Curtis LeMay was blunt, determined, and always controversial.
Curtis E. LeMay is one of the icons of American airpower history, ultimately becoming the Air Force’s fifth Chief of Staff and the first who did not attend West Point. LeMay earned his commission through ROTC at Ohio State in 1928 and over the next decade became one of the best navigators and pilots in the Air Corps.
In 1937, despite being given the wrong coordinates, he located the battleship Utah in exercises off California and “bombed” it with water bombs. The following year, he navigated B-17s nearly 800 miles over the Atlantic Ocean to intercept the Italian liner Rex, illustrating airpower’s ability to defend the American coasts. In 1938 he led flights of B-17s to South America to display airpower’s range and role in hemisphere defense.
War brought rapid promotion and increased responsibility. LeMay began as a group commander in the 8th AF in England, but within 18 months he leapt from lieutenant colonel to major general commanding an air division—he led many missions himself.
LeMay’s memoirs, written with MacKinlay Kantor and titled “Mission With LeMay,” were published by Doubleday in 1965. The best biography is Thomas M. Coffey’s “Iron Eagle” (Crown, 1986). The general died in 1990.
LeMay earned a reputation as an innovative tactician and problem-solver, so when Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold had difficulty bringing the new B-29 into service, he chose LeMay to take over B-29 operations, first in China and later in the Mariana Islands. Always a tactical innovator, LeMay abandoned the long-held American doctrine of high altitude, daylight precision bombing. Stripping his B-29s of guns, he loaded them instead with incendiaries and sent them against Japanese cities at night and at low level. His decision to reverse two decades of American airpower doctrine was courageous, controversial—and successful. Japan was devastated, but still refused to sue for peace. The dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 provided the convincing final blows, bringing the Pacific war to an end without requiring an invasion of the Japanese home islands and the hundreds of thousands of casualties that would have entailed.
Returning to the States, LeMay served briefly as the Army Air Force’s head of research and development in an attempt to learn more about the highly secret atomic bomb program. The AAF was still frozen out at that point, though they had been charged with using the weapons. He then went to Germany to command U.S. Air Forces in Europe. When the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin in 1948, LeMay was responsible for launching the Berlin Airlift. The Berlin crisis precipitated a major reshuffling in Washington. A war with the Soviets now appeared increasingly possible, and Strategic Air Command (SAC), which would bear the brunt of such a war, was seen as deficient following a series of internal inspections that illuminated serious problems within the command. Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg relieved Gen. George C. Kenney and named LeMay as his successor in command of SAC.
Building SAC into an effective and efficient warfighting arm was LeMay’s greatest accomplishment. LeMay built new bases, facilities, and training programs, began a “spot promotion” system to reward his best aircrews, and through his legendary iron discipline soon transformed his command into one of the most effective military units in the world. The culture LeMay instilled was crucial: He wanted everyone to be ready for war at any time. A nuclear Pearl Harbor was unthinkable. His drive for readiness would translate into the command’s motto: Peace is our Profession.
In 1957, LeMay was named Vice Chief of Staff, and when Thomas White retired in 1961, he became Chief. LeMay was one of the coldest of America’s cold warriors, and partly for this reason his tenure as Chief was not a happy one. Under the new management policies of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the “flexible response” military strategy of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, LeMay found himself at constant odds with his superiors. In his years as Chief, LeMay argued strenuously for new air weapons like the Skybolt missile and B-70 bomber, and against the swing-wing “fighter” plane from General Dynamics that would become the F-111. He lost those battles.
In the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, LeMay took a hard line. The crisis resulted from the Soviets placing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in Cuba, putting much of the U.S. in the crosshairs. LeMay wanted to launch preemptive airstrikes against Cuba to take out those sites, but President John F. Kennedy opted instead for a blockade. The Soviets eventually removed the missiles and no shots were fired.
LeMay also had strong feelings regarding American involvement in Vietnam, arguing against the gradual response advocated by the administration and pushing instead for a major bombing campaign against the North. He foresaw that the administration’s policy would result in a long, bloody, and inconclusive war. He was ignored.
LeMay’s personality was often described as tactless to the point of rudeness. Although highly intelligent, he was unsophisticated, taciturn, possessing of unquestioned physical courage, and driven to work hard. Yet LeMay was sincerely concerned about the welfare of his troops, insisting on the best possible housing and facilities on the SAC bases he established all over the country.
LeMay is often characterized as the epitome of strategic bombing theory and practice and is lauded for the vigor and determination with which he rejuvenated Strategic Air Command. But his focus on bombing had a downside, as tactical airpower atrophied during his tenure as Chief and the Air Force as a whole became unbalanced. One could argue that this overemphasis on SAC left the Air Force unprepared for the Vietnam War.
Largely as a result of his run-ins with Defense Secretary McNamara, LeMay was pushed into retirement in February 1965, five months short of a typical four-year tenure. In 1968, he ran unsuccessfully for Vice President as George Wallace’s running mate on a third-party ticket. He died in 1990.