Space Force Awards Up to $13.7 Billion in Launch Contracts

April 5, 2025 | By Greg Hadley

The Space Force awarded three contracts April 4 for rocket launches worth up to $13.68 billion combined—and this time, Blue Origin is in the mix for the business along with longtime incumbents SpaceX and United Launch Alliance.

The National Security Space Launch contracts include 54 critical missions for the military and intelligence community between 2027 and 2032. Under the contracts:

SpaceX wins 28 missions for up to $5.9 billion

ULA wins 19 missions for up to $5.4 billion

Blue Origin wins 7 missions for up to $2.4 billion

The disparity reflects each company’s progress and stature in the launch market at this point: SpaceX is the dominant provider, accounting for the vast majority of U.S. launches in recent years, while ULA, long a leading provider, only recently won certification for its new Vulcan Centaur rocket to provide NSSL launches. Newcomer Blue Origin has so far only executed one launch of its New Glenn rocket, which is not yet certified.

For Blue Origin, winning any launches is a major win. Founded even before SpaceX, being included is a landmark, but Blue Origin must get New Glenn certified before it can actually execute those launches.

Blue Origin’s New Glenn launch vehicle prepared for testing in February 2024. (Blue Origin photo)

Space Force leaders see the contracts as a major milestone approaching their vision to ensure more competition in the launch market and to avoid becoming overly reliant on a single vendor or vehicle. Until ULA’s Vulcan Centaur was certified last week, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets were the only active launch vehicles cleared for NSSL missions.

“A robust and resilient space launch architecture is the foundation of both our economic prosperity and our national security,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman said in a statement. “National Security Space Launch isn’t just a program; it’s a strategic necessity that delivers the critical space capabilities our warfighters depend on to fight and win.”

To encourage competition, the Space Force took a “dual lane” approach for this most recent round of NSSL launches, dubbed Phase 3. In Lane 1 are missions that can tolerate more risk, allowing less proven launch companies to compete for them. In Lane 2 are the most critical, the ones awarded April 5.

Blue Origin, ULA, and SpaceX are all in Lane 1, but they have more competition in the form of newly approved companies Rocket Lab and Stoke Space, both of which have yet to actually launch their rockets for the program.

Lane 2 remains the bigger and more valuable prize for contractors—in addition to having more companies competing, Lane 1 has approximately 30 missions worth up to $5.6 billion.

A United Launch Alliance Vulcan Centaur rocket lifts off at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Fla., in October, marking the second certification mission required for certification by the Space Force. (U.S. Space Force photo by Airman 1st Class Collin Wesson)

The government’s launch appetite continues to grow. NSSL phase 2 contracts from 2020 to 2024 encompassed about 34 launches, but as the Space Force and National Reconnaissance Office increase their satellite systems on orbit, the rate of launches and the number of satellites per launch will continue to multiply.

USAF F-35 Squadrons at Lakenheath Near Full Readiness

April 5, 2025 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

The U.S. Air Force is poised to fill out its full complement of F-35 fighters and reach full operational capability with two squadrons at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom this year, according to the head of the U.S. European Command.

“USEUCOM established one F-35 squadron at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, which is now fully operational,” Army Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, commander of EUCOM wrote in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 3. “A second squadron of F-35s will be complete this summer and will achieve full operational capability this fall.”

The 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath has four squadrons, two with F-15E Strike Eagles, and two with F-35s: the 495th Fighter Squadron, known as the “Valkyries,” and the 493rd Fighter Squadron, nicknamed the “Grim Reapers.”

The 495th reactivated in October 2021, becoming the first U.S. Air Force squadron to operate the F-35A overseas, with its first stealth fighters arriving in December of that year. In total, the two squadrons are expected to have a combined 52 F-35s, Gen. James B. Hecker, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, previously told Air & Space Forces Magazine. EUCOM did not immediately respond to how many F-35s are currently at Lakenheath.

The stealth fighters’ presence in Europe gives USAF fifth-generation airpower in close proximity to the threat of Russia. Just last year, several F-35s from Lakenheath deployed to Poland.

F-35s defense spending bill — U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II aircraft assigned to the 495th Fighter Squadron from Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, sit static after landing for Tactical Leadership Programme 22-3 at Los Llanos Air Base, Spain, Sept. 15, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Charles Welty

Cavoli’s comments about the F-35 reaching full operational capability come amid growing speculation that Lakenheath may house nuclear weapons to equip them.

