US Steps Up Intelligence Flights for Border Mission with RC-135 and P-8 Spy Planes

US Steps Up Intelligence Flights for Border Mission with RC-135 and P-8 Spy Planes

The U.S. military is carrying out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions along the southern border and off the coast of Mexico using U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint and U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft as part of the Pentagon’s effort to secure the southern border at the direction of President Donald Trump.

A U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint, a signals intelligence aircraft, flew from its home base of Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., to conduct missions off the coast around Mexico’s Baja Peninsula on Feb. 3 and Feb. 4, flight tracking data shows. A U.S. official confirmed to Air & Space Forces Magazine the U.S. was using the RC-135 to conduct ISR flights off the coast of Mexico. Flight tracking data shows the aircraft, tail number 64-14845, appears to have stayed in international airspace when operating near Mexico.

The U.S. has also conducted multiple missions with U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft over the last several days, flying missions along the border out of Florida, California, and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz. A U.S. official said the P-8s were capturing imagery of border. The Department of Defense publicly confirmed the missions and released photos of the P-8 operations.

A P-8A Poseidon aircraft, assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 40, rests on the runway at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz,, between operations along the southern border on Jan. 31, 2025. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andy Anderson

While not commenting on the flights, U.S. Northern Command said on Feb. 4 that 140 U.S. military intelligence personnel had been assigned to the command as part of the southern border mission along with 500 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division. Overall, over 2,000 additional troops have now been ordered to support border security efforts by the Pentagon.

“These intelligence personnel will provide full motion video analysis, counter network analysis, and Spanish language translation to the U.S. Border Patrol Office of Intelligence,” NORTHCOM said in a news release. 

The command has stood up the “Joint Intelligence Task Force-Southern Border to integrate and deconflict intelligence planning and threat analysis,” NORTHCOM added in its statement. 

Also on Feb. 4, a U.S. Air Force C-17 carried the first flight of migrants to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from Biggs Army Airfield in El Paso, Texas. The plane was carrying roughly a dozen people who will be held at the prison that has been used to hold terrorism suspects, a U.S. official said. Trump issued an executive order on Jan. 29 directing the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security to “expand the Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay to full capacity.” Air Force C-17s have carried out numerous deportation flights to foreign countries since the Pentagon began its border security operations at the direction of Trump on Jan. 22.

Roughly 150 Marines have been sent to Guantanamo Bay on Feb. 3, according to U.S. Southern Command. More Marines were expected to arrive soon. The service members are preparing tents to hold roughly 1,000 migrants, a U.S. official said.

“There’s a lot of space to accommodate a lot of people,” Trump said on Feb. 4. ”So we’re going to use it.”

U.S. Navy Sailors, assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 40, conduct flight operations along the Southern Border aboard a P-8A Poseidon aircraft on Jan. 31, 2025. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andy Anderson
One of the Last Original Tuskegee Airmen Dies at 100

One of the Last Original Tuskegee Airmen Dies at 100

Harry T. Stewart Jr., one of the original Tuskegee Airmen, who captured three aerial victories in World War II and was on the winning team for the Air Force’s first ever aerial gunnery competitive, died Feb. 2. He was 100.

Stewart grew up in New York City. At the age of 16, he tried to join the Army as an aviation cadet, shortly after the war in Europe began,  but was rejected because Black men were not accepted for Army pilot training at that time. Soon after the U.S. entered the war, the policy changed, and the Army established a flight training program at Tuskegee Institute, Ala. On his second try, Stewart was accepted, becoming one of the first 1,000 men to train at Tuskegee Army Air Field.

After completing basic flight training there in June 1944, he went on to advanced training at Walterboro Field, S.C. He was assigned to the all-Black 332nd Fighter Group, where he flew P-51 Mustangs; one of the storied “Red Tails” who helped the bombers they escorted achieve a very high combat survivability rate.

On April 1, 1945, the 20-year-old Stewart, his wingman Walter Manning, and others from their Italy-based wing were flying P-51Ds, escorting B-24s on a bombing mission over Austria. On the way home, the flight struck ground targets of opportunity. Ambushed by a dozen FW-190s, Stewart shot down two of the attackers and maneuvered a third into the ground, achieving three aerial victories.

Although 10 of the 12 German fighters were destroyed, two of his fellow flight members were shot down, including Manning, who survived the bailout but was caught and lynched by area civilians.

