Kendall Tours Seven Eastern European Countries, Praising NATO Air Defense

Kendall Tours Seven Eastern European Countries, Praising NATO Air Defense

Amid NATO’s continued push to ramp up air defenses in Eastern Europe, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall swung by seven allied countries to boost relations last week, including those on Russia’s and Ukraine’s doorstep.

“As threats have evolved, NATO remains as unified as ever,” Kendall said in a release.

Wrapping up his tour in Poland earlier this week, Kendall visited Łask Air Base’s 52nd Operations Group, Detachment 1 to spotlight the unit’s role in securing NATO’s eastern flank and deterring threats. Part of the 52nd Fighter Wing stationed in Germany, the detachment manages U.S. Air Force aircraft rotations to Poland, boosting joint operations with the Polish Air Force. The unit represents the first permanent presence of U.S. forces in the nation, a move made last year in response to escalating regional tensions related to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine.

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall meets with U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 52nd Operations Group, Detachment 1, at Łask Air Base, Poland, Aug. 24, 2024. During his visit, Kendall expressed appreciation for members assigned to Det. 1 for their efforts to foster bilateral defense ties, enhance regional security and increase interoperability among NATO allies. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Jessica Sanchez-Chen)

Poland frequently collaborates with U.S. fighters for joint training and hosts exercises over its airspace. Earlier this month, Poland hosted a U.S. Air Force F-35 exercise involving the 48th Fighter Wing from Royal Air Force Lakenheath, U.K., along with KC-135 Stratotankers.

Poland is also set to be the first Eastern European country to receive F-35A fighters in 2026. Earlier this week, the country’s first Lightning II was unveiled to defense leaders at Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Texas.

Poland’s First F-35 revealed at Lockheed Martin’s F-35 production facility in Fort Worth, Texas, on Aug 28, photo by Lockheed Martin

“We are joining a strong coalition of fifth generation fighters across Europe, bolstering air superiority through allied deterrence,” Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak, Inspector of Polish Air Force, said in a release.

Poland’s first F-35 aircraft, AZ-01, named “Husarz” in honor of the country’s historic cavalry unit, will be delivered in December. This aircraft will be stationed at Ebbing Air National Guard Base, Arkansas, for pilot training until 2026.

Kendall’s itinerary also included a stop in Lithuania, where he met with the Minister of National Defense and the country’s military leaders.

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall meets with key officials as he begins with his engagements through the U.S. European Command area of responsibility Aug. 19, 2024, to strengthen international partnerships. (Courtesy photo)

At last month’s NATO summit in Washington, leaders unveiled plans to enhance the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system by rotating the model across the Eastern Flank, aimed at fortifying defense across land, air, maritime, cyber in Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria.

“The NATO alliance is the rock-solid cornerstone to security, not only in Lithuania, but also the Baltics and across all of NATO,” Kendall said in a release. “It is crucial to peace and stability that we continue to work together to deter our adversaries in the region.”

NATO’s air policing mission has been ongoing for the Baltic nations—Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—since they joined the alliance in 2004. This effort has intensified since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the U.S. deploying fourth and fifth-generation fighters to the region. During his trip, Kendall visited the three nations to emphasize regional defense cooperation.

“The Baltic Air Policing mission is an essential activity to maintain peace and security not only for Estonia, but throughout NATO,” said Kendall.

During his trip, Kendall also visited Finland and Sweden, relatively new NATO members. NATO is working to establish a presence in Finland and fully integrate both Finland and Sweden into NATO plans, forces, and command structures to leverage their capabilities.

Finland shares more than 800 miles of border with Russia. Last month, two Russian fighters intercepted two B-52 Stratofortresses over the Barents Sea in the Arctic. The bombers flew through Finnish airspace for the first time before landing in Romania to start their first-ever operational deployment from that country. The strategic bombers crossed Norway before flying over Lapland, Finland’s northernmost region that borders Russia, Sweden, and Norway.

Northrop Touts Value of Digital Engineering as It Announces First Flight of Model 437

Northrop Touts Value of Digital Engineering as It Announces First Flight of Model 437

Northrop Grumman’s Model 437 “Vanguard,” a potential demonstrator for the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program from subsidiary Scaled Composites, made its first flight from the company’s Palmdale, Calif., plant on Aug. 29. The company said the aircraft demonstrates the effectiveness of Northrop’s “digital ecosystem.”  

Northrop first introduced Model 437 as a concept three years ago, touting it as a possible answer to the Air Force’s “loyal wingman” program—now called CCA—as well as a U.K. requirement for an attritable escort for F-35s. Since then, however, it has been tight-lipped about the project, and in announcing the aircraft’s first flight made no mention of CCA.