The F-35s are currently the only fifth-generation fighters certified to carry nuclear weapons, the B61-12 gravity bomb, with a blast yield of about 50 kilotons. The certification is exclusive to the Air Force’s A models. For now, only select units are known to have the capability to carry the weapon, but all USAF F-35As are expected to eventually be equipped with the necessary wiring and software to deploy the B61-12.

Last year, British media reported that U.S. government contracting notices referenced the need for “imminent surety support” at Lakenheath, with “surety” being the Pentagon’s term for securing nuclear weapons. Following widespread attention, the website revised its description to remove the term.

In February, the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists published a report compiling open-source information suggesting the Air Force may be planning to reintroduce nuclear weapons to a U.K. base. The think tank had previously raised this possibility in 2023, citing the Air Force’s 2024 budget request, which mentioned the construction of a “surety dormitory” at the base.

The organization noted that its findings is that the service “intended primarily as a backup rather than to deploy weapons now.” There has been no official confirmation regarding a nuclear mission at the base.

As part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, Washington is estimated to vault around 100 B-61 bombs across six air bases in five nations: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

Lakenheath has previously been associated with nuclear missions; during the Cold War, in response to the Soviet Union, the U.S. deployed nuclear-capable B-29 bombers to bases across the U.K., including Lakenheath. The base also housed B-47 bombers in the 1950s. In 1954, the first American nuclear weapons in Europe were deployed to the base along with other military sites in the U.K. In 2008, the U.S. withdrew its final nuclear weapons from the base as part of a post-Cold War drawdown.

NSA Director, an Air Force General, Fired with No Cause Stated

April 4, 2025 | By John A. Tirpak

The Pentagon abruptly relieved Air Force Gen. Timothy D. Haugh, head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, and his NSA civilian deputy, Wendy Noble, on April 3.

“The Defense Department thanks Gen. Timothy Haugh for his decades of service to our nation, culminating as U.S. Cyber Command Commander and National Security Agency Director,” Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell said in a brief statement. “We wish him and his family well.”

Parnell offered no reason for the firings.

In addition to leading NSA and CYBERCOM, Haugh served as chief of the Central Security Service at Fort Meade, Md. He had led the organizations since February 2024.

A Pentagon official reported that said Noble would be “reassigned.”

Haugh’s Air Force career spanned more than 30 years, almost exclusively in the intelligence and cyber operations field. He had served as head of intelligence for Air Force Special Operations forces, head of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at U.S. Central Command’s Air Operations Center, commanded the 480th ISR wing, commanded 16th Air Force—which oversee USAF efforts in cyber warfare—and was the deputy commander at CYBERCOM before his previous assignment.

Haugh helped lead cybersecurity operations against Russia for the last four years, and in 2018 ran Cyber Command’s joint effort with the NSA to thwart Russia’s attempted interference in the 2018 midterm elections.

Haugh is the latest in a series of high-ranking military officers to be fired—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti, and Air Force Vice Chief Gen. James C. “Jim” Slife were all relieved in February, as were The Judge Advocates General for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

More recently, the National Security Council has also reportedly had four high-level firings, including intelligence director Brian Walsh; senior director of technology and national security David Feith; senior director for international organizations Maggie Dougherty; and senior director for legislative affairs Thomas Boodry.

Multiple news outlets said the firings were recommended by conservative media personality and advisor to President Trump, Laura Loomer, who has courted controversy and promoted conspiracy theories.

Loomer seemed to confirm the report in posts to social media on April 4, saying Haugh and Noble “have been disloyal to President Trump. That is why they have been fired.” She thanked Trump for “being receptive to the vetting materials provided to you,” and for “firing these Biden holdovers.”

Asked by reporters on Air Force One if Loomer had made the recommendations, Trump replied that “sometimes I listen to those recommendations, like I do with everybody.” He called Loomer “usually very constructive. She recommended certain people for jobs.” He also called her “a very good patriot and a very strong person.”

Democratic lawmakers across Congress roundly condemned the move.

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a statement criticizing the firings as “a priceless gift to China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, by purging competence from our national security leadership.” In particular, he said he was “angered” that Trump “dismissed one of the most skilled, accomplished officers in the U.S. military. As the commander of Cyber Command, General Haugh led the most formidable cyber warfighting force in the world and kept our enemies up at night.”

Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee, said in a statement that he has known Gen. Haugh “to be an honest and forthright leader who followed the law and put national security first. I fear those are precisely the qualities that could lead to his firing in this administration.”

Meanwhile, Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb.), a retired Air Force brigadier general who represents Offutt Air Force Base, also critiqued the firings, writing on social media that Haugh “is an outstanding leader and was doing a superb job at Cyber Command and National Security Agency. He was fired with no public explanation. This action sets back our Cyber and Signals Intelligence operations.”

In March, Elon Musk, presidential advisor and then-chair of the Department of Government Efficiency comission, posted on X that “The NSA needs an overhaul,” and met with Haugh a week later.

Also in March, multiple media outlets reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered U.S. Cyber Command to halt its offensive cyber efforts against Russia. The Pentagon later disputed those reports.

In a March 3 statement, Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the new Trump administration “is rapidly changing all foreign policy configurations,” and that “this largely aligns with our vision.”

Air Force Changes Rules for Pregnant Aircrew—Again

April 3, 2025 | By Greg Hadley

The Air Force is changing its policy for pregnant aircrew, generally reverting to rules set in 2019 that barred female aviators from flying during the first trimester—or from flying in aircraft with ejection seats at all—due to potential risks to the pilot and her unborn fetus.

The changes come in response to commanders and medical experts concerned about “accepting unknown risk as well as potential damage or loss of multi-million-dollar aircraft if something unexpected where to tragically occur,” a spokesperson for Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

But advocates in favor of a more lenient policy put in place in 2022 charge that the revision is based not on data but on personal feelings toward pregnancy.

Changing Policy Objectives

In 2019, the Air Force eased its policies for some pregnant aircrew, but retained restrictions for most aviators once they had a confirmed positive pregnancy test. At that point, pregnant fliers were grounded until 12 weeks, and fighter and bomber pilots remained grounded for the entire pregnancy because of concerns about the potential impact of G-forces and ejection seats on pregnant women and the unborn.

Aviators in non-ejection seat aircraft with a “normal” pregnancy could be cleared to fly with approval from local commanders, flight surgeons, and obstetrics providers up to 28 weeks, at which point all pregnant aircrew were grounded for the duration of the pregnancy.

In 2022, however, the Biden administration changed the policy again, allowing pregnant aviators to seek a waiver to fly any aircraft during any trimester, and allowing non-ejection seat aircrew to fly with just base-level clearance from 12 to 28 weeks. At no point were pregnant aircrew members ever required to fly.

Now the Air Force is revising the rules again, reinstating the first trimester and aircraft restrictions barring all pregnant aircrew from flight until 12 weeks, and barring pregnant aviators from flying “high performance aircraft or aircraft with ejection seats at any time,” according to an Air Force release. Officials cited the increased risk of miscarriage during the first trimester and the lack of “definitive medical research on G-force impact” as reasons for reverting to earlier policy.

But the new policy also increases the window when aircrew can fly, from 12-28 weeks under the 2022 policy to 12-32 weeks under the new rules. The waiver authority for allowing those members to fly during that period is now at the major command level, however, ensuring a more consistent approach across an entire community. An Air Force spokesperson said this will result in better decisions because major commands will see more cases “in the aggregate.”

What Does the Data Say?

Around 20 percent of pregnancies end in miscarriage—the numbers are lower for women in their 20s—and about 80 percent of miscarriages happen in the first trimester, according to medical data.

A briefing prepared by the Air Force Medical Service produced after the 2019 policy was implemented but before the 2022 change, said it is “unknown if aviation will increase risk of first trimester miscarriage but should be assumed that they will occur at least as frequent as in ground setting.”

Factors like acceleration, strong vibrations, and high Gs encountered in flight or in case of ejection from a high-performance aircraft were all cited as potential risk factors for pregnancy loss in the briefing. But the briefing also noted a lack of medical studies directly measuring the impacts of vibration and acceleration on pregnancy loss. Indeed, civilian researchers have noted that pregnant women are often excluded from most medical studies, leading to a lack of data on pregnancy.

That lack of detailed data is impacting Air Force decisions, advocates for female fliers say. The policy “is being pulled back, not because of science, not because it’s a data-driven decision,” said Lt. Col. Sharon Arana, a former member of Air Combat Command’s now-disbanded Sword Athena team. “It’s being pulled back out of fear.”

