We love letters! Write to us at letters@afa.org. To be published, letters should be timely, relevant and concise. Include your name and location. Letters may be edited for space and the editors have final say on which are published.
Gunning for Defense
I certainly agree with both of these articles [“Editorial: Relearning Old Lessons,” September/October, p. 2 and “S&P: A National Defense Strategy Under the Gun,” p. 10]. We are at greater risk of major wars than at any time in the past 30 years. The quickest and most effective way that the U.S. and its allies can respond to war breaking out in Europe (e.g., Baltics, Finland etc.) or Asia (e.g., Taiwan) is with airpower.
No military force can move as quickly or with as much force. One area that gives me hope is Rapid Dragon using standoff weapons. For example, if Taiwan is invaded with a force of 10,000 large ships, it is theoretically possible to sink nearly all 10,000 with one sortie of 220 C-17s carrying 45 AGM-158s each. That would be 220 x 45 = 9,900 missiles with a 1,000-pound warhead that would sink most ships. The problem is that we don’t have 9,900 AGM-158s. Thus we need to load those C-17s with the weapons we do have including Tomahawks, Harpoons, Naval Strike Missile, SDBs, JSOWs, and JDAMs. Obviously to use JDAMS the C-17s would have to get close to their targets, which would mean air superiority would have to be established first. Furthermore, it is never good to have a strategy relying on just one delivery system. Thus we need to strengthen the Air Force across the board.
The task we face is much more acute than Persian Gulf War I.
The critical thing for people in Congress to realize is that the Communist Chinese will probably come with 25,000 ships on Day One.
We have to be able to knock out about 10,000 of the larger ships on Day One. This will take more missiles, not more aircraft. But we also need to establish air superiority simultaneously. Not an easy task. Hopefully the CCAs will be ready in time. I’m pro Navy, but more Navy ships aren’t going to stop an invasion by Communist China … anti-ship missiles are.
William Thayer
San Diego
John Tirpak’s “Strategy & Policy: A National Defense Strategy Under the Gun,” [p. 10] did an excellent job of presenting just how precarious our U.S. military situation is. Specifically citing the fact that USAF is “at the forefront of a host of missions,” ranging from homeland defense, to rapidly projecting power worldwide, including intelligence support which “allows the rest of the force [USAF & USSF] to function.”
Sadly, our nation is fractured and cannot seem to “get its act together.” The only way to provide USAF/USSF with the necessary manpower, equipment and weapons systems to achieve “peace through strength” again in this 21st century is for the President and Congress to work together to allocate the necessary funds to make it happen, equipping our U.S. military to meet every contingency. But that has not happened for several years now.
Then, it’s too late to do much about it. I’ll end with this thought: Peace through strength can be achieved again. This nation needs strong, unwavering, and demonstrative leadership which has what it takes to allocate the necessary resources to plan, execute and follow through making hard decisions in the process to rebuild our nation’s ability to defend itself … through the creation of effective networks, alliances, and coalitions.
MSgt. Randy Whitmire,
USAF (Ret.)
Past President
Air & Space Forces Assn. Michigan
East China, Mich.
Eye on the Sky
Given the advent of omnipresent FPV [first-person view] drones likely near all of our installations worldwide [referring to, “Fighting the Air Base,” September/October, p. 37], I would suggest as an emergency measure the deployment of rapid-firing, semiautomatic shotguns with appropriate ammunition to all vulnerable locations.
As a starting point, imagine every Security Force vehicle/team possesses one shotgun, with concomitant training based on skeet shooting. In addition, perhaps every aircraft crew chief or maintenance team should also have such weaponry available.
If a bunch of maintainers are on the flight line preflighting say an F-15E, then there should be one trained and equipped member standing watch, facing the likely threat axis from outside the perimeter. Skeet shooting competitions and awards should be pushed to improve the anti-drone skills of as many deployable Airmen as possible.
It is true that these engagements would occur at “danger-close” distance, but of course, detonation of a drone’s fragmentation charge at 30 meters is far better than it would be landing in the middle of 10 people, or on the top of a fueled aircraft. Shoot/no-shoot training would be critical, of course. This project could be started immediately if desired. And the skeet shooting competitions would be good for morale.
Another morale advantage would be gained because no one likes the idea of being killed by a drone without at least fighting back—you know what I mean! To start with, perhaps 200 shotguns and 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and coordination with some of this country’s skeet-shooting experts and associations. I am sure they would be thrilled to help.
