Letters

Spaced Out

I struggled to understand Maj. Gen. Thomas Taverney’s article [“Space Order of Battle: Beyond Domain Awareness” July/August, p. 44] and how it fits into the mission of our U.S. Space Force. To help with context I looked back at Secretary Frank Kendall’s seven Operational Imperatives, and that made things worse.

Maj. Gen. Taverney’s knowledge on the subject is without question. The problem is with USSF and Department of the Air Force communication with Americans writ large: articles like this are as far over our heads as satellites in low-Earth orbits. Present it to a congressman and watch their eyes gloss over.  

Ask a USSF second lieutenant setting GPS operations where they fit into “The 5 Functions of Space Operations” and they’ll be stumped.  Use this article to get sister service support and they’ll rightly ask, ‘What does this do for us?’ And most importantly, for all American citizens, how can we support a separate service that can’t speak to us in plain language that we can understand?

Ask any American what the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard do; and nearly all will give a good answer.  

Col. Robert A. Munson,
USAF (Ret.)
Monument, Colo.

Things Change

I know many things have changed in the Air Force since I retired 50 years ago, but it wasn’t until I read the piece about Air Force Specialty Codes [AFSCs] in the July/August issue [p. 50] that I realized just how much has changed. I held four different AFSCs during my 22-year career and only one specialty still exists—boom operator!

Our class was finishing up Tech School when a sergeant walked into the classroom and said, “I need 10 volunteers  for flying status.” I asked; “What’s the job?” He didn’t know, but added, “you’ll get $50/month flight pay.” … Ten hands went up! The job turned out to be In-flight refueling specialist, aka boom operator, or simply, boomer. We were crewed up at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, and flew the B-29 for about 50 hours and then went on to fly the KC-97 tanker at Smokey Hill Air Force Base, Kan. In 1954 our crew went to Lincoln Air Force Base, Neb., to check out a new tanker squadron with B-29 crews returning from Korea. … Those airplanes and both bases no longer exist!

After five years flying as a boomer, I applied for Officer Candidate School. Tough school, we started with 250 and graduated 114, but everybody got a brown bar, even the Anchor Man (me). That school no longer exists. I went to Navigator School at Waco, Texas, … navigator specialty no longer exists, and James Connolly Air Force Base, Texas, has closed. Then I went to Advanced Navigation and Radar Bombing School at Mather Air Force Base, Calif., … that specialty no longer exists and Mather has closed.

I selected B-52’s and was assigned to a new base in Minot, N.D. I flew as navigator and then radar navigator for five-plus years. In 1967 I had been in the service for 15 years and hadn’t heard a  shot fired in anger.  One way to solve the problem was sign up for the Recon field flying the new RF-4C. My wife didn’t like it much, but she finally said OK. Flying the back seat was a whole new world for a guy that had been trapped in the belly of the BUFF for 1,200-plus hours!

Flying reconnaissance meant switching from SAC  to TAC, and I became a weapons systems officer (WSO). Both these commands no longer exist nor does the WSO specialty. Training at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, went OK, except for one bad day. While practicing defensive combat maneuvers, we got the bird in a very high descent rate with insufficient power setting and we had to bail out.

My tour in Vietnam went OK, 200 combat missions with 47 of them over  North Vietnam and Laos. Nothing more than a bullet hole or two in bird, but six of our guys didn’t make the Big Freedom flight home!

I put in a three-year tour at TAC Hq, Langley Air Force Base, Va., DOV and DOR. Back to Mountain Home to fly the right seat of the F-111 and believe it or not, while flying with an instructor pilot, we got the bird into a spin and it would not come out. We spun from 20,000 feet down to 12,000 and then had to punch out, again!

A lot has changed in the last 50 years, but a couple things have remained the same. Tanker crews are still on station ready to pass gas to anyone in need, and the venerable old Baker Five Two (B-52s) is still soldiering on!

I salute all you guys and gals in blue.

Maj. John Sinclair,
USAF (Ret.)
Placerville, Calif.

Weather Related

In his article [“Weather Ops: The Air Force’s Next Great Weapon,” July/August, p. 36], David Roza explains how weather affects air and ground operations and strategic planning. He quotes Col. Patrick Williams as saying that weather impacts how much fuel pilots need, how many bombs they can carry and, how to get back safely.   

As a former chief of targets at a tactical fighter-bomber wing, I agree that better weather forecasting capability could be helpful, but not overly necessary. Fuels were determined mainly by the distance to the targets and numbers of bombs were determined by the given types of bomb loads, targets, and aim points. If weather was an issue, it resulted in a unit request to the AOC to change the target (location), add alternate target(s) to eject unused bombs, change the air-ground mission, change the return base, and/or cancel the sortie(s). 

In this day and age, though, I would think the ideal solution is to have “all-weather” GPS-guided stealthy weapon systems and munitions.  

A good case in point are Tomahawks and other long-range air-, ground-, and sea-launched missiles.

Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi,
USAF (Ret.)
Pearl City, Hawaii

A statement in the article, “Weather Ops: The Air Force’s Next Great Weapon” got my attention.  The author states that, “… only two of the military’s 60-year-old weather satellites are still functioning.  ….”  

