

**"Desert Storm"****Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, USAF****Address to Business Executives for National Security****Cannon House Office Building****Washington, D.C.****May 8, 1991**

Thank you very much. I will accept that warm praise on behalf of all the men and women who served in Saudi Arabia and the other countries.

I have deep appreciation towards Senator Hollings. Because I'm a resident of Sumter, he took my family under his wing and during those difficult nine months of our separation, he was so kind to my wife, and I can't thank you enough, sir. That was an act of great kindness, and for you to take the time out of your busy life to take care of someone I love so deeply, I am touched to the core.

I don't always believe all the stuff you say about me, but it sure sounds good.

What I plan to do is talk a little bit about Desert Storm and Desert Shield and then would entertain questions for however long you want me to be here. I'm at your service. What I hope to do is sort of set the scene of what occurred prior to Desert Storm, describe some of the events as I saw them, and then perhaps have some observations that may initiate some questions.

It really goes back to when General Schwarzkopf took over Central Command. He came out of the Pentagon down to Central Command, and before that, our emphasis, our reason for being, was to deter Soviet aggression, primarily in Iran, the thoughts being the historic warm water port and the importance of oil, that the Soviets would, in our confrontation one against another, would cause problems there, and we needed to have a military response capable of defeating that problem, and hopefully of deterring it from ever occurring. So that's the way our planning had been running.

Gen. Schwarzkopf, because of his experience in the tank, and the change that was occurring in our country, and in the Soviet Union, came and said, "That dog won't hunt." And in fact, he said, we need to turn and see where we can contribute in the security of the United States and its objectives through other strategies. And so he said I want to look at the regional instability and things that may occur.

Obviously, Iraq goes to the head of the list, with a government that's been described as a bunch of gangsters by people whom I've met in the State Department who served in Baghdad, and with a huge army and a huge air force.

So in April of '90, I went back down to Central Command and I briefed the new CINC, Gen. Schwarzkopf, on options we'd have should we ever have to encounter the Iraqi forces in the field of battle. And I talked about things like the problems that the Scud

missile would pose to us, targets that the Iraqis would hold dear that we could leverage in order to preclude them from using chemical weapons or nuclear weapons if they had them, and methods that airpower could be used to contribute to his overall campaign.

In June and July, we watched intelligence build up and it just so happened that we'd scheduled in July, the last two weeks in July, what we call a field exercise where Gen. Schwarzkopf brings the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps together. We did it down at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, pitched our tents and got our computers warmed up and war-gamed an invasion of Saudi Arabia by a country to the north, which was called Country Orange.

About this same time, of course, the pressure was building. Saddam Hussein decided he'd had enough of Kuwait and the UAE being disobedient in terms of oil production and for whatever reason, had massed his forces.

The UAE did, I think, a very daring and very intelligent thing in that they asked that we deploy two KC-135s—very small, very insignificant military presence, but nonetheless, it sent a signal that we considered the UAE our friend, and our action that Iraqis might take against the UAE could possibly involve the United States.

For some reason, Kuwait did not do so, and in fact, went into talks with Saddam Hussein in Jidda, which broke down, and of course, we had the invasion of Aug. 2.

I'm sure there are some people in this room who anticipated that invasion. I can tell you, I'm a student of that area and I never thought it would happen. And I only know of one person from the area that really thought that Iraq would invade the brother Arab country of Kuwait, and that was Gai Ahmed Bahari, who's commander of the Saudi Air Force. And on about the last week in July, he says, "They're coming. They're going to do it." And nobody believed it.

So the prevailing wisdom was: It'll never happen, we won't have war, this is just a maneuver in order to get Kuwait to cut its production.

What happened then, of course, after the invasion, quite frankly, we were all a little bit stunned by the quickness and ferocity of it. Obviously, a serious situation in terms of the norms of international law and our own vital interests in this country. As a result, talks were held in Washington at the White House on Wednesday, and then on Saturday, I briefed the President at Camp David on options that we could have, and he asked very intelligent questions. I was amazed, quite frankly. I guess that shows how arrogant you can get when you get to be a three-star general. He asked one question, "What do the Saudis feel about all this?"

And so on Sunday morning, we got on an airplane with Secretary Cheney, Gen. Schwarzkopf, myself, his logistician, my logistician, and John Yeosock, the head Army guy, and we flew to Jidda to meet with the King.

