SDA Awards $1.5 Billion for 72 New ‘Transport’ Satellites to Lockheed and Northrop

Aug. 21, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Development Agency awarded contracts Aug. 21 to Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin for 36 satellites each as part of Tranche 2 of its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), a large constellation of satellites in low-Earth orbit.

The two deals, worth a collective $1.55 billion, are part of SDA’s Transport Layer—envisioned as a constellation of up to 500 satellites that will provide constant coverage over 95 percent of the Earth’s surface at all times. The Transport Layer would create a global satellite mesh network, providing high-speed tactical links supporting the Pentagon’s broader plans for Joint All-Domain Command and Control.

Under the deal, Lockheed and Northrop will each build satellites carrying ultra-high-frequency and tactical communications payloads in what SDA is calling the “Beta” segment of Tranche 2. The 36 satellites each contractor is to build will operate in three orbital planes, each with 12 satellites.

Northrop’s agreement is worth $733 million, and Lockheed’s is worth $816. That means the average cost per satellite is about $21.5 million, well above Tournear’s stated goal of $15 million. Whether future tranches will be less costly is still to be seen.

The satellites from this tranche are to be ready for launch by September 2026, according to an SDA release, or 36 months from contract award to launch. That keeps with SDA Director Derek M. Tournear’s stated focus on speed as his top priority, followed by cost and performance.

“We are now solidly in the procurement phase for Tranche 2 of the PWSA to support a 2026 delivery,” Tournear said in a statement. “Tranche 2 brings global persistence for all our capabilities in Tranche 1 and adds advanced tactical data links and future proliferated missions.”

Tranche 1 has yet to be launched—SDA launched its first batch of “Tranche 0” satellites in early April, and a second planned launch has been delayed. SDA plans to start sending Tranche 1 satellites into orbit in the fall of 2024, followed by Tranche 2 in 2026.

Tournear has described Tranche 0 as the “warfighter immersion tranche,” giving service members the opportunity to work with the systems, understand their capabilities, and begin to imagine how they might be employed. Tranche 1 will then operationalize those capabilities, and Tranche 2 will provide global persistence, with the number of satellites in each tranche continuing to grow.

Two more planned segments are planned for the Tranche 2 Transport Layer, Alpha and Gamma. A solicitation for Alpha, which will include 100 satellites, was released in June.

Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

TRANCHE	LAYER	# OF SATELLITES	CONTRACTORS
0	Transport	20	York Space Systems, Lockheed Martin
	Tracking	8	SpaceX, L3Harris
1	Transport	126	York Space Systems, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman
	Tracking	35	L3Harris, Northrop Gumman, Raytheon
	Demonstration and Experimentation System	12	York Space Systems
2	Transport	72	Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin
	Transport	100	TBA
	Transport	44 (approx.)	TBA
	Tracking	52 (approx.)	TBA
	Demonstration and Experimentation System	20 (approx.)	TBA

The solicitation for the Beta satellites, issued in late May, noted that SDA anticipated awarding three contracts. An SDA official told Air & Space Forces Magazine that six proposals were received from industry.

“SDA anticipated a maximum of three awardees resulting in the total procurement of six operational planes of T2TL-Beta Space Vehicles,” a spokesman said. “The solicitation tasked each offeror to propose an option for 36 satellites total in addition to the base of 24 satellites. Based on the government’s assessment of best value, SDA made awards to two vendors for 36 satellites for three planes each.”

Tournear has said SDA’s strategy of spreading out contracts among multiple vendors reduces the riks of vendor lock, allowing many different contractors multiple opportunities to bid on opportunities for the PWSA. Thus far, the agency has awarded contracts to:

York Space Systems

SpaceX

L3Harris

Lockheed Martin

Northrop Grumman

Raytheon

Fueling the Future High-End Fight with the Joint Simulation Environment

Aug. 21, 2023 | By Patrick Reardon

The U.S. Air Force is all-in on the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) to revolutionize the way warfighters train for the future fight.

JSE—and HII’s Mission Technologies division, a contributor to the evolution of JSE—will be a central component in the Air Force’s mission to increase force readiness, one of the top operational imperatives outlined by Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall.