Air Force officials could not immediately say if the service has tracked data on the impacts of the 2022 policy on pregnancy outcomes, and the Air Force Surgeon General’s office did not reply to a query. The service release did cite “medical data indicating that there is no significant risk increase between weeks 28-32″ as the reason it expanded that window.

The CSAF’s spokesperson also could not say if an aircrew member’s pregnancy has ever contributed to a mishap resulting in damage or loss of an aircraft. Though cited by the Air Force as a concern among commanders, no recent Accident Investigation Board results released by the Air Force have cited an aviator’s pregnancy. Not all such reports are made public, however. Advocates likewise said they have heard of no such instances.

Advocates argue that, in the absence of clear medical evidence, medical providers are defaulting to over-caution. “The medical community, in my experience, in the Air Force, tends to be very, very risk-averse,” said a former volunteer with the Women’s Initiatives Team, which pushed for the 2022 policy revisions. “So would they ever want to put themselves in a situation where they have cleared somebody to fly and then something bad happens? … Even if that’s not a conscious bias, it’s definitely an unconscious one.”

The former volunteer said she saw that happen in 2022 when presenting their arguments to commanders. “It was, ‘Well, I wouldn’t want my wife to fly pregnant,’ or ‘Well, I wouldn’t be comfortable with my sister or my daughter [flying],'” she recalled. “It was very much personal beliefs and opinions versus, ‘Hey, the data shows this is unsafe for you and your fetus, therefore I’m not comfortable assuming the risk.’”

The Federal Aviation Administration states that for civilian pilots, “pregnancy under normal circumstances is not disqualifying” from any flying.

Air Force officials noted, however, that the new policy is in line with the other military services.

Readiness Concerns

Arguments on both sides of the issue also turn to military readiness. The CSAF’s spokesperson cited “insignificant impacts to readiness” stemming from the 2022 policy change, which did not result in a “significant jump in the number of waivers” helping fill cockpits, he said.

Advocates acknowledge that, among thousands of aviator positions across the Air Force, only a small number of female aircrew experiencing a normal pregnancy want to keep flying combat aircraft or fly at all in the first trimester. Therefore, they reason, the impact on overall Air Force readiness is low. But they also say more flexibility to fly can be crucial to keep an aviator qualified and proficient—key factors in advancing their military careers.

“Ask those female aviators if the effect is minimal to them and their career advancement,” said Arana.

While data is hard to come by, anecdotal evidence is that time away from flying hurts officers’ competitiveness for promotion. That contributes to the frustration among female aviators who pushed for the 2022 policy changes.

“I’ve heard aviators say, it’s very insulting to a woman to assume that she can’t make decisions for herself and for her fetus that are reasonable, and just assuming that she’s going to try to do something reckless. … All of that just further makes female aviators feel like they are not a value-added part of the team. It makes them feel like they are not seen on the same level playing field as their male counterparts.”

The Air Force, for its part, says that pregnant aircrew can maintain their currencies through “simulator training, academic instruction, leadership positions and many other training opportunities and duties.”

Space Force Focused on the Ground for Anti-Satellite Weapons

April 3, 2025 | By Shaun Waterman

As it develops new weapons to attack satellites, the U.S. Space Force is focused more on ground-based efforts where the technology is more mature, the service’s top general said April 3.

“Our initial energy—and some of this is because of the technology readiness level in our industry—is mostly ground-based, looking up to space,” Gen. B. Chance Saltzman told the bipartisan U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an advisory panel chartered by Congress.

“As you start to move to orbit, the technological threshold is a little higher, and so we’ve not put our dollars there initially. And so we are more interested right now in ground-based capabilities,” he added.

China, on the other hand, is “investing heavily” in both ground and space-based weapons, Saltzman warned.

The three kinds of non-cyber weapons—kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, and radio frequency jammers—“can be on orbit, or can be on the ground, pointed up. The [People’s Republic of China] is investing heavily in all six categories,” he said.

China’s investments in anti-satellite weapons, sometimes called counter-space capabilities, and other technologies like quantum satellites, “represent an inflection point in space access that may result in China overtaking U.S. leadership” in the domain, he warned.

At the same time, China’s progress in space means that it is becoming more dependent on space-based capabilities, and therefore more worried about aggressive kinetic testing, like the Russians’ use of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2021, Saltzman added. That may reach a point where it causes friction between the two nations.