The King, after deliberations with his own counsel, did a very brave thing. He invited the Americans to come. The point being that there was no certainty that Iraq would not continue its attack. There were no military forces other than some light Saudi national

guard units between him and the oil fields at Abqaiq, the oil productions at Al-Jubail. And so it was a very tense, serious situation.

On the other hand, any Arab country that gets too close to the United States, the government runs the risk of being branded anti-Islamic or anti-Arab or all manner of things. So his invitation to us to come was a very brave stand. His justification, quite simply, was his country had come too far in 25 years to see it destroyed. And so he stuck his neck out, quite frankly, and as it turned out, it seems to have paid off.

The build-up went very rapidly. The idea was we were to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, and if an invasion did come, we had to be prepared to defend. Gen. Schwarzkopf flew back to the States to push the forces over—left me over there to receive them, and we flew up to Riyadh and set up the headquarters. Those were some of the worst nights in my life, because I had good information as to what the Iraqi threat was, and quite frankly, we could not have issued speeding tickets to the tanks as they would have come rolling down the interstate highway on the east coast. It was an opportunity the Iraqis did not take, but every night, we'd get more forces, and we'd sit down and get a game plan of what we'd do if we came under attack. The first forces deployed were air defense forces. We brought F-17s. The Saudi Air Force was flying their AWACS and their F-15s, so we just fell in on their operations and had a more robust air defense as we went along.

Next, we brought in air-to-ground aircraft, and the role of these systems were [sic] we were going to trade space for time, if he attacked, and we would attack the forces meanwhile, falling back as far as the United Arab Emirates. The point here, of course, is the mobility of your forces is awfully important. And we were able to get them there rather rapidly. The 82nd Airborne showed up very light, would not have been able to forestall the tanks, but would have given us the means to delay the onslaught. We brought in A-10s, the Marine Corps arrived, and of course, the carriers arrived in the Gulf.

Later, we were able to add more heavy forces, and the point where the issue is no longer really in doubt was when we got the 24th Infantry Division there with their tanks. Then we knew we could defend the Port of Damam, which is just across from Bahrain, and that would allow us to bring our forces on board; we wouldn't have to fight our way in from Jidda.

There are some things that helped us. We talk about the excellent infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain. And it is true their bases are magnificent. But to an American, it's a little different story. If you get an idea of the size of the area, if you go from Brownsville, Tex., to the Canadian border, or you go from Boston to Omaha, Neb., that's about the size of the area we were defend.... [W]e had great infrastructure, and the facilities they had were excellent. However, there was a very real lack of infrastructure, which made our prepositioned equipment very, very important—tents, telephones, the whole—trucks, all of that became very, very important in the success of our initial build-up.

My headquarters has been in being since the rapid deployment force, and our focus has been on the Middle East. So my guys—I've served there four years—I know all the heads of the air forces over there, and am friends with all of them, except Iraq and

Iran. And so my guys arrived three days later, and they were immediately able to set up shop, co-located with the Saudi Air Force. And what we did, we prepared an air tasking order for if the attack came, and updated each day as we got more forces, and we also then began training, and the Saudis and the United States Air Force sat down and we started working with all the other countries so we had de-confliction of our training, so we didn't run into one another, so we used the same ranges. And it really started from the very start, the cooperation that was to serve us so well when the combat came.

The strategic air campaign has been called that—I'm not sure what "strategic" means. But what we're talking about is bombing of targets outside of the Kuwaiti theater where the Iraqi army is located. With Gen. Schwarzkopf's request to the JCS: I need a series of targets in hand to start right away. That was brought over to me about the second week of August, and what it consisted of was a collection of target materials, and I was very fortunate. Buster Glosson, whom you may know, who's now stationed over at the Pentagon in the legislative liaison for the Air Force, was coming off duty as the deputy commander for the Middle East force in the Gulf, and I shanghaied him, quite frankly, and said, Buster, you get a bunch of guys and you start to work on this, but we must keep it very, very secret, obviously for military security, but also we did not want to advertise that we were contemplating offensive plans because that was not our mission nor would that be conducive to peace talks should Iraq decide to moderate its behavior. So as a result, they went into very tight secrecy, and they worked in a room, and a new guy would come in, and I'd send one of them in there to work for Buster, and they'd say, well, where's Joe? I just saw him get off the airplane, where did he go? And they said, well, he went into the black hole. And we had the black hole, and nothing came out of the black hole, only things went into it. They worked that plan. We were ready to go in mid-August with an attack—we had a credible plan. And then we refined it over the next six months. The target base went from 84 targets to over nearly 400, to give you an idea of the emphasis that went in there.