“JSE embraces an enterprise approach, meaning it is built using common, non-proprietary solutions for joint all-domain operational training challenges,” said Mike Aldinger, vice president of the U.S. Air Force portfolio in Mission Technologies’ Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) Solutions business group. “Enterprise approaches are central to HII’s business strategy and an element of the Air Force Material Command’s strategic plan. A primary advantage of the JSE solution is to provide a single, unified, high-fidelity environment that generates conditions like weather, weapons effects and electronic warfare (EW). The upshot is a common simulated battlespace where multiple simulators can interact using next-gen platforms like the F-35 and Next Generation Air Dominance.”

Plans are in place for the JSE to be integrated into the Virtual Training and Testing Center (VTTC) at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada by 2028. The initial instantiation will comprise eight F-35, four F-22, and eight virtual air threats. HII is supporting the evolution of this new technology at Nellis, working on-site to integrate systems and models, as well as performing software development to ensure that the simulated environment reflects real-world changes as they develop.

”JSE is a common environment that all of the training platforms query for results,” Aldinger said. “An input (weapon engagement) is transmitted into this common environment that then provides the adjudication to figure out [whether] it was successful or not, and this is then reflected across battlespace participants.”

Aldinger said that today’s distributed training environments are comprised of disparate systems connected over wide area networks, which can result in segmented training environments. These segmented environments impact training interoperability, and at times result in the use of dated battlespace parameters (e.g., models, threats, EW) due to the lengthy process for updating the many training systems.

“JSE includes a set of systems and processes to allow the U.S. Air Force to rapidly update models, such as radar models [and] threat models,” Aldinger said. “As our peer adversaries evolve, we can rapidly update this JSE architecture so that when we train with future platforms and current fifth-gen, they [accurately] represent what the near peer adversary we’ll be up against.”

John Bell, technical director of HII’s LVC Solutions business group, said the concept is to provide a common architecture for the simulated environment that all the models can use.

“In particular, the Air Force and the Navy, who are developing JSE together, can build a common set of models such as the Next Generation Threat System (NGTS), which is providing the constructed simulation component of the JSE,” Bell said. “We are, as of this year, beginning a new software development effort at the VTTC to develop new threat models and new weapons system models in NGTS, specifically using data that we are given from the National Air and Space Intel Center. The concept is: We get [new] data that’s been collected about real-world threats, and within a period of months, we’re able to implement that data. Depending on the nature of the data and the nature of the threat, it may be a matter of weeks before we can implement that data in the new threat system.”

Aldinger and Bell both said JSE is a “Train as you Fight” solution, giving warfighters the high-fidelity, real-world experience they need with the full range of fifth-gen (and Next-Gen Air Dominance) platforms. An F-35 pilot, for instance, can turn on all their sensors in the JSE that they wouldn’t be able to on a range without exposing capabilities to adversaries.

“This is a different approach to how they’re training today in USAF Distributed Mission Operation,” Aldinger said. “The training platforms [will] include the Operational Flight Program. What’s in the air is being fully represented in the VTTC, so you’re getting the most realistic training possible with this JSE approach.”

That streamlined, high-fidelity and efficient solution to training wouldn’t be possible without Mission Technologies’ LVC expertise. HII’s enterprise solutions and support are imperative in the Air Force’s pursuit of JSE, a revolutionary force multiplier that’s preparing today’s warfighters for tomorrow’s fight.

US, Japan, South Korea Agree to Shared Missile Warning by End of 2023, Annual Exercises

Aug. 18, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The U.S., South Korea, and Japan have committed to sharing real-time missile warning data by the end of 2023, holding annual multi-domain military exercises, and more as part of an historic summit Aug. 18.

U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suk Yeol met at Camp David, Md., for the first ever standalone meeting of the three countries’ leaders and announced a raft of agreements and understandings bolstering their ties in the face of aggression from both China and North Korea.

Among the agreements:

“We’ve all committed to swiftly consult each other in response to threats against any one of our countries,” Biden said in a press conference. “That means we’ll have a hotline to share information and coordinate our response whenever there’s a crisis in region.”