Stewart received the Distinguished Flying Cross for his achievement that day and for actions across 43 total combat missions. Only three other Tuskegee Airmen downed three enemies in a single day.

When the war ended, Stewart remained in the Army Air Force, continuing to fly fighters as the service transitioned to become the U.S. Air Force. In 1949, he was part of a four-man team from the 332nd to win the first ever fighter gunnery meet “Top Gun,” flying P-47s against other units equipped with jets.

The Air Force did not publicize the achievement, however, and the trophy won by the team went missing more than 50 years. The team was recognized by the service in 2022 with a commemorative plaque at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

As part of a postwar reduction in force, Stewart left the Air Force in 1950, but was able to stay in the Air Force Reserve, eventually rising to become a lieutenant colonel. Though he tried to become an airline pilot, the airlines did not hire Black pilots at that time.

He enrolled in New York University and studied mechanical engineering, receiving his degree in 1963. He later landed a job with a natural gas pipeline company. He retired as its vice president in 1976.

Stewart maintained his flying currency and in later years took children up for flights, inspiring some to become pilots themselves. In 2019, he published a memoir of his wartime experiences, “Soaring to Glory: A Tuskegee Airman’s Firsthand Account of World War II.” The Tuskegee Airmen National Historical Museum in Detroit, Mich., honored him on July 4, 2024—his 100th birthday—with an event attended by state and national dignitaries.

The surviving Tuskegee Airmen were awarded the Congressional Gold Medal in 2019.

“Harry Stewart was a kind man of profound character and accomplishment with a distinguished career of service he continued long after fighting for our country in World War II,” said Brian Smith, President and CEO of the Tuskegee Airmen National Historical Museum. “We are deeply saddened by his passing and extend our condolences to his family and friends around the world.”

Stewart was believed to be one of the last two or three surviving original pilots from the Tuskegee Airmen.

Air and Missile Defense for the US Is an Absolute Imperative

Air and Missile Defense for the US Is an Absolute Imperative

If there is anything we’ve learned from the conflicts in Ukraine and Israel—and the growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—it is that massed air and missile attacks are now a fundamental component of modern warfare. This puts our U.S. homeland at risk. 

President Trump’s executive order calling for an “Iron Dome Missile Defense Shield for America” to protect against “ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks” is right on target. Achieving that vision, however, is far from simple. Fortunately, the U.S. already possesses the building blocks for such a defense, what we might call a phase one solution. Now we need to get serious about scaling and employing it.

Today’s threats present a “back to the future” moment. During the Cold War, when Soviet nuclear-armed bombers and ballistic missiles threatened the United States and our allies, America invested aggressively, advancing the state of the art in air defense and early warning by establishing defenses including 43 primary and 96 supplementary radar sites, mostly in Canada and the northern U.S., each designed to detect and track threats. An airborne interceptor capability composed of over 800 air defense fighters and hundreds of surface-to-air missiles complemented the early warning systems. But following the Cold War, many of these defenses were dismantled. Although air defenses were given a close look after the attacks of 9/11, the 2023 Chinese balloon fiasco clearly demonstrated remaining deficiencies.

Today’s determined adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—are now aligned, as are their means of attack. These include a range of airborne drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and even a space-based fractional orbital bombardment system. Many of these weapons have been employed against Ukraine by Russia and against Israel by Iran. Yet those attacks pale in comparison to what China or Russia might be able to muster against the United States in a full-scale conflict.

By holding U.S. targets at risk, adversaries hope to degrade core elements of the U.S. national security enterprise and limit American force projection overseas. By keeping U.S. combat forces focused on homeland defense, they aim to curb America’s capacity and capability to repulse China in a fight over the Taiwan, Russia in Europe, and Iran in the Middle East.

This new global security environment requires a U.S. national defense reset. As in the Cold War, the U.S. military must acquire the sensors to detect an attack and the interceptors to defeat inbound aircraft and missiles. The difference between then and now is technical complexity. Today’s threats are fast, maneuverable, stealthy, and in some cases can transit both air and space.

Defending against such threats requires a modern layered defense. The drone and cruise missile threat highlights the wisdom demonstrated when the U.S. Air Force, backed by Congress, committed to replacing the struggling 46-year old AWACS aircraft with the advanced E-7 Wedgetail early-warning aircraft. Partnering Wedgetail with long-dwell unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like MQ-9 Reapers and RQ-4 Global Hawks can provide an effective initial solution. Retrofitted with advanced radars and connected to interceptors—including both missile-equipped fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles on the ground and at sea—this sensor-shooter, manned-unmanned solution closes existing coverage gaps, especially in the high north. Indeed, the closest axis of airborne attack for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—every one of them—is over the polar region and across Alaska and/or Canada.  