This program should immediately be coordinated and implemented in the Ukraine as well. All important places and vehicles should have at least one person with a shotgun ready and watching the sky at all times these days.
MSgt. Chris Dierkes,
106th Rescue Wing, NYANG
Westhampton Beach, N.Y.
Forty years ago, I was the base commander on one Strategic Air Command dual-wing base and three U.S. Air Forces in Europe bases, one ground-launched cruise missile base and two fighter bases. That was back when the base commander focused on base support, base defense, survivability and recovery, and the wing commander focused on the mission.
About the time I left USAFE, the fighter pilot leadership did away with the base commander title, retitled combat support to mission support, and wing commanders divided their focus between mission and all the other tasks, not trusting those in the support area to do their jobs without being micromanaged.
During the combat support group days, in wartime, the wing commander and his battle staff concentrated on generating aircraft and fighting the war. My job was to run the Survival Recovery Center (SRC), with a battle staff made up of all the key support functions. The security forces took care of base defense, the base engineer had rapid runway repair capabilities, and we were hardened, camouflaged, and survivable.
Simply said, my job was to give the wing commander a functioning and defended base so he could fight the air war. NATO Tactical Evaluations were a tough test of both the mission and the support. Nothing was more exciting than exiting a gas-filled SRC in full chem gear with M-16 in hand, carefully maneuvering my staff car out of its revetment around an unexploded 500-pound bomb and making my way to the backup SRC under simulated enemy small arms fire.
It sounds like in the 35 years since I retired, all that has gone away and we are trying to bring it back, but with today’s technology. Let the wing commander do his job and focus on the air war, and bring back a combat support commander tasked to provide him a base to fight from.
Col. Charles G. Simpson,
USAF (Ret.)
Breckenridge, Colo.
Oldie But Goodie
The U.S. Air Force is about to put all the A-10s away. They are making a mistake, but so be it. It’s the only platform that can take a hit from the most widely used weapon, an AK-47.
But don’t fret, they did the same thing during the Vietnam War with the A-1. They put all the A-1s in the Boneyard and had to get them out for work when they finally figured out they really needed it.
Don’t get me wrong, I love the stealth technology. But line up an F-22, F-35, F-16, F-15, and an A-10 on the flight line and rack a magazine of AK-47 rounds randomly at each platform and see which one can taxi out and take off!
Col. Clyde Romero,
USAF (Ret.)
Marietta, Ga.
There’s No ‘R’ in Commission
With regard to “World: Airmen Development Command Taking Shape” [November/December 2024, p. 34], in the evolution of Airmen education and training, and more than a name change, the new Airmen Development Command will provide the next generation a foundation for success.
As for officer development, another change is needed. Remove R (reserve) from ROTC. From what I understand, only officers commissioning to the Guard or Reserve received a reserve commission. Those going on Active duty receive regular commission.
This change will more accurately reflect the characteristics of officers commissioned through this source.
Col. Charles Unice,
USAF (Ret.)
Springville, Utah
Define Deterrence
I wish to comment on two related articles that appeared in the November/December issue: “Weaponizing Space,” [World, p. 24] and “Launch: The Fundamental Prerequisite for Space Superiority” [p. 40] by Col. Charles Galbreath.
I spent half my USAF career in the launch business, both space and ICBM test, with assignments at both our major launch bases, and four assignments and three tours with the Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., organization, including the F-15 program office, now part of Space Force’s Space Systems Command, an organization established and led by then Brig. Gen. Bernard Schriever 70 years ago—the father of our launch business.
In the first article, I’m glad to see our leaders speaking out for the need to include counterspace capabilities and strategies, although no other specifics were provided; “space fires” were not defined. Kind of theory without fury. Developing resilient satellite constellations and responsive launch to replace lost satellites is defensive in nature and does not constitute much of a deterrent. Deterrence requires a clear communication of a potential threat to the enemy’s space capability should they attack our space assets.
Both Generals [B. Chance] Saltzman and [Kevin P.] Chilton endorsed that thought. Such a deterrent should not be limited to Space Force assets, but should include all necessary military capability to silence the threat should it be implemented. Unfortunately, the only joint force counterspace example mentioned was a Navy ASAT launch. Counterspace should not be confined to fighting a battle in space. You do not need Space Force assets to threaten or take out surface-based space assets of the enemy, like the GPS jammers currently operating effectively in the Ukraine battlefield.