“The PRC has developed such a need for space capabilities that the idea of irresponsible behavior by anybody else is starting to affect the way they see the space domain as well,” Saltzman said. “It used to be that only the U.S. really took full advantage of space, and others didn’t need it as much, so it became a vulnerability.

“Now I think the PRC, for example, certainly needs to use space capabilities to achieve what they want to accomplish. … They did not like the 2021 destructive ASAT test by the Russians either. This is irresponsible behavior, and I think they see that it could potentially jeopardize the way they want to use space.”

Nonetheless, Saltzman added, there is still potential for the two U.S. adversaries to cooperate. “My job is to think about the worst-case scenario, and that’s where they collude to work against our national interests,” he said.

Meanwhile, the Space Force is fighting with one hand tied behind its back, constrained by policies based on outdated ideas about space, bemoaned Saltzman.

“We continue to struggle with overly restrictive space policy and outdated ways of thinking, dating back to when space was a benign environment,” he said in his written testimony, “Much of our guidance and direction continues to frame space as a strategic resource rather than a warfighting domain.”

Moreover, “We restrain ourselves from doing what is needful to avoid creating improper perceptions of ‘weaponizing space.’ In reality, space has been weaponized for at least two decades, and our slowness to absorb that reality has held back our progress.”

Asked to elaborate during the hearing, he said Space Force commanders “still have to go to very high levels of approval to do some of the basic things that you would think are just normal operations, testing, tactics, development, training.” He added that Guardians often had to train “in simulation, not in actual live practice … because of policies are in place.”

He said he believed that when policy issues get the high-level attention they need, leadership generally comes out with the right answer, but it takes work to get there

“I wouldn’t characterize this as … we chose the wrong policy,” he said. “I characterize it as, to some degree, space has been literally out of sight, out of mind, and so it just hasn’t risen to [a high enough] level.”

Whenever the Space Force tries to get a policy changed “whether it’s testing capabilities or or putting resources to a particular kind of capability, when those rise to the right level, generally, we can get people to acknowledge, yeah, this is probably a good idea. It’s just still a low priority in terms of the policy regime to even take a look at. And so I just feel like we’re lagging in the importance of establishing declaratory policy, and establishing the kind of policies we need to move fast.”

On the other hand he acknowledged that space is seen very differently than it was a decade ago, a change in the national conversation prompted, to some degree, by the Space Force’s establishment.

“I’m not afraid to say offensive capabilities. … I’m not afraid to say disrupt, deny, degrade,” enemy satellites, he said. But he acknowledged that “10 years ago, I would have been in serious trouble with my bosses, with Congress, with the media.”

Asked whether China was pulling ahead of the U.S. in terms of its space capabilities, Saltzman said the picture was more complicated than implied by the analogy of a “space race.”

“A race implies a very simple set of rules that everybody understands, and somebody’s ahead and somebody’s behind, and you cross the finish line and you can determine who the winner is,” he said. “It’s far more nuanced than that. And so to say one person’s ahead or their learning curve is faster, [is] to some degree, overly simplistic, but I understand why the question is asked.”

First Mission-Ready Skyraider II Arrives at Air Force Special Operations Command

April 3, 2025 | By David Roza

Air Force Special Operations Command marked a new chapter with its latest aircraft April 3 when the first Skyraider II fully modified for military use arrived at Hurlburt Field, Fla.

A modified crop duster, the OA-1K will provide airborne eyes, ears, and precision fires to support ground troops in permissive airspace, just as its namesake, the A-1 Skyraider, did in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. Michael Conley said at the welcoming ceremony that the aircraft’s small maintenance footprint and ease of swapping out sensors, weapons, and communications equipment will play a key role in future conflicts.

“Skyraider II represents not just a new platform, but a modular solution to our national security needs,” he said, according to a press release. “It will redefine how we approach joint campaigning, crisis response and the evolving landscape of modern warfare.”

Produced by Air Tractor and modified by L3Harris, the Skyraider II replaces the U-28A Draco, a small intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft that also operated in austere conditions. Officials have spoken of Skyraider II’s ability to “collapse the stack” of up to 20 ISR and armed defense aircraft that are sometimes called in to support special operations missions against violent extremist organizations.

“This aircraft embodies the very essence of our command: it’s agile, it’s adaptable, and it’s always ready to deliver lethality,” Conley said.