The three countries will “activate a data-sharing mechanism to exchange real-time missile warning data,” according to a White House fact sheet, particularly focused on North Korea’s missile launches. The hope is to make that mechanism operational by the end of 2023.

“Annual, named, multi-domain trilateral exercises,” according to the fact sheet.

Annual meetings between the countries’ leaders, as well as yearly meetings between their defense ministers and other top-ranking officials, “not just this year, not just next year, but forever, that’s the intention,” Biden said

A working group between the three countries to combat North Korea’s malicious cyber activities.

A joint agreement condemning any possible use of military force against Taiwan.

In a press conference, the three leaders tried to emphasize their security commitments go beyond responding to just one country, with Kishida emphasizing the importance of the “rules-based international order” and “regional stability.”

But the threats posed by China and particularly North Korea were common themes.

“We have consulted on practical ways to cooperate aimed at improving our joint response capabilities to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, which have become more sophisticated than ever,” Yoon said through a translator.

The agreement for major annual military exercises builds on a previous agreement in January between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin and South Korean defense minister Lee Jong-sup to ramp up military exercises between the two countries, including more deployments of assets such as fifth-generation fighters and strategic bombers.

In April, Biden and Yoon released a new agreement, dubbed the “Washington Declaration,” aimed at strengthening the U.S.’s commitment to its “extended deterrence” mission—in which America vows to defend South Korea from attack with the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. As part of that declaration, the U.S. agreed to make high-profile, but temporary, deployments, of nuclear-capable systems to the Korean peninsula, such as B-52 bombers and nuclear missile submarines.

Japan and the U.S., meanwhile, also stepped up their bilateral exercises in 2022, according to news agency Nikkei, and have conducted exercises every month this year. A U.S. Air Force B-52 briefly landed at Yokota Air Base in July due to an in-flight maintenance issue, and B-1s deployed to Misawa Air Base as part of a Bomber Task Force rotation.

Trilateral exercises have also taken place: in February, April, and July, the three countries combined for naval ballistic missile defense exercises in response to North Korean missile tests.

Trilaterial aerial exercises have been less common to this point, but Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach told Nikkei in April that he would like to see them occur.

Historically, there has been enmity between Japan and South Korea, hindering cooperation. But at Camp David, Yoon and Kishida presented a united front and pledged to open a “new chapter” in cooperation.

Air Force Will Offer Pilots Assignment Preference As Part of New Retention Program

Aug. 18, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

Editor’s Note: This story was updated Aug. 21 to clarify details regarding the Assignment of Preference requirements.

The Air Force’s Rated Officer Retention Demonstration Program, announced Aug. 15, will offer pilots assignment preferences in addition to monetary bonuses, a service spokeswoman told Air & Space Forces Magazine on Aug. 18.

Pilots will have to sign at least an eight-year contract to receive the highest possible financial payout, and most command and control/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance pilots will be capped at $35,000 per year, compared to $50,000 for other pilots.

The extra details shed more light on a trial program the Air Force is trotting out to entice pilots to stay in the service and re-up their commitment years in advance. Eligible pilots have until Sept. 15 to apply.

The demonstration program was implemented in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which gave the Secretary of the Air Force leeway to offer bonuses and preferred assignments to rated officers “whose continued service on active duty would be in the best interest of the Department of the Air Force” and who have between 1-3 years left on their initial service commitment—a key difference from the service’s existing Aviation Bonus program, which targets Airmen whose service commitment is expiring.

The law requires a minimum of four extra years in the service from officers who take advantage of the program. Contracts for bonuses and preferred assignments are signed separately, so Airmen who take advantage of both will incur at least six years of service—four from the bonus, two from the assignment of preference. Airmen who only receive an assignment of preference will incur four years.

“[Assignment of preference] is worked directly between assignment officers and members, but may not be a good fit for all individuals based on career timing, etc.,” service spokeswoman Laurel Falls said, noting that assignment lengths will be standard, depending on the needs of the Air Force.

The level of bonuses will be determined based on the length of the contract signed and the Air Force’s needs for different specialties, Falls added.