Airborne defenses are extremely agile compared to ground-based defenses. They can transit an entire theater in minutes or hours, and can redeploy to other zones as circumstances warrant. Fixed ground-based systems cannot do that. Case in point: U.S. fighter aircraft were crucial to defending Israel against Iran’s missile and drone attack in April 2024. American space-based sensors offer early warning of ballistic missiles, but lack the capability of the E-7 to identify and track most aerial threats. America needs that kind of situational awareness now. 

For ballistic and hypersonic missiles, space-based sensors remain the answer, while interceptor systems like Patriot, THAAD, the Standard Missile, surface-launched AMRAAM, Iron Dome, Ground Based Interceptor, and Next Generation Interceptor all provide parts of a solution. Yet though these capabilities are highly effective, with some having been used to tremendous effect in Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea, the scale and scope of the threat demands a balance between exquisite capability and mass defensive pragmatism. To intercept thousands of incoming strikes demands solutions, the U.S. needs defensive rounds that can be produced in high volume. No one can afford to spend millions per round indefinitely to fight off low-cost drones and cruise missiles; it’s a defensive calculus akin to running a marathon, not a sprint. 

It is easy to scoff at the idea of an “Iron Dome for America,” given the U.S. is roughly 500 times the size of Israel. But the threat is real, and the cost of inaction is too great to ignore. No military obligation is more important or sacred than protecting the homeland. Our lives, liberties, and prosperity depend on it.

Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, USAF (Ret.), served as a combat pilot, commander, and strategist, flying the F-16, MQ-9, and RQ-4 aircraft. Over the course of a 30-year career, he spent more than 12 years in the Pacific and European theaters, working closely with U.S. allies and partners, including as part of NATO. 

Promotion Tests Still on Schedule as Air Force Handbook Changes

Promotion Tests Still on Schedule as Air Force Handbook Changes

The Air Force does not expect any changes to its promotion testing schedule for staff sergeant and technical sergeant as the service reevaluates one of the key study materials for those tests.

“Although there are no testing schedule changes anticipated at this time, leadership teams will communicate any potential changes to impacted Airmen,” an Air Force official told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

On Jan. 29, the Air Force temporarily removed Air Force Handbook 1, a 628-page primer on the branch’s history, values, standards, structure, doctrine, and other fundamentals. 

Airmen hoping to make staff sergeant or technical sergeant use the handbook to prepare for the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) promotion fitness examination (PFE), but the handbook was rescinded “as part of the ongoing efforts to implement and comply with all directives outlined in the Executive Orders issued by the President,” the Air Force wrote on its promotion study guide website.

 “We understand this decision may impact your ability to study for the annual and supplemental promotion cycles,” the Air Force added. “We are diligently working to provide alternative study materials to support your professional development and career advancement and anticipate having these materials available to you by 15 Feb 2025.”

The promotion testing window for technical sergeant goes from Feb. 15 to April 15, while the window for staff sergeant is May 1 to June 30.

Air Force regulations say Airmen must have access to study reference materials at least 60 days before their test date. An Air Force official said study reference information laying out which parts of the handbook Airmen should review before their promotion fitness examination was released Dec. 1, 2024. That means 60 days had elapsed by the time the handbook was rescinded on Jan. 29, so the temporary removal still complied with regulations. 

Any alternative study materials made available on Feb. 15 would not have new information for Airmen to study, the official said. The only changes would be the removal of any content not in line with the executive orders.

It was not immediately clear which specific Executive Orders the handbook may have conflicted with, but the 2024 version of the handbook included several mentions of diversity as an organizational value in the Air Force.

“Managing workforce diversity can result in higher productivity, improved performance, more creativity, more innovativeness, and reduced stress,” the handbook read. “Giving emphasis to diversity without threatening our unity is the proper way to strengthen the ties that bind a team together.”

Any offices, programs, training, or documents related to diversity and inclusion has become verboten under President Trump’s new administration. Within the Air Force, the social media pages and websites of such programs disappeared as the service began to implement the order. 

Besides knowledge of the Air Force Handbook, the WAPS test includes “situational judgment questions” aimed at seeing how Airmen handle different scenarios and also specialty knowledge tests specific to each Airman’s career field.