During our training during Desert Shield, we were able to do a lot of things that we later used during Desert Storm. For example, we had nearly 300 tanker aircraft, and we offloaded, I think, it was 110 million gallons of fuel over Iraq during Desert Storm. To do that requires tremendous integration. So we were able to fly subsets of that tanker plan during our training period. We also flew together—for example, I went on a mission flying an F-16; we had Saudi F-15s providing our defense; we had Marine F-18s being the aggressor aircraft, we had Navy jammers, we had Air Force AWACS, we had the UAE flying some Mirages in support with the Marine Corps. And we just would do that everyday. We'd fly these mixed packages of difference forces from the different services, different country. And that paid off.

We also were able to examine the use of new systems—the F-15E has a synthetic aperture radar that allows you to actually, physically, to paint tanks, high-definition radar. So what we started doing is flying against the 24th Infantry Division, and they didn't know it, but they were being targeted every night by our airplanes. We were making dry passes upon them, getting ready to attack the Iraqi forces.

As we went on, in October and November, it became obvious that Iraq was not interested in negotiation and that at some point in time, there would be a decision made to eject them, and that's when the briefing was brought to the president of the

strategic air campaign, and what we would do to prepare the battlefield for the ground forces.

The decision on when to attack obviously, given the cut-off date of Jan. 15 that came from the UN resolution, was made based on moonlight and weather. We wanted as dark a night as possible, because the F-117, the stealth fighter going into Baghdad. And we wanted good weather obviously for air operations. The 16th was picked, 3 o'clock in the morning our time, 8 o'clock in the evening here. And we had the first two days of the war mapped out in detail; I mean, we knew each target, each sortie, what time it hit, where it refueled, what country would fly the sortie, what the munitions—and all the detail was there.

I would not let them prepare a third day. I said we have to learn how to manage chaos, because that's what war is, it's chaos. And so the first day of the war, while the nation was watching the bombs fall, the black hole guys came out of the black hole and all the staff got to work and started planning for the third day, and using the intelligence inputs that we could generate....

We had some initial uncertainties. I guess the biggest thing I worried about was loss of friendly aircraft. We had stealth technology, we had a lot of technical data about stealth technology, but I had no way of knowing that we wouldn't lose the entire fleet the first night. Those boys were going in there naked, all alone. We were betting everything on the data. As it turned out, they flew every night and we did not suffer any battle damage to any of the F-117 aircraft.

But that had to be a big lump in my throat right there, as I watched them go over Baghdad the first two nights. And I think you all saw on television the vast amounts of ground fire. My intelligence people told me that Baghdad was twice as heavily defended as any other target in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. And I can believe it, looking at all the SAM sites and the guns on every building. So that paid off, but we had no way of knowing. We had no way of knowing how well our ECM would work because those are things you don't practice in peace. We wanted to seize control of the air so we could do all of the other things. And that's a very individualistic thing. And your training comes to bear as much as your equipment and the courage of your pilots, and the robustness of your command and control. And so I worried about that.

There're a lot of questions about losses—what did you anticipate and what did you have—so on and so forth. Buster and I, about two days before the war started, we were sitting in the command center, and he said, what do you think the losses are going to be? And I wrote 39 down on a piece of paper. And that meant I thought we'd lose 39 aircraft. As it was, we lost, I believe the number is about 41, when you subtract out the ones that we shouldn't have lost because somebody got lost, ran out of fuel, and things like that.

I'd like to take credit for being brilliant. Actually, when I wrote 39 down, I thought we were going to lose 39 USAF aircraft. And in fact, I expected our losses to be nearly 100 airplanes. As it turned out, our losses were very low, and in large measure, because of the equipment we've been given, the training that the taxpayers have paid for.

And another thing you cannot overlook is if you command any force today, is the marvelous young people we have in our military services. They are like nothing you've ever encountered in your life before. In fact, if there's a tribute to our nation, it's the people 18 to 27 years old. They are fantastic, in every sense of the word. And it was a real honor to serve with them.