The first production aircraft was supposed to be delivered in October 2023. Delays pushed it back so that the first operational aircraft arrived April 3, though an experimental version made a brief appearance at Hurlburt in January, when AFSOC officially dubbed it the Skyraider II.

In the coming months, more Skyraider IIs will converge at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base, Okla., as the aircraft’s formal training unit stands up there. Pilots have already been familiarizing themselves with a pair of standard issue Air Tractor AT-802Us, but those aircraft lack the modifications L3Harris is installing on the operational planes.

Demand for special operations aviators has surged since 2019, in some cases exceeding peak levels seen during the Global War on Terror, Conley told the House Armed Services’ Intelligence and Special Operations subcommittee at a hearing in February.

Despite the high demand, U.S. Special Operations Command scaled back its planned buy of OA-1K aircraft from 75 copies down to 62 last March, a 17 percent drop “due to resource constraints,” the command said at the time.

About three months earlier, the Government Accountability Office published a report skeptical about the 75-fleet buy, but a SOCOM official said at the time that the report did not cause the command to trim its desired fleet size.

Attending the ceremony at Hurlburt was retired Lt. Col. Bill Buice, a former A-1 Skyraider pilot who flew in Vietnam, and Phillip Edward Jennings, who rescued him after he was shot down.

“The ingenuity, courage, and discipline of not only you, but your fellow Skyraider pilots, demonstrated why these missions are so critical to our partners on the ground,” said Conley. “It is today’s Air Commandos who are now tasked to carry on that mission.”

Let’s Put the ‘Tech’ into Military Technology Policy

April 3, 2025 | By Victoria Coleman and H.S. Philip Wong

Power projection is more than projecting military might—a nation’s economic power is the foundation of its capacity to project national power. And technological development is an important component of that power. In citing its reasoning behind the 1987 Nobel Prize for Economics, given to Robert Solow, the committee wrote: “Technological development will be the motor for economic growth in the long run.”

It, therefore, behooves us to seriously consider how nations should promote technological development. The basic tenet of the U.S. approach has long been for the federal government to fund basic research and let the commercial sector compete to develop technologies that benefit society, create jobs, and fuel economic growth. But is it really this simple?

In the days after World War II, when the U.S. had undisputed economic power and a massive lead in technology, monopolistic corporations with large research laboratories performed not only basic science research but also served as the north star that guided research toward commercialization. American industry’s giant lead in technology masked its underlying inefficiency in translating basic research into applied research. Corporations focused manufacturing on improving productivity rather than improving products to make them more competitive.

The world today is very different. Economic powerhouses bring competition to our shores: from China, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Europe. Some competitors are allies and partners, sharing American values; others have different world views. Regardless, these competitors are not waiting for basic research to trickle down into technology products. They are actively nurturing technology development and fueling advancements in both manufacturing and technology products. They are building new supply chains and deploying their increasingly highly educated workforces to perfect the manufacturing process.

Without the ability to manufacture, no amount of research and development can bring competitive products at scale to the marketplace.

Manufacturing advanced technology products, such as semiconductor chips and batteries, is not just about churning out the same thing repeatedly without change. Innovations in materials, processes, and design driven by lessons learned on the manufacturing floor enhance product engineering every bit as much as design and product R&D do.

America may continue to bring home Nobel Prizes, but increasingly, others are building and scaling the technologies enabled by our inventions. Bridging the “lab-to-fab” gap, as touted by the 2023 CHIPS Act, is essential but not nearly enough. We have seen first-mover advantages such as flat-panel displays and electric vehicles slip away from our hands. Sustained technology leadership requires excellence in manufacturing at every level, from components to systems. Manufacturing as a discipline itself merits dedicated R&D and policy. This is nowhere more apparent than in the semiconductor industry.

We’ve seen this story before. The CHIPS Act is only the most recent federal initiative in a long line of efforts to secure America’s lead in semiconductors. Earlier programs like VHSIC in the 1970s and Sematech in the 1980s aimed to solve the same problem. And for a while, they did. But when attention and investment faded, so did the gains, opening up the field to our competitors.

Technology policy must, therefore, be approached not as a one-time fix but as an ongoing commitment. This includes crafting good policies that go beyond nurturing inventions and actively encourage domestic scaling. If invention is 10 percent of the process of building value and competitive advantage through technology, scaling is 90 percent.