The statement is untrue and incomplete. While the military’s satellite program has been in existence for over 60 years, no satellite has lasted half that long. A functioning 60-year-old satellite would represent a technological miracle. According to this magazine’s recently published Almanac 2024, one of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) birds actually lasted a record 22 years before being decommissioned in 2020. 

The design life for this version was five years. The DMSP Factsheet published by USSF on the internet states that the current DMSP constellation consists of “two primary operational DMSP satellites.”  These satellites are operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that also operates complementary NOAA polar-orbiting satellites.

Col. Dennis Beebe,
USAF (Ret.)
Solvang, Calif.

Editor’s Note: The comment provided by Colonel Beebe regarding the age of DMSP satellites on orbit is correct. The article should have stated, “…only two of the military’s weather satellites of the 60-year-old program are currently operational.” The DMSP program has been around since 1962 and the design of the satellite has continued to evolve over the decades. Most military satellites have a five to 10 year design life. In some fortunate cases, the actual operational life has lasted over 20 years.

Who Me? 

In reference to CMSgt. John P. Fedarko’s comments about “a commander’s style” [“Letters: Air Force Standards 2.0,” July/August, p. 5]—I found the best solution to correcting customs and courtesies violations during my seven years as a base commander on four bases.  I would simply ask the young officer or enlisted member his name and squadron.  

When I got back to the office, I would call and invite the squadron commander and the officer or enlisted member to my office. I didn’t chew out the offender, I talked only to the commander about his people while the offender listened. 

The word got out pretty well.

Col. Charles G. Simpson,
USAF (Ret.)
Breckenridge, Colo.

Group Think

I take exception to Gen. David Allvin’s comments concerning group commanders as quoted in the article [“World, No More Ops & Maintenance Groups.” July/August, p. 19]. He says, “If you’re a group commander, what do you want to be when you grow up? A wing commander.” 

Ninety percent of them go into group command knowing they will never be a wing commander. There are no further promotions in their future and no selection for further command. These colonels are at the apex of their careers and simply want to do the best job they can as commanders before they retire.

Their concern for their squadrons does not keep them from failing in training. On the contrary, it helps them learn and prepares the next generation of group commanders.

Placing these colonels on wing staff will only accelerate the submission of retirement requests. There is no way a colonel wants to end a very successful career serving on the wing staff.  Contrary to what General Allvin states, this will not prepare these colonels to become better joint leaders. They will never be around long enough for that.

Col. David Geuting, 
USAF (Ret.)
Colorado Springs, Colo.

Roles and Measures

I am somewhat surprised by the sympathetic response to Dennis Trynosky’s letter [“Honored to Serve,” May/June, p. 6] that appeared in the July/August issue. 

Apparently, by the writer’s sign-off, he was able to salvage some type of career with the Army. So what’s the beef? Complain anyway. An assertion that there is a place for everyone, regardless of disability, and the military should approve any and all waivers, does not include wheel chair bound persons? What about legally blind? Suppose you need a respirator. Just where should the cutoff, if any, be? 

The civil service within each military branch exists in some part, for just such allowable reasons. Military service could aggravate or even render a member immobile and helpless at a time when other members are depending on them to fulfill their job requirements. That could result in mission failure. 

How are you going to explain to the parent of a fallen Soldier, you allowed in a person with a known serious disability or serous chronic condition that just happened to manifest itself in a critical situation?

Years ago, DOD initiated Project 100,000. It was an attempt to enlist lower-IQ individuals and perhaps improve their lives. It was a well-known costly disaster. Is Trynosky suggesting that we can afford to take chances with individuals who may not in times of stress be able to even take care of themselves?

There is a world of difference between what he is suggesting, and veterans partially disabled after years of service who can still possibly contribute. As, he himself, has admitted, not all waivers or exceptions are granted.

Serving in the military is not a right protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The military is not, and should never be, a uniformed version of the Job Corps or any civilian agency.

MSgt. John Wolf,
USAF (Ret.)
Bethel, Pa.

Accountability on Sentinel

As a career missile officer and a tax- payer, I am embarrassed and appalled by the recent report that “Sentinel ICBM Survives Pentagon Review as Costs Jump 81%.” [World, July/August, p. 27]. How can a program exceed the estimates by 81 percent and someone not get fired?  In private industry such an inept program management team would find their office contents in boxes in the parking lot with a severance check.

 This is living proof of the comment by the recent Commission on National Defense strategy which stated, “Despite years of attempted acquisition reform, the military remains hobbled by a ponderous procurement system that slows innovation and the fielding of new equipment.” 

The Minuteman ICBM (solid fueled) has been operational since 1962.  It has seen countless mods and upgrades.  Additionally, in the mid to late 1980s, the USAF developed and demonstrated Peacekeeper and a Small ICBM (both solid fueled)  as options to upgrade the ICBM force.

Therefore, research has been done for over 60 years on land-based, solid-fueled ICBM, single and multiple warhead systems, both mobile and fixed based. However, today it appears that some program managers are making a career out of reinventing the wheel and demonstrating a task that apparently exceeds their ability.  It makes you wonder if there is any “real” desire by DOD or the current administration for a new ICBM system.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 directed modernization of the ICBM force. That was 17 years ago. Am I the only one embarrassed?

Col. Quentin M. Thomas,
USAF (Ret.)
Woodstock, Ga.