“The Model 437 began as a conceptual design, based on the Model 401, exploring a multi-mission, low-cost, attritable aircraft,” Northrop said in its release. The Model 437 is “a crewed variant of the original concept, powered by a single Pratt & Whitney 535 engine, with approximately 3,400 pounds of thrust.” After envelope expansion, it will have a range of approximately 3,000 nautical miles and endurance of six hours, Northrop said.

The company added that the aircraft can carry a payload of up to 2,000 pounds “in multiple locations” including two AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs).

In its own release, Scaled said the Model 437 “leveraged extensive experience in rapid design, fabrication, and test of experimental aircraft.” In this case, it involved a “clean-sheet aircraft design, aerodynamic and structural analysis, fuselage and empennage fabrication, aircraft assembly, systems integration, and ground and flight test execution.” It described the first flight as “uneventful.”

Northrop also touted the digital framework underlying the Model 437—which carried a pilot on its first flight—as a product of collaboration between “the customer and supplier users.” Together, they developed, analyzed, built, and tested the wings of the aircraft, the company said. Northrop was not immediately able to explain why the aircraft is crewed, although industry officials have suggested the pilot could be there to be a hands-off safety supervisor as the jet tests out various autonomous flight programs.

“The Digital Pathfinder project demonstrated how the company’s fully digital engineering ecosystem reduces engineering rework, accelerates schedule and reduces costs, offering advantages to customers on future aircraft programs,” Northrop said. It employs “real world experience gained on programs like the B-21 Raider,” the Air Force’s new stealth bomber.

Colin Miller, vice president of Northrop’s aeronautics systems, said the company is working to “continuously improve” its digital tools and capabilities.

“This project demonstrates how high-fidelity models within our digital ecosystem serve as a single source of truth to streamline testing and certification on future aircraft, significantly saving cost and time for our customer,” Miller said.

Presumably referring to the Model 437, the company said digital methods “cut engineering rework and redesign to less than one percent, compared to the 15-20 percent experienced using traditional methods.” In the future, these methods could “significantly reduce the workload required to determine airworthiness, offering further cost and schedule savings opportunities.”

Northrop says Model 437 measures 41 feet by 41 feet and has a 10,000 pound maximum takeoff weight. It can accommodate a single pilot and fly at 25,000 feet.

Northrop said the aircraft also pioneers a new additive manufacturing process which produced “a titanium structural bracket using plasma arc energy deposition.” Northrop said it believes this method of forming a titanium part is a first in the defense industry. The method reduces the need for hard tooling, accelerating the prototyping process, while “improving first-time quality.”

The digital ecosystem used for the Vanguard “connected engineers, customers, and stakeholders in a virtual environment, allowing them to proactively foresee and solve the types of problems that typically plague acquisition programs up front and early—greatly improving program performance,” Northrop said.

In a press conference in 2021, Northrop officials posited a cost for the Model 437 of $5 million to $6 million per copy if it was put into series production. Company officials said the aircraft could achieve a speed of .85 Mach, making it capable of keeping up with F-35s enroute to a target, and said it would need less than 3,000 feet to take off.

The Air Force has adjusted its thinking on the CCA in the last few years, and now envisions the aircraft as performing escort functions for fighters but also carrying out independent missions. The first mission the Air Force plans for CCAs is as an air-to-air combat platform, likely carrying additional missiles that can be targeted by crewed fighters, but also able to select and fire air-to-air missiles autonomously.  

Northrop was not chosen for the first increment of CCA—which went to Anduril, with its “Fury” aircraft, and General Atomics, with a variant of its XQ-67A Off Board Sensor System—but the company is competing for the CCA Increment 2, for which a downselect could come as early as 2026.  

NGA Boss: Intel Community Having ‘Eureka Moment’ Cooperating with the Space Force

NGA Boss: Intel Community Having ‘Eureka Moment’ Cooperating with the Space Force

The intelligence community is increasing and improving its collaboration with the Space Force, U.S. officials said this week—indicating progress after months of discussions on how to sort out roles in the rapidly changing domain.

A key new hub for that work is National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Joint Mission Management Center (JMMC), which brings together services, combatant commands, other intelligence agencies, and international partners. That center has now moved from the concept phase to “initial operational capability,” NGA director Vice Adm. Frank D. Whitworth said at a Defense Writers Group event Aug. 30.

The idea was hatched a year ago, “as we saw an evolving and enlarging constellation” network of U.S. government space players, such as the Space Force, combatant commands, and other government agencies, Whitworth said.

“We do tasking for a constellation, but when you’re talking about something that’s getting this big, and especially given the investment that DOD has made in this particular constellation, we knew that we needed to have a place for collaboration. It needed to exist,” Whitworth said. “That’s typically where the rubber meets the road is, like, how are we going to prioritize? There’s a certain amount of time, there’s a certain amount of sensors, what’s going to go first, what’s going to go last, what falls below the cutline. And that is exactly the type of conversation and process that will be integrated into the JMMC.”

