic Aircraft assembly at Travis Air Force Base, California, Nov. 2, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Nicholas Pilch)

Officials say it is cooler to wear, less bulky, and has a better field of vision.  It’s also much easier to put on. Odom said aircrew can spend 10 minutes wrestling their way into the old full-body AERP, but it takes just 10 seconds to don the new M69 mask and only two minutes to put on the full suit. “In a CBRN environment, there isn’t going to be a lot of time to react,” Odom said, so speed is crucial.

Aircrews first started trying the M69 about 2018, when HH-60G Pave Hawk and UH-1N Huey aviators tested it at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. In 2019, C-130J aviators at Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark., conducted operational testing. At the time, Tech. Sgt. Benjamin Leis, of Little Rock’s 19th Operations Support Squadron, said “I think we’re in a far better situation for aircrew protection and the ability to maintain operations in contested environments with this piece of equipment.” He also thought it would be easier to teach others to use.

Now, four years later, 20,273 masks have been fielded and the Air Force will soon declare full operational capability, perhaps by 2024, according to a Wright-Patterson release. That sets “a new standard with system deployment,” said 1st Lt. Gunnar Kral, lead engineer for Joint Aircrew CBRN Protection.

But What About the Planes?

Yet while the M69 system better protects aircrew, what’s less clear is how to protect and, if necessary, decontaminate exposed planes. The C-17 pilot who spoke with Air & Space Forces Magazine flagged this issue as one of ongoing concern.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Joint Biological Agent Decontamination System (JBADS) gained favor for decontaminating aircraft against the virus. Ground crews built temporary shelters around the aircraft and then pumped it full of hot air, killing any lingering virus. 

“JBADS uses high temperatures of 140 to 180 degrees Fahrenheit and controlled humidity levels to eliminate contaminants in an enclosed environment without harming aircraft systems,” the Air Force Research Laboratory wrote of JBADS during the pandemic. “The system enables full decontamination of an entire aircraft.”

But chemical, radiological or nuclear exposure may not be affected by that treatment. JBADS also requires specialized equipment not widely available to most commands. Air Force doctrine recognizes that CBRN exposure could “significantly degrade the rate of force deployment” as aircraft are removed from use, according to Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-40, “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations.” “Until large-frame aircraft decontamination is technically feasible, contaminated aircraft should be segregated from the airlift flow.”

If aircraft have to land at contaminated airfields, commanders may need to establish a site for crew and cargo in between clean and contaminated aircraft, a necessity that would delay time-sensitive deliveries and may not be feasible except in emergencies. Host nations may also object to landing contaminated aircraft in their territory.

“Until internationally recognized standards and legal requirements for acceptable decontamination levels are established, nations may deny transit and overflight rights to contaminated aircraft or cargo,” the publication said.

The C-17 pilot wondered what circumstances might require flying into an exposed area.

“I cannot foresee a scenario,” he said, “where the Air Force would knowingly sacrifice a $220 million jet by purposely flying it into a contaminated environment.”  

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

Videos: Russia Confronts US Drones Over Syria for Second Day in a Row

Russian fighters dropped flares in front of U.S. MQ-9s over Syria on two consecutive days in escalating tactics intended to disrupt U.S. operations in “a new level” of aggressive behavior by Russian forces, according to U.S. officials.

On July 5 at around 10:40 am local time, three U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones on a mission against ISIS targets were intercepted by three Russian Su-35 fighter jets, which began “harassing” maneuvers, according to U.S. military officials. Then at 9:30 am local time on July 6, Russian Su-34 and Su-35 fighters again intercepted two MQ-9s conducting another anti-ISIS mission.

“These events represent another example of unprofessional and unsafe actions by Russian air forces operating in Syria, which threaten the safety of both Coalition and Russian forces,” Air Forces Central commander Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich said in July 6 statement. Grynkweich condemned Russia’s “dangerous behaviors.”

In the first incident, the Russian fighters dropped parachute flares in front of the MQ-9s, U.S. officials said. The actions forced drone operators to conduct “evasive maneuvers,” according to Grynkewich. A Russian fighter also flew in front of a U.S. MQ-9 and engaged his engine’s afterburner, “increasing speed and air pressure, [the maneuver] reduced the MQ-9 operator’s ability to safely operate the aircraft,” AFCENT said.

The incident was the latest in a series of Russian maneuvers intended to disrupt U.S. drone operations. The Reapers can carry weapons in addition to their native intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. On-board cameras captured the encounter in detail. The U.S. Department of Defense swiftly declassified and released a compilation video late July 5.