Our job was to get control of the air. Those initial aerial engagements were key. What we did was, we had F-15s sitting there painting those airfields where his fighters were. The minute one of his fighters would take off, we'd shoot it down. That became very frustrating to him. He probably lost some of his best pilots. It was a very vigorous battle, but it didn't appear that way.

I can guarantee you that the Air Force, from our forces, Saudi, the Marine Corps pilots, the Navy pilots—all the people that were flying those air-to-air missions did not feel it was an easy battle. But we prevailed handsomely and we should never lose that lesson—the importance of being able to seize control of the air. Of course, the other thing we did immediately was, we attempted to crack his command and control set-up.

The other thing that we'd been told to do is get rid of his offensive weapons—particularly his chemical, biological, and nuclear systems, since they posed a strategic threat to our allied forces and our own ground forces in the area. And so we started working on that. There're a lot of reasons why I believe he did not use chemical weapons during the course of the war, although he was certainly prepared to do so, and certainly Saddam Hussein was quite willing to use them.

I think that the nuclear question is probably the biggest question that we face as we look to the future. He had the delivery means and he had the technology to build nuclear systems. I don't believe he had a workable nuclear warhead. But that certainly raises the issue of regional war to a very serious situation and I think it really has lessons in terms of the importance of international controls and us taking a very firm line on nuclear weapons among all the nations of the world, in inspections and things of that nature.

The biological weapons were a problem because we don't have a lot of experience in attacking biological weapon storage areas. And, of course, the concern there is the liberation of these agents in the air causing damage to civilian populace and even to your own friendly countries as they're carried by the wind.

We did an in-depth study by a number of different groups in order to ensure that we would not unleash a terrible disaster on all the countries involved. There is—the way we attacked the targets were designed to hold that down. We attacked them at a certain time of day. We attacked them with certain weapons. And we brought to bear the full capability we can to kill the virus and the bugs before they were liberated in the air. We also watched the weather conditions. But we are able to say that no one would catch anthrax, for example, or botulism and die from it. We were able to limit the damage to inside Iraq. And I think the message there is that any country that develops biological weapons has to know that they carry a tremendous burden for their own people by having and storing those particular devices.

And, of course, from a military standpoint, they're of little utility because it takes a long time for the incubation. So you just don't kill troops in the field with anthrax, for example. And our chemical gear protects us from anthrax.

So the biological weapons are truly horror weapons. They're designed to attack civilians, not military people. But again, that's something that I think we, as a nation, must ensure that other countries understand the risks with following that course of action.

We had some modifications to our operations. The Scuds proved to be a problem—not from a military standpoint. Only one Scud missile caused any significant damage, and that was the last one fired into Dhahran, which called all the Army guys and the transportation fellows—29 of them.

But they caused panic among many of the civilian population—certainly in Israel and certainly in some of the metropolitan areas of Saudi Arabia.

We had some excellent tools to take on this battle when it appeared. We thought we would destroy most of the missiles and destroy most of the fixed launch pads in our initial strikes, and in fact, we destroyed a lot. Well, we destroyed the fixed launch sites, but we did not destroy all the missiles and we underestimated the number of mobile launchers he had.

So he was able to shoot Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE and Qatar throughout the war. We did knock him down from where he could shoot them with relative impunity, down to where it became a very high-risk operation. The systems we used there primarily were the night vision devices on board the F-15E and the F-16 called Lantern, which is an infrared sensor. And during the daytime, we used A-10s and B-52s even to search out and destroy the launch sites.

But again, it comes back to the impact of these ballistic missiles, and then you couple it with a chemical warhead or a biological warhead or a nuclear warhead, and you have very serious problems that we've never encountered before in regional warfare.

Gen. Schwarzkopf—of course, one of his major goals and tasking to me was, we've got to keep the casualties when we start the ground campaign. So he specifically identified armor and artillery. Our war was not with the Iraqi people. Our war was really not with the Iraqi soldier, as such. Many of those were draftees and really didn't want to be there.

But obviously we had to win back Kuwait. We had to destroy his arms, and so targeting went against armor and artillery, primarily.

We ran into a problem in that our intelligence systems are primarily designed to peacetime. You think about it, it makes sense. You have peacetime for 10 or 15 years, and you have war for, in this case, six weeks, and then we would hope to enjoy a long period of peacetime. So as a result, you intend to develop intelligence capabilities that look into a country, count its forces in garrison, count its production capability, look at where it has its missiles and airplanes, and things of this nature. And you tend to atrophy your capability to identify where his forces are deployed in the field.