That has led to tension at times as leaders discuss how to sort out who does what and who gets priority, particularly around intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions—discussions that have spilled into public view with media reports.

NGA is an element of the intelligence community that collects and analyzes satellite images, known as geospatial intelligence. But there are some 18 organizations—military and civilian—that make up the U.S. intelligence community, often with overlapping missions.

“That center is going to be where we bring together the operational side as well as the intelligence side to do the joint tasking, the collection, and dissemination of the data,” Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael A. Guetlein said at AFCEA/INSA Intelligence Summit Aug. 28.

The JMMC reached initial operation capability (IOC) in late May. It was particularly important for the JMMC to involve the Space Force, given its service’s role in National Security Space Launches, and the increasing number of satellites the U.S. government is putting on orbit.

“We did this in collaboration with the U.S. Space Force,” Whitworth said. “It will continue to evolve. It will continue to mature, but it is IOC as we speak, and that’s in preparation for some of the initial launches of just booming, enlarging constellation.”

Northrop Grumman’s proposed Tranche 1 Transport Layer (T1TL) mesh satellite communications network—a constellation of 42 low-Earth orbit satellites—aims to provide resilient, low-latency, high-volume data transport supporting U.S. military missions globally. Northrop Grumman graphic

International partners are also increasingly involved in space, and the Pentagon has tried to reduce classification and information-sharing barriers in an area that has historically been extremely secretive. NGA wants the JMMC to ultimately produce better intelligence, and Whitworth said getting allied involvement in the center is essential.

“That actual wiring for an allied participation was actually part of what I considered IOC and we’re there,” Whitworth said. He declined to provide further details on the nature of those efforts with other countries.

The Space Force is also working with other intelligence agencies. The service has a partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office for a new satellite system to track moving targets on the ground, called Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI). The effort is particularly critical because the Department of the Air Force is moving away from airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and towards space-based sensors.

Speaking about the NGA’s relationship with the targeting program and how it will deconflict with the Space Force and NRO, Whitworth said Aug. 28 one role of the JMMC is to work out disparate intelligence efforts across the government and decide who should do what, “so that the worlds don’t collide.”

Another collaborative intelligence-military effort—between the NRO and USSF—is the Space Executive Committee. How GMTI will work in practice was discussed at a meeting of the committee on Aug. 28 with NRO Director Chris Scolese and Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Guetlein indicated.

Details are still being finalized, Whitworth suggested, but there has been progress.

“What the answer to that is it’s being worked out, but I’m seeing a lot of progress, and each side understanding each other, and ultimately it’s a decision for the [Director of National Intelligence] and the Secretary of Defense,” Whitworth said. “We’re also really confident in our relationship with U.S. Space Force and the whole of government approach that we’ve got going here, and the collaboration that’s occurring as demonstrated by the JMMC.”

Overall, he said that his agency has made significant progress in its relationship with the Space Force.

“I’m really confident that we have been in a very good kind of Eureka moment, and our understanding of Space Force and their understanding of us, it’s going very well. I think the JMMC is part of that,” Whitworth said.

As Questions Hang Over the 16th Air Force, New Boss Moves to Fine Tune Info Warfare

As Questions Hang Over the 16th Air Force, New Boss Moves to Fine Tune Info Warfare

Six months after Air Force leaders announced sweeping moves to re-optimize for great power competition, one of the main units affected by the changes still faces an uncertain future.

The 16th Air Force, a sprawling Numbered Air Force that encompasses cyber attacks, electronic warfare, traditional surveillance and reconnaissance, public affairs and information operations, and weather forecasting, is due for a major shakeup, new commander Lt. Gen Thomas K. Hensley acknowledged in a conference call with reporters: Air Forces Cyber is being elevated to the status of a service component command, on a level with Pacific Air Forces or Air Forces Central.  

That leaves a question mark over the future of the 16th Air Force, since AFCYBER is a significant proportion of the 49,000 strong unit.   

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall “has said that he wants to elevate AFCYBER and we’re going to elevate AFCYBER,” said Hensley. “But that brings into question, then, what is the future status of 16th Air Force in its totality. The only thing I can offer at this point is that we have some very senior leaders that are going through a very deliberate process to determine what is the right way forward.” 

“I think we’re getting pretty close to a decision on that,” he concluded. 

One thing will not change, Hensley said: the combination of military (title 10) and intelligence (title 50) authorities which enable unique operational concepts.

“When it comes to title 10 and title 50 and cyber authorities we certainly want to keep those together in one organization, so that we have unity of command,” Hensley said. “I know the authorities that we have: the authorities to work with [Public Affairs] on strategic messaging, and on those [military deception] operations.” 

Indeed, despite some recent public critiques that the overarching role of 16AF is insufficiently well-defined, Hensley said there were many advantages to bringing disparate elements together. “Being in one command gives you unity of command, unity of effort, the speed and agility to produce outcomes,” he said. If different elements were stovepiped in “in separate commands with different processes, different commanders,” the work can still be done, “but not with the speed and agility” required. 