Initiatives like the Microelectronics Commons, which aims to accelerate the passage of semiconductor innovation from lab to fab by building and sharing domestic prototyping facilities, are essential for success, as are programs for training and retraining the domestic workforce required for scaling. Creating a favorable scaling environment through deliberate ecosystem building, including the judicious application of export and import controls, rewarding scaling with special purpose tax credits, and removing overburdensome regulations are also critical success enablers, as is measuring whether scaling is working—and adjusting as needed when global competitors change course.

This is especially challenging in the U.S., where the default instinct is to let the market decide. But the market doesn’t optimize for long-term strategic outcomes—it prioritizes short-term profits. In mature industries like autos or chip manufacturing, the focus is on efficiency and margin; in newer industries like tech design, the focus is on breakthrough innovation. Both are necessary, but the incentives diverge.

In the global competition for technology leadership, what often separates the winners from the losers is the government’s determination to use every available tool to create and nurture both the invention and scaling ecosystems. That is the strategic challenge ahead.

Victoria Coleman was Chief Scientist of the Air Force during the Biden administration and Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) during the first Trump administration. She is now CEO of Acubed and Head of Research & Technology for Airbus North America. H.S. Philip Wong is a professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University and a former vice president of corporate research at TSMC, the world’s largest semiconductor foundry.

Caine: US Has Lost Electronic Warfare Skills, Needs to Enhance Training, Ranges

April 2, 2025 | By John A. Tirpak

Over 20 years of wars in “permissive environments,” the electronic warfare skills of the U.S. military have atrophied, requiring a new emphasis on EW training and new investment in simulation and training ranges, the prospective Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told lawmakers.

Among nearly 300 written questions Lt. Gen. Dan Caine answered for the Senate Armed Services Committee ahead of his April 1 confirmation hearing, he touched on the state of the Pentagon’s EW enterprise, saying several American electronic capabilities writ large are not adequately protected from electronic attack, and simulation capabilities are poor and in need of substantial upgrade.

“Against the most advanced adversaries, the joint force would likely face challenges protecting itself from electromagnetic attack,” Caine said in the written testimony. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, when U.S. forces were not challenged by a peer, “the Joint Force has lost some muscle memory defending against electromagnetic attack,” Caine wrote. “Operations within this spectrum have changed significantly, while the most advanced adversaries have done their best to rapidly evolve.” He said that if he is confirmed, he’s committed to ensuring that the Pentagon “continues to invest in training and additional capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum.”

If confirmed, Caine would succeed Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., who used almost exactly the same “loss of muscle memory” comment in his July 2023 confirmation hearing to describe the state of U.S. military electromagnetic warfare capabilities.

In January 2021—when he was Chief of Staff of the Air Force—Brown pledged to refresh the EW and electromagnetic spectrum operations enterprise in the service, saying that the service had been “asleep at the wheel” in this area because of a lack of a peer competitor during the Global War on Terror.

Soon after, the Air Force stood up the its first ever spectrum warfare wing, the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing. Underneath it, the service has established the 850th Spectrum Warfare Group and the 388th and 563rd Electronic Warfare Squadrons The various units assess Air Force spectrum warfare capabilities and develop tactics and techniques for combat in the EMS domain.

As to EW ranges, their “current state … is inadequate,” Caine said.

“Despite some investments, these ranges have not kept pace with current technology or the threat environments in which we expect to fight,” Caine added. “These ranges often fail to provide the necessary fidelity, capacity, and complexity required to prepare forces for modern electromagnetic warfare threats.”

While the Pentagon has said that simulation can substitute for live-range electromagnetic warfare exercises in certain circumstances—especially when it doesn’t want to reveal to potential observers what it is doing—Caine said that even these simulators are “insufficient.”

“Although facilities like the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) and the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) exist, they are not fully integrated with other systems and lack sufficient capacity to fully develop new joint electromagnetic warfare concepts,” he said. “These gaps hamper the Joint Force’s ability to experiment with and refine concepts in this area, leaving us vulnerable to emerging threats.”

The Air Force has EW training ranges at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.—where the 350th SWW is headquartered—as well as one in Idaho, three in Nevada, two in South Carolina, one in Texas and one in Utah. Snyder Electronic Warfare Range, near Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, is used by all the services. The Nevada Test and Training Range is used during large-scale Red Flag exercises. Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., has a Digital Test and Training Range and is integrated with the JSE.