New Pentagon Report: F-35 Test Progress Slow, Readiness Below Par

New Pentagon Report: F-35 Test Progress Slow, Readiness Below Par

The F-35 fighter program continues to struggle with meeting test milestones and mission readiness goals, but progress is being made on both fronts, according to the latest report from the Pentagon’s test director and comments from the Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin.

Testing of the F-35’s Technology Refresh-3 software and hardware “remained significantly behind schedule throughout [Fiscal Year] 2024, acting Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Raymond D. O’Toole Jr. said in his organization’s annual report, released in late January.

“The F-35 program has shown no improvement in meeting schedule and performance timelines for developing and testing software designed to address deficiencies and add new capabilities,” the report added.

Tech Refresh-3 remains in developmental testing, even as jets are being delivered. The DOT&E office doesn’t believe operational testing can begin in earned until 2026, two years after deliveries started.

“Aircraft modifications, flight test instrumentation, [open-air battle shaping] capabilities, and stable software will all be required before dedicated operational testing can begin on the TR-3 aircraft with the capabilities already fielded on the TR-2 aircraft,” the report states, while noting that such testing might start sooner if modifications and software mature faster than expected.

The TR-3 is the foundational software and hardware on which the F-35’s Block 4 upgrade depends. Lockheed Martin began producing F-35s in the TR-3 configuration in summer 2023, but the government would not accept them until developmental TR-3 testing was complete. A year later, JPO director Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt permitted deliveries to resume, saying the software in the jets was showing sufficient stability in test for safe flight operations and exercises.

“We are aggressively implementing comprehensive test plans to ensure this critical upgrade delivers cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter,” Schmidt said in response to query from Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“The F-35 program’s delivery of TR-3-equipped jets continues to enable combat training capability. As of January [2025], we have delivered over 100 TR-3-equipped aircraft, bringing the total number of operational aircraft delivered to more than 1,100,” Schmidt added. “All of these TR-3 equipped aircraft now have software, ensuring users have access to robust training capability. The F-35 JPO remains focused on working through known risks to deliver TR-3 combat capability in 2025. The capability will continue to be improved in future lots to ensure warfighters have what they need to win in future conflicts.”

A Lockheed Martin spokesperson said the contractor has made “significant progress” on TR-3, “with 98 percent of the capability in flight testing,” eight percent more than it reported last fall. “We expect continual software updates related to TR-3 insertions and Block 4 capabilities, with major milestone software drops along the way, to ensure we are always providing our customers with the most advanced technology.”

The DOT&E report said software updates were planned to be released on annual basis but are taking 18 months.

The report also noted that the JPO is developing a new calendar of milestones for the Block 4 program, which includes some 80 changes related to electronic warfare, new weapons, improved communication and navigation, and software. The JPO could not immediately say when it expects this roadmap to be complete.

“The F-35 Program is working closely with its user community to refine and identify what our warfighter needs, as well as what industry can realistically deliver,” a JPO spokesperson said. “The program is leading an effort to formalize Block 4 as a major subprogram and will apply subsequent modernization and learning throughout future development efforts. Development efforts will continue throughout the life of the F-35 program.”

Readiness

As to reliability and maintainability, the DOT&E report noted that the F-35 “continues to fall short” of the metrics set for it in the original Capabilities Development Document, or CDD, which has never been changed.

“Historical trend data show that, despite reliability improvements initiated by the program, improving and sustaining improvement in aircraft suitability metrics is difficult to achieve,” the DOT&E report states.

The report notes that with an uptick in spare parts in fiscal 2019, there was a corresponding improvement in the reliability and maintainability of the entire fleet. This trend suggests “that the most impactful near-term option for improving aircraft availability is to increase the pool of available spares—either by purchasing more or by maximizing depot capacity to repair broken parts and return them to the spares pool.”

The JPO is also working to address so-called readiness “degraders” with some success.

“Over the past year, we have eliminated over 20 top readiness degraders,” the JPO reported, adding that “a small number of degraders mask tremendous progress that’s been made. That said, our overall readiness rates remain unacceptable “

The JPO did note that units have high mission capable rates when they’re deployed, largely because they take a generous supply of spares with them.

“It’s essential to invest in spares and repair capacity in a timely manner, as well as attack every other aspect of readiness with our stakeholders,” the JPO said.

