Q&A: The Vast Interconnected Pacific 

Q. We’ve seen China acting more aggressively in the South China Sea and other areas. What will you need to deter the Chinese militarily five and 10 years from now?

A: There are two aspects to the picture. … One is the behavior of potential adversaries out there, the challenges to the security situation. … On the flip side of that picture is all the positive things that are taking place. And I’ll still highlight the asymmetric advantages that we have, and it’s the growing strength and relationship of allies and partners within the region, the professionalism of our force, and then the inherent strength of the United States joint force, which continues to work closer together every day.

Going forward, what will we need? First of all, our forces in the United States and those of our allies and partners are ready for the challenges that are in front of us, and we continue to watch what potential adversaries are doing—whether that’s Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang. My pushback to USAF and to senior leaders is,  we must continue to modernize. We must continue to develop advanced capabilities that continue to keep us ahead of what adversaries or potential adversaries are doing.

Q: You and other U.S. officials have in the past highlighted the dangerous Chinese interactions with Philippine vessels, as well as the close calls when Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military aircraft intercept U.S. American military aircraft. Is China continuing to apply those tactics or have they become more safe in their intercepts of U.S. aircraft?

A: Over time—and I’ve been able to watch this for a number of years—some of this behavior goes in cycles, and there will be rashes and incidences of unsafe, unprofessional behavior, and then it will curtail for a while, and then it will come back. So you can look at this one of two ways: Either the basic skill sets and professionalism of their force isn’t up to standards and norms, or the unsafe unprofessional behavior is directed from higher up and it’s a form of messaging. We continue to watch and assess.

And while I’ll say that over the last few months we, the United States, have not been on the receiving end of unsafe and unprofessional behavior from the PLA, at least in the air domain, our allies and partners have been on the receiving end … and they continue to see that. … You can draw your own conclusions as to why these things ebb and flow.

Q: Would you like to at least be able to pick up the phone in case of an incident? We’ve seen that communication has opened up a bit at a high level between the Chinese military and the U.S. Do you see any prospect of being able to talk to your Chinese counterpart?

A: I don’t know if I see a prospect for me. [To] start at the beginning, I believe that a mil-to-mil dialogue is always good, regardless of who we’re dealing with. The ability for military leaders and nations to pick up the phone and have an opportunity to talk to de-escalate a situation that is ramping up in its severity is beneficial for all. I am always encouraging mil-to-mil dialogues or a venue to have these mil-to-mil dialogues.

One of the things that has come out of the head of state [meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden in November 2023] was the MMCA dialogue—Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. That event took place at the O-6—at the colonel level—[in April] in Hawaii. We had not had one of those face-to-face, sit-down dialogues [since December 2021, which was a virtual meeting]. … When these things happen, we do two iterations a year, usually one in the United States—in Hawaii—the other in China. We are still on track later this year to do the one in China.

[On Sept. 9], Adm. [Samuel] Paparo, [commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] had a call with the Southern Theater Commander of the PLA. In terms of the substantive levels of discussion, that will continue to come out in terms of what was discussed. But I think just the fact that senior leaders on both sides have had that avenue for conversation is a positive step.

Q: In July, Chinese and Russian bombers flew together, crossing into the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). How are China and Russia cooperating militarily? And how does that impact your plans and operations in the Pacific?

A: We’ve watched the combined bomber operations between Russia and China. This was the first event since 2019, their eighth iteration of doing a combined bomber patrol. …

I describe it as a relationship of convenience. … By comparison, when I look at how the United States allies and partners work together, it’s on a foundation of trust. It’s on a foundation of shared values—the respect for sovereignty, the respect for open economic systems, transparency in how we do business, and respect for human rights. I do not see that same foundation between the PRC and Russia. Outwardly, they describe their relationship with no limits. [But] I would seriously question if that really is the case. I think it is limited in terms of scope and their ability to trust each other the same way that the United States and our allies and partners have mutual trust and respect.

Q: You deployed to South Korea as a young fighter pilot. Some analysts think there’s a risk that conflict with China might take place at the same time as a North Korean attack. Do you think that’s a risk? How do you assess the North Korean risk, and how are you preparing for that?

A: I’ve used the word opportunists or opportunism to describe the governments in Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. We have seen this play out as an example: While the world was distracted by COVID, Beijing made a move on Hong Kong—[seizing]  an opportunity to push forward on their objectives. The case that you described, while hypothetical, is certainly something that we pay close attention to.  Commanders at all levels are encouraged to pay attention to the interconnections between the potential threats that exist, not only in the theater but around the world.

Q: Like China, North Korea is also helping Russia now, and perhaps getting something in return?

A: That’s certainly true, both on the military equipment side and the exchange of information. 

Not to get too much into hypotheticals, but you could take this out a little bit further to go, “In times of conflict, could other players enter into the mix, or be other factors that we would have to consider?” But it is something that, again, we think through, we plan for.  We don’t put basically everything against one potential threat or one potential adversary and that will remain positioned to deal with things across the board.