Specifically, bomber pilots, fighter pilots, special operations pilots, rescue pilots, mobility pilots, and U-2 pilots will all be eligible for bonuses between $35,000 and $50,000:

Four-year contracts come with $35,000 per year

Five-to-seven-year contracts come with $42,500 per year

Eight-to-12-year contracts come with $50,000 per year

Alternatively, those pilots can take a lump sum payment instead of annual payments:

Five-to-seven-year contracts come with a lump sum of $100,000

Eight-to-12-year contracts come with a lump sum of $200,000

For C2/ISR pilots, all contracts from four to 12 years come with annual payments of $35,000. Lump sum payments, however, are split between $100,000 for five-to-seven-year deals and $200,000 for eight to 12 years.

The demonstration program was implemented in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which gave the Secretary of the Air Force leeway to offer the bonus to rated officers “whose continued service on active duty would be in the best interest of the Department of the Air Force” and who have between 1-3 years left on their initial service commitment—a key difference from the service’s existing Aviation Bonus program, which targets Airmen whose service commitment is expiring.

For this year, the program will be for Airmen whose Active-Duty service commitments from training are due to expire in fiscal 2024 and 2025. Moving forward, the Air Force will reserve the biggest bonuses for pilots who sign contracts while still having three years left on their initial commitment.

The program is authorized to run through 2028. If this initial year is deemed a success, the Air Force “may potentially continue with higher funding allocation requests in future years to expand offerings to a broader rated field and/or for an extended period,” according to a release.

Air Force leaders and members of Congress hope that providing pilots the chance to renew their commitment years in advance will address a common complaint among aviators—a lack of stability for their families.

In the past, Vice Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin noted before Congress in May, bonuses have come too late to change plans that were already years in the making.

“Now, obviously, we’re asking for a longer commitment, but at that time, it’s helping them cement their future, see where their families are and have that predictability,” Allvin said.

Improving retention will be a key part in addressing the service’s persistent pilot shortage. In written testimony, Allvin noted that the Air Force had a net loss of about 250 pilots in fiscal 2022 and ended the year 1,900 pilots short of its goal of 21,000. For years now, the Air Force has struggled to produce and retain enough pilots to meet its goals, facing stiff competition from private industry.

Decentralize and Conquer: Brown Pushes for More Autonomy in New Doctrine Publication

Aug. 18, 2023 | By David Roza

The Air Force’s success in a future conflict will depend on “clear communication of intent, shared understanding, trust, and empowerment,” Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. wrote in an Aug. 16 memo to the force. The memo accompanied a new Air Force doctrine publication on mission command that Brown hopes will help leaders understand how to empower subordinates to make decisions, a skill he believes will be essential in a possible future conflict where units may find themselves isolated from command.

“Though the USAF doctrine has historically focused on decentralized execution, the operational environment the last few decades have instead typified centralization at all levels,” the new doctrine publication states. “However, future contested, degraded, or operationally limited environments may impede these efficiencies, necessitating a pivot towards decentralization.”

The memo and doctrine come at a time when the Air Force is preparing for a possible future conflict against China in the Pacific, where vast distances, robust anti-aircraft weapons, and signal jamming could force units to act with greater autonomy. One of the tenets of that shift is Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the operating concept in which Airmen and aircraft disperse from a central base to smaller, more austere locations in order to complicate an adversary’s targeting.

For concepts like ACE to work, however, Airmen need to be well-versed in the principle of “mission command,” whereby Airmen are empowered to make their own decisions in line with their commander’s intent in an uncertain, complex environment.

“Armed with shared understanding, subordinates can make effective decisions consistent with commander’s intent to protect and preserve the force and generate combat power even if they have lost contact with higher echelons,” the publication says.

tacp — Tactical Air Control Party Airmen with the 3rd Air Support Operations Squadron from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, watch as a MH-60S Seahawk takes off July 22, 2015, at Andersen Air Force Base South, Guam. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alexander W. Riedel

The new publication is meant to guide leaders towards adopting the mission command mindset. In the past, Brown wrote, he has witnessed “friction between bold leadership, in the spirit of mission command, and the guidance our Air Force has outlined in our instructions and regulations.”