Hensley added that other services have, in their own ways, followed the Air Force’s lead in combining cyber with other non-kinetic capabilities under the rubric of information warfare, like the Marine Corps’ Information Command. 

“When the 16th Air Force stood up and we began messaging the convergence of capabilities and authorities, the other services were like, ‘Hmmm. We like that. We want to replicate that.’ The Marines actually followed suit with what 16th Air Force did,” he said. 

The multifaceted character of 16th Air Force capabilities is a feature not a bug, Hensley added, allowing the integration of traditional targeting intelligence with 21st century warfare concepts.

“You start talking about cyber effects that we can produce, as well as the effects from the electromagnetic spectrum, nonkinetic effects, and being able integrate the enablers [surveillance and reconnaissance] and weather with cyber … you are driving behavior,” he said 

Now, even as Hensley waits for final decisions on his unit’s future, he said he is working hard to fine tune the multifaceted mission, which can make its work supporting the air component commands complex, he acknowledged. 

“We’ve had a couple of ‘thinks’ with the air components, going through a crawl, walk, run phase, if you will. We’re now in the walk phase, and we have generated some outstanding lessons learned on how we can support the air components all the way from the unit level up to the Office of Competitive Activities’ [department-wide] level and everywhere in between,” he said.  

A new information warfare operations center was designed to “see how we could take all the convergence of capabilities and authorities that we have to support all of the air components with their operations, activities, and investments,” he said. 

Hensley, who spent a year as deputy commander, is just the third commander since the 16th Air Force was reactivated in 2019 to bring together the many facets of the Air Force’s nonkinetic capabilities, including AFCYBER.  

Watchdog: Air Force Must Get Better at Holding Contractors Accountable for Bad Spare Parts

Watchdog: Air Force Must Get Better at Holding Contractors Accountable for Bad Spare Parts

The Air Force lacks proper guidance and controls for getting contractors to pay it back for defective spare parts, leaving the service with millions of dollars’ worth of broken equipment and sometimes paying even more money to repair it. 

A new report from the Department of Defense Inspector General found that the Air Force did not seek restitution for 45 defective spare parts worth $5.9 million for the C-130J Super Hercules, because Air Force deficiency reporting personnel did not enforce the warranty for those parts, did not have an effective system for tracking those parts, and did not fully understand the warranty requirements.

Beyond the C-130J, the Air Force also could not provide evidence of contractor restitution for 77 defective parts valued at $500,000 for other airframes, including the F-16, F-22, and even the device which arms certain kinds of bomb fuzes. 

While the Air Force was paid back for 185 other defective parts valued at $19.4 million, it took an average of 81 days to provide evidence of contractor restitution, leading the watchdog to question the service’s process for holding contractors responsible. Restitution could take the form of payment, repaired parts, or replacement parts.

“These conditions occurred because the Air Force lacked adequate guidance and controls over the contractor restitution portion of its deficiency reporting process,” investigators wrote. “As a result, the Air Force missed opportunities to hold contractors accountable and obtain restitution for defective parts.”

Airman 1st Class Iyana Wells, a C-130 mobility readiness spares package journeyman with the 1st Special Operations Logistics Readiness Squadron, conducts inventory of an MRSP kit at Hurlburt Field, Florida, July 12, 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Dennis Spain)

It’s not just a matter of returning taxpayer money; when parts are bad, they put lives at risk. In 2020, an F-16 pilot died when his ejection seat failed to deploy its parachute. Air Force investigators suspected some key parts of the seat may have been counterfeit.

“The Air Force’s official inquiry in the months following the accident found that electronics inside the seat were scratched, unevenly sanded, and showed otherwise shoddy craftsmanship,” Air Force Times reported in 2022.

The DODIG investigation found reports of many other defective aircraft parts, including hazy F-16 cockpit canopies; inadequate fuel tubes for an F-16 engine; flaps that could not be installed on the exhaust nozzle of the B-1B’s engine; and faulty processors for the C-130J weather radar systems. The service seemed to keep few records of which parts they’d received restitution for; investigators noted that it took more than four months for the service to provide evidence it had received $1 million in restitution for defective B-1 exhaust nozzle flaps.

“This information was generally not readily available to Air Force deficiency reporting personnel, and they often had to obtain the evidence from other Air Force organizations, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the [Defense Contract Management Agency], and contractors,” the report said.

An official for Air Force Materiel Command told investigators that Air Force deficiency reporting guidance focuses on the investigation portion: identifying the cause of defective parts, and mitigating risks. But the contractor restitution portion leaves much to be desired. For example, the guidance does not address how to track restitution for defective parts, nor does it lay out the key roles or responsibilities for obtaining that restitution.

Other branches do it differently. Investigators noted that the Army Aviation and Missile Command does not close out its product quality deficiency reports (PQDR) until the Army receives restitution from the contractor. 