Lockheed said it will invest $350 million over the next five years “to improve capabilities and drive efficiency across the F-35 enterprise. These investments will enhance fidelity and capacity across our development, integration, and test labs, ultimately enabling us to shift defect discovery to the left.” 

The company said the F-35 has “demonstrated high combat and deployed readiness since data was collected for this report, in some cases more than five years ago” and that it is working with the JPO and its industry partners to “propose, recommend and  implement improvements to F-35 readiness.”

The report noted that there’s been an uptick in quality defects and deficiencies not being detected during the F-35 checkout and delivery process and not being discovered until the jets are at their operational units, though many of these are “minor.”

Lockheed claimed, however, that “the information and data contained within the DOT&E report is dated and does not reflect the current status of the program. The F-35 program has an exceptional safety record, especially for a complex, global aircraft program that spans 20 nations.” Some of the “quality escapes” include “minor items such as an incorrect serial number on paperwork,” the company said. These are being addressed.

The DOT&E office said the F-35 also suffers from cyber deficiencies which are actively “under review” by the JPO in a deep-dive assessment. One of these relates to “aircraft mission systems instabilities” that can “degrade mission performance and may require a pilot-initiated reset of mission systems in-flight, which could have severe consequences during combat, affecting overall mission reliability.”

The Autonomic Logistics Information System that is meant to track F-35 data, predict part needs, and inform maintainers of each jet’s health “does not currently have the capability to automatically log these events in the Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS),” and pilots typically don’t manually log them in, the DOT&E said. The ALIS is being migrated to the Operational Data Integrated Network system.

The JPO said that over the last year, “we have conducted successful cybersecurity tests on ALIS/ODIN and continue to enhance our processes to stay ahead of emerging threats.” It noted that it has modernized and hardened its hardware and “enhanced [its] monitoring capabilities” for cyber vulnerabilities.

Air Force Plans to End All Telework Within Days, but Hurdles Remain

Air Force Plans to End All Telework Within Days, but Hurdles Remain

The Department of the Air Force laid out plans in a new memo to send thousands of civilians and service members back to full-time in-person work by the end of the week, following a directive from President Donald Trump.

Issued Feb. 1, the memo directs all commanders or directors of major commands, field operating activities, direct reporting units, and field commands to cancel telework and remote work agreements and direct employees within 50 miles of their official worksite to report in-person no later than Feb. 7.

However, a string of policy exceptions, facility limitations, and collective bargaining agreements with civilian employees could make fully implementing the memo a long and idiosyncratic process.

First off, the Air Force has to get a handle on how big its remote workforce is. The memo directs commands to find out the number of civilians, Airmen, and Guardians “on remote agreements or arrangements,” and what would be the most appropriate in-person worksite to assign them.

The call for more information does not seem to distinguish between telework, where employees work in-person part of the time, and remote work, where employees never come into the office. Headquarters Air Force set a tight deadline of Feb. 3 for commands to submit the information, just two days after the memo came out.

The public affairs office for the Secretary of the Air Force did not immediately respond when asked if any telework statistics were available. But according to a 2024 report by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, about 74,000 of 155,000 civilian employees who worked for the Air Force in fiscal year 2023, teleworked, or roughly 48 percent—though the report acknowledged some employees may have been counted twice.

Commands also have to form a plan to overcome risks or resource constraints to bringing workers back, such as not enough suitable office space. The memo directs commands to “consider use of alternative options to maximize facility space, such as alternative work schedules, additional workstations in existing facilities, or other alternate duty locations.”

Some commands may have to seek exemptions based on office space, mission impact, or other compelling needs. The memo said further guidance will be forthcoming regarding how to submit exemption requests. The exemptions will require approval by the Secretary of Defense, which could also constitute a large bureaucratic hurdle considering the other sweeping changes and efforts new Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is pursuing early in his tenure.

The Air Force scrambled to embrace telework and remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the aftermath, some leaders suggested the service would continue to use the arrangements—albeit reduced from pandemic highs—to attract or retain talent and save on infrastructure costs.

In 2021, the Department of the Air Force updated its regulations on telework and remote work, giving squadron commanders the authority to approve such arrangements while providing examples of work that could be eligible. The Feb. 1 memo rescinded that instruction until an updated one can be worked out.

Another challenge could be renegotiating contracts with unionized civilians—Trump has clashed with government labor unions early in his term, seeking to declare telework provisions in union contracts invalid, cancel contracts negotiated at the end of the Biden administration, and offer buyouts to more than 2 million government workers despite union criticism.