Leaders can foster a climate of mission command based on five principles, he added:

Character: building mutual respect and trust in line with the Air Force core values

Competence: proficiency in performing duties, which builds trust

Capability: the unit’s processes, feedback mechanisms, and other organizational functions for establishing a culture of mission command

Cohesion: a unit’s degree of camaraderie and morale

Capacity: the overall measure or degree to which a unit can operate according to the principles of mission command

Pursuing those five Cs, the doctrine publication states, can help ensure subordinates grasp the commander’s intent (the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of a mission), that commanders trust subordinates to devise the ‘how’ to fulfill their intent, and that all parties have a shared understanding of acceptable risk levels.

The doctrine publication includes historical case studies of mission command. One is retired Lt. Gen. Marshall Webb, who on Sept. 11, 2001 was a lieutenant colonel and operations officer for the 20th Special Operations Squadron. Webb was ordered to report to McGuire Air Force Base, N.J. with seven MH-53 Pave Low rescue helicopters, where he received the simple instruction to “go help Americans!”

“Understanding his brief, but unequivocally clear commander’s intent, Webb and his crews began flying life-saving missions into ground zero at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon without requiring nor requesting additional guidance from higher headquarters,” the publication states. “Though extremely fatigued and dogged by numerous challenges, they overcame adversity, performed their mission, and achieved commander’s intent.”

The doctrine publication cautions that mission command does not mean commanders should abandon their responsibilities or unnecessarily ignore established tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also may not applicable in all situations, and it cannot be achieved “without developing a command climate of mutual trust,” the doctrine says.

Creating such a climate does not happen overnight, Brown noted in his memo.

“While this publication will help build a common understanding of mission command across the force, the culture of mission command doesn’t happen just because it is written in our doctrine,” he said. “I believe building confidence in mission command, for both leaders and Airmen, requires daily execution in simple scenarios ahead of a complex challenge in conflict.”

USAFE Boss: Ukraine Won’t Get the F-16 Until 2024—And Proficiency Will Take Years

Aug. 18, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

Ukraine won’t get a basic F-16 capability until at least 2024, and developing proficiency with that aircraft “could be four or five years down the road,” Gen. James B. Hecker, commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces-Africa, said Aug. 18.

“It’s going to [take] at least until next year until you see F-16s in Ukraine,” Hecker said at a virtual meeting of the Defense Writers Group.

According to multiple media reports, within the past few days President Joe Biden’s administration gave the necessary official approvals needed for a consortium of countries led by Denmark and the Netherlands to start training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. The U.S. has also provided formal assurances that it will fast-track any requests from those countries to transfer their older F-16s to Ukraine that they are trading out for newer aircraft like F-35s.

Yet Hecker downplayed the significance the F-16s may have in helping Ukraine combat Russia’s invasion, saying the capability won’t be a “silver bullet” but will simply ease Ukraine’s use of air-to-ground weapons already being provided. His comments echo previous remarks from Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, who have said F-16s won’t be a “game-changer” or “magic weapon,” respectively.

“What the F-16 will give them is, it’s going to be more interoperable with the current weapons that we’re giving them now,” Hecker said. “Right now, weapons that we’re giving them have to be adapted to go on the MiG-29 or go on the Su-27, or something like that.”

The U.S. has provided Ukraine with weapons including the AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile, which has been seen flying on Ukrainian MiG-29s, which Hecker called “a pretty capable aircraft.” However, Ukraine has asked Western nations for F-16s in part because the MiG-29 is a Russian design and parts are difficult to get to keep the fleet flying.

The air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons provided by NATO nations and partners are “already interoperable” with the F-16, “so that will help out and give them the added capability. But it’s not going to be the silver bullet, [that] all of a sudden they’re going to start taking down SA-21s [Russian surface-to-air missiles] because they have an F-16,” Hecker said.

Hecker added that the cadre of pilots undergoing F-16 training are very junior and will need seasoning to become proficient with the fighter—they “barely have any hours at all. So they’re not currently fighting in the war,” Hecker said.

POLITICO reported that Ukraine has selected 32 pilots for F-16 training, but only eight are sufficiently proficient in English to begin training. The others are “getting language training in the U.K.,” Hecker said.