Q: Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is one way you are trying to respond to China’s anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. Where are you in terms of the number of runways you want? How much equipment is going to be pre-positioned? 

A: I have been thoroughly impressed with what the units have been doing to develop the capabilities, the tactics, techniques, and procedures, to be able to go out there and do the job that we ask them to do when it comes to Agile Combat Employment.

The command chief and I got to go to Guam and Tinian during an exercise a few months ago, and we got to see this in action. I was really impressed. It’s a small number of people, led by kind of a midlevel officer and a lot of enlisted that were out there working in an austere environment, generating sorties, generating combat power with not a lot of kit, and showing that they could be survivable and adaptable in the environment. That’s one example that takes place all across the theater, in each of the Numbered Air Forces. They’re practicing Agile Combat Employment in Korea. They’re doing it in Japan. They’re doing it in Alaska.

The piece that we’re building, we’re adding, is doing this at scope and scale. Instead of individual units training, let’s do them all together. Let’s do a theaterwide, PACAF-focused event, and this is REFORPAC—Resolute Force Pacific—the exercise that we’ll execute in ’25. … What Gen. [Mike] Minihan [former commander of Air Mobility Command] did with Mobility Guardian in 2023 was to bring the air mobility capability out to the theater at scope and scale. Now we’re going to combine the air mobility supporting all of our unit-level exercises in the theater, and to surge capacity into the Western Pacific. I’m really excited about what we’re going to do.

PACAF and the United States Air Force have been doing this for a number of years. I remember talking about Agile Combat Employment when I was at PACAF in 2015, so we’re going on the 10-year point. We are not standing by the assumptions that we had when we entered this a decade ago. So we’re continuing to challenge the assumptions in terms of, “What are the bases from which we are going to operate? What are the missions that we’re going to be asked to do? What are the resources we need? What are the capabilities we need? How do we build force packages?” I am really impressed that the staff and the units are not accepting status quo, and they’re continuing to challenge the assumptions.

The other thing that has helped in that regard is Beijing’s heavy- handedness [with its neighbors] is opening a lot of doors. I’m able to talk to counterparts in the region who are very welcoming, either in terms of access, basing, and overflight, and a desire to participate in our events and our exercises. It is literally opening up doors and avenues for us that did not exist a few years ago.

Q: U.S. Forces Japan is going to be elevated. How is that going to work with PACAF?

A: Admiral Paparo is taking a very measured and deliberate approach, and we are working hand in hand with the government of Japan to make sure that we are aligned and linked at every step of this. It is certainly a change, especially with the desire or intent to have a four-star headquarters at the end of this. We need success at every level of that incremental growth, and we’ll work through the authorities piece as we do that. An elevation to a higher level will be a change, but at the same time, it’s needed, it’s wanted by both sides, and we’ll continue to move forward, hand in hand with the government of Japan on this.

Q: F-15EXs are heading to Kadena Air Base, Japan, to replace the rotational fighter presence and the F-15C/Ds. What has to happen regarding workups to ensure they’re ready to be on the PACAF front line—in the first island chain on day one—and to be ACE-capable?

A: The airplanes are new; the pilots, crews, and maintainers are not necessarily new. The Air Force has been doing Agile Combat Employment writ large, and we’ve certainly been doing it in PACAF. A lot of the men and women that are either sitting in the cockpits or launching the airplanes or providing all the enabling capabilities are already aware of the skill sets, if not steeped in the skill sets, that go along with Agile Combat Employment. There will be some learning as it comes to putting a new platform into these environments, and we’ll probably learn a few lessons about the capabilities of the F-15EX—maybe there’s different ways to handle it and different things that are required in an Agile Combat Employment environment, operating in austere locations—[but]I don’t think it’s going to be a significant transition. 

Q: The E-7 Wedgetail will provide you with a much-needed new capability starting, hopefully, in 2028. How are you filling the gap for command and control and battle management in the meantime?

A: I cannot say enough about the teamwork of the Royal Australian Air Force, who provide E-7 capability to us, to the United States writ large, where and when we’ve asked for it. I was down at Exercise Pitch Black recently on Australia, we had an F-22 unit that was down there. … There was fifth-generation integration that takes place, and I was really impressed. … 

To your question about command and control: As I look at the theater as big and as expansive as it is, I continue to articulate my requirements back to headquarters Air Force to build out more resilient command and control, battle management capability more forward in the theater. And we’re certainly making progress on that.

It’s also not just a U.S. Air Force problem to solve, so we’re working with Army, Navy counterparts as well to figure out ways we all connect the joint force to build out this capability. And then there are partners and allies as well. Some of our command and control is based on sensing and forward-based radars, and we’re able to do more and more in terms of air-domain awareness, information-sharing agreements, to tap into other people’s equipment and other people’s sensing capability, to help build out this picture.

Q: You serve as the region’s Area Air Defense Commander. Where are you with the Army on exactly figuring out who will do what  in terms of air base air defense?