So initially we'd send our airplanes out to, say, hit tanks with the Republican Guard, the Tawakalna Division, and the guys would come back and they'd be very irate, because we'd send them out, they got shot at by SAMs and guns, and they'd roll in and the revetments would be empty, there wouldn't be anything down there to hit.

So what we did is we divided the battlefield up into geographic boxes and we assigned experienced fighter pilots in F-16s to go out and patrol those boxes. And we called the boxes kill boxes, and patrollers we called killer scouts. And they'd take off, and before the first attack airplane arrived on scene, they'd have patrolled the area and they knew where the army had moved to that particular day, and so when the sun would come up, we'd start hitting those forces.

The other thing we found is that at night, we were able to use the laser guided bombs on the tanks, and I think you've seen some of those films. I sit and watch them. I'm abhorred by war, but I'm fascinated by that technology coming to bear on the armor.

And in fact, one of the Iraqi generals we caught, in his debriefing said during the Iran War, my tank was my friend because I could sleep in it and know I was safe. He said, during this war, my tank became my enemy, and he says none of my troops would get near a tank at night because they just kept blowing up on him.

And I kind of did like, you know, an insurance sales. I said, all right, guys, we've got a quota. And I set the quota originally at 100 tanks a night. And they started exceeding it and I bumped it up to 150. I wouldn't go to 200 because I didn't want guys doing crazy things. But it became a very productive way. The pilots called it tank plinking. Now the tankers don't like to hear you say that.

Gen. Schwarzkopf asked that I not call it tank plinking, and so I told the troops Gen. Schwarzkopf does not want you to call it tank plinking, and that way I ensured that it will forever be known as tank plinking.

BDA. You heard about it. I accused the news media for causing the great BDA stir. We had good information on how we were doing with the fixed targets. We had reasonably good information on how we were doing with the fixed targets.

We had reasonably good information on how we were doing with the tanks and artillery pieces. We were reluctant to brief the news on our successes, for two reasons. One is we did not want to alarm the Iraqis needlessly. I'd torn down their command and control system so many times, they didn't know in Baghdad what was happening in Kuwait, for example. They just didn't have the feedback system that would allow them to change things.

And so I wasn't going to give them the BDA. The other thing is we found in Vietnam, that once you announce you've done X amount of something, then tomorrow, you'd better do Y amount or you're not getting any better. And as a result, you get into things that lead to destruction of integrity of your people.

So I would never give BDA to Gen. Schwarzkopf and he would never give BDA to the press. We examined in detail, we obviously had to have some idea how it was going in order to make decisions like when to start the ground war. But we did not want to get



into a body count business, and you saw his revulsion of that particular method of measuring success.

What we did do is we measured output; we measured what he could do, and when he couldn't fly against us with fighters, then obviously we could take some of the airplanes off cap and put them into attacking ground targets, things of that nature.

Gen. Schwarzkopf really did one thing, it's quite brilliant—he used farmer logic. And if you've been around the military, you know sometimes farmer logic doesn't go very far in these meetings.

But the guys were trying to measure how many tanks we'd killed and it was driving the Army up the wall, quite frankly, and the Marine Corps and the Islamic Army guys, because they wanted to know precisely how many tanks were being killed.

And a lot of times, when one of these 500-pound bombs had hit a tank in a revetment, we found after the war it would blow the tank out of the revetment. So the turret would be over here, and tank body would be over here and the gun would be back there.

So then the picture-takers would come by, and they'd take a picture, and then they'd go and they'd say, "See, that revetment you hit was empty."

And in fact, the tank had been killed.

What he did is he said, "Okay, gee, this is how many they started out with, and this is what a reasonable man would say was done, and so—and this is—you know, this is what the BDA was telling us, the actual pictures were telling us.

So he says the truth must be somewhere in here. And so each day, he'd just sort of look at how much work we'd put into it, what our film from our airplanes showed, what the pilot reported, and not taking any one data point, but just sort of say, well, it just seems about reasonable we're going to have so many, as we say back in Iowa, bushels per acre.

And we used that data in order to determine when to start the ground war, and it paid off, right on the money. It was amazingly accurate.

We had some problems. The weather was terrible; it was the worst weather in 14 years. And my weather guy was the guy that forecast the weather for the night the war started, and he says, "Don't worry, boss, it'll be no problem."