For its part, the Air Force memo directs commands to review collective bargaining agreements “in preparation to take necessary steps to bring these CBAs into compliance with the [presidential memo].” The memo also directs commands to “initiate return to work bargaining.”

Tens of thousands of Air Force civilians are covered by union contracts. Council 214 of the American Federation of Government Employees, for example, is a bargaining unit of about 35,000 employees in both white and blue collar roles working at Air Force Materiel Command locations across the country. 

AFMC was one of the leading proponents of telework during the pandemic and immediately afterwards, as the office work of acquisition translated well.

“Post pandemic it was demonstrated that employees could be highly effective performing their work via telework,” wrote the 2024 OPM report about telework across the service. “Leadership recognized the potential benefits of leveraging the temporarily increased telework posture into a more permanent posture, leading to new policy guidance being developed.”

That started to change in 2022 at AFMC when commander Gen. Duke Z. Richardson encouraged supervisors “to revisit the telework posture and determine the optimal blend for individuals, teams, centers, and the headquarters.”

The general expectation was for service members and civilians to spend most of their time in the office, but Richardson did not have an exact ratio for the entire command to pursue. Only 10 percent of civilian federal workers are in fully remote positions, according to the American Federation of Government Employees. 

Air Force Equal Opportunity Programs Not Included in DEI Purge

Air Force Equal Opportunity Programs Not Included in DEI Purge

The Air Force is not shutting down its equal opportunity programs, it said in a new memo, distinguishing them from the department’s sweeping review of diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts. 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Gwendolyn Defilippi wrote that she was issuing the Jan. 30 memo as “a matter of clarity.”  

In the past two weeks, President Donald Trump has issued a series of executive orders aimed at ending all DEI-related positions, programs, and training across the Pentagon. The Air Force is in the process of enacting them by revising curriculum, disbanding working groups, and placing some personnel on leave.

Early in the process, however, it was unclear what the service would do with its Equal Employment Opportunity and Military Equal Opportunity programs, which implement laws and investigate complaints regarding unlawful discrimination and harassment, often having to do with race and gender.  

While equal opportunity programs focus on individual cases of discrimination, DEI programs sometimes sought to identify systemic discrimination while fostering diversity. 

In the Jan. 30 memo, Defilippi noted that the EEO and MEO programs are based on federal laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination in the workplace and thus are cleared to continue. 

“Examples of EEO and MEO programs and initiatives that are still permitted and encouraged include training on equal employment opportunity laws and regulations, investigations into allegations of discrimination or harassment, and reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities,” she wrote. 

The move seemingly placates concerns of some observers like retired Col. Don Christensen, a former chief prosecutor for the Air Force who previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine that “we know that discrimination exists, we know harassment exists … and if we take our eye off of that, then we run the risk that it’s going to run rampant and there’ll be basically no one to look at it.” 

Defilippi did seem to note the overlap that can sometimes occur between equal opportunity and DEI as she directed the EEO and MEO programs to stop using any language, graphics, or images that promote “any diversity and inclusion training, affinity groups, or targeted recruitment efforts that prioritize diversity over merit-based hiring.” 

As examples, Defilippi included attachments showing equal opportunity logos that are no longer permitted because they reference “diversity” and “inclusion.” 

No longer permitted Equal Opportunity program logos. Image from Air Force memo

In addition to the Air Force memo, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth also issued guidance Jan. 31 announcing the Pentagon will no longer observe “cultural awareness months” meant to highlight the history and contributions of different minority groups. 

“Our unity and purpose are instrumental to meeting the Department’s warfighting mission,” Hegseth wrote. “Efforts to divide the force—to put one group ahead of another—erode camaraderie and threaten mission execution.” 

Air Force units, along with the rest of the military, cannot use official resources to put on events related to cultural awareness months such as: 

  • National African American/Black History Month 
  • Women’s History Month 
  • Asian American and Pacific Islander Heritage Month 
  • Pride Month 
  • National Hispanic Heritage Month 
  • National Disability Employment Awareness Month 
  • National American Indian Heritage Month 
Not 10 Feet Tall: Experts Say China’s Military Faces Major Issues

Not 10 Feet Tall: Experts Say China’s Military Faces Major Issues

While U.S. defense officials have spent much of the past decade warning that China is the nation’s pacing threat and its People’s Liberation Army represents an urgent threat in the Indo-Pacific, several defense researchers are skeptical that the PLA has the human capital, the structural ability, or the political appetite to fight and defeat the U.S. military in a conventional conflict.