“An Air Force deficiency reporting official also suggested that keeping the PQDR open until receipt of full contractor restitution would help improve the process,” the report said.

The problems were particularly acute for the C-130J, where investigators found Air Force deficiency reporting personnel did not establish a process to track defective parts; follow Air Force guidance to establish a warranty plan and communicate that to Air Force users; or receive training on or fully understand contract warranty requirements.

“As a result, the Air Force was unable to recover $3 million for defective parts, and paid approximately $200,000 to repair defective parts under warranty, resulting in questioned costs,” the report wrote. 

The scale of these issues worried investigators “that similar deficiencies may exist with other major Air Force weapon system programs.”

DOD IG listed several recommendations for AFMC to improve the situation, including:

  • Find out if the Air Force can still obtain restitution for defective parts for which evidence of restitution is missing
  • Update technical orders to provide details on process, roles, and responsibilities for obtaining restitution for defective parts, then establish a training program for deficiency reporting personnel
  • Develop and implement controls and oversight for tracking contractor restitution
  • Require C-130J deficiency reporting personnel establish a process for tracking defective parts to make sure they are repaired or replaced by the contractor under warranty
  • Develop warranty guidance for C-130J deficiency reporting personnel and communicate it to the relevant parties
  • Provide recurring training on warranty requirements for defective parts
  • Review other major Air Force weapon system programs to make sure deficiency reporting rules are being followed

AFMC agreed or partially agreed to all of the recommendations, but the DOD IG said it will keep its recommendations open until “we verify that the information provided and actions taken by management fully address the recommendations.”

Leadership from the 63rd Fighter Squadron conducts on-the-job training for Senior Airman Brenden Hansen, 56th Component Maintenance Squadron maintainer, March 10, 2020, at Luke Air Force Base, Ariz. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Brooke Moeder)

This report is not the first time the Air Force or the military writ large has been called out for its spare parts practices. In 2023, the Government Accountability Office said lack of Pentagon oversight for F-35 spare parts meant that the F-35 Joint Program Office has been unable to review losses worth tens of millions of dollars.

“The F-35 Joint Program Office does not track or enter these spare parts into an accountable property system of record that would enable it to capture and store real-time changes to property records,” the report stated. “Currently, the prime contractors maintain this information.” 

There is a lot of money in spare parts, which at $1.5 billion made up the biggest single item on the Air Force’s unfunded priorities list for fiscal year 2025, but some of that money may be wasted due to aging systems for forecasting parts supply needs. In January, the Air Force paid a quantum computing company $2.5 million to create a more accurate supply chain inventory management system. 

“At best, a supply chain forecast is an educated guess,” the company CEO said at the time. “At worst, it is a wild guess.”  

New Reports: Two Osprey Mishaps in One Week

New Reports: Two Osprey Mishaps in One Week

A pair of new accident investigation board reports demonstrate how easily a simple mission can go wrong. In the span of five days last August, members of the 20th Special Operations Squadron at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., caused accident damage in excess of $2 million each.  

Investigators faulted crew members for both crashes, which included a botched parking job at Inyokern Airfield, Calif., and an accidental engine shutdown that led to an uncontrolled rapid descent and crash at Melrose Air Force Range, N.M. Neither crash appared to be systemic, a relief to supporters of the Osprey, which has been under increased scrutiny following a series of deadly mishaps in recent years.  

Inyokern Airfield 

The first incident took place Aug. 17 at Inyokern, near Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, when the copilot maneuvered too close to another CV-22 nearby, causing the rotors of the two planes to collide.

During the exercise, the squadron’s CV-22s parked on an apron at one end of a runway with sufficient space for four aircraft and enough width to allow them to maneuver, investigators found. But the parking apron was deteriorating, and ground crew assigned to marshal the aircraft reported that loose concrete and dirt was getting blown into them by the CV-22’s rotors. Rather than stand where debris might hit them, the ground crew gave up their marshaling position and put one Airman behind the aircraft and another alongside.  

Parking the aircraft, the copilot did not pull enough forward before backing up alongside a stationary CV-22. That put his aircraft on a path collide with the parked Osprey. 

Ground crew members said they signaled for the aircraft to stop, but investigators found that the ground crew failed to use standardized language or signals throughout the deployment, creating a false sense of security for aircrew. They also were not using the daylight-fluorescent wands required. The signals were missed, ignored, or not understood.

The two aircraft’s rotors collided, destroying blades on both aircraft, and when one ground crew member dove for cover from debris, the Airman sustained a shoulder injury and concussion. Total estimated damage: $2.5 million. 

Investigators cited two main causes of the accident: First, the copilot failed to ensure adequate clearance before starting to park, and second, the aircraft commander failed to tell the copilot to stop, despite feeling “uncomfortable” with how close the two aircraft were getting. 