The next morning, a Su-34 and a Su-35 dropped flares in front of an MQ-9s while another MQ-9 recorded the incident. The Russian fighters “flew dangerously close, endangering the safety of all aircraft involved,” Grynkewich said in a July 6 statement. The Pentagon also released video of the second incident.

In March, a Russian Su-27 collided with an American MQ-9 over the Black Sea while two Su-27s were trying to harass the American drone. The U.S. declassified drone footage at that time as well. Separately, Chinese fighters harassed a U.S. RC-135 over the South China Sea in May. Such incidents increase the risk of accidents.

Grynkewich and other U.S. military officials have raised alarm over Russian behavior in Syria in recent months, which one U.S. official previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine might be an attempt to “engender an international incident.” After a pause in Russian air activity near U.S. positions over the winter, Russian warplanes resumed regularly overflying U.S. positions in Syria in March. The U.S. positions in Syria also came under deadly attack from Iranian-backed militias the same month.

The U.S. first bolstered its air presence with A-10s, which arrived in late March and have been modified from regular Warthogs to carry small-diameter bombs and other precision munitions. U.S. actions also included a recent training mission in which B-1 bombers fired a long-range JASSM cruise missile and were escorted by allied air forces. Most pointedly, the U.S. rushed F-22s Raptors to the region in mid-June in direct response to recent Russian actions, which does not seem to have made a lasting impact on Moscow’s pilots.

“Russian forces continue to display unsafe and unprofessional behavior in the air,” Army Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, said July 5. “Their regular violation of agreed upon airspace deconfliction measures increases the risk of escalation or miscalculation.”

F-22s were sometimes used in the past to escort the U.S. strike missions on ISIS militants in northeast Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the anti-ISIS campaign, because of the threat from Russian planes, but the U.S. has diminished airpower presence in the region to focus more on the Pacific and Europe since the ISIS self-declared caliphate was defeated. AFCENT currently has around two and a half squadrons of fourth-generation F-16s and F-15Es fighters, as well as A-10s and MQ-9s based in the region.

The U.S. has around 900 troops in Syria to assist its Kurdish allies in fighting the remnants of ISIS. Russia is supporting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. In a recent conference call with reporters, Grynkewich said that Russians have continued to violate mutually agreed upon deconfliction protocols designed to reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict in Syria and keep the two sides’ air forces separate in eastern Syria. Since the spring, Air Forces Central has noted that Russia has gotten as close to 500 feet from manned U.S. aircraft and regularly overflown U.S. troops dozens of times.

A Russian Ministry of Defense official, Oleg Gurinov, said U.S. coalition drones were spotted flying over an area where Russian and Assad regime forces were conducting drills.

“We remind that the Russian side bears no responsibility for the safety of flight of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which were not agreed with the Russian side,” Gurinov said according to the state-owned TASS news agency.

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder dismissed Russian accounts in a July 6 briefing, which was conducted before the second incident was announced.

“We have been in Syria for many years now fighting ISIS as part of an international coalition,” Ryder said. “That is no surprise to anyone.”

“To suggest that somehow, you know, this is our fault, it’s ridiculous,” Ryder added.

Russian actions are not just limited to U.S. aircraft. A Russian Su-35 also maneuvered July 6 close to two French Rafale aircraft as they flew near the Iraqi-Syrian border. “The pilots maneuvered in order to control the risk of an accident before continuing their patrol,” the French military said in a tweet.

Grynkewich has repeatedly questioned Russia’s motives, saying they undermine American efforts to defeat the remnants of ISIS—a goal Russia ostensibly supports.

“We urge Russian forces in Syria to cease this reckless behavior and adhere to the standards of behavior expected of a professional air force so we can resume our focus on the enduring defeat of ISIS,” Grynkewich said. “The safety of military personnel and the success of the mission against ISIS depend on the professional and responsible conduct of all forces operating in the region.”

Editor’s Note: This story was updated with details of a second incident between U.S. and Russian aircraft.

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

Veteran Talk: Latest Authentication Trends for Service Members in the Field

Q&A with Air Force Reserve Col. Tri Trinh (ret.) and Navy Reserve Senior Chief Petty Officer Alex Antrim (ret.).

Q: What was your personal experience as a member of the military, and what made you look into non-CAC authentication alternatives? 