NORTHCOM Wants to Buy New Tech to Down Drones Within ’24 Hours’ of Sighting

April 2, 2025 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

Amid an uptick in drone activity nationwide, the commander responsible for safeguarding North American airspace said U.S. Northern Command is acquiring new technology to swiftly deploy to bases around the country to counter these threats.

“What NORTHCOM has done is proposed a process where we would bring in ‘flyaway kits’ to supplement, or in the case where there are no capabilities, provide the initial capability at that base to defeat [drone threats],” Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command told the House Armed Services Committee on April 1.

“Flyaway kits” are, as the name suggests, mobile packages that are “rapidly deployable, prepackaged counter-drone technology, along with personnel trained to employ that technology, that can be dispatched via commercial aircraft to get to the installation in need,” a NORTHCOM spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine. The idea is to send these kits to military sites that lack sufficient counter drone capabilities as needed.

The technology would include a drone detection system, countermeasures—such as jammers, lasers, or kinetic systems to take down drones—and control software to manage the devices. The goal is to have these kits available for use “within a year,” the spokesperson added.

The Pentagon has been seeking an effective counter-drone solution for small unmanned aerial systems, hosting its first event last year for companies to showcase their latest technology to detect, track, and neutralize them.

The Falcon Peak exercise in October, hosted by NORTHCOM and NORAD, featured both kinetic systems—such as nets—and nonkinetic weapons to disable small drones. Technologies from DroneHunter by Fortem, Cerberus XL by Teledyne, CUGAR by Leidos, and SPYNEL by HGH were among the countermeasures tested in “complex, realistic scenarios” during the event.

Lt. Gen. Thomas Carden, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command speaks with industry partners and distinguished visitors at Falcon Peak on Fort Carson, Colorado, Oct. 30, 2024. Falcon Peak is a USNORTHCOM led counter-small unmanned aircraft system experiment and the first Department of Defense C-sUAS initiative focused on detecting, tracking, and mitigating sUAS incursions at DoD installations in the United States. U.S. Department of Defense photos by Josh Armstrong

“There is perhaps no better example of the rapidly evolving strategic environment than the emergence of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the homeland.” Guillot wrote in testimony to lawmakers. These drones, mostly small enough to be “fit into a backpack,” have emerged as a “significant risk” in a relatively short period of time, he added.

As the “flyaway kit” is currently in the development phase, the NORTHCOM spokesperson said specific equipment and manufacturers cannot be discussed at this time.

The push to deploy UAS-killing technology grew urgent following a series of high-profile drone sightings between November and December 2024 that halted public airport and military flight operations.

One of the first sightings was reported in New Jersey in November, after police officers spotted drone activity during patrols. A few days later, the Federal Aviation Administration imposed a flight restriction in Bedminster, N.J. After that, another restriction was placed over Picatinny Arsenal military base in the state, lasting from Nov. 25 to Dec. 26. In early December, unknown drone activity forced the shutdown of runways at New York’s Stewart Airfield.

On Dec. 12, New York and New Jersey senators, including Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), penned a letter to the heads of the FBI, FAA, and Department of Homeland Security, demanding a briefing on how the agencies were working to identify and address the source of these incursions, expressing “urgent concern regarding the UAS activity.”

At the time, then-White House National Security spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the administration was actively investigating the matter but was unable to “corroborate some of the reported sightings.”

However, there were confirmed drone sightings at or near military bases like Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif.; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and Hill Air Force Base, Utah.

Overall, Guillot said 350 UAS detections were reported last year across 100 different military installations. While he attributed much of the activity to hobbyists, he also noted that law enforcement partners had uncovered “evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus” in some of these incidents.

“The widespread availability of small drones, coupled with a complicated regulatory structure and limitations on UAS countermeasures based on concerns for flight safety and privacy, has created significant vulnerabilities that have been exploited by known and unknown actors,” Guillot added.

As part of the command’s ongoing effort to employ the flyaway kit, Guillot noted that another event, dubbed ‘Falcon Peak 25.2,’ will be held in August, featuring a “larger slate of vendors, participants, and systems.”

“We have a great relationship with the FAA that would allow us to operate the ‘Flyaway kits’ quickly,” Guillot added. “We just need to procure and field those kits so we can respond to [incidents like those at] Picatinny and Stewart fast; my goal would be inside of 24 hours, being able to respond.”