“Then they’re going to get a little bit more training on propellers, and then go down to France and fly in the Alpha Jet for a little bit,“ the USAFE commander added. “That all is going to take time. And that’s probably not going to happen before the end of the year. So that takes a while to make that happen. So that’s why it’s going to be at least until next year until you see F-16s in Ukraine.”

Hecker’s prediction matches comments from a Ukrainian air force spokesman, who said on state television this week that F-16s will not arrive this autumn or winter. John Kirby, a spokesperson for the National Security Council, had previously suggested the fighters may arrive toward the end of 2023, but that timeline was seen as ambitious.

Whenever the F-16s do arrive in Ukraine, reaching proficiency will take even more time, Hecker warned.

“To get proficient in the F-16, that’s not going to happen overnight. You can get proficient on some weapons systems fairly quickly. But ones like F-16s, it takes a while to build … a couple squadrons of F-16s, and to get their readiness high enough, and their proficiency high enough. I mean, you’re talking, this could be four or five years down the road.”

In the short term, the F-16s “will help a little bit, but it’s not the silver bullet,” he repeated.

U.S. officials have consistently downplayed the significance of F-16s in the Russia-Ukraine war. Kirby noted in July that “it’s not our assessment that the F-16s alone would be enough to turn the tide.”

The fighter would offer benefits, though. Hecker said that F-16s with AIM-120 AMRAAM dogfight missiles will likely just push Russian forces back a bit further. The NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) is already in service with Ukraine, and the rounds of that system are AMRAAMs modified for surface launch.

Ukrainian F-16s with AMRAAMs could shoot down Russian aircraft, “but all Russia has to do is stay out of the range of the AMRAAMs,” Hecker said, noting the Russians have already started doing that and adapted by moving command posts further away from the front lines when a new, longer-ranged artillery system or other weapon is introduced.

Importantly, F-16s won’t be able to “chase down” Russian aircraft over Russian territory, “because you’ll get shot by one of the Russian surface-to-air missiles,” Hecker said.

Overall, Russia’s failure to quickly achieve air superiority after its full-scale invasion was a surprise to USAFE, Hecker said, noting that Russia built Ukraine’s air defense systems and likely had good insight into how to defeat them.

“I think that most everybody thought that [Russia] would be able to take out the IADS (Integrated Air Defense System) in Ukraine such that they were going to … be able to get air superiority,” he said.

And while air superiority is a tall order, Hecker indicated that Russia “kind of gave up on that pretty early on.” The Russian air force has lost dozens of aircraft in the fight and as a result has seemingly decided not to fly within range of Ukraine’s air defenses, he added.

Instead, Russia adapted by sending unmanned aircraft bought from Iran and cruise missiles launched from bombers at targets in Ukraine, without risking further combat aircraft or crews. Those tactics have proved “relatively successful,” Hecker said, because while Ukrainian air defenses knock down most of the incoming drones and missiles, some still get through.

As for the state of Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive, Hecker acknowledged that “it started off a little slow [but] we’ve seen it pick up slightly since then.”

Russia has slowed that progress in part by heavily mining areas, forcing the Ukrainian forces to methodically neutralize them, Hecker added.

Space Force Gets Its First Targeting Squadron. Here’s What It Will Do

Aug. 17, 2023 | By David Roza

A new unit activated recently at Peterson Space Force Base, Colo., is the branch’s first-ever targeting squadron, designed to scope out adversary space capabilities and present options to the joint force on how to neutralize them.

“Today is a monumental time in the history of our service,” Lt. Col. Travis Anderson, commander of the 75th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron, said in a press release about its Aug. 11 activation. “The idea of this unit began four years ago on paper and has probably been in the minds of several U.S. Air Force intelligence officers even longer.”

Space systems are made up of three elements: the satellite, the ground station that commands and controls it, and the signal that connects the two, retired Space Force Col. Charles Galbreath, senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“My interpretation of space targeting is understanding all of those elements for an adversary system and then being able to make recommendations on what would be the best way to counteract that threat system,” he said. “In some cases, that may mean sending a jamming signal from our Counter Communications System, or it could mean putting a JDAM on a building somewhere to destroy the command and control or the end user.”