Tri:

In 2019, I was a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve on full-time military orders working at the Pentagon under the Secretary of the Air Force Chief Data Office. I helped deploy the Air Force Connect enterprise mobile app as a Spark Tank project. AF Connect had a CAC feature that used a mobile CAC reader and physical Common Access Card (CAC) to authenticate into CAC-enabled sites. The footprint of a mobile CAC reader and CAC card sticking out of a phone and tablet got old fast.

With the YubiKey from Yubico, I was able to use the DISA Purebred Registration Application to enroll and provision my YubiKey with my CAC certificates and PIN.

I was dual-hatted as a Squadron Commander at the time with a government issued iPhone. I turned in my government iPhone and used my personal phone to access .mil email. Having to carry an extra phone for email when I already had access with a YubiKey was a burden I didn’t need, so it really made my life easier. 

Alex:

As a Navy Reservist, I was not issued a government laptop or mobile device to perform military-based tasks. Reservists have to rely on their own devices when not in drilling status.  This meant buying my own smart card reader – sometimes more than one –  so I could use my CAC. With varying USB connections on my devices, it was hard to keep the right dongles at the ready. 

When I found out that YubiKeys were approved to hold DoD-issued credentials, similar to my CAC, I jumped at the chance to put one to use. I was able to find a Purebred agent in my Navy Reserve unit that helped provision my FIPS YubiKey with Purebred credentials. I was instantly impressed with how easy the YubiKey was used to authenticate into the Navy workstations in my unit’s computer lab.  When I plugged the YubiKey into the Navy desktop computer, it saw the credentials, asked for PIN, and I was logged into the workstation.

I had the same easy experience with YubiKey on my personal laptop, so I could check email and attend Teams meetings in between drill weekends. The last test was for my personal mobile phone which was successful too. I was able to shelve my smart card readers and get to work. 

How has authentication changed in the armed forces, and where do you see it going in the next decade?

Alex: 

The military is often slow to move on new authentication standards, so other than the shift from CAC credentials to the PIV standard (aligning with the federal government’s PKI), service members must still rely on smart cards to authenticate to devices and services. However, I can confirm people at high levels are looking closely at the most up-to-date FIDO2 standard and are working through testing. I hope and expect that soon there will be an approval document coming from the DoD CIO office. Flexibility is going to be really important to service members. A uniformed person should not have to worry about multiple CAC readers or what device is within reach.  All they need to have is their provisioned YubiKey, plug it into their device, and conduct business as usual.

Tri: 

The good news is that YubiKey is a multi-protocol authenticator, so it can closely follow the evolution path that DoD is on. Once DoD gives the green light on deploying FIDO2 credentials for stronger authentication, YubiKey is already FIDO2 compliant and the transition should be seamless. 

How does a hardware-based authentication device like the YubiKey make service members’ lives easier? 

Alex:

One important and positive difference between the YubiKey and the CAC is that no identifying and amplifying information is on the YubiKey. The CAC is instantly recognizable around the world as a form of identification for members of the U.S. Armed Services.  Service members serving overseas are taught to blend in and not draw attention to themselves (for good reason). But try doing that when a DoD identification card is hanging out of a laptop or mobile phone when you’re in public at a coffee shop! If it’s a dongle, or something larger like a reader, there’s a much higher likelihood that it breaks. A low profile device like the YubiKey ends up being a huge value-add to those serving outside the continental US. 

Tri: 

Definitely agree. And there are a number of other reasons you might want more flexibility and speed when you’re overseas. For example, you only get one CAC – if you lose it, you’re looking at weeks of downtime while you struggle to get a new one issued. But if you have a backup YubiKey in your kit, and you’re able to authenticate with it, you’ve solved that problem. Even if you don’t have a backup handy, getting a replacement can be done same-day, plus some shipping time, as you won’t have to go through the CAC-replacement channels. 

Speaking of “low profile,” are there other security concerns service members have that are avoided when you can authenticate without a reader? 

Alex: 

Well, as I mentioned, the port connections on different devices and laptops often require more readers than one person wants to carry while traveling or working in a non-military-base environment. Some readers have even been known to carry malware, as they are not required to have the same compliance checks as a YubiKey. So if a service member unwittingly gets a reader from some unauthorized provider, there’s a significant risk that it could be compromised and create a vulnerability. 

Tri: 

Right. CAC remains a very secure channel for authentication, especially when it’s used at sanctioned workstations or on base. When you’re talking about gaining access to a military installation, or proof of eligibility for healthcare and military benefits (e.g. commissary, BX/PX/NEX, billeting), then you’re still going to go with CAC. It’s not going anywhere.