Officials also blamed mission planners for failing to mention the “congested aircraft parking area, non- standard reverse taxi requirements, deteriorating concrete conditions, and lack of ramp illumination,” all of which were potential hazards. They also faulted an overall sense of complacency, the ground crew’s failure to use standardized signals throughout the exercise, and poor oversight by squadron and group leadership, as they did not receive a brief from the mission commander. 

Melrose Air Force Range 

Less than a week after the California incident, a 20th Special Operations Squadron flight engineer unknowingly caused his Osprey to crash in New Mexico when a cable connecting a battery pack to his night vision goggles got looped around a lever and inadvertently switched off one engine. 

The Osprey slammed into the ground, causing $2 million in damage. The incident occurred at Melrose Air Force Range, N.M., during nighttime training on Aug. 22, 2023. The flight engineer “struck his head” upon impact and was treated at a local hospital, but there were no other injuries. 

According to the accident investigation report, the Osprey crew was on a training sortie for the 27th Special Operations Wing and flight engineers had just completed aerial gunnery training. The Osprey was hovering about 190 feet above the ground, and the aircraft commander and copilot were preparing to switch from hover to forward flight. 

As they retracted the landing gear, the flight engineer entered the cockpit “with significant slack” in his night vision goggle battery pack cable, the report notes. Sitting down in the designated flight engineer seat, he did not notice his cable get wrapped around the right engine control lever, pulling it from “FLY” to “OFF.” 

With the engine shut down, the aircraft lost the necessary power to maintain a hover and began plunging toward the ground at up to 1,500 feet per minute. The copilot tried to command full power from the aircraft, but the single engine could not generate enough lift. 

The aircraft commander was able to pull the nose up to arrest the aircraft’s forward speed and slow the descent rate slowed to 800 feet per minute, but in just 11 seconds the Osprey struck the ground at a speed of around 40 knots. When the aircraft bounced—the looped battery pack cable pulled in the opposite direction, this time shifting the lever back to “FLY.” After a second, harder landing, the CV-22 slid about 360 feet.  

“The antennae, lights, nose landing gear doors, and the Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) turret positioned on the bottom of the [aircraft] were crushed, destroyed, and spread along the skid path,” the report states. 

The FLIR turret “provides a thermal image that enables a pilot to take-off, navigate at low altitudes and land in total darkness,” the report added. 

The flight engineer whose cable turned the engine off was unrestrained during the crash, his head and neck “yanked backwards to the extreme of flexion and extension” by the battery cable, until it snapped, slamming his face into the center display. 

The engineer was transported to a local hospital out of concern that he had suffered a concussion and released early the next morning. 

Air Force investigators determined the main cause of the crash was the battery pack cable, but also faulted the aircraft commander for failing to protect the engine control levers, even though other experienced CV-22 aviators knew that pilots often guard the levers when anyone in the cockpit is getting in a seat while in flight. 

On top of that, the report faulted the aircrew’s inattentiveness during a critical phase of flight and lack of real-time risk assessment. The flight engineer should not have tried or been allowed to get into the seat while the aircraft was transitioning from hover to forward flight, and the aircraft commander could have noted the wind conditions while hovering—by moving the aircraft away from a tailwind, investigators said, the aviators could have been able to recover once the mishap began. 

Finally, the investigation found a lack of clear procedural guidance for how to deal with excess cable from night vision goggles, leading to the slack on the flight engineer’s cable. 

Lockheed Delivers ‘More Robust’ Software for New F-35s—But Not Full TR-3 Yet

Lockheed Delivers ‘More Robust’ Software for New F-35s—But Not Full TR-3 Yet

Lockheed Martin has begun delivering software for Tech Refresh 3-equipped F-35s that will allow pilots to train more comprehensively for future missions, the Joint Program Office announced Aug. 29. The software is not yet the full TR-3 capability, though, and Lockheed is being docked some of its final delivery payments accordingly.

The JPO and Lockheed “have reached an agreement for the acceptance and delivery” of TR-3-enabled aircraft “with robust training capability,” a program spokesperson said. He said the JPO and Lockheed have agreed to “terms and conditions” for deliveries and software releases but did not elaborate.

As many as 100 F-35s had been in storage for up to a year before deliveries resumed in mid-July. They had been completed but not delivered because the TR-3 upgrade—processors, displays, and other improvements—has not been fully tested. To get deliveries moving again, the F-35 partners agreed early in the summer to accept a “truncated” version of the TR-3 software, and JPO director Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt determined the software was safe for flight in July.

The TR-3 is the basis for the F-35’s Block 4 upgrade, which includes more than 80 improvements chiefly having to do with electronic warfare, navigation and communications, and weapons.