Instead, two new reports from the federally funded RAND Corporation describe a PLA incapable of delegating authority to leaders who can adapt to complex, uncertain situations.

Part of the problem is how the Chinese public perceives the PLA. In their Jan. 30 report “Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military,” senior international defense researcher Mark Cozad and senior economist Jennie W. Wenger wrote that the PLA “has struggled to attract top-tier talent, particularly from China’s best universities.”

Another part of the problem is structure. In his Jan. 27 paper, “The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness,” senior defense researcher Timothy R. Heath argued that the PLA’s primary purpose is not to fight a war, but instead to keep the Chinese Communist Party in power, resulting in a military that prioritizes loyalty over merit.

“The core of the PLA’s system of political controls includes political commissars, party committees, and the political organization system,” Heath wrote. “These controls are designed to ensure the military’s subordination to CCP authority, and all come at the cost of reduced potential combat effectiveness.”

People Power?

Like many other countries around the world, China’s population is rapidly aging and its economy has declined from the explosive growth of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, wrote Cozad and Wenger. 

Still, China’s overall population, both young and old, is predicted to be 3.95 times bigger than the U.S. population by 2030. Chinese children suffer obesity and asthma at lower rates than American children; and the vast majority of young Chinese people have enough education to complete military training. 

Despite those advantages, it is unclear the PLA can attract the kind of workforce it needs to adopt the “Western or quasi-Western operational model” to which it has aspired since the 1990s, Cozad and Wenger argued.

“The PLA’s efforts to develop an informatized, joint force capable of executing systems warfare will require officers and noncommissioned officers capable of making decisions in uncertain situations and willing to exercise innovation and creativity in highly complex operational environments,” they explained.

Achieving that has proven difficult for the PLA. While recruitment efforts focus on young college graduates with science and engineering backgrounds, recent clarifications of the military’s conscription regulations “strongly suggest a host of problems with the PLA’s recruitment efforts, including corruption, forced conscription, evading conscription, and refusing to serve once recruited,” researchers wrote.

Life in the PLA is widely perceived as harsh, particularly for new recruits, and having few economic and social benefits. Many of its remote base locations are unattractive. Like the U.S. military, the PLA is investing in higher living standards, post-service employment, student loan repayment, and other incentives to try to draw recruits. Also like the U.S. military, the PLA is emphasizing psychological resilience and physical fitness to help recruits adjust to military life.

Unlike in the U.S. military, these changes “represent a radical change from an extremely harsh, authoritarian environment with rudimentary, spartan conditions for recruits,” researchers wrote. But even if these carrots help improve recruitment, it remains unclear if a capable, information-age force can thrive in an authoritarian state, they said.

The PLA’s goal “is a model that is suited to the general cultural, political, and social attributes of Western societies (which tend to be individualistic, democratic, and less hierarchical), not to the authoritarianism that is deeply rooted in China’s society,” Cozad and Wenger wrote. “Thus, China’s economic and social environment will likely limit the PLA’s ability to get the ‘right’ people in its ranks.”

Party On

Heath raised similar questions in his paper. Despite vast modernization plans and growing numbers of warships and combat aircraft, the PLA’s main purpose remains upholding CCP rule rather than fighting wars, he argued. Such militaries prioritize political reliability over the capacity to fight foreign adversaries.

“Coup-proofing measures, such as promotions according to loyalty instead of merit, the fragmentation of command structures, and highly centralized command and control networks, reduce the military’s effectiveness on the battlefield,” Heath wrote.

The PLA has not fought a war since 1979, but its exercises so far are underwhelming; Chinese media “is replete with withering criticisms of the military’s inability to execute integrated joint operations and its lack of combat readiness,” Heath wrote. 

Political commissars—military officers who specialize in politics and ideology—share coequal authority with commanders, which impairs decision-making, especially since anecdotal Chinese media reports show commissars lack basic military knowledge and are often not physically fit for frontline duty. 

Commander authority is further diluted by party committees, whose approval has been sought by commanders before surfacing a submarine or rescuing stranded fishermen, Heath wrote. 

“The necessity of seeking party committee approval for most decisions and the imperative of strictly implementing all higher-level CCP policies and directives raises questions as to how rapidly and timely decision-making can be during combat,” he said. “This system of approvals and top-down control also provides little incentive for commanders to act with initiative.”

