


The Chart Page

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Before and After Gorbachev



In 1986-88, production of Soviet tanks, bombers, AWACS planes, SAMs, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles actually increased. However, the output of conventional ground force equipment as well as fighter aircraft and helicopters generally declined. Gorbachev announced in January 1989 that output would be reduced, and Soviet 1989 production of military materiel generally fell from 1988. Major surface warships here include carriers, frigates, corvettes, and paramilitary ships. R&D accounts for twenty-four percent of Soviet defense spending (compared to 13.4 percent for the US) and procurement of weapons and military equipment accounts for another forty-three percent (compared to 27.5 percent for the US).

Soviet leaders seek to address the growing shortages in the civilian economy by redirecting into production of civilian goods the resources and capacities released as a result of weapon production cuts. According to Soviet statements, some 400 defense plants and 100 civilian plants that produce military products are engaged in or are planning for industrial conversion. Conversion, however, has been slower and less extensive than promised by Soviet officials.

Source: US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990*, September 1990.