The 75th ISRS is part of Space Delta 7, the operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) component of the Space Force. While its sister squadrons also perform ISR and likely have targeting elements, the 75th consolidates targeting expertise and acts as a focal point for stakeholders who need that information, Galbreath said.

Before the Space Force launched in December 2019, Air Force intelligence officers often served just a single assignment in space, which precluded a robust corps of experts in the field, he said. The 75th is likely one of several new stand-ups to occur in the near future as the Space Force develops ranks of specialized experts.

“Having a squadron like this creates an opportunity for true depths of understanding of the threat environment,” he said.

Assessing space systems can be a difficult task. For example, dual-use satellites may present a challenge for intelligence officers trying to assess threats—China may claim that a robotic arm attached to a satellite is intended for space debris removal, but it could also be used to grab and disrupt other satellites.

Air Force space operators-turned commercial space executives expressed a similar concern during a panel discussion hosted by the Hudson Institute in July.

“Commercial operators become targets when they support the DOD,” Even Rogers, former Air Force space operator and CEO of the space technology company True Anomaly, said at the discussion. “In fact, I suspect that there are some incentives that would cause commercial operators to be targeted first as a strategic off-ramp in a broader conflict, because it is a gray zone, there is uncertainty about whether the United States intends to defend and protect … commercial providers.”

Other challenges include locating a satellite and its ground station, and determining what information its crew needs to operate and where its orders come from. Working together, the 75th ISRS and other intelligence organizations can fuse “a consolidated picture of what makes an adversary threat system tick, and therefore how can we best defeat it?” Galbreath said.

This illustration created for the Space-Based Weapons section of the “Competing in Space” unclassiﬁed report depicts space-based anti-satellite systems that target other space systems. Concepts for space-based anti-satellite systems vary widely and include designs to deliver reversible and irreversible counterspace effects. National Air and Space Intelligence Center illustration by Justin Weisbarth.

As adversary space capabilities become more sophisticated, so too must U.S. counterspace capabilities. Future operators may need to use cyber or electromagnetic spectrum weapons to target enemy satellites, especially when ground stations are tucked away behind an anti-access/area-denial environment such as mainland China. The problem is that the U.S. does not have many counterspace weapons at its disposal, especially compared to its main rival.

“China has already fielded an alarming array of operational counterspace weaponry” including ground-launched kinetic weapons and lasers, cyber capabilities, and electronic warfare weapons, Galbreath wrote in a June paper on counterspace capabilities. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also developing space weapons that could attack with robotic arms, electronic warfare, or lasers.

The U.S. defense against such weapons must include establishing international norms of behavior in space, resilient space system architecture that can withstand attack, and exceptional space domain awareness, Galbreath said. But it must also include strong counterspace capabilities.

“The United States has largely shunned the thought of fielding space weapons since the end of the Cold War,” the retired colonel wrote. “However, recognizing space as a warfighting domain means any serious effort to achieve space security must include space weapons.”

At least one such system is on the way. In April, Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman promised Congress a “substantial on-orbit capability … in full spectrum operations” by 2026, though he did not provide many details on what that capability might look like. Galbreath argued that the U.S. needs an architecture of multiple new counterspace systems to protect its space enterprise.

In the meantime, the 75th ISRS will analyze existing threats and how to counter them—the latest addition to the “mighty watchful eye” lauded in the Space Force official song.

AFCENT Unveils a New Patch to Recognize Partners as Part of ‘Transformed’ Command

Aug. 17, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

Air Forces Central has unveiled a colorful new patch to acknowledge the significant role U.S. allies and partners play in military operations in the Middle East.

Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, the commander of Air Forces Central, said the move is an overdue recognition that coalition partners are an integral part of AFCENT.

“We’ve got a group of people that have been working together on various missions for 30 years, and we don’t actually have something that we can all say is our patch, where we’re working together,” Grynkewich told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “And so that’s what we’ve tried to create.”

Military patches can carry significance, whether it is showing pride in serving with a specific unit or showcasing joint commands.

This one is largely green, a color long associated with Islam, with a burst of yellow representing the sun and desert and a blue star, the historical Air Force symbol.