Politics is also a significant factor in recruiting, where candidates are screened for their compliance with party values and directives. Corruption touches everything from defective weaponry to false training records and seems to be tolerated as the price of political loyalty. 

“The perpetually half-hearted and incomplete nature of structural reforms designed to improve combat readiness suggests that this goal remains a secondary priority at best,” Heath wrote.

Political Appetite

But even if the PLA were a more fearsome, battle-tested force, Heath sees no evidence that Chinese leaders want to risk a conventional fight against the U.S. over Taiwan. Amid a declining economy, senior leaders “scarcely ever” list Taiwan as one of the top threats to CCP rule in their speeches, focusing instead on corruption, unemployment, crime, and subversion.

Xi’s language about unification with Taiwan is “relatively formulaic” and consistent with his predecessors, and CCP officials have done little to rouse public support the way leaders typically do before a conventional conflict, he said. The PLA also seems uninterested in such an option.

“No study on how China’s military could defeat U.S. forces has surfaced in any academy affiliated with the Chinese military,” Heath said. “China’s military has not even published a study on how it might occupy and control Taiwan.”

There is likely a classified plan to fight the U.S. military, but the lack of any unclassified supporting research raises doubts over how robust that plan might be, Heath said. The researcher made similar points at a June 13 hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“There is ample evidence that China’s military is enhancing its preparedness, but little evidence that the national leadership intends to fight a war anytime soon,” he said at the time. Military preparedness is the routine modernization all militaries pursue, while national war preparation involves mobilizing an entire economy for war, he said.

Instead, Beijing seems to prefer using its “ample economic, policial, and military means” relative to Taiwan to deter Taiwanese independence while waiting for a better time to resolve the island’s status.

Tensions could still worsen and lead to war, Heath warned, but if China’s economy continues to decline, the PLA will further prioritize regime survival. Governments around the world, including that of China and the U.S., are struggling to preserve their legitimacy, which means U.S. defense officials “should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats alongside the remote possibility of conventional war with China,” he added.

Air Force Wargames for a Summer of Major Exercises

Air Force Wargames for a Summer of Major Exercises

Air Force wargamers gathered in Alabama earlier this month to help leaders prepare for a sweeping series of exercises this summer that will be among the biggest in recent service history.

More than 60 participants took part in the Jan. 14-17 tabletop exercise at Maxwell Air Force Base, according to an Air Force release, including members of the Air Force Wargaming Institute, exercise planners, and senior leaders. The goal was to work through the decisions and challenges officials are likely to face in a few months when they start the so-called “Department Level Exercise series.” 

“We conducted a risk analysis for the leadership to help show them where some of the blind spots may be, and also worked through some possible risk mitigation,” said Ronald Betts of the Wargaming Institute. 

At the heart of the exercise series is Resolute Force Pacific, a major Pacific Air Forces-led exercise that will include nearly 300 aircraft spread across 25 locations. Officials want to integrate REFORPAC with other exercises, such as the multinational Talisman Sabre, Air Mobility Command’s Mobility Guardian, and the Air Force Warfare Center’s Bamboo Eagle.

Thousands of Airmen, hundreds of aircraft, and tons of equipment will need to move into and across the Pacific. Planning has been going on for months to include a conference in early October at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., cosponsored by the Air Force and U.S. Transportation Command. PACAF commander Gen. Kevin B. Schneider previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine that another planning conference wrapped up at the end of November, with planners going to “incredible levels of detail.” 

The wargaming conference helped stress-test planners’ efforts by examining command and control, operations, movement, maneuver, and sustainment elements, and considering potential issues. 

“It was more of a discussion of ‘If this occurs, what do we do next, and who has the authorities,’” Betts said. 

More tabletop exercises are planned for later this spring, he added, and a final planning exercise is set for late March and early April at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 

The size of REFORPAC and the other planned exercises in the series may depend on whether Congress passes a fresh 2025 budget in time—an element that has also come up in planning. 

“Through the course of our planning, we have options,” Schneider said in December. “So we take a look at, obviously, what we would like to do at the high end, if we get all the funding that we are asking for, through all of this to a lower end of the funding, we’ll still be able to make this happen at a pretty large size and scale. It’s kind of a TBD in terms of how the funding will flow through all of this. But I have optimism, because I think it has been well articulated, the why we’re going to do REFORPAC.”