So I go into the meeting, Gen. Schwarzkopf is anguishing over the weather because he—obviously it could impact on taking casualties. And I said, "Don't worry, boss, the weather's going to be great." The weather was lousy. But as it turned out, we'd prepared the battlefield properly and we did not take the casualties that we thought we would.

We had some problems with computers. The problem there is we underestimated the role of the computer in modern warfare. And I have a system that allows me to lay out the air tasking order and send it out; it's both a telephone and a PC, and what it allows

you to do is just tell everybody what everybody else is doing. And I have one string that's assigned to me, there's one string that's assigned to 12th Air Force out in Texas. When we got over there, we found our first string wasn't enough, so I got another string. And then that wasn't enough so I got the string we used out in Eglin Air Force Base to do exercises with, and that wasn't enough so I got the string that was used for test and evaluation.

And that wasn't enough, so then we took all the spare parts and all the spare computers, and we built a fifth string.

So we underestimated the role of computers in the war, and of course the trouble is the guys that make those decisions are people like me who are computer illiterate, but the guys who do all the work and planning are these young captains and majors who have grown up with computers and are able to get a tremendous amount of work done by using them.

Some other things that helped us overcome the weather was GPS system. We were able to send aircraft in the vile weather and drop reasonably accurate bombs, and keep the pressure on the Iraqi Army, and that also paid off in terms of their morale.

One other area where we found we had some problems is I don't think anyone could imagine the amount of military construction that Iraq had unless you'd looked at all the targets like I had over the past nine months. It was awesome.

Some of his weapons storage areas exceed anything we have in our inventory, and we have some big ones out in the desert, out in Quantico, and Davis-Monthan. And they have a lot of bunkers, heavy bunkers, and of course there was the infamous bunker in Baghdad where the civilian casualties occurred, and—but we destroyed a lot of bunkers.

The problem is that our bombs couldn't get through all the overburden and concrete that was above them. And on some of them, what we'd do is we'd drop three and four laser guided bombs, 2,000-pound bombs, and dig out the dirt on top the bunker which might be six stories below the ground, and then send one of our hardened case bombs in.

The R&D community here in the States, from the time the war started, until the last days of the war, were able to develop a 5,000-pound penetrating bomb which we deployed over there, and it worked over there, and it worked like a charm. We used it on Taji number one bunker, which we had not been able to destroy. I think it'd go through something like 180 feet of concrete or some fantastic number. But it was awesome.

We had some real pluses. I think the single greatest plus was a gift from Gen. Schwarzkopf. His philosophy is he created the environment for the components to fight the war, and as such he worked the coalition forces very, very carefully. I think our success in living in an Islamic country, a very, very strenuous observance and pious country with regard to the Koran—our success there was in large measure of his guidance and initial directives that allowed our troops to respect the culture and yet do

our business. Because we were looked up initially with great suspicion as some kind of outlandish, loutish people, and in fact we did very well.

The other thing I think, the people that you don't hear a lot about who are real heroes, a guy named John Yeosock, who's the head of the Army, a guy named Walt Boomer who's head of the Marines Corps, a guy named Stan Arthur who headed the Navy and Jesse Johnson who had the Special Ops. The five of us worked together like I've never worked with anybody in the military before. And a lot of people say well, Goldwater-Nichols, and certainly that had a lot to do with it.

But it also had to do with guys who were interested in winning this battle as quickly as possible, protecting their own troops as best they could. So the cooperation among the services, I mention it, I shouldn't even have to mention it, but it was outstanding.

The other thing, I never had a single problem with any of the allies, and if you read the history of World War II, that's the toughest battle that they had to fight.

Now I had the French and the British on the same staff, and they still want to fight the battle of northern France or southern England, depending on what point of history you're in. They get along famously, and in large measure because of the leadership of Gen. Schwarzkopf, and also the quality of the people the allies chose to deploy.

The bottom line is the ground war lasted four days, the air war lasted six weeks, the casualties, even one casualty's too many, but they were far lower than anyone anticipated.

We destroyed over 80 percent of his armor, over 85 percent of his artillery, we destroyed for a long time to come his nuclear production, his chemical production, biological production.

It was truly a land, sea, and air victory, but I do believe—I'm very, very proud of the way it demonstrated the importance of airpower, if used properly, and certainly in that environment.