Galbreath’s article on space launch summarized his complete piece for the Mitchell Institute. Although there is no dispute with his title, his historical summary, and some of his main points, I think both he and our Space Force leaders in the first article fail to clearly put these space capabilities in context.
What level of conflict are we talking about? If it’s a hot war, we won’t be conducting surface-based space operations. All our surface-based space assets, like launch infrastructure, won’t be there. We won’t be conducting responsive space launch or counterspace operations. To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “You go to war with the [space capability] you have, not the [space capability] you might want or wish to have at a later time.”
So, I submit that both articles and all other speeches and papers I have observed since Air Force Space Command was first stood up 40 years ago, and now Space Force, are addressing the ongoing “space cold war.” This is a conflict characterized by each side testing and probing each other’s capabilities and responses; evaluating, employing proxies, conducting sabotage, and destroying or degrading targets of opportunity, clandestinely or even openly if possible. Perhaps it may include “tit for tat:” You take out one of my satellites, I take out one of yours (if I had the capability and will).
Galbreath emphasizes the need for deterrence and then, winning should deterrence fail. I have trouble defining a win in a space cold war. And in such a conflict, I don’t see the homeland directly threatened.
My comments regarding some of Galbreath’s details are admittedly more detailed. He cites four important trade-offs when planning for a launch infrastructure, but I’m not sure these provide much guidance to Space Force leaders. His “cadence” equates to launch rate, which does not seem to consider the multiple satellites per launch enabled by small satellites.
His “confidence” (which I equate to reliability) may very well relate to cost, but I can’t see a launch system designer dialing back reliability to reduce cost. It doesn’t work that way. A launch infrastructure planner has to start with the mission. What is the space capability that is wanted? Then, evaluate the options to achieve the mission, using Galbreath’s trade-offs and many others.
I also don’t share his concern for the current space launch infrastructure and any urgent need for the Space Force to generate new programs to enhance or expand it. We now have a host of launch providers and significant launch bases, some with multiple launch sites for some providers.
In an emergency situation, even in a Cold War scenario, I sure don’t see us unilaterally constraining ourselves with safety rules.
I admit to my perspective of 40 years ago when all the expendable launch production programs were at an end, and we had put all our space launch eggs in the shuttle basket.
Lastly, I thank Colonel Galbreath for putting one more nail in the coffin of ideas for employing human spaceflight for Space Force operations. His reminder of the extensive recovery time after the two space shuttle disasters should be sufficient, but I can also attest to the time and resources it took to plan, design, integrate, test, and navigate the arduous readiness review process prior to a shuttle mission, even for unmanned nationally significant satellites.
Col. Dennis E. Beebe,
USAF (Ret.)
Solvang, Calif.
One More to the List
Col. Phillip S. Meilinger’s list of books provides an outstanding guide for better understanding the lessons of World War II [“America’s Air War in Europe” November/December, pp. 46-51], but I wish he had included one more book on lessons from that war, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder’s war memoir “With Prejudice.”
During World War II, Tedder not only transformed the Royal Air Force in the Middle East into an effective war-winning organization, he also was key to educating the other two services that airpower was key to waging joint warfare. When U.S. forces arrived in North Africa, Tedder soon earned the respect of key American Soldiers and Airmen, helping show them how operate in a coalition environment.
As U.S. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower’s deputy, Tedder played a key role in integrating Allied airpower into Operation Overlord. Sadly, it appears that the lesson Tedder taught American Airmen and Soldiers about the importance of air bases to achieving air superiority and campaign success was soon forgotten.
This may explain the flawed decision to leave the Army with responsibility for air base air defense and air base construction when the U.S. Air Force became a separate service.
Lt. Col. Price T. Bingham,
USAF (Ret.)
Melbourne, Fla.
Drink Up
“Is China Prepared to Uncork the Nuclear Option?” [November/December 2024, p. 11] is perhaps a rhetorical question, in my humble opinion.
The nuclear option provides a deterrence to other nuclear powers and provides an ability to threaten or bully nonnuclear countries that are indebted to China for industrial, economic, or infrastructural developments. Therefore, China’s nuclear option is, in fact, already “uncorked.”
As long as China may fear the potential destruction of its enormous and stupendous physical structures in its exquisite cities, I do not think China would offensively launch its nuclear weapons against the U.S. China’s military facilities and capabilities are less endeared.
As a result, the U.S. should openly place all of China’s major cities on its primary retaliatory nuclear target list as viable deterrence.
Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi,
USAF (Ret.)
Pearl City, Hawaii