The spokesperson was not immediately able to say what functions the new software will permit, but Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said on an earnings call in April that the truncated software will mean the jets can “get … in the hands of squadron, wing, and regional commanders so that they can start training their pilots on them and training their maintenance organizations, and also get the base infrastructure, spare parts, tools, everything else.” He said the jets “could be deployed into actual combat operations” if called on.

“In the statement we sent out in July,” the JPO spokesperson said, “we explained that the TR-3 aircraft initially being delivered had ‘initial training capability,’ and that ‘more robust combat training capability’ would be delivered in August. The ‘more robust combat training capability’ is now being delivered.”

As part of the agreement, the JPO will withhold a portion of final aircraft delivery payments until “TR-3 combat capability is qualified and delivered.” That amount will be about $5 million per aircraft, the spokesperson said. An F-35 costs about $82 million each, according to the latest contract.

The full TR-3 software package is still not expected to be fielded until early next year.

In addition, the JPO said Lockheed and its F-35 partners are “making significant investments in development labs and digital infrastructure that benefit the F-35 enterprise’s speed and agility in fielding [new] capabilities” for the fighter.

The announcement comes a day after Lockheed received F-35 contracts valued at just over $5 billion covering a range of F-35-related items such a simulators and training devices, sustainment, engineering, materiel support supplies, repair capabilities and equipment for depots.

Ukrainian F-16 Crashes in Combat, Killing Pilot

Ukrainian F-16 Crashes in Combat, Killing Pilot

A Ukrainian Air Force pilot was killed when his F-16 fighter crashed Aug. 26, Ukraine’s military announced Aug. 29. The incident occurred during a massive Russian missile and drone attack that day that saw Ukraine’s F-16s make their combat debut. But the mission came at a high cost. Ukraine has only a handful of F-16s, and the pilot, Oleksiy “Moonfish” Mes, was a prominent aviator who was one of the first Ukrainians trained to fly the F-16.

“During the air battle, the F-16 aircraft demonstrated their high efficiency,” Ukraine’s General Staff said in a statement. The Ukrainian Air Force said Moonfish helped down three cruise missiles and one drone on Aug. 26—his final mission.

“During the approach to the next target, contact with one of the aircraft was lost,” the General Staff said.

On Aug. 26, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy touted the effectiveness of the F-16s in their first contact with enemy targets but made no mention of any losses to aircraft or pilots.

It is unclear what caused the crash. The Ukrainian military said it is investigating. A member of the Ukrainian parliament, Marina Bezuhla, said the incident may have been a case of friendly fire. Moonfish’s F-16 was likely shot down by another American-made weapon, a Patriot surface-to-air missile system, “due to a lack of coordination between units,” Bezuhla wrote on social media. No evidence has been presented for that theory so far.

A memorial for Mes was held on Aug. 29.

“We lost a reliable friend and a strong warrior,” the Ukrainian Air Force said in a statement. A pair of MiG-29s flew over the ceremony. Mes was posthumously promoted to colonel.

A memorial is held Aug. 29 for Ukrainian Air Force pilot Oleksiy “Moonfish” Mes, who was killed when his F-16 crashed in Ukraine on Aug. 26. Photo courtesy of the Ukrainian Air Force

“F-16 fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were used together with anti-aircraft missile units during the repulse of a missile attack by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine,” the General Staff statement said. It said a committee was investigating the crash.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh declined to provide details of the crash and said the U.S. was not involved in the crash probe.

“The United States has not been asked to participate in any type of investigation to look into this incident,” Singh said. “Broadly speaking, combat aviation is incredibly complex, and we’ve been very proud to train some of the pilots here in the United States. … Every day that they fly those aircraft, these are brave men and women going up there to defend their skies and to defend their country.”

Moonfish is the second high-profile Ukrainian pilot who advocated for Ukraine to get F-16s to be killed. Andriy “Juice” Pilshchykov and two other pilots were killed in an accident involving trainer aircraft in 2023. Moonfish and Juice appeared together in the media, including in the United States, and lobbied Congress to pressure the Biden administration to authorize the transfer of F-16s.

Moonfish “was the very first trained F-16 pilot for Ukraine and carried that pride even into his death,” wrote former Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.), who met with the two pilots in 2022.

“His skills as a pilot were unmatched, his instincts razor-sharp,” Kinzinger added. “He had a natural talent for flying, but it was his heart that set him apart. Moonfish flew not just for victory, but for justice—for the children of Ukraine, for the future of his nation.”

The Ukrainian Air Force, also known as the PS ZSU, also celebrated the pilot.

“Oleksiy saved Ukrainians from deadly Russian missiles, unfortunately at the cost of his own life,” the PS ZSU said. “Oleksiy Mes was a strong and loyal soldier, a high-class pilot, a leader on earth and in the sky, a good friend, a loving son, father, husband, and patriot of his country.”