For AFCENT, the process of getting a new patch approved in a bureaucratic organization like the U.S. military was surprisingly easy. The command went to Air Force’s heraldry department, which is responsible for patches and the processes, and encountered only a few hurdles.

Grynkewich said the design was centered around being “historically significant and culturally appropriate.”

As the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East has shrunk in recent years, building partnerships has become an increasing important element of CENTCOM’s strategy. That has put a premium on getting Arab members of the coalition to work together and encourage military cooperation with Israel, which in 2021 was shifted from the U.S. European Command area of responsibly to CENTCOM’s.

Airmen in the Middle East already carry a number of hats. Officially, AFCENT is the 9th Air Force, tracing its lineage back to a World War II unit that fought in Europe and North Africa as part to the Army Air Forces. Members of the command have worn both Air Forces Central and Ninth Air Force patches.

AFCENT’s new patch, in contrast, recognizes the 18 countries that all work together in the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, whose personnel can wear the patch.

“As we’ve transformed this command to focus on the long term, and on campaigning, in addition to being able to run day-to-day combat operations, we’re really trying to expand that coalition presence across the entire headquarters,” Grynkewich said. “The intent would be it was something that any of the coalition partners including the U.S. could wear on their uniforms.”

There are practical limitations: there is only so much space on a someone’s arm. AFCENT hopes to eventually create one patch to represent the 9th Air Force, Air Forces Central, and coalition partners.

“As you think about how you integrate those partners better into all of your different processes and into what your activities are in the region, it just becomes kind of a natural evolution that our minds all shifted to, oh boy, you know, we’ve actually got something here that’s pretty powerful,” Grynkewich said.

U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, 9th Air Force (AFCENT) commander and Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) for U.S. Central Command, center-left, poses for a photo with senior national representatives from coalition and partner nations during the unveiling of the new coalition and combined forces central emblem August 16, 2023, at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel Brosam

Space Force Deactivates One Space Surveillance Satellite, Sets Plans for Two More

Aug. 17, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Force declared “mission complete” for one of its space surveillance satellites and took it off operational status last month, ahead of another satellite joining the constellation next year.

The Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program provides the Space Force with the ability to track and characterize objects in geosynchronous orbit. The first two satellites launched in 2014 and were accepted into service in 2015, and the second of those, GSSAP Space Vehicle 2, is no longer operational after it was transferred from Space Operations Command to Space Systems Command.

According to an August release from SpOC, the satellite was past its designed service life and was deactivated to “make way for new more advanced technology in the space domain.”

There are now five active GSSAP satellites left—after the initial two, two more launched in 2016 and become operational in 2017, followed by two more in January 2022 that reached IOC by April of that year.

Two more are still to come. The SpOC release noted that they will launch in 2024 and 2027.

GSSAP satellites operate in near-geosynchronous orbit, roughly 22,300 miles above earth, and have the ability to maneuver, allowing them to observe more and more closely in an orbit where most satellites remain locked in place relative to the earth below.

That maneuverability comes at a price, though. Lt. Gen. John E. Shaw, deputy commander of U.S. Space Command, noted in a July event with the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that operators have to think “in terms of months and years of where they’ve going to maneuver these GSSAP satellites” given the limited store of fuel onboard.

The way the Space Force has planned and fielded its satellites up to this point, once a space vehicle is out of fuel, it’s done—there is no way to refuel in space.

“The way we’ve been doing space operations since the dawn of the space age, we’ve been doing it wrong,” Shaw said, arguing there could be a “fundamental doctrinal shift” toward more “dynamic space operations.”

“We can’t have those constraints in the future. And so we’re trying to articulate a requirement to the Space Force that we need to be able to have sustained space maneuver for those platforms,” Shaw added.

Specifically, Shaw cited a goal of 2028 for having sustained space maneuver. Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson has also endorsed the idea of the branch using commercial capabilities to “service” satellites in orbit. In April 2022, Space Systems Command revealed plans for an experiment for refueling small satellites in geostationary orbit. And in September, SSC held an industry day to see what the commercial sector is working on for assured access to space, including on-orbit servicing, maneuver, and debris removal.