A: On the third of September, I sat down with my counterpart from the Army, USARPAC Commander Gen. Charlie Flynn, and our staff. We do Agile Combat Employment, the U.S. Air Force, and the Army concept of operations, or CONOPS, is called Multi-Domain Operations. But if you look at the geography of the Pacific, which has not changed, we are both forces that project power from land. We operate in the air. The Army operates a little bit differently, but we’re … looking at the same real estate around parts of the theater. So it makes sense for us to find ways that we can team together. They bring capabilities … base defense capabilities. They have offensive fires capabilities. They have command and control capabilities. They have logistics and sustainment capabilities. We have the same. Neither one of us probably has as much as we want, but if we’re going to be operating forward in the theater, and if we go to the locations that are the same or nearby each other, now we can pool resources together. We can fill in gaps that we might have to cover those, and we can work a lot more effectively.

Q: What are the challenges of meeting your current readiness needs?

A: One of the challenges, and I have, as a younger guy, lived this, [is that] exercises help build readiness, but exercises also come with a cost. You can exercise so much that it actually starts to decrement your readiness, because you can’t reconstitute. … It’s a fine balance, and I work with the wing commanders to understand how much is too much. When it comes to exercising, there’s tremendous benefit that comes from it. There’s also tremendous benefit from being able to just focus on the things you weren’t able to do during an exercise: Take care of maintenance, take care of some of the other things, and make sure that your people and your equipment are healthy to be able to respond across the spectrum.

The other challenge in the macro sense is do you invest in today for readiness? Are you investing in tomorrow’s modernization? The age-old question, and you know the friction that happens between operational commanders and probably combatant commanders who are on the front edge, maybe dealing with the realities of the situation right in front, versus services that are taking a longer-term approach, solving problems, five, 10, 20 years in the future.

Q: What’s your role in that conversation?

A: It’s two-hatted. … One of my responsibilities is obviously to the Air Force. I sit on what I’ll call the board of directors as we make budgetary decisions and we look at not only the upcoming fiscal year [Program Objective Memorandum budget document], but we look into the out-years to figure out, ‘What it is the United States Air Force needs?’ The challenge is that I have to try to be nonparochial in those conversations. It’s not just me throwing PACAF issues onto the table, but me having a wide enough aperture to look at the United States Air Force and to do that 20 years down the road.

At the same time, I’m responsible to Admiral Paparo for dealing with every challenge in front of us in the here and now, and to make sure that we are resourced and ready enough to handle those. And sometimes there’s not enough money to do both.

Q: You said during your keynote, ‘We’re in the business of sinking ships.’ That is almost the genesis of the U.S. Air Force, if we go back to Billy Mitchell. How are you pursuing that? 

A: We’re buying a lot of weaponry that gets after that business. One of my concerns is if there is a continuing resolution, it impacts our ability to buy and to field this anti-maritime capability, which is certainly needed for some of the conflicts that we may face in the Pacific. As with Global Strike Command, I give Gen. [Thomas A.] Bussiere and his team tremendous credit, whether it’s the B-2, the B-1, or the B-52, they are continuing to find ways to be more survivable in an A2AD environment, but certainly to be more lethal and to be able to go after refining those techniques and ways that we get after the maritime or the anti-ship capability.

Q: Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) cost millions of dollars apiece. And in some wargames of a U.S. fight against China, LRASMs will be depleted in 72 hours?

A: Unless we buy more.

Q: Would you like to see cheaper anti-ship weapons or other capabilities come along?

A: Yes, there is a balance, like, with everything else. I think there’s that high-end, exquisite capability that can do penetration into the most challenging of anti-access, area denial regions. But at the same time, there’s a need for affordable mass because we probably don’t have enough to get after that for 24/7/365, to do high-end all the time, that may be prohibitively expensive. There’s a lot of value to affordable mass, to continue to keep the pressure on, to find lower-cost systems, to be able to impose cost on a potential adversary [with a weapon] that is less expensive, maybe less exquisite, but still causes the enemy to react to it or to deal with it.

Q: Are those capabilities that exist now, or is this in the future?

A: I think there’s both— certainly stuff we’re looking at, [Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks’ initiative] Replicator is trying to get after some of that. … These are capabilities that can be fielded in quantity in the very near term, which is what makes them very attractive to me.

Q: What do you think the people might be overlooking in the Pacific?

A: I’ve watched this ebb and flow over time, sometimes the public’s understanding of the severity of the situation in the Pacific, especially as it applies to the People’s Republic of China, and I’m not sure there’s a good understanding within the American public about the dangers that poses. … Our ability to endure in a conflict is based on the will of the people and the will of the people needs to be informed by the realities of the situation out there. And—this isn’t a knock on the media, it’s maybe a knock on how people get informed these days—I just don’t think people are looking past TikTok or Facebook to understand [the world situation]. 

 The risks for escalation are so high. It’s the interconnectedness of all the security dynamics that are taking place thousands of miles away.