Airpower experts and U.S. officials have cautioned that Ukraine’s second-hand F-16s, publicly unveiled Aug. 4, will not provide Kyiv with air superiority in the near term. The fighters have been spotted carrying AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and the U.S. has already provided the Ukrainian Air Force with JDAM Extended Range guided bombs and HARM anti-radiation missiles for its legacy fleet of MiGs and Sukhoi jets.

The F-16 just celebrated its 50th birthday. The venerable, multirole fourth-generation fighter has been heavily upgraded over the years and is still in production. Denmark and the Netherlands are donating Ukraine’s first jets, and Norway and Belgium have also promised to provide Ukraine with F-16s—some 80 total aircraft. The U.S. is not providing Ukraine with any Vipers, but the U.S. Air Force’s 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing recently announced that it helped enhance the electronic warfare capabilities of the foreign jets Ukraine is receiving and plans to continue providing support.

Zelenskyy has said Ukraine needs more F-16s and permission to engage targets in Russia to protect Ukraine’s skies.

Connecting the Dots on China’s Airspace Violation 

Connecting the Dots on China’s Airspace Violation 

When China’s air force and coast guard engaged recently in apparently provocative actions in the East and South China Seas, most Western media framed the events as evidence of Beijing’s aggressive and potentially destabilizing behavior. While aggressive is often an apt term for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations, important details and context are often overlooked.  

The PLA’s rapid growth and expansion, combined with its relative lack of experience, poses outsized risks—especially if Beijing is directing the PLA to provoke interactions with U.S. allies and partners. 

Japanese officials responded angrily this week when a Chinese military aircraft entered Japanese airspace, calling the incident an “utterly unacceptable” incursion. On Aug. 26, a PLA Y-9DZ electronic intelligence collection aircraft came within 12 nautical miles of Japan’s Danjo Islands, 80 miles west of Kyushu, Japan’s southernmost main island. It was the first time a PLA aircraft had violated sovereign Japanese airspace since the Japanese Self Defense Force started keeping records of such events in 1967.  

While there is no doubt this incident was a violation of international law, it is not clear it posed a serious threat to Japan’s security. The Y-9DZ, among the newest of the PLA’s special mission aircraft, was flying directly at the small outcropping of Japanese islands when it penetrated Japanese airspace for about three minutes. However, the windswept Danjo Islands are both uninhabited and undefended. The islands’ main purpose seems to be as an anchor for a marine sanctuary and nesting grounds for a vulnerable species of Japanese sea bird. Unlike the disputed Senkaku Islands, China makes no claim to these rocky spits of land. In response to Japanese protests over the incident, China’s foreign ministry spokesman said China has “no intention” of violating any airspace. 

While it is certainly possible the airspace violation was unintentional, there is still cause for concern. China’s defense contractors began mass producing special mission aircraft for the PLA in 2019. Over the past several years, increasing numbers of these aircraft have appeared at PLA air bases, which have made upgrades to base infrastructure to accommodate the new aircraft. The rapid influx of new reconnaissance aircraft necessarily means many aircrew are likely inexperienced with little flight time in their new aircraft. Because these aircraft are increasingly being sent on flights where they will encounter a U.S. or allied response, tense situations will inevitably ensue where experienced aircrew and cool heads would be preferred.   

If the airspace breech was intentional, however, it is entirely possible that Beijing manufactured the violation as a distraction for this week’s visit to Beijing by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. The two days of meetings on Aug. 27-28 were the first visit by a U.S. national security advisor to China in over eight years. Sullivan and his Chinese counterparts discussed many important topics, from Chinese protests over U.S. support for Taiwan to cooperation on counternarcotics to guardrails for the military use of artificial intelligence. Agendas for these types of high-level meetings are often set weeks in advance with outcomes all but predetermined.  

One of Beijing’s well-known, if unacknowledged, negotiating tactics is to create an incident immediately in advance of or during a high-level diplomatic visit. The Chinese side is completely prepared for the incident, but the event upsets the established agenda and drives unprepared foreign participants to focus on the manufactured crisis. There is every reason to believe both the unprecedented violation of Japanese airspace and the past week’s escalating incidents involving the Philippine and Chinese coast guards were intended to shape the information space to Beijing’s advantage during this week’s high-level talks.  

The PLA will continue to drive regional tensions which, intentionally or unintentionally, could draw the U.S. military into a conflict in East Asia. Relatively inexperienced PLA personnel operating new ships and aircraft in close proximity to U.S. and allied military forces in unfamiliar operating areas pose a significant concern.  

That Beijing might direct Chinese military forces to intentionally create an incident to further a strategic narrative is a very dangerous game indeed. In increasingly crowded airspace and water space, a military crisis that happens quite by accident seems much more likely than a deliberately executed PLA operation.  

Beyond the attention-grabbing headlines heralding Chinese military aggression, the details and context surrounding these military and security events should be clearly understood to reveal Beijing’s strategies and the potential dangers inherent in their execution. 

J. Michael Dahm is the Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. He previously served as a U.S. naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China.