But we live in a much more mobile work environment world than we did 20 years ago. So it’s worth discussing how we can augment current authentication in different contexts, especially mobile environments. How do we add value and make things easier to use for the rank-and-file servicemember who may be working at multiple sites, that’s what we’re working on improving. 

What other applications would strong non-CAC authentication have, the ones we may not immediately think about? 

Alex: 

I think mission partners are something to consider. The military works with so many mission partners that don’t have CAC-enabled ability to authenticate securely. 

DoD wants to maintain secure coalition networks for intelligence and data sharing with mission partners. Those networks often bring new authentication challenges. FIDO2 is an option to bring phishing-resistant MFA to non-CAC eligible mission partners that need to securely authenticate into a coalition network. 

Tri: 

There’s another benefit for those who have already served. If you’re working with a hardware-based key like a YubiKey, that can be carried with you once you are discharged from the service. So even after you no longer have a CAC, you can use a YubiKey to log on to VA services, the IRS, or other federal and state agencies that support FIDO2. 

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

The Pentagon is moving to block Chinese and Russian organizations from obtaining U.S. technology secrets through academia, according to a Department of Defense memo made public on June 30.

The memo, signed by Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, lists more than 80 Chinese and Russian academic, scientific, engineering, or cultural institutions that have engaged in “problematic activity” geared at improperly gaining access to classified U.S. research or influencing teaching staff or students. The memo is a response to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which sought a Pentagon response to foreign intelligence exploitation of U.S. academic institutions.

The memo requires a review of new research contracts and prohibits Pentagon money going to projects that involve one of the blacklisted entities, based on their previous track record in harvesting U.S. technology secrets, or simply having suspect relationships with Chinese and Russian intelligence organizations.  

Those on the list have “been confirmed as engaging in problematic activity as described in Section 1286 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended,” the Pentagon said. “These include practices and behaviors that increase the likelihood that DOD-funded research and development efforts will be misappropriated to the detriment of national or economic security or be subject to violations of research integrity or foreign government interference.”

The listing of “these foreign entities underscores our commitment to ensuring the responsible use of federal research funding and safeguarding our critical technologies from exploitation or compromise,” said Shyu in releasing the memo.

The goal of the memo and policy is three-fold, Shyu said:

  • To ensure the security of DOD-funded fundamental research
  • To ensure that participants in sensitive research “fully disclose information that can reveal potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment”
  • To provide “clear messaging” to those doing fundamental research about what constitutes “acceptable and encouraged behaviors” as well as activities “that may lead to challenges in securing DOD research funding.”  

Along with the suspect “foreign entities” list, the Pentagon posted a “Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research,” which now requires that any basic research funded by the Defense Department “go through a review for potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment rising from foreign influence.” The policy includes a template for DOD program managers to follow in awarding contracts for research, to help them spot “signs of potential foreign influence and appropriately mitigate risk.”

The Pentagon “encourages academic institutions, industry partners, and the public to review the list and exercise caution when engaging with entities listed,” Shyu said.

China and Russia have both engaged in long-term cyber espionage, stealing technology secrets from U.S. companies, and the new effort is aimed at thwarting similar efforts through colleges and universities.

Not all of the targeted institutions are focused solely on direct espionage. One, the “Confucius Institutes,” awards scholarships to students in a variety of academic fields and offers free Chinese language lessons, along with free trips to China to students with desirable knowledge. The Heritage Foundation described the Confucius Institute as a “Trojan Horse,” seeking to convince American students and professors that China is a benign actor and a potentially constructive partner in research, when actually, Heritage said, it is part of a “soft power” campaign to encourage research organizations to share sensitive knowledge with China.

The Confucius Institute has satellite locations on scores of U.S. university campuses, but the new guidelines say that from 2024 forward, no American college or university with a Confucius Institute presence can receive Pentagon research money without a detailed waiver.  

Other organizations on the list have lent or granted money to research organizations and universities, in exchange for access to the results of defense-oriented research.  

The Government Accountability Office identified the practices of these suspect entities in a 2020 report and urged the Pentagon to put policies in place that would protect U.S. research and researchers from hostile entities posing as scientific benefactors.

Shyu and her recent predecessors have pushed for greater Pentagon-academic partnerships to address technology challenges that could have commercial benefit to the U.S. economy, as well as military-only challenges that could make headway with funding or resources supplied by the DOD. Hypersonics testing capabilities are among those the Pentagon is setting up at academic institutions.   

The FBI has reported an uptick in recent years of Chinese and Russian research organizations attempting to recruit agents in the scientific community, or inducing them to sell or share their work, or research to which they have access.