Space-based capabilities like GPS and satellite communications are vital to modern warfighting—and they are also most easily attackable via the electromagnetic spectrum via jamming or spoofing the radio transmissions that provide their command and control. But the Department of Defense’s electromagnetic warfare efforts in space are hamstrung by poor coordination and a lack of communication between stakeholders, experts said.
David Zurn, chief of test engineering at the Georgia Tech Research Institute, has worked on electromagnetic warfare (EW) programs for a decade or more. During a panel discussion at the Association of Old Crows’ symposium this month, he warned of the Pentagon’s vulnerability when it comes to what he calls “EW counter-space.”
“A day without space is really a day without 21st century warfighting,” said Zurn. “Space, however, is completely dependent on reliable data in its [Telemetry, Tracking and Command] links,” the radio transmissions that enable ground stations to communicate with and control satellites in orbit.
Satellites generally aren’t capable of autonomous operation, Zurn noted. “We’ve got to have the TT&C links to operate those vehicles, and the data we get from them [for surveillance or communications] is critical. If those data links are cut off, we’re not going to get that info and we’re not going to be able to communicate across the force,” he said. But they can easily be jammed.
The conflict in Ukraine “is obviously the poster child for this. We’ve seen significant use of jamming, both against commercial and military [space] assets in Ukraine. So we’ve seen that EW counter-space is going to become normal … in future conflicts,” he added.
The problem is made doubly urgent because the barriers to entry for EW attack in space are comparatively low: “Pandora’s box is open there, and I don’t think it’s going to close,” he said.
“Resilience to space EW should be a critical DOD priority. I don’t think it is based on what I’ve seen from an investment perspective and an acquisition perspective,” Zurn concluded.
Another issue holding resilience back is communication breakdowns between stakeholders, according to Jared Duckworth, a former Navy EW officer who now works on Joint Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) as a contractor for the MITRE Corp. JEMSO encompasses both jamming (offensive EW), counter-jamming (defensive EW), and spectrum management activities.
“When we start talking JEMSO, especially EMS operations in space, it is so diverse, so complex, so enormous, that each one of us is going to have a different perspective,” he said during the panel discussion, “It doesn’t mean that anyone is wrong, but we have to understand the big picture.”
In that regard, Duckworth compared space EW to the elephant in the parable of the three blind men, each of whom is touching a different part of the animal. “Each one of them comes up with a different perspective of what the elephant is,” he noted.
In a subsequent interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine, Duckworth noted that the organizational picture in DOD is “a little bit confusing” when it comes to EW in space:
- U.S. Strategic Command is the executive agent responsible for JEMSO and is the requirements owner and the user representative for tools being developed.
- The other combatant commands actually execute JEMSO operations
- In space specifically, U.S. Space Command executes JEMSO ops, while the Space Force and its acquisition elements like Space Systems Command and the Space Development Agency buy the tools.
“In any large organization like DOD, it is always very difficult to make sure everyone has the whole picture of what’s going on,” Duckworth said.
As an example, he pointed out that combatting EW attacks on satellite communication downlinks is the responsibility of the end user—whichever combatant command is at the bottom of the downlink being jammed. But attacks against the uplinks generated by those end users are the responsibility of SPACECOM, which also had ownership of any attacks against TT&C links in either direction.
“So you always have this push and pull of these huge organizations going in different directions and having different resources, and there’s a lot of overlap between them,” he said. “Figuring out who has what responsibility, what the process is, and what information everyone needs … is where everyone is starting to come to the table to work together.”
Add to that the fact that all these organizations and concepts are still in the infancy, and it is a challenging recipe, he said. The Space Force came online nearly five years ago, and U.S European command’s JEMSO unit reached initial operating capability in March 2019.
“All these communities just stood up within the last five or six years. … So we’re still learning roles and responsibilities,” Duckworth pointed out. “Operationally speaking, I would say the communication is impressive. There’s a lot of dialog that takes place.”
But the development/acquisition side is less impressive. “Getting a lot of the acquisition technical people to speak, define roles, responsibilities, processes, and get at who really should be responsible for what part is the critical point,” he said.
Part of the problem is the cross-cutting character of spectrum operations, Maj. Gen. Steve “Bucky” Butow, head of the space portfolio at the Defense Innovation Unit, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.
“I’m fortunate,” he said, explaining that “space is a well-defined vertical in the Department of Defense. There’s a Space Force that operates in the space domain and so my portfolio is well-aligned with that.”
By contrast, he said, technology portfolios can cut across verticals across all the domains and “require a lot more hand-holding and a lot more engagement.”
“Electronic warfare is very much one of these horizontals, and it always has been,” he added. “One of the areas we need to innovate on is policy.”
The policy challenges are especially grave, Duckworth added, because of the relatively low barriers to entry for EW, even in space. GPS signals can be jammed and civilian ones spoofed with cheap, easily available hardware.
“You don’t need any kind of space launch capability to do EW [in space], and you don’t need very good space domain awareness, because of the proliferation of [commercial off-the-shelf] equipment,” he said.
As a result, smaller countries that aren’t typically considered space powers or even non-state actors could wield EW in a “‘David and Goliath’ kind of situation